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SUMMARY 
The book confronts squarely the changing role and behaviour of the European Commission. 
Whilst much of the literature is focused on the unique qualities of the integration project and 
its core institutions, this work defies the trend. Instead it places the European Commission 
firmly in a line of institutional types which have existed before, as in the case of the Medie-
val Papacy which was analysed in the author's earlier published book "EU: Papacy Reincar-
nated?" 
This last book examined the Medieval Papacy and found a series of parallels between its ear-
lier development and that of the ECSC and EEC. In particular the period of the so-called Re-
form Papacy, dating from around 1054, showed Rome and the Papacy to have grown from a 
modest spiritual centre to the political - spiritual powerhouse of Christendom. It generated 
vast amounts of legislation to run Christendom and in particular the sectors, often economic, 
which the church controlled. Secular rulers were placed, to a disputed degree, under its legal 
jurisdiction. The political ambitions of the Papacy failed to be fulfilled which would seem 
questionable that those of the EC and EU will meet a better fate. Both would have liked the 
Political rulers to have been more integrated into a structure headed by the organs of Papal or 
European government. Finally it can be said that the organisational structures of both, their 
development and ethos had a range of similarities which arguably show their relationship, 
The 2004 Enlargement of the EU was used by the thesis to assess its effects on the European 
Commission departments and also the New Member States (NMS). The European Commis-
sion was expected to have been placed under pressure by the enlargement which would reveal 
certain internal structures, formal and otherwise. In fact, it was expected that some of the fun-
damentals of the European Commission and thus the integration process might be revealed by 
analysis performed whilst the organisation was going through this tough period. 
The thesis accepts and incorporates many of the mainstream theories of European integration 
and some if not all of their main assumptions into a new theoretical perspective. So it accepts 
many of the notions of inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism and the other main theo-
ries and considers them to both be correct in part. What is missing is an explanation about 
how the process has been driven, why can both or all seem to be right at the same time? What 
is the mechanism for the achievement of integration? What is necessary is a meta level theory 
to integrate the others. 
The process of developing such a theory was partially inspired by realising that the Commis-
sion uses almost all types of organisational structure type as distinguished by Mintzberg and 
that it combines them even if they seem practically incompatible. Indeed the combination of 
organisational types found in the Commission could be argued to be extremely unusual. But 
the thesis found that the complex muiti - organisational structure of the Commission in fact 
often worked to its advantage. This explained how different theories of integration could be 
correct to some extent, depending on the type of organisation it would focus upon and which 
period of time and in what environmental circumstances it found itself in. The question re-
mained however, how organisational change is caused and proceeds. 
The answer proposed here is a form of functionalism and in the realms of cells and organisms 
and the perception that human society has, metaphorically speaking, for analytical purposes 
similar qualities. This is, in and of itself, not so surprising since neo-functionalism was ini-
xi 
tially one of the most successful mainstream theories for analysing the integration process. 
However the older notion of functional ism as was constructed by Herbert Spencer, with ante-
cedents probably in ancient Greece is also useful. He developed an intricate theory with, at its 
centre, an organic analogy referring to and relating cells, animals, humans and social rela-
tions. Evolutionary pressure was seen to be the driving force behind social change and 
worked in a cyclical manner. Whilst recognising that we are only talking about similar phe-
nomena being observable between organisms and social structures and that the analogy can 
only be used so far, from functionalism it is possible to consider society to be "organic", evo-
lutionary and responsive. In many ways it behaves like a human body responding to threats 
and pressures. 
If a body can get ill and dysfunction then it seems that so can a social body. Warfare can be 
seen as a major form of a disease, a point developed by McNeill, which afflicts the social 
body. Wars do not just arise from nowhere often there is an imbalance in the "organic body", 
an underlying disorder which makes it susceptible to war. Political extremism, ideological and 
often undemocratic, is one such problem, another is economic instability; combined war is all 
too likely. Regarding the European continent prior to the Second World War, nationalism and 
ideologies can be said to have both became pathological. 
If a social body can get "ill" it should also be treatable by the application of medicine. One 
important branch of medicine is that of immunology and the application of vaccines to pro-
vide protection to the body and to prevent a recurrence of disease. A doctor treating the 
bloodied continent after the Second World War might have said that what was needed was a 
vaccine to prevent another war. The vaccine would need to address the economic as well as 
the political causes of war and also remove the very possibility for another outbreak. Vaccines 
are usually basically made up of dead virus and will provoke mild but similar responses from 
the body to those that the full blown disease would cause. In the process it stimulates the 
body's defences to make any full scale outburst of the disease impossible. In essence a patho-
gen is used to cure a pathological condition. 
It is argued that bureaucracy, which is often not terribly productive economically, can be con-
sidered to be a pathogen, or a parasite; but sometimes it can be seen as a cure for warfare. 
Many aspects of the European Commission could be seen in a 'theoretical5 manner to be 
pathological, i.e. not in accordance with what certain fundamental theories, such as that of 
Max Weber's, expect. However, most or many things in life must be seen in relative terms 
and the same is true for the pathology (ies) of the European Commission. As the previous 
paragraph indicated pathogens can cure and prevent disease, if applied correctly. Whilst the 
analogy cannot be extended too far it allows us to consider the pathological state of Europe 
prior to the Second World War and to see how this problematic political reality required the 
European Commission and the integration project to remedy the sick state of the continent at 
that time. This does not imply, of course, that this bureaucracy is still fulfilling this function. 
Two forces are seen to have been at work in the evolution of the EU, one is the key compo-
nent of the vaccine, the Monnet Method and the other is Democratic Parliamentarianism. The 
former is here defined as the deliberate, promotion of spill-over from one sector to another, 
engrenage, technocracy, functionalism, all in all, the breaking down of issues, problems and 
governmental structures. It is located at the heart of supra-nationalism. 
The second factor, Democratic Parliamentarianism, is defined as the traditional liberal democ-
ratic governmental structure, rationale and methods of the Nation States in much of Western 
Europe. It had lost much of its credit in the interwar period. It was restored, however, because 
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of the victory over fascism under the leadership of the Anglo-Saxon democracies. Both de-
mocracy and fundamental rights were promptly internationalised in institutions like the UN 
and the Council of Europe. They acted as partial guarantees not only of freedom, but also 
against war, at least in the western world that found itself threatened by communism, both ex-
ternally by Soviet Russia that had almost all of Central Europe under its control, and inter-
nally, because of the popularity of communist parties in France, Italy and Greece. 
However owing to the extent of these external and internal threats, fundamental rights and 
democracy appeared as insufficient to keep Western Europe a part of the free world if it 
would not also become united both economically and militarily. This explains why the US 
pushed so much for European integration rather than the European nation states who had suc-
cessfully defended their independence (Great Britain) or just regained it (the continental na-
tion states), and who (notably France) were reluctant to start co-operating with Western-
Germany. It was also only after the French initiative of integrating Europe as a political and 
military Union had failed in 1955 that the alternative of a European Economic Union was 
taken in hand on the basis of the Monnet Method that had proven its viability in the ECSC. 
However, democracy was foreign to the Monnet Method, in principle at least. Democratic 
politicians were to an extent seen as brokers between interest groups. In fact, Monnet had 
turned away from the ECSC because he was disappointed about a European Assembly being 
attached to it. The technocratically fragmentising Monnet Method places the centre of politi-
cal power and initiative with the bureaucracy. 
Typical for parliamentary democracies are political parties with fairly encompassing party and 
election programmes, usually inspired by a certain political ideology, between which citizens 
have a choice in periodical elections. Democratic party politics is about the aggregation and 
inclusion of issues, interests and even groups and parties, especially if government has no ma-
jority party to support it. Democracy understands itself as a bottom-up model which is trans-
formed, after the elections, in a top-down model, as the government that, directly or indirectly 
results form it, is supposed to impose its will on the state bureaucracy that is supposed to op-
erate in conformity with it sine ira et studio. 
In contrast to the aggregative-inclusive nature of democratic parliamentarianism, the Monnet 
Method is fragmentising and technocratic. It splits up issues both substantively and adminis-
tratively. This is not because it cannot perceive connections between issues. Quite the con-
trary. Precisely because there are functional connections between fragmentised policy fields it 
counts on spill-over taking place slowly but surely. 
The above named forces make up the somewhat unlikely pair that has nevertheless been put 
together in the EEC and even more in the EU. And yet they should not, according to a tradi-
tional political perspective, exist harmoniously together in the structures that they have 
formed but rather compete. This has, in fact, been the case and both have constantly striven to 
take over the leadership role. The result of the struggle for dominance is the EU as it is today. 
The Commission often served as the carrier of the Monnet Method, but could also fall foul of 
it and itself be fragmented. The more sectors the Commission has entered into, the more prob-
lems of co-ordination have risen that demanded to be solved by a central governmental insti-
tution on the basis of a democratic mandate, a mandate that is lacking in the case of the 
Commission and that national governments can invoke to lame the Commission if necessaiy 
or to infiltrate it in sectors perceived as of great national interest. 
The results of the analysis revealed that in the Commission the Monnet Method had had a 
highly effective structure for surviving in a hostile environment and achieving its goals. 
Whilst the Commission could be, from a theoretical perspective, considered to be pathological 
it was found to have had multi-faceted unique organisational structure which had functioned 
well. Some of the Commission's confusing aspects, like its rigid complex bureaucracy dating 
back to the 1950s, in fact served the useful purpose of protecting it within the European inte-
gration cycles, in particular from the Member States when they attempted to slow integration 
and thus the Commission down. 
The Monnet Method in the Commission had successfully carried out a policy of fragmenting 
major issues, problems and opposition. Many competences had been successfully fragmented 
from the Member States and incorporated into the new European governmental layer. It had 
succeeded in many ways in creating, or provoking the necessary elements for a new European 
government; European level institutions had been generated in response to the 'vaccine,' usu-
ally to contain it and apply political / democratic controls to it. Policy Networks which DGs, 
or elements in the DGs, have seemingly created or encouraged and at times led, are, to an ex-
tent, the natural governmental arms issuing from Brussels to the would be federally organized 
states. European wide sectoral power to an extent naturally resides in these. 
In the nineties, after the enormous steps taken towards integration with the Treaty of Maas-
tricht, fragmentation within the Commission and within the various DGs had increased so 
much that the top of the hierarchy in the Commission seemed to be beginning to lose their 
grip on their apparatus. The last Delors Commission left behind an organisational structure 
that was still geared to integration promotion but was now over-stretched and facing the post 
Maastricht EU. This led to a crisis in the Commission which was analysed by the Committee 
of Independent Experts, established to get the crisis under control. The crisis enabled the at-
tempt at bureaucratisation, modestly begun by Santer, to develop some more momentum. The 
number of horizontal units in the DGs, the units which deal with bureaucratic tasks rather than 
policy making, shot up as did the amount of bureaucratic procedures staff were required to 
perform. The result was some Commission slow down. The reaction of the Commission dur-
ing the later nineties and up to the enlargement appears to have been a tempering of its initia-
tives and increasing bureaucracy to try to make itself immune from attacks. This can be de-
scribed as a sort of retreat, regroup and advance process. 
Seen in a longer term perspective the Commission follows the pattern of changing speeds of 
European integration in which bursts of integration are followed by longer periods of seeming 
stagnation. From this perspective bureaucratisation and changes in the speed of integration is 
a form of immunisation against criticism of the role of the Commission and against the at-
tempts of MSs and interest groups to over-influence and infiltrate the Commission. However, 
in earlier periods of stagnation the Commission was quickly able to change from a state of 
apparent inertness into an organisation that used the opportunities for further integration given 
by the common desires of the MSs. The bureaucratisation reforms seem to be little more than 
another phase in the cycle of the Commission varying between emphasising its role as: a pol-
icy manager; a policy maker; a civil service bureaucracy; a proto federal government top level 
executive. It decides on its role to be emphasised according to the environment it finds itself 
in. 
And indeed the signs of an intended re-launch of the integration process were present in the 
later part of the Prodi Commission. A period of Commission perceived timidity during the 
mid - nineties giving way to a more up-beat approach later under Prodi. The introduction of 
the European Constitution bear this out along with the attempt to make the Commission more 
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like a national government with Commissioners more like national ministers based in their 
DGs. Indeed Prodi was said to have wanted to see more staff relocated to making policy, pre-
sumably to enable the re-launch. In DG Enterprise and Industry (ENT) there were signs that 
the numbers of staff in the sectoral units were gradually increasing. DG Regional Policy 
(REGIO) was seen to be robustly developing a re-launch potential with the new regulation for 
their policy that they were proposing which contained more bullish language than its prede-
cessor. The anti-fraud organisation of the Commission (OLAF) which had been seen as part 
of the bureaucratic belt around the Commission was by the mid-term of the Prodi Commis-
sion being used as a tool to generate integration, the creation of a European Prosecutor and a 
new legal framework to contain the activities of OLAF. Another sign of the re-launch readi-
ness of the Commission is in its claiming a leading role for the EU in fighting global warming 
and the European Council's willingness at its meeting of June 2007 to honour the ambitions 
of the Commission by adding climate control to the goals of the EU in its proposal for chang-
ing the Treaties. 
The increase in re-launch potential from a stricter bureaucratic base seems paradoxical. How-
ever this can be explained rather ironically with recourse to the horizontal units in DGs. These 
were said by staff to be the most idealistic about general European integration, unlike the pol-
icy making sectoral units which seemed to develop sectoral loyalties and idealism quite 
quickly. Thus the paradox of an expansion of horizontal units accompanying a re-launch of 
integration is partially explained by the increase in idealism for the European project as whole 
and no doubt a growing desire and pressure for its re-launch that these units provide. In gen-
eral the period under discussion followed the pattern set earlier of integrationary stop and go 
progressive process; EC expansion and then stagnation; Commission dynamism and then bu-
reaucratisation. The enlargement itself can be said to have added to the problems of co-
ordination and control that the Commission was undergoing. The resultant bureaucratisation 
and slow down were in part exacerbated by the enlargement but it too was negatively affected 
by both. This and the other theoretical points made earlier are what our empirical findings, 
now to be presented summarily, bear out. 
Detailed case studies were performed on six EU organisations to test for the impact of the en-
largement on them. These case studies included elite interview material from a variety of per-
spectives, primary and secondary literature. The goal was to collect data from a wide variety 
of Commission organisations and one non Commission organisation which would also be able 
to comment on the activities of each other. In addition interviews were carried out with New 
Member State (NMS) officials working with the Commission who could comment on the 
Commission organisations. Furthermore interviews were carried out with the Secretariat Ge-
nerate, the headquarters of the Commission and responsible for its co-ordination to gain more 
insights. 
Two Directorate Generales, (DGs), Commission departments, which pay out large sums of 
money, were chosen which had plenty of sectoral contact with the NMS, DG Agriculture 
(AGRI) and DG REGIO. In contrast two policy making DGs, DG Environment (ENV) and 
DG ENT with frequent NMS contact were also chosen. OLAF was chosen to offer insights 
into the Commission reforms. The European Environment Agency (EEA), an EU organisa-
tion, was there to provide information on DG ENV and the enlargement process which it was 
also involved, and also as it represents what might be one of many potential sectoral agency 
substitutes for the Commission in the future. Such agencies can count on distrust from the 
Commission. 
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OLAF finds itself well within the cycle of defensiveness in the Commission as the latter's re-
action to OLAF shows. The reform that OLAF represented was accepted but only allowed a 
limited impact, it appeared to be more for external audiences than for real effect. OLAF was 
not totally independent of the Commission and its investigative powers were still being dis-
cussed. The resources initially available for the organisation were kept low by the Commis-
sion and the tasks it was required to perform vast. At the same time the Commission did seem 
to see in OLAF the possibility of making its officials more like a civil service and so remov-
ing some of the external influences and unhealthy link ups between industry, MSs and Com-
mission officials. OLAF was useful for the Commission's bureaucratisation moves to appear 
less problematic and a threat. OLAF seemed to have added to the general slow down in the 
Commission, particularly as Commission staff were made subject to increasing numbers of 
financial audits to prevent any OLAF investigation. 
The Commission was also apparently quite capable of turning the threat into a benefit over 
time above all by using OLAF in its own cycle of organisational bureaucratisation and then 
re-launch of the integrationary mission. The OLAF staff who were really there to control cor-
ruption and fraud, in particular in the Commission, were to help launch new integrationary 
moves like EUROJUST and the European Public Prosecutor. OLAF showed the tendency of 
the Commission, and EU in general, to require things from the NMSs which would not have 
been necessary had the Commission been in better shape itself. OLAF can be seen very much 
in the light of the creation of another actor in the EU system, or rather the re-invention and 
strengthening of an old one, to solve a problem which could maybe have been better solved 
by a more rational organisational structure. 
The EEA was an interesting case as it revealed some trends in the EU and also showed once 
again the Commission's resistance to real, permanent reform and any organisation that is in a 
position to inspect it and its performance. The Commission is said to react rather allergically 
to European agencies regardless of their usefulness; understandable granted that the MSs do 
indeed seem to perceive the EEA at least as a useful institutional counter to the Commission. 
The EEA reflects what would appear to be a concerted attempt by the MSs to reassert control 
over the environmental field. On a more fundamental level the combination of sector interests 
with MS actors happened in the EEA, as had also happened in the ECSC with the steel cartels 
and MSs. The EEA seems to be a symptom of the general sectoralisation of the EU policy 
fields, much like the other agencies and so related networks, with more power going to sec-
tors and MS-Commission rivalry resulting in yet more actors with diluted compromise com-
petences which are not effectively coordinated by any central authority. The EEA was quite 
critical about the DG and its enlargement activities and alleged the habit of the Commission 
failing to coordinate itself internally and as a result requiring that the limited resources of the 
NMSs be used to construct networks which were duplicating each other. A particularly inter-
esting finding was the changing relationship of the EEA and DG ENV. Whilst the DG was 
more environmentally active and in a state of internal conflict, the conflict with the EEA was 
at its worst. As the DG was re-oriented via personnel reorganisations at various levels and 
economic interests apparently became more important so the conflict between the two seemed 
to grow less. At times the EEA seemed to almost present an alternative sectoral approach to 
managing the policy field, far more modern and less formal, with a more partnership-like ap-
proach to the MSs than the DG. 
DG ENV revealed much about the sort of behaviour that the Commission encourages in 
officials to help it to expand when the time is right. The micro level of the officials shows the 
entrepreneurial qualities that the hierarchy appears to lack. Furthermore the rigidity of the 
hierarchy seems less dramatic when observations are made about how the Commission works 
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in practice and what sort of behaviour it tacitly encourages. There is a real sense that the 
bureaucratic rigidities are retained but ignored for certain phases in the EU cycle. The 
Commission has been shown to encourage self sufficiency in the officials with staff members 
having to fend for themselves. Initiative is promoted as any success gained is often down to 
the decision to act being taken by an official. Freedom is very present with the official 
possessing incredible room for choice and discretion, quite unlike anything their equivalent in 
the MS civil services would possess. The official must be able to network and thus possess 
the social skills which are basic to success. Entrepreneurial sensitivity is also required for 
officials to be able to find the opportune moment to introduce a legislative product that is sure 
to succeed. Officials are encouraged to compete for everything in the Commission, for their 
position; their promotion the possibilities for which can be extremely scarce in particular to 
the position of Head of Unit; and for their dossiers. 
The DGs which possess such officials, who have, as it were, front-line experience, are in pos-
session of a valuable commodity. If correctly placed these officials could be expected to carry 
their DG to success. The vast amounts of environmental legislation that Europe has produced 
combined with the information gained during interviews, appear to show a DG made up of 
extremely capable officials, often lawyers, who have not only been quite entrepreneurial in 
their behaviour but also successful in ensuring the passage of their laws; a task which in-
volves political and networking ability. The DG created work for itself. In fact the combined 
evidence of the accident - legislation correlation would appear to be suggestive evidence that 
entrepreneurs have been present in the DG and combining very effectively with Policy Net-
works. The DG showed dynamic officials seemingly encouraged to circumvent hierarchies so 
long as this was deemed desirable by the Commission as a whole. The Commission used 
various methods to temporarily clamp down on some of this behaviour. 
The case study also seemed to show one policy network in action ironically those who held to 
the old culture and ideology of the DG. They adhered closely to the most idealistic forms of 
Europeanism and environmentalism. But the MSs were allegedly willing to exert pressure to 
control the DG as it was also no longer in tune with the more economically oriented 
Commission and EU. Personnel re-organisations were effected in the DG as was mentioned 
above to seemingly weaken and break down policy networks. The DG has allegedly become 
more centralised, in particular due to the wave of bureaucratization which was discussed in 
the chapter, and certainly controlled its officials, including the policy network mentioned 
more closely, at the same time the issuing of legislation has decreased and the DG's profile 
has become blurred. Intensive inter-DG rivalry was noted to have occurred along with 
fragmentation. DG ENV and DG ENT were said to have had so called mirroring units which 
were used to watch every move of the other DG. 
The Fragmentation and rivalry between DGs was also noted with DG AGRI. The next point is 
that the growing power and willingness of the MSs to interfere in a DG seems to be most 
clearly shown in DG AGRI. There are allegedly examples of MSs pressing their nationals into 
positions as low as Head of Unit level and MS officials showing quite clear MS loyalty in 
their decisions. According to the literature, there is a process of re-nationalisation going on in 
the policy and there are some who would like to see this continue. Unsurprisingly many 
within the DG have resisted this tendency and the reforming of the policy or the DG. The 
growing bureaucratization was also outlined in the chapter, serving as it did the multi pur-
poses of changing the image of the DG and Commission from dynamic political actor to slow, 
safe bureaucracy and reducing the power of Policy networks and MSs. Also the case chapter 
demonstrated that the outsiders, the NMSs, lost out as a result. 
The complex bureaucratic requirements resulted in minimal payments to them in the period 
stated. The DG was described as being a tense place in part due to the different national man-
agement views. In organizational terms the DG has witnessed more power going to horizontal 
units and directorates, those dealing more with bureaucratic administrative tasks. Personnel 
reorganization was used as a tool to achieve many goals including overcoming the resistance 
to policy reform that had been successful before. Allegedly there was resistance in some of 
the market units (CMOs) to the reforms which would affect their sectors and of course their 
- units. The DG had allegedly been resilient to reform and reorganization. 
DG REGIO had until recently seen the MSs gradually clawing back control over its policy 
with the DG taking on a more checking role than a decision making one. There has been an 
increase in horizontal units, as in most DGs; the growth reflecting the need to coordinate the 
DG better and the fact that during reform horizontal units have more power. The DG was al-
leged to have a weak centre and that its Directors were pretty independent. The DG seemed to 
be trying to centralise itself. The hierarchy of the DG has apparently become more central-
ized. There was allegedly tendency for MSs to want to appoint politically favoured individu-
als to top positions in the DG. As in other DGs some of the bureaucratic reforms have been 
somewhat turned on their heads, and a seeming use of bureaucracy for its own sake. As with 
all DGs there was alleged to be a history of almost unbelievable inter-DG rivalry. There were 
said to have been struggles over cohesion policy between DGs and at times a struggle be-
tween ideologies. On the theme of networks in general and policy ones in particular, it seems 
likely that the DG had plenty of both. Some seem likely to have been not very favourable to 
the enlargement, with certain policies being decided on which were problematic for the 
NMSs. This all resulted in a negative conception of the process by NMSs, and a feeling that it 
was geared against them. Within the DG several directorates were stated to have remained 
apart from the enlargement even though this should not have been the case. Finally in the 
2004 re-organization they were forced to change. 
Where DG ENT is concerned the current state of inter-DG communication and co-ordination 
was described as being problematic. The MSs appeared to have been increasingly interfering 
in the DG. There had been a dramatic increase in the number of staff involved in the horizon-
tal units. There have been at least two major reorganizations to bring the DG into line with the 
Lisbon criteria and to house the new Competitiveness Commissioner. It was stated that the 
many reforms affecting the DG and in particularly those affecting the Heads of Unit were 
problematic for the enlargement as they simply did not have the time to concentrate on all 
their tasks at once. Parts of the DG were alleged to contradict each other, according to NMS 
officials, who also criticised the excessive bureaucratic procedures which had doubled or treb-
led. Inter-DG communication and coordination was criticised and that DGs had too much dis-
cretion and the decisions reached had been 'odd'. The DG was said in the past to have had 
policy networks present but the major reorganisations seem to have reduced their clout. 
The findings of the case studies into the various EU organisations can be said to have shown 
indications of the following: Commission fragmentation, the growth of policy networks, 
greater MS involvement in DGs, and, by way of a reaction, the growth of bureaucratic proce-
dures, use of personnel reorganisations to deal with the policy networks, and, finally, a grad-
ual move towards a re-launch of the Commission, 
After making a diagnosis a prognosis should follow. The Medieval Papacy developed in a 
way veiy similar to the EU. The Papacy also appeared to behave as a vaccine against war and 
lack of unity. Certainly a layer of governance developed at a supra-national level on the Euro-
pean continent that had not been there before. What the EU can learn from the history of the 
Church, the integrating power in medieval times, is that because of its overriding concern 
with maintaining itself as a bureaucratic organsation and as a political force, the believers saw 
it more and more as a corrupt organisation that was rather concerned with its own interests 
and those of the political elite than with those of the believers. What began as an idealistic 
organisation became over the years a centralised and centralising bureaucracy. The Medieval 
Papacy saw itself and Christendom become hopelessly complex, fragmented, bureaucratic and 
distant from its citizens. It was said that the sheer amount of canonical and secular legislation 
was suffocating. The Sacred College at times fragmented into clientele networks often with 
secular authorities heavily involved in them. Increasingly Cardinals were seen to be pursuing 
regional loyalties and networks rather than pursuing the universal ist, official goals of the Pa-
pacy. Conciliarism of the 15th century represented a courageous bottom up attempt at preven-
ting the disintegration of the church. However, the reaction of the church bureaucracy was not 
to support democracy but, on the contrary, to ignore the need for reform and instead re-
organised and reinforced the bureaucracy. The result was a definitive division of the Church 
during the reformation. 
Some of the trends described above can be, to an extent, seen in the recent history of the EU, 
as was stated in the summary, and should serve as a warning and impetus for reform and 
greater democracy. The recent re-launch of the rejected constitution this time as a treaty 
which allows the national executives to avoid or rather ignore their citizens stated views 
sounds familiar enough to anyone reading about medieval Europe. Church - State executive 
relationships were often unhealthily close and this was particularly true as the reformation ap-
proached. The right response would be to heed the warnings and restructure the EU and ren-
der it democratically viable for the future. The yellow and red card procedures may help to 
increase the involvement of national parliaments in the EU and have a diminishing effect on 
violations of the proportionality and subsidiarity principle. But it is very questionable, how-
ever, whether this will also help to increase the involvement of the EU citizens, even though 
the powers of the EP are expanded more or less in parallel with those of the Council. Such 
viability requires a democratically legitimated European government and not just the patch-
work of card procedures. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Often when browsing through books on European law and or politics the words 'architecture' 
and 'harmony' with regard to the European Union crop up with surprising frequency. It is all 
too easy to see a group of architects gathered around their drawing boards enthusiastically ad-
ding lines and curves here and there and stepping back to admire the grand outcome; with 
Monnet, of course, leaning over their shoulders and directing pens to the final perfection. The 
language of the rhetoric of the EU and the concepts used are powerful but based on wobbly 
assumptions and do not help the observer to consider it for what it is. Take, for example, the 
concepts of ancient harmony and authority carried by the expression 4the three pillars of the 
EU' as created after the Maastricht Treaty. The concept here is, of the perfect proportions of a 
Greek temple, dominating the physical, cultural, intellectual and, of course, spiritual life of 
the Greek city states; implicit is the notion of the birthplace of democracy, Athens. If however 
the actual political reality of the EU were to be considered, then the highly unequal pillars, 
two of which, even in the European constitution, show little desire to belong to the rest of the 
structure, would have to be placed on one side. Which means the ruins of the Greek temples 
which greet the visitor today, with singular gaunt columns standing at random would be clo-
ser to the mark. Maybe a better suggestion would be that the appropriate building concept 
which the observer will have to content themselves with is not an ivory white temple, but an-
other building of excellent pedigree and definite charm and character, namely, the Aachen 
Cathedral. This structure has elements of beauty and harmony but, as a whole, it has a make-
shift: 'organic,' feel about it. Please note that in the thesis the word organic is used although 
biological or natural share the same meaning. The three main parts: choir, bell tower and the 
central, stocky octagon chapel are bound together by steel bands to prevent them falling apart, 
much like the European Parliament, Council and Commission. The un-dramatic, central octa-
gon chapel is the oldest and most stable part of the Cathedral and internally, in its proportions, 
the most harmonious, the other two structures were added on later as required to modernise it. 
Whilst the subject of Cathedrals is under discussion, it should be pointed out that medieval 
Papacy and Papal Monarchy will be considered by the thesis as remarkably similar to the EU, 
and therefore of use when developing theoretical stances and generating certain deductions. 
The first problem for the observer is to try and remove some of the assumptions and rhetoric, 
temple columns and porticos to reveal the real building or, for the thesis, organisation. 
After the reader moves on from the metaphors and imagery, they are confronted with two mo-
re words which appear with curious frequency, 'bureaucracy' and 'idealism.'*The two seem 
to be worlds apart, but a perusal through history reveals that usually idealism turns rigid be-
comes institutionalised and bureaucratic, 'routinised' in Weberian terms. The French revolu-
tion to an extent begat the French bureaucratic system; the Russian revolution the Stalinist 
bureaucracy and the more ancient Papal Monarchy with its equally grand notions and ideals, 
finally harnessed ideals2 and bureaucratic power into an unstoppable legalistic machine which 
dominated European politics for centuries. The fact is that idealism is too vague to be able to 
govern since daily life is about organising detail. Nature abhors a vacuum, so the saying goes, 
and vagueness certainly seems to attract detail, and the creators of both, idealists and bureau-
crats, seem to be attracted to each other too. Although this relationship can be one of those 
love-hate relationships tragedies are made of, it is only by controlling government that the i-
1 Peterson, J and Bomberg, E, (1999), Decision making in the European Union, New York, St, Martin's Press; p. 11 It is 
worth noting that ideals have been seen to have always been the motor for European integration 
2 The Reform Papacy opposed traditional rulers with ideals of peace, church reform combined with the efficiencies of edu-
cated modem government 
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deals can be given concrete application. And yet curiously enough the idealists base much of 
their idealism on rejecting the old system of government, be that the ElJ and the previous sta-
te dominated system, or the secular church system of the medieval period prior to the Papal 
Monarchy with its vested interests and compromises. It is a sad dilemma that people cannot 
stand being governed by a bureaucracy without ideals (if a bureaucracy were able to provide 
effective leadership) nor benefit from ideals without bureaucracy. Thus throughout history 
idealism and bureaucracy seem to have gone together, as if following a physical law, like the 
law of gravity; the greater the upward thrust of idealism the greater will be the subsequent 
downward weight of bureaucracy. Whatever else, usually the mixture of idealism and bu-
reaucracy alone does not lie easily with the basic concepts of a stable political system based 
on rational dialogue and democratic decision making; the stuff of a modern, workable politi-
cal system. The Medieval Papacy with its origins in the Carolingian Empire contained the 
mixture mentioned above and the latter was openly acknowledged to have been a source of 
inspiration for the European project.3 
The further problem of idealism is that its often extremely vague, broad goals can hardly be 
measured; performance is hard to assess if there are few if any fixed indicators on which to 
base any measurements. This can be beneficial for the idealist organization which can thus 
evade assessment and subsequent removal from office. Idealistic, vague goals are useful for 
the creation of such an organization as they cannot easily be challenged or argued against 
without attracting the label of political incorrectness; if anyone would want to, after all usu-
ally the future threats contained in the idealistic organisation are not apparent and ideals are 
easy to sign up to. The grander the ideal so the vaguer the plan for achieving it; which ensures 
that the ideal can be and usually must be agreed within a blank cheque form. Ambiguous 
wording such as the Union has mostly adopted also 'facilitates' compromise in the future.4 It 
seems unlikely that political actors of their time, the Monarchs and Emperor in the Papal Mo-
narchy period or the Member States (MSs) of the EU, would have agreed to the plans laid out 
by the idealists, as they in fact did, had they known what they would mean in practice. That is 
not to say that idealism and vagueness do not have their place and that ends can justify means. 
But they have to be handled with care, take the ideal of achieving peace; it certainly occurred 
and no war broke out in western Europe but that had much to do with the cold war era and 
with the vast military presence of the two superpowers in the heart of Europe and, of course, 
later the military alliances of NATO and the Warsaw pact. These organisations removed the 
ability to decide to go to war in Europe from the European powers, but did not remove the 
threat of war from Europe. This point was important for Monnet who considered that a state 
of war existed albeit cold war5. So the statement that the EU prevented war and maintained 
peace is incorrect. But that it was of assistance to the general cause of peace seems equally 
clear. Monnet saw Germany as the prize that the super powers sought and that the European 
project should absorb Germany in a sense and remove it from its then prize status.6The Euro-
pean project had to help prevent or end the state of war that existed and was in danger of wor-
sening. But it is impossible to state for sure that the absence of hot war in Europe was due to 
the ECSC or rather to the Mutually Assured Destruction logic of nuclear weapons. The cold 
war was not unduly affected by the ECSC and the European project and the Berlin wall and 
Cuban missile crisis happened despite the project. What is certain though, is that the atmos-
phere of tension that had existed between European states, was replaced by a remarkable cor-
3 Monnet, J. Memoirs. (1978) New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc. p.287 
4 Shackleton M and Peterson J. The conclusion in Shackleton, M and Peterson, J (ed.); The Institutions of the European Un-
ion,, (2002) Oxford, Oxford University Press p.353 
5 See note 3 Monnet (1978); p 290 'The cold war, whose essential objective is to make the opponent give way, is the first 
phase of real war... In effect, we are at war already.' 
4 ibid p.29I 
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diality that must be considered to have been beneficial and a positive example for the cold 
war opponents of what was possible between erstwhile enemies. 
Something similar can be said of the idealistic goal of ensuring economic prosperity for Euro-
pe. Did the project succeed in that mission? The problem is that of cause and effect, there we-
re many other circumstances in favour of economic regeneration in western Europe at that 
time; the Marshall Plan for one. Germany may well have been economically successful with-
out the European project as its economy got underway again.7 After all it had the major re-Q 
serves of coal and steel needed for its industries, unlike France, which needed German coal. 
France seems have been in a worse economic position than most9 and so can be said to have 
owed a lot of its economic improvement to the European project quite apart from Monnet's 
modernisation programme. But that is rather different to saying that the European project was 
responsible for economic improvements for all the MSs. Regarding prosperity gains then, it is 
most remarkable that the other major sufferer from the Second World War, Japan, achieved 
economic growth rates which are remarkably similar to those of the nascent EC, or even bet-
ter. However, economic improvements did occur and with increased inter-European trade 
came greater trade competition and communication and a positive attitude to other European 
states. In 1971 there was a return to the levels of trade that had existed in 1914. 
Bureaucracy follows its own remorseless logic of increasing specialization, centralisation and 
fragmentation and complexity, and finally ideals are suffocated. 10Gaping democratic deficits, 
popular rejection and growing pressure for reform are the result. The Papacy of the medieval 
period was finally confronted by Church Councils demanding a more democratic stance, con-
stant crises with the more purely secular powers of the day and an ever increasing distance 
emerging between the ideals of Christianity and the reality that the bureaucratic machine de-
livered. The end result was the reformation and split within Christendom; the gradual separa-
tion of Church and State and the consolidation of the bureaucratic Papal Curia, Ironically the 
Papal Monarchy itself had come into being with the goal of separating the Church from the 
control of the secular powers of the day, only to then attempt to become a major secular po-
litical player both in the assumption of power in the Papal States and in the direction of the 
other secular rulers. The current problems of the EU it will be argued are similar, with similar 
dangers in store. 
It is paradoxical that the stated mission of the idealistic organisation all too soon gets forgot-
ten, as the organisation set up to further its cause gets too involved in its own survival. The 
Papacy lost sight of its Christian goals or many of them, and struggled for political power 
with the secular rulers; the EC failed to complete its mission of a single market and in 1965 
set out to struggle for political status with de Gaulle. Thirty five odd years later in 1992 after 
the re launching of the project, the legal framework of the single market was finally in place 
after many moments when it seemed to have been abandoned. Political power is evidently 
more attractive to non elected organisations than achieving their self declared missions. It is a 
curious fact that the EU, despite its declared goals of improving economic performance, has 
generated vast amounts of regulations to the point that many companies are complaining that 
they cannot function, T h e EU is a powerful level of governance, and in fact is the main regu-
lator of the most highly regulated societies in the world. 'nThus the organisation that set out to 
achieve an economic mission, then championed the Lisbon Summit to improve the economic 
performance of Europe, and produced a document which covered a vast range of goals many 
7 See note 3 Monnet (1978) p.292 
8 ibid p.283 
9 ibid p.277,275 
10 As the Medieval Papacy demonstrated 
11 See note 1 Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p. 8 
3 
of which, only distantly, had anything to do with improving economic growth. The organisa-
tion and, in particular, the Commission has had difficulties in concentrating on one task at a 
time and achieving it. Even to the point where this inability has had negative effects on its 
main mission. Some of the reasons for this are fairly clear, but one should be mentioned. Or-
ganisational logic for the Commission requires the generation of regulation. If for Descartes, 
thinking was proof of his existence, for the Commission it is '1 generate legislation therefore I 
am.' Its reason to exist is above all to fulfil its right to initiate legislation for Europe. This is 
what makes it different and essential in the EU. It is primarily made up of policy making ex-
perts and these individuals require policies to make. Policy making is the measure of success 
in the Commission and one of the sure means of gaining promotion. But this will be discussed 
in depth later on. 
The difficulty for any researcher approaching an only in part completed project is manifold, to 
work out what the end result may look like; what it was intended to look like and what the 
basic elements and proportions were and are. Often these are not immediately observable. It is 
only by use of science and scientific methods that a true picture of the project can be drawn. 
Engineers place machines and their structures, or elements of them, under duress and run tests 
on them in laboratories and computer models, much as scientists test substances out in a vari-
ety of ways, to increase their knowledge about them and to thus place them in a certain cate-
gory where they can be related to other substances. Science would look rather odd today if 
every substance and machine were said to be sui generis, an utterly incomparable item unre-
lated to anything else. That said there are nuances to various scientific branches which can 
make them more or less useful to other branches which one might not immediately associate 
with them. 
Science, in the western sense, rose from empirical observation of nature which allowed theo-
ries to be developed and tested. The natural sciences were thus the first sciences and remain 
the basic foundation of the scientific tradition. Earlier developments of political science had, 
under the Greeks, led philosophers to decide that the city state was the individual writ 
large12and that man was basically an animal modified by laws to his improvement.13Aristotle 
voiced the latter view and elaborated on the biological similarities of nature and politics, 
comparing economic/social classes to an animal's organs. 14The chain of connection for the 
Greeks was along the line that cities, and here can be understood all political systems, were 
fundamentally based on the characteristics of the human individual who was directly related 
to nature as being an animal with certain political qualities. So the natural world and political 
systems were directly connected via the human agent. Old news, true, but it needs to be re-
emphasised, as modern political science has chosen to locate its claim to being a science, pret-
ty exclusively on being similar to the 'miserable' science, economics. Undoubtedly correct in 
some senses and a useful method of harvesting 'objective' data with a mathematical feel to it. 
Whilst this is fine, it does tend to ignore the rest of the natural sciences, and then as a natural 
corollary the organic world of animals to which Darwinian Theory has firmly attached human 
beings for the last hundred or so years, essentially agreeing with the ancient Greek view. This 
topic will be returned to later, but suffice it to say that the thesis considers human beings to 
belong, in certain aspects, to the organic world and to be as bound to its rules as other animals 
and organic forms, and bear resemblances to other denizens of it. Political organisations will 
thus be considered as derivatives of the organic world. As in the organic world organisms ra-
rely just happen, they usually evolve from a previous species or more primitive member of the 
same species changed in measure to fit the new environment but retaining successful genes 
12 Plato. 'The Republic1 
13 Aristotle. 'The Polities' 
14 ibid 
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and characteristics; so the thesis will argue that the Medieval Papacy is the organic 'primitive' 
member of the organizational species that the EU and Commission belong to and therefore a 
source of useful insights. 
Coming to the Commission, the enlargement, the single currency and the ubiquitous Delors 
inheritance are a splendid opportunity to observe this organisation under stress. Biblically, 
one might say that its character is being tested, and as St. Paul commented, difficult situations 
bring out perseverance, form character and allow hope to form. So we might expect from this 
to see the Commission not only revealing its true character but also developing towards a mo-
re optimistic future. Suffice it to say, the main relationship between the enlargement and the 
Commission, for the thesis, is one of a pressure and huge stress on the latter which allows ob-
servations to be made of about it that are most easily made at such times. Diagnoses are made 
when the patient is ill often as a result of stress, incorrect nourishment and exhaustion and not 
when they are fit and well 
'Looking ahead, the difficulty of reaching agreements at the political level in an enlarged un-
ion made it likely that more would be decided at the sub-systemic level within policy net-
works, many of which could not be expected to welcome actors from New Member States. 
More generally, eastern enlargement seemed certain to foster intense new battles between pol-
icy networks for turf and resources. As Wessels suggested, a plausible future scenario was 
that "the competition for access and influence among these networks would continue, with 
intensifying fights over scarce resources as the EU enlarged further.'"15 
What internal bureaucratic dynamics has the enlargement process, combined with the Delors 
inheritance revealed and exacerbated in the Commission and how have these dynamics af-
fected the enlargement process itself? The Santer reforms and the reforms undertaken by 
President Prodi were to both remedy the emerging problems and to prepare the Commission 
for the enlargement. Have the Prodi reforms become part of the problem and added to the se-
riousness of the convulsion overtaking the Commission? Following on from this, have Com-
mission changes or resistance to them in policy areas affected the enlargement, and what 
changes has the enlargement forced in the Commission? Have certain structures like policy 
networks and link ups between them and other internal networks been revealed by the 
enlargement? A further pressure apparent on the Commission is the growing scarcity of re-
sources available to it, ranging from personnel to policy discretion, its internal organs and 
structures could be expected to be laid barer than before as they compete for their dwindling 
supply. And finally, do the Commission and various of its DGs emerge stronger from the 
enlargement or not? Durable structures and organisations are likely to evolve and develop 
with a changing environment, rigid ones crack. 
The hypothesis of the thesis was initially that some of the DGs would benefit more than oth-
ers from the increase in work and resources that would result from the enlargement. However 
this hypothesis could not be completely sustained in the light of the severe restrictions being 
placed on staff numbers employed at the Commission by the Council, and the vast increase in 
work that the staff have been required to complete. So, whilst a comparison is carried out, a 
more appropriate analysis was developed which was to observe and analyse the Commission 
coping under great pressure, and to see how the various DGs adapted to the circumstances and 
to explain their willingness to adapt or not. From this standpoint it was only a small step to 
the realisation that many of the changes occurring, as mentioned above, were revealing certain 
basic truths about the origins of the Commission, its very nature and likely future develop-
ment. 
15 See note I Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p. 29 
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In order to answer some of the above listed questions the thesis first explores the theoretical 
perspectives available for the analysis and develops its own approach and theory from these. 
A series of in-depth-case studies of six EU organisations follows, and is rounded off with a 
summary of the findings and analysis and recommendations. Four European Commission Di-
rectorates General (DG) organisational structures;16 their respective histories and develop-
mental phases in combination with their policy fields make up the bulk of the case studies. 
The DGs concerned are those of Environment (DG ENV), Enterprise and Industry (DG ENT), 
Regional Affairs and Structural Funds (DG REGIO), Agriculture (DG AGRI). In this selected 
DG mix there are two 'paying' DGs, those of DG REGIO and DG AGRl, and one more pure-
ly policy making DG in DG ENV; DG ENT lies somewhere in between. The last two DGs 
listed have been undergoing many changes recently and are of great interest. The anti fraud 
agency of the Union (OLAF), and the European Environment Agency (EEA) were examined, 
as both reveal important EU and Commission trends and specific Commission weaknesses. 
Over fifty officials in the Commission were interviewed in Brussels as were twenty New 
Member State (NMS) officials dealing with the relevant DGs. The experiences of the NMS 
officials were compared to those of the officials in the DGs and explanation found for the 
problems that they had experienced. In general, recent developments in the Commission's in-
ternal organisation were examined and where possible links made to the recent developments 
in the policy areas of the DGs and in particular where these impinged upon the enlargement. 
The DGs and Union agencies examined were chosen as they each reveal aspects of Commis-
sion work during the enlargement period. Furthermore they are excellent examples of the va-
rying degrees of seriousness that organisational 'pathology'17 has reached. All the DGs also 
share certain basic difficulties and common experiences but at the same differ in their re-
sponses and the solutions chosen. Further details on the interview process are included in the 
annex on the subject. A mixed theoretical approach was used in the micro level analysis, 
whilst for the core theory the theories of McNeill, Mintzberg, the author, and EU aspects of 
Policy Network Theory were used. 
Please note that each chapter's footnotes are numbered separately and that there is a method-
ology annex. Also the annex to the book includes details about use of certain wording, vo-
cabulary and terminology in the text. There is also a list of abbreviations included next to the 
annex. Much of the text was completed prior to the completion of enlargement and whilst the 
tenses have been altered as far as possible, the author requests the reader's consideration for 
where this did not happen. 
16 The sectoral 'ministries' of the Commission. 17 
As will be stressed throughout the thesis 'pathology' is intended to stress deviation from theoretical ideals and models, 
such as Weber's 'ideals' 
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1.1 EXAMINATION OF THE THEORIES 
Drawing up a chapter offering more theoretical possibilities with which to ponder on the EU 
is both a challenge and a must. The complexity of the EU has spawned so many theories that 
adding more might seem to be rather counter productive. However something quite as multi 
faceted as the EU requires this. Modesty is the order of the day with analysis of the EU, and 
awareness that only many theoretical approaches and use of analogies will enable the steady 
small increments of knowledge which are what are necessary to explain some of the observed 
phenomena. It is in this sense that the chapter approaches the task and aims to offer a theory 
to add to the academic arsenal. Analogies are a very useful method of advancing argumenta-
tion and Karl Deutsch offered one of the first with the notion of considering the EU as 4a nu-
clear process.'18The theory and analogies in this chapter aim to assist in the general integra-
tion of the various theoretical approaches which aim encompass and comprehend the com-
plexity that is the EU and thus add to integration theory in general,19 
The realm of the EU and its politics has generated a kaleidoscopic variety of theories which 
appears to fluctuate over time. What they have in common is an awareness of the complexity 
of the subject which they are addressing. Is it really a well hidden traditional form of govern-
ment; or one in the making; a hybrid; or a truly unique construct? The best approach seems to 
be to consider the EU to be a very incomplete, at times contradictory process and governmen-
tal creation. Therefore elements of most of the standard theories are helpful and used when 
appropriate in this study along with some organisational theory. Some theories will play a 
more secondary role in particular case studies whilst some are more generally used. The basic 
perspective of the thesis is that the various theories are not incompatible with each other if 
excessive claims and positions are moderated. Indeed top academics in the field are moving 
steadily in this direction. The influential so called 'Sapir Report' of 2003 on the Union and 
Commission, which was requested for President Prodi and compiled from the work of the top 
academics in the field, stressed that the over emphasis on exclusivity by various theoretical 
approaches, each claiming to be the most useful, was detrimental to the Union and to under-
standing it.20 Instead the report recommended cooperation and acceptance of a mixed theo-
retical approach to match the policy reality. 
For the thesis the neo functionalist theory with its emphasis on a dynamic, evolving, pretty 
much automatic process, provides some important insights on the process of European inte-
gration.2122The spillover effect that it describes, with integration in one sector inevitably hav-
ing effects in another, whose actors will want to enjoy the benefits of integration too and push 
to have it, is useful. Particularly since the theory expects the Commission officials to be active 
in encouraging and motivating the actors in such spillovers. The reactive role of the political 
masters of the officials, namely the MSs, in creating EU structures to constrain the agency 
role of the Commission is also important. A new group of transnational and supranational of-
ficials are created who will want more integration. However, the theory is over simplistic in 
18 Wallace, W. The transformation of Western Europe. (1990), London, Pinter Publishers p.28 
19 See note 4 Shackleton; Peterson (2002) p.353; 'In doing so, they have compounded the EU's dizzying complexity,' 
20An Agenda For A Growing Europe: Making the EU Economic System Deliver the so called 'Sapir Report'; Report for the 
President of the European Commission, (July, 2003), chairman Sapir, A. Group members; Aghion, P, Bertola, G, Hellwig, M, 
Pisani-Ferry, J, Rosati, D, Vinals, J, Wallace, H. 
21 HaasE.B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. (1958) Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1958 
22 Lindberg L N. and Scheingold S.A. Europe's would be Polity; Patterns of Change in the European Community. (1970) 
Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall 
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its conception of the Commission as a single actor and the MSs as being essentially unwill-
ingly forced along the path of integration. The complexity of the EU is not usually amenable 
for rational actors to rationally pursue their agenda to the full and the Commission cannot be 
exempted from this.23Additionally, it does not explain the internal structure of the Commis-
sion as whole and its reaction to the evolving EU situation.24Furthermore, the process of inte-
gration requires more elaboration and examination and use of analogies to adequately explain 
more of the facts that have occurred. 
Liberal Intergovernmental ism25 promotes the idea that integration can be explained primarily 
by use of traditional approaches to international relations, which posit Nation States with the 
ability to act in accordance with their own national interests and to use the EU as a tool to a-
chieve these. The Commission and other institutions are essentially passive fora for the MSs 
to make their decisions in. The theory is important to EU research as it re-established the MSs 
as important actors in the EU who want integration for their own purposes. Certainly behind 
some of the major historic events of the EU there have been clear national interests playing a 
major role, as well as the supranationalist ones promoted by the EU institutions, in particular 
the Commission and European Court of Justice (ECJ). The problem with the theory is that it 
overly downplays the role and influence of the supranational actors and exaggerates the MSs 
internal unity as Nation States; which ignore the fact that they, like the Commission, consist 
of many elements which may be at loggerheads at times. There are also a range of quite dispa-
rate MSs which may be more or less willing to act as a coherent group at various times and 
with more or less sympathy and support for supranational institutions and their ambitions. It 
also underplays the force of idealism and the integration process itself, which forces decisions 
in certain directions and limits the rational choice power of all the actors involved to reach 
decisions reflecting their own optimal position. 
(H/ 
Neo institutionalism is important for its insistence that institutions are relevant and their 
structures and ethos. In particular the theory stresses the role played by what can best be de-
scribed as institutional behaviour by individuals, who essentially behave as if bound by the 
rules of formal institutions. Among the insights that the theory has helped generate is that of 
path dependency, which explains why the results of hard fought bargains by political-
bureaucratic actors are liable to be retained, regardless of whether they are beneficial any 
longer. It is therefore useful in explaining reform resistance in institutions and why the actors 
mentioned are effectively bound into integrationary processes and refuse, or are unwilling to 
reverse or undo, what has been established and prefer rather to add bits onto the institution. 
The recent statements of Commissioner Verheugen that senior bureaucrats have been hamper-
ing the Commission's anti-bureaucracy reform and resisting any reduction in the amount of 
legislation support this: 
4 In a follow-up interview with the Financial Times on Tuesday (10 October), Mr Verheugen 
said that because of bureaucrats' obstructionism, the commission will this year fail to simplify 
54 existing EU laws as part of its offensive against red tape. Mr Verheugen said in an inter-
view with Sueddeutsche Zeitung that the officials, apart from frustrating key reforms, also 
sometimes "put their own personal perspective across as the view of the commission" in 
communication with member states or the European Parliament. Dutch finance minister Gerrit 
2 Wallace, W. Collective Governance in (he EU political process in (eds) Wallace, H and Wallace, W. Policy Making in the 
European Union fourth edition (2000) Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.527 
24 Dimitrakopouos D in The Changing European Commission p. 1 
25 Moravicsik A. Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European 
Community. (1991) international Organization 45, no.l p. 19-56 and Moravicsik A. Preferences and power in the European 
Community: A Liberal Governmental ist Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies 31. no A p.473-524 1993 
26 March J.C. Olsen J,P. Rediscovering Institutions: the Organizational Basis of Politics, ( 1989) The Free Press NY, 1989 
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Zalm and Danish economy minister Bendt Bendtsen on Monday wrote a joint letter published 
in the Financial Times calling upon Brussels to do more "The commission's plan was to sim-"J 
plify 54 laws this year, but only five have been tackled. That is alarming."' 
Unfortunately neo institutionalism does not provide enough on the informal processes and the 
potential for individual actors to affect the system. 
Network theory, in particular that of Policy Networks makes up for the gap outlined in the last 
paragraph; the need to consider the informal processes which are so vital to the functioning of 
the EU. Network theory will be considered in greater depth in the next section owing to its 
relevance to the theory in the thesis, but the drawbacks of the theory or rather theories which 
surround Policy Networks are that they are primarily descriptive; they give a fairly accurate 
picture of how things are, but do not provide a complete theoretical perspective to consider 
the integrationary process from. Thus their deductive potential to generate insights and under-
standing are limited. 
Having outlined the main theories which are relevant but in and of themselves insufficient or 
contradictory, we will now move on to briefly introduce the theoretical perspective of the the-
sis and its integrative value. The immunisation theory which will be laid out in the rest of the 
chapter, complements and aims to integrate the standard integration theories which focus on 
the expansion of the EU either via a steady increase in supranational competences or due to 
deliberate MS foreign policy choices. Suffice it to say at this point that the immunisation the-
ory will consider the High Authority - Commission to have functioned in a manner compara-
ble to a Vaccine for Europe and to contain 'pathological' qualities (pathological in terms of 
deviance from certain theoretical norms). Far from denying that the main integrationary theo-
ries are partially correct, the theory concurs, but since the emphasis of the thesis is on the 
Commission and explaining exactly how it has and does function, a particular perspective had 
to be developed and is found in the theory. Unlike most integration theory which emphasises 
a comparatively smooth progression forwards towards greater unity and union as if these were 
somehow always to have been expected, and over-stresses the role of supranationalism or 
MSs as the main integrationary force, this theory sees a dialectic progression as having taken 
place. To some extent this could have been and was planned by Monnet but other elements 
^ Q 
seem to suggest fuzzy logic at work. Integration is a bit like in a car with the Clutch pedal 
and the Gas; Combined there is movement, apart there is noise and little change but a danger 
of the engine coming to pieces if left for too long. The gas pedal and the brute force for inte-
gration came from the MSs. The Commission - High Authority bring and guide them into 
gear; neither of the pair represent the brake pedal. Rather than 'for or against' integration we 
have 'more MS oriented integration or less MS oriented integration.' The two forces act and 
react to each other and in general make a common direction possible. The direction is for-
wards for integration, but it is forwards in a zigzag manner, and the more integrated, immu-
nized and 'rehabilitated' the MSs have become the more supranational the whole process 
feels: 
'One important implication is that a rigid conceptual distinction between 'national govern-
ments' and 'supranational institutions' is unsustainable. On the one hand, national leaders 
27 Beunderman, M 'EU officials stand firm after Verheugen attack.' EU Observer 10.10.2006 - 09:50 CET 
28 See note 3 Monnet (1978); p.267 
20 Hayes-Ren shaw. F The Council of Ministers in Shackleton M and Peterson J (ed.); The Institutions of the European Un-
ion, (2002) Oxford, Oxford University Press p. 62. She talks about the Council and Commission being like two horses pull-
ing a carriage, both needing the other. 
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may become so acclimated to EU decision making that they may appear to act on the basis of 
"supranational ideology."30 
MS leaders act to resolve the perceived need to strengthen European structures, even as they 
1 1 TO-
seek to defend national interests.' The fascinating result, the Eli, has had almost enough 
democratic elements to avoid total rejection in the modern world whilst encouraging rational-
ity in European politics, economy and society. It still bears the marks of the integration to and 
fro movement and thus bears witness to the continuing existence of the two main integration-
ary forces the MSs and their supranational creation. The theory aims to include and not veneer 
over certain facts like; the positive central role of modified and steadily modifying MSs in the 
integration process; the fact that most of the institutions of the EU were the result of MS insis-
tence on democracy and not supranational pressure; the increasing importance of sectors and 
policy networks combined with a decrease in Commission power; the curious organisation of 
the Commission and the reasons for this. The theory refers to immunisation more than simply 
a neat dialectic process, as there is a distinctly organic, biological feel about European inte-
gration. 
A brief digression is perhaps called for here, to answer the European optimist's objection to a 
thesis which considers the 'problems1 of the EU and Commission as opposed to their 
strengths and good points, the following point should be said. There is a large body of aca-
demic opinion which states that there are a range of problems facing the EU and the Commis-
sion and they need to be solved. True optimism in the integration process requires realism too 
and the awareness that problems are present but can be solved for the attaining of the ultimate 
goals of peace, prosperity and freedom. The Sapir report is clear that, 'the EU suffers from 
twin problems: some of its methods of governance are obsolete; and the system as a whole 
has become too complex and fragmented.'33Criticism is also reserved for the EU budget, 'As 
it stands today, the EU budget is a historical relic. Expenditures, revenues and procedures are 
all inconsistent with the present and future state of EU integration.'34These academics are 
right to stress this, as the highly desirable goals listed earlier and healthy political systems, are 
of greater importance than rigid adherence to organisations and their ideologies which had as 
their initial justification the achievement of the stated goals. It has to be the case that the mis-
sion of European integration and the supranational structures were and are a means to an end 
and not the end itself. If the end is to be a range of structures, say federal for arguments sake, 
which reign over poverty, social and political tension and instability and possibly war, which 
as recent history reveals is still a possibility even in Europe, as in 'federations' like Yugosla-
via, then most people would agree this is hardly desirable. Wanting change for change's sake 
is understandable in elites who do not yet enjoy all the benefits of power that they would like 
to possess, but this should not be allowed to muddy the real issues of European integration. 
Sometimes too much loyalty to organisational ideologies can be problematic for the very pro-
ject they were intended to pursue, 'Ideas inhibited adjustment in Community priorities and 
policy, as the enthusiasts of the Commission and the veterans of Community building de-
fended the acquis communctuiaire, and the integration theology of the 1960s against the 
changing circumstances of the 1970s.'35Thus the institutions of the EU must be open to ad-
10 Edwards, G and Spence, D. The Commission in Perspective in Edwards G (ed) The European ('ont miss ion, (1997) Carter-
mill, London p. 11. 
31 See note 1 Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p.277. 
32 ibid p.274; 'Elite actors who dominate EU decision making have become socialised to a permanent system of bargaining to 
which they are "locked in".1 
33 See note 20 Sapir Report (2003) p. 125 
34 ibid 
35 See note 18 Wallace (1990) p. 81 
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justment, improvement and even the overall mission itself if this improves the situation of the 
average citizen. 
1.1.1 POLICY NETWORK THEORY 
Now that the main theoretical perspectives have been introduced it is necessary for us to look 
at the more relevant ones in greater depth. Two of the theories which also capture the micro 
level of the European project to some extent, are Multi Level Governance (MLG) and Policy 
Network theory; both are quite descriptive in character and paint a reasonably accurate picture 
of the EU as it is. The theory of Policy Networks supports MLG theories by allowing for 
greater analysis than MLG alone would. MLG can be summarised as a perception that policy 
is decided by many actors from; industry, civic society and various levels of government, in a 
policy arena which is steadily replacing the Nation State's more monolithic structure. Within 
Policy Network theory the Commission and its officials sit at the hub of many of these net-
works, their choices will be crucial. A useful summary of the various theories relevant to the 
thesis and a working definition of the policy network are provided by the quotation below by 
an academic who showed how EC policy networks helped to hinder reform, a point taken up 
in this thesis: 
'A policy network is an organizational arrangement created to facilitate the intermediation 
between state actors and organized interests. The policy network concept is a meso-level con-
cept. Meso-level analysis focuses on the relationship between government (or EU Directorate-
Generales) and interest groups and analyses relationships which are structural rather than per-
sonal. Political actors create a policy network when they exchange resources regularly. Any 
organization entering the policy process is dependent on other organizations for resources. 
Consequently, they have to exchange resources in order to achieve their goals. Policy net-
works "may become disassociated from the strategic choices o f . . . (the) formative phase and 
survive as institutional residues of past organizational choices" in such situations, the struc-
ture of the network becomes an important determinant of policy choices and outcomes. This 
is particularly emphasized in the structural policy network approach (the Marsh and Rhodes 
model) which explicitly states that "the structure of networks affects outcomes.'36 
Networks are considered to offer remedies to several problems which have developed in the, 
'increasingly complex and dynamic environment.'37They, ' . . . reduce transaction cost in si-
tuations of complex decision making as they provide a basis of common knowledge, experi-
ence and normative orientation. They also reduce insecurity by promoting the mutual ex-
change of information. Finally, networks can counter-balance power asymmetries by provid-
ing additional channels of influence beyond the formal structures.' They are considered to 
have become essential and the only means for governance to occur in particular as 'hierarchi-
cal co-ordination' has become 'difficult if not impossible.'3940The point about networks offer-
ing ways around formal hierarchies, within the Commission context, is examined under the 
Chapter dealing with Regulatory entrepreneurs in DG ENV. 
The importance of EU policy networks is shown by this quotation by a leading academic in 
the field: 
36 Daugberg, C. Reforming (he CAP: Policy Networks and Broader Institutional Structures, In Journal of Common Market 
Studies Vol.37. No 3 September 1999 p. 413,414. 
37 Btirzel T Policy Networks A New Paradigm for European Governance? EUI Working Paper RSC No 97/19 p. 16 
38 ibid p. 16 
39 ibid 
40 Mazey, S and Richardson, J. The Commission and the Lobby in Edwards G (ed) The European Commission, (1997) Car-
termill, London p. 180 
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'Policy networks are the basic units of European public management. EU policies are not the 
sole or exclusive responsibility of the Commission they are managed through organisational 
networks. The effectiveness of networks depends on the ability and willingness of a variety of 
organisational actors, to work together.'41 He goes on to add, 'Integration is increasingly a 
managed process that requires large scale reorganizations of policy networks and regimes.'42 
Policy networking theories have been applied to help explain actors' motivations by MLG 
theorists. Various theories applied to the policy networking observed, have emphasized the 
exchange element via 'exchange logic' which amounts to a, 'mutually beneficial exchange of 
goods and services' and information resulting in a network where ' . . , the exchange approach 
aggregates up from the endowments and preferences of individuals.'430thers consider the ac-
tors 'structural' position in the network to be important, 'the structuralist approach analyses 
individual behaviour in terms of the structural patterns of relationships.'44The role approach 
of structuralism networks stresses, 'actors develop the sense of their own identities as well as 
their strategic possibilities through their relationship with others. This role-based approach 
may be particularly appropriate in institutional settings where networks are often the by prod-
ucts of individual actors fulfilling obligations specified by law, or institutional role, rather 
than voluntary exchanges. The partnership clause of structural funds is an example of such an 
obligation.'45This perspective then sees networks as, 'structural channels through which po-
litical mobilization and coalition building take place and networks themselves become re-
sources in political conflicts.'46Dual network theorists stress that there are a wide spectrum of 
possible alliances to be made by the actors, either the Commission and SNAs against the 
MSs, or SNAs and MSs against the Commission, with the flows of information and initiative 
going in every direction.4 
In general, policy network theory gives the Commission a wide role to play and a crucial one 
at that, "' . . . but frequently 'policy networks of like minded actors, often organized and led 
by the Commission have considerable scope to set the agenda and influence outcomes. In ge-
neral, as Laura Cram has demonstrated, the Commission and its staff have "proved to be re-
markably adaptable,"'48and again, 'the Commission has a substantial role in driving the policy 
agenda, especially at the lowest level of policy decisions.'49 
The Commission and its officials operate in an environment that invites and encourages net-
work building: 
'Commission officials have a constitutional obligation to play a prominent "political" role that 
is not simply a by-product of their technical expertise or tenure. This power is jealously guar-
ded by Commission officials, though it puts them at odds with their lack of political account-
ability. So Commission officials are expected to 'shake up' things. The price for the right to 
be partisan is a loss of bureaucratic integrity. Matters that could be bureaucratic in less am-
biguous institutional contexts may easily become politicized in the EU. To a much greater de-
gree than in national environments, the bureaucratic and political worlds are blurred . . . The 
41 Metcalfe, L. Reforming the Commission, Journal of Common Market Studies Dec 2000, vol,38.No.5. p.828, 
42 ibid p.832 
43 Ansell K, Parsons C, Darden K, 4Duel Networks in European Regional Development Policy', Journal of Common Market 
Studies Vol 35 No 3 1997p.355 
44 ibid p.355-356 
45 ibid p.355-356 
46 ibid p. 3 56 
47 ibid p,350 
48 Stevens, A and Stevens, H. Brussels Bureaucrats? (2001) Basingstoke, Palgrave p.223 
49 ibid p.221 
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EU is not a Westphalian state: there is no single, hierarchically concentrated, exclusive core 
of authority where demands are prioritized . . . Commission officials have to deal with a mul-
tiplicity of competences (mostly shared with other actors), principals to serve (most notably 
the Council, the EP, individual MSs, and the public), demands, and resources (many on loan, 
others severely limited).the complexity of EU governance compels actors to simplify decision 
making. That may logically take them in two directions . . . actors make policies jointly, and 
rather than trying to impose tasks, they coax affected parties to collaborate. In other words, 
actors are compelled to play a "game" of mobilizing and nurturing suppor t . . . , 5 0 
Not surprisingly Commission officials on the ground are very different from their civil service 
equivalents in the MSs and are ideal material to make the very maximum from the network 
potential in the EU: 
' . . . viewed on the bases of these three features, Commission officials hardly emerge as pas-
sive servants exercising a role etched in EU governance rules. Instead, they receive varied and 
partially conflicting incentives, which invite them to select from the menu what suits best 
their personal preferences. In Douglass North's terms, they are purposeful actors in a rela-
tively rule-free environment, seeking alliances with others to form various "groups bound by 
some common purpose" . . . In the first place, Commission officials work in units with differ-
ent task descriptions, and these may send signals at odds with the institutional interest of the 
Commission. Directorate generals are often portrayed as worlds on their own . . . Secondly, 
even in their immediate work environment Commission officials are less rule-bound than is 
often assumed. The rules are not always clear cu t . . . The organization and task descriptions 
of the various services change at a high rate. Hence DGs send ambivalent signals to Commis-
sion officials.'51 
Two more quotations from a top member of the College of Commissioners show the power of 
officials to decide policy: 
" T h e commissioners have to take extreme care that important questions are decided in their 
weekly meeting, and not decided by the civil servants among themselves. Unfortunately it 
sometimes happens in the communication with member states or parliament that civil servants 
put their own personal perspective across as the view of the commission," he told the news-
paper. Citing a concrete example the 62-year old social democrat commissioner said that 
commission bureaucrats had tried to sort out the use of pesticides between them and the issue 
only came to the attention of their political masters - the commissioners - when the bureau-
crats fell out over the issue. In my opinion, too much is decided by civil servants," he said in 
conclusion.'52 
Another demonstration of the power of officials to decide top policy is as follows: 
'The commission document, on the EU's innovation strategy, should be adopted by EU lead-
ers in Lahti, Finland, on 20 October - but it was drafted by the commission's secretariat-
general without any involvement of Mr Verheugen who is in charge of the policy area , . . 
Commission sources told the daily that the responsible official in the secretariat-general did 
not like Mr Verheugen's political views on innovation and therefore drafted the paper himself 
without involving Mr Verheugen's cabinet . . . In the eight-page commission document, Mr 
50 Hooghe L. The Commission and Cohesion Policy in Nugent, N (ed) At the heart of the Union, second edition, (2000) Bas-
ingstoke, Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 104-105 
51 ibid p. 107 
52 Mahony, H 'Commission bureaucrats are getting too powerful, says Verheugen' EU Observer 05.10.2006 
13 
Verheugen's key idea to foster innovation through member states' public tenders is notably 
absent, while commission bureaucrats instead inserted the idea of European technology plat-
forms.'53 
The above points are particularly true of the so called 'Desk Officers' of the Commission; 
these officials usually enter the Commission services at grade A7 or A8 and proceed up until 
they are promoted to either deputy Head of Unit A5-6 or Head of Unit A5-A4. They are so-
metimes referred to as policy-making officials because they are at the forefront of developing 
proposals for legislation into complete documents ready for adoption. Despite the rhetoric that 
the Commission political level (the Commissioners) sets policy-making direction,54in practice 
it is very hard to locate the origin of a policy in the EU5 and it has been calculated that only 
6% of policy proposals are generated from inside the Commission,^Management plans of the 
DGs are said to be regularly altered to accommodate the policies generated from below during 
the period they were supposed to be covering.57The majority of proposals are put forward to 
the DG by NGOs and other stakeholders, lobbyists, MSs, and the European Parliament (EP)58; 
the administration decides, the Desk Officers and sometimes unit heads, which proposals are 
pursued and passed up to the hierarchy ,59According to one source over 80% of the final pro-
posal adopted by the Council is the same as that prepared by the desk officer supervising the 
directive. The same source stressed the fact that the desk officer is alone in the initial process 
of developing the proposal.60The Desk Officers are at the centre of a network of actors coa-
lescing around the directive beginning to be formulated.MThis last point, stressing the politi-
cal role played by Desk Officers and the administration in general is confirmed by the state-
ment of Jacques Delors when he said that Commission officials had six professions: to be a 
law maker, to innovate (generate policy proposals), to control respect for community deci-
sions, to negotiate with the different actors involved in the community process and to be a 
diplomat.62Rarely are national civil servants called on to perform such a combination of tasks, 
the use of the word 'law maker' by Delors rather than any other phrase appears to place the 
Desk Officers on a par with legislators and emphasises that their work is political as well as 
bureaucratic. In the DG the Desk Officers are often the absolute experts in the field of their 
directive and the Commissioner and their supporting cabinet can only have the very broadest 
of ideas about the contents of the directives. Allegedly plenty of the management from above 
the Heads of Unit to Director Generals are often not experts63 and the higher their rank the 
more likely it is that they owe their position to factors other than ability64 and knowledge. 
Delors apparently strengthened and enhanced the power of networks in general in the Com-
mission which also benefited the policy networks which had important members in the Com-
mission DGs. There were networks based on nationality 'across the services' and these was 
'supplemented' with officials being selected and dropped into top positions in DGs leading to 
an unfortunate situation, 'the creation of alternative networks, alongside, through and across 
the formal hierarchies and structures, increased fragmentation and potential conflict and de-
" Beunderman M. lEU officials stand firm after Verheugen attack' EU Observer 10.10.2006 
M Interviews with Commission Officials SG 
55 See note 40 Mazey, S and Richardson (1997) p. 179 
5fi Liefferink, D and Andersen M.K.. (eds): The innovation of FA J environmental policy, (1997) Oiso, Scandinavian Press p.49 
" Interviews with Commission Officials: DG AGR1 
38 See note 40 Mazey, S and Richardson p. 179 
5y Interview with Commission Officials DG ENV 
W)Grant, W, Mathews, D, Newell, P, The effectiveness of EU Environmental Policy (2000) Basingstoke, Macmil-
lan Press p. 19 
61 See note 40 Mazey, S and Richardson (1997) p.179 
62 Spence, D. Staff and Personnel policy in the Commission in Edwards G (ed) The European Commission, (1997) Cartermill, 
London p95 
6? Interviews with officials DG REG 10 
64 ibid and See note 62 Spence (1997) p.95 
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creased the scope for good management.'650ften the hierarchy is ignored or set aside and 'a 
certain key number of people' secure the 'advancement of the policy', if it were not for this 
the Commission would not function at all.66 
Thus the Commission, as Delors left it, was ripe for network activity, and granted that weak 
political masters result in greater discretion for bureaucrats,67in general the way was set for 
the next ten years, with Networks helping to organize resistance to reforms that occurred 
throughout the Commission and in its DGs.68The problem is that networks do not have to be 
benevolent to the organization itself, and indeed were and are not meant to be. By their very 
nature they are brought together or evolve together to solve a specific sectoral problem and to 
render coherent the incoherent masses of information and actors that would otherwise prevail. 
The works of several authors show that policy networks, 'tend to be very resistant to chan-
ge;'69"'quasi-institutional' arenas with their own structure of conflict and problems of coordi-
nation." °And they are often pretty undemocratic.71Which all in all means 'they cannot fully 
substitute formal institutions because of their own deficiencies,' although they 'perform func-
tions necessary to overcome deficiencies of bargaining systems.'72The ability of policy net-
works to organize resistance to reforms is attested to by several authors, 'What is often over-
looked, however, is that policy networks can have quite the opposite effect by inhibiting pol-
icy change and excluding certain actors from the policy making process.'73In particular the 
work of Daugbjerg shows how an Agricultural policy network was able to resist reforms to 
the CAP for many years.74He considers the issue of network resistance to reform in relation to 
the CAP and states the following: 
'When pressure for reform arises, the network members are likely to defend the existing pol-
icy paradigm because doing so comes naturally to them, and because radical reforms bring 
about uncertainty which they want to avoid. Firstly, this uncertainty arises because it is diffi-
cult to know in advance which consequences a radically reformed policy may have. In other 
words, there is a risk of bringing about unintended consequences . . - Secondly; it is unlikely 
that the network formed around an existing policy survives fundamental reforms. As a conse-
quence, members holding central and powerful positions within the network may lose power 
when it is redesigned . . . Members of cohesive networks are powerful because they control 
the expertise within their policy field and when outsiders threaten their control over that field, 
the consensus on policy principles enables them to meet reformers with forceful counter ar-
guments.'75 
Indeed this network, or Commission unit elements of it, was discussed by various officials in 
the Commission and the NMSs with myself, and the results of these interviews are described 
in the chapter on DG AGRI. The dangers are considerable that policies are being decided by 
policy networks rather than the Commission as a whole. Policy networks can be "captured" 
65 See note 48 Stevens; Stevens (2001) p.238-239 
66 Hooghe forthcoming quoted see note 48 Stevens; Stevens (2001) p. 175 
67 Hague, R and Harrop, M, Comparative Government and Politics an introduction (1987) Basingstoke, Macmillan Educa-
tion Ltd. p.263. 'Whether the bureaucracy and the military rule or serve depends primarily on the strength of the other institu-
tions in the political system. As permanent and coherent organisations power gravitates towards them unless more overtly 
political institutions are capable of providing an effective counter weight. Thus bureaucratic influence is greatest where po-
litical leadership is weak.' 
68 See note 36 Daugberg, (1999) 
69 See note 37 Bûrzel (97/19) 
70 ibid 
71 ibid 
72 ibid 
73 ibid 
74 See note 36 Daugberg, (1999) 
75 ibid p.413-414 
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and this seems to have happened. It is worth quoting in full the danger related to the above, 
'Daugbjerg concluded that despite the increasing urgency of CAP reform, in view of the 
eastward enlargement and the WTO negotiations on trade in agricultural products, radical re-
form would come only as a response to a crisis and not as a result of deliberate efforts to steer 
structural change. If this is a realistic assessment, it has very worrying implications not just 
for reform of the CAP but for developments in other policy fields. Waiting for crises to occur 
is a costly and hazardous way of dealing with structural change, especially if the result is tur-
bulence and not reform/ 
The notion of a core/periphery dynamic is also useful as it certainly fits many of the facts a-
vailable. By this is meant that the political entities of the MSs of the EU form the periphery 
and the EU institutions the core. The core holds an important advantage over the periphery in 
that here vast amounts of communication come together in Brussels much as all roads were 
said to lead to Rome. The core is said to 1 . . . capitalise its position of a crossroads of streams 
of communication by linking and combining, by processing that is, the informational compo-
nents of communications, producing information out of information.,78As information can be 
considered to be a valuable resource, the possession by the core of 'an informational surplus' 
is quite clearly advantageous in its relationship vis-à-vis the periphery and can be turned into 
'political influence1. The example of the CAP policy networks with their Commission mem-
bers representing important elements of the core using their information surplus to resist re-
form, is salutary. 
One last, major problem of policy networks already mentioned which needs to be re-
emphasised is that they are not really democratic; 'The problem is that governance by policy 
networks is not very democratic . . . ,79This would not be a problem if they were limited in 
their scope and accountability existed elsewhere. However as will become increasingly appar-
ent the scope, power and influence of policy networks is a worrying feature of EU governance 
and the weakness of other sources of accountability means that there is real democratic prob-
lem that needs resolving. 
1.1.2 ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY OF MINTZBERG 
The theories relevant to assisting us in understanding and describing the more micro level of 
EU and Commission reality have been explained, and the negative if not 'pathological' as-
pects of Policy Networks encouraged by and often with the Commission DGs at their centre. 
We will now consider two theories which are helpful in analysing the organisation; the Com-
mission, and its relevant parts from an organisational theory perspective. The work of Mintz-
berg has been used in the analysis section of the thesis to examine the Commission. Since he 
offers a workable, standard method of considering organizations and analysing them, obvi-
ously his work was of great assistance. This was particularly the case when combined with the 
work of Hofstede who offered an effective combination of his work and that of Mintzberg. To 
explain the basics of Mintzberg's theory it is therefore right and proper to stand back and let 
Hofstede outline them: 
'To Mintzberg, all good things in organizations come in fives. Organizations in general con-
tain up to five distinct parts: 
76 See note 1 Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p.31; CEU policy networks may be "captured" by agents who shape major decisions 
in ways that effectively predetermine them before Member States can "make" them.' 
77 See note 41 Metcalfe (2000) p. 835 
78 Blom. T 'The Multi-level Governance approach to European Integration. Some critical considerations.1 Oratie Universiteit 
Maastricht (2004) p. 19 
79 See note t Peterson; Bomberg (1999), p.269 
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1. The operating core (the people who do the work) 
2. The strategic apex (the top management) 
3. The middle line (the hierarchy in between) 
4. The technostructure (people in staff roles supplying ideas) 
5. The support staff (people in staff roles supplying services) 
Organizations in general use one or more of five mechanisms for coordinating activities: 
1. Mutual adjustment (of people through informal communication) 
2. Direct supervision (by hierarchical superior) 
3. Standardisation of work processes (specifying the contents of work) 
4. Standardization of outputs (specifying the desired results) 
5. Standardization of skills (specifying the training required to perform the work) 
Most organizations show one of five typical configurations: 
1. The simple structure. In this case, the key part is the strategic apex, and the coordinating 
mechanism is direct supervision. 
2. The machine bureaucracy. Key part: the technostructure. Coordinating mechanism: stan-
dardization of work processes. 
3. The professional bureaucracy. Key part: the operating core. Coordinating mechanism: 
standardization of skills. 
4. The divisionalized form. Key part: the middle line. Coordinating mechanism: standardiza-
tion of outputs. 
5. The Adhocracy. Key part: the support staff (sometimes with the operating core). Coordi-QA 
nating mechanism: mutual adjustment.' 
Amongst the many important findings of Hofstede, we find he makes the justified step of 
suggesting that Mintzberg's data offers itself to comparisons with his own 'national cultural 
profiles' 
'The link means that, other factors being equal, people from a particular national background 
will prefer a particular configuration because it fits their implicit model, and that otherwise 
similar organizations in different countries will resemble different Mintzberg configuration 
types because of different cultural preferences.'81 
He describes his particularly relevant variables to measure as follows, the term Power Dis-
tance relates to the manner in which people, workers relate to their bosses, is the boss auto-
cratic, paternalistic, do they confer with the workers before issuing decisions? The exact defi-
nition provided by Hofstede is 'Power Distance can therefore be defined as the extent to 
which powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept 
that power is distributed unequally.'82 Uncertainty avoidance can be defined as follows; 'Un-
certainty avoidance can therefore be defined as the extent to which the members of a culture 
feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. This feeling is, among other things, ex-
pressed through nervous stress and in a need for predictability: a need for written and unwrit-
80 Mintzberg H (1979), Mintzberg H (1983)Mintzberg H (1989) referred to in Hofstede, G. Culture and organizations: Soft-
ware of the Mind. (1991) McGraw-Hill International UK Limited. 
81 Hofstede G. Culture and organizations: Software of the Mind, (1991) McGraw-Hill International UK Limited p,151 
82 ibid p.27-28 
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ten rules.,83Within companies the emphasis will be on rules not being broken, long term ca-
84 reers. 
Mintzberg's standard five types can be found combined in some organisations but to combine 
all five would be extremely unusual and problematic.85If that combination is found, combined 
with heightened levels of internal 'polities' i.e. internal conflict and competition, then it seems 
fair to say that the organisation has deviated so far from the theoretical norms as to be theo-
retically 'pathological.'86Mintzberg indicates that a strong ideology is helpful in holding to-
gether a company and moderating the forces of 'politics.'87The thesis will examine how the 
EU seems to have developed and been developing and to see if this can be considered from a 
democratic parliamentarian theoretical perspective 'pathological', if there are high state of 
complexity and fragmentation this 'pathology' is no longer just theoretical. It is to be ex-
pected that at the core of such an EU, there is an organisation that shows certain theoretically 
'pathological' qualities which have played a part in making the EU as it is. That organisation, 
using Mintzberg's theory, might be expected to also reveal 'pathological' organisational qua-
lities; these can be expected to be found in the High Authority-Commission, the organisation 
in question. But a 'pathology' can have beneficial effects too, and it will be argued that this is 
exactly how the Commission should be considered. In many environments a 'pathology' can 
behave negatively and either destroy the host and or itself, however in a diseased environment 
it might just do the opposite. It was an essential organisation that replaced and changed a pa-
thological, violent and often poverty stricken European political reality, equipped as it was 
with organisations and political structures that contributed to the problem, into something 
considerably better if with some negative elements. 
Application of both Mintzberg and Hofstede to the conundrum of Commission organization 
will offer some theoretical relief to those looking for clear structures or at least explanations 
for their absence. Mintzberg will be shown to offer a glimpse into the problematic organisa-
tional structure of the Commission which strongly indicates its pathological and potentially 
unstable form, in particular once its mission vis-à-vis its host is over, or at least when it has 
been temporarily 'arrested' by the host. The concept of the Commission being arrested is dis-
cussed later. Thus in the Findings and Analysis section both authors will be drawn on to assist 
with the intricate task of examining the Commission. 
1.1.3 ORGANIC MODELS FOR GOVERNMENT; THE WORK OF W. MCNEILL 
We have now laid out theories which will help us examine the Commission and indeed the 
EU layer of officialdom for both usefulness and also their 'pathological' qualities. The next 
step is to find a theory which examines layers of officialdom and warfare in a manner that en-
ables us to deepen the discussion about 'pathology' and human society in general. An inspira-
tion for the thesis was the work of William McNeill,88 who made a major contribution to the ftO 
field of politics and history with his book 'Plagues and Peoples.' He outlines human history 
and locates two sources of parasitism which have profoundly influenced it, namely those of 
Microparasitism and Macroparasitism. The former is familiar enough and relates to the many 
diseases which have afflicted mankind over time and strongly affected his geographical dis-
83 See note 81 Hofstede (1991) p. 113 
84 ibid p.112 
85 Mintzberg H (1989) Mintzberg on Management: inside our strange World of Organizations, New York: Free Press p.260 
86 ibid p.283 
87 ibid p.277 
88 McNeill, W. Plagues and Peoples. (1998) New York, Anchor Books p.366. The American historian ex Professor of His-
tory at the University of Chicago, President of the American Historical Association in 1985 and winner of the Erasmus Prize 
1996; 'an annual award given for exceptional contributions to European Culture, Society, and Social Science,' 
S9 ibid. 
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tribution and numbers; the latter is more controversial and covers human behaviour to humans 
as a whole, and warfare90and civilisation91are both classified as belonging to this category al-
though obviously one is more benevolent than the other. He makes clear that often the two 
forms can work together as a whole, although this need not always be the case. For the thesis 
the use that he makes of organic analogies and descriptions of disease to enable analysis of 
human behaviour in history is of particular interest. To the reader unfamiliar with McNeill's 
work a quotation now follows which is illustrative of the book as a whole: 
'Before proceeding further with disease history, it is worth pointing out the parallels between 
the Microparasitism of the infectious disease and the Macroparasitism of military operations. 
Only when civilised communities had built up a certain level of wealth and skill did war and 
raiding become an economically viable enterprise. But seizing the harvest by force, if it led to 
speedy death of the agricultural work force from starvation, was an unstable form of Macro-
parasitism. Nevertheless, such events happened often enough, and deserve to be compared 
with parasitic invasions like the African rinderpest of 1891 that also destroyed the hosts in 
such numbers as to inhibit the establishment of any stable, ongoing infectious pattern. Very 
early in civilised history, successful raiders became conquerors, i.e., learned how to rob agri-
culturalists in such a way as to take from them some but not all of the harvest By trial and 
error a balance could and did arise, whereby cultivators could survive such prédation by pro-
ducing more grain and other crops than were needed for their own maintenance. Such sur-
pluses may be viewed as the antibodies appropriate to human Macroparasitism. A successful 
government immunizes those who pay rent and taxes against catastrophic raids and foreign 
invasion in the same way that a low grade infection can immunize its host against lethally dis-
astrous disease invasion. Disease immunity arises by stimulating the formation of antibodies 
and raising other physiological defences to a heightened level of activity; governments im-
prove immunity to foreign Macroparasitism by stimulating surplus production of food and 
raw materials sufficient to support specialists in violence in suitably large numbers with ap-
propriate weaponry. Both defence reactions constitute burdens on the host populations, but a 
burden less onerous than periodic exposure to sudden lethal disaster. The result of establish-
ing successful governments is to create a vastly more formidable society vis-à-vis other hu-
man communities , . . Macroparasitism leading to the development of powerful military and 
political organization therefore has its counterpart in the biological defences human popula-cn 
tions create when exposed to the Microparasitism of bacteria and viruses.' 
Part of his broad analysis of human history identifies certain patterns which run together. As 
with the Papal analysis which is mentioned next; history shows that aspects of the Community 
project are not new but rather old patterns expressed in modern circumstances. Periods of sa-
vage warfare within a certain geographical region have historically given rise to a new gov-
ernmental system and a large bureaucracy often with a new ideological religious ethos at-
tached guiding the officiais' behaviour. Thus the Chinese wars which ended in 202 BC with 
the emergence of the Han dynasty saw, 'Internal peace secured by an imperial bureaucratic 
administration probably diminished the costs to the peasantiy inherent in earlier chronic war-
fare. Yet the Han peace also meant consolidation of a double layer of human Macroparasites 
upon peasant rice (and millet fields).'93Preventing the parasitism from becoming intolerable 
and maybe thus keeping it working in favour of the peasants was 'The propagation of Con-
fusian culture among imperial officials and private landowners internalized an ethic that 
strenuously restrained arbitrary or innovative use of power. One critical consequence was to 
90 See note 88 McNeill (1998) p.72 
91 ibid p . I l l 
92 ibid p.72-73 
93 ibid p. 100 
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keep exactions imposed upon the peasantry within traditional and, under most circumstances, 
tolerable limits.'94The 400 year reign of the Han showed the success of this balance. Some-
thing similar happened with the rise of the Roman Emperors out of the civil wars, and the 
emergence of an imperial cult with the growing bureaucracy and officials bound to the Royal 
family, although the peace achieved was more tenuous, and military influence was greater, 
possibly owing to the previous Republic and memories of it. The major World Wars which 
wracked Europe and the subsequent growth of an EU bureaucracy geared to ensuring peace 
are part of the endless pattern of major warfare followed by an ideologically oriented bureauc-
racy bringing peace. But the EU bureaucracy is still another laver of officialdom95 and so 
from the McNeill perspective a 'double layer of macroparasites,' 6as the following quotation 
shows when it stresses the extra governance created, T h e EU's existence as an extra level or 
layer of governance that has been "fused" onto the Nation State.'97 
We can now stop and take stock of progress so far, Mintzberg's theory categorizes organiza-
tions and suggests that some are problematic or, using the terms of the thesis, 'pathological' 
in their form, McNeill's theory places human governmental systems firmly in the natural bio-
logical world, something Mintzberg toys with as well when he discusses the life cycle of or-
ganizations and their deaths. In principle some types of organisations seem to start life in one 
of his five forms and develop but they can suffer from intense internal politics and 'die.' So-
me adopt another of the five forms which allows them to recover.98In order to govern the 
complex, violent world of the European political environment dominated by Macroparasitical 
warfare behaviour and powerful, dominant actors the Commission - High Authority had to be 
a rather new Macroparasite, with a range of capabilities in order to operate in a potentially 
hostile environment. It would have to be a curious organization, multifaceted, flexible and 
able to adapt to face new multiple dangers from: national bureaucracies, political actors, lob-
byists. It would have to deviate from the 'norms' in order to avoid being quickly recognized 
and eliminated as 'foreign bodies' would quickly be, and in order to perform its tasks success-
fully. The examples of the initial Russian Revolution and the attempts by a range of Nation 
States to eliminate it by invasion, or the similar moves against the French revolutionary state 
illustrate this. Comparing the Commission to the MSs of the time is like comparing the 'sim-
ple' cell in the body with a virus. Mintzberg's theory should capture the uniqueness of form 
of the Commission in its Macroparasitical glory. 
The thesis is in full agreement with McNeill's application of the title Macroparasitism to war-
fare as a whole, and also to civilisation and develops from this definition a view of the Com-
munity project as a very necessary inoculation to prevent any further outbreak of more lethal 
Macroparasitism in Europe. The full details of this notion will become readily apparent later. 
1.1.4 MEDIEVAL PAPACY- EU MODEL 
Following on from the use of broad considerations of human politics and histoty to approach 
the Community and develop an appropriate theory, the similarities of the Medieval Papacy 
with the Community are added to round off the theory, as both have behaved similarly and 
been affected by the points raised in the last three sections and is therefore of interest, and 
04 See note 88 McNeill (1998) p. 101 
95 Van Schendelen, R. Machiavel!i in Brussels third edition (2003) Amsterdam, Amsterdam Univerity Press p.67 In addition 
to the format number of officials in the Commission there is also a large assistant bureaucracy of officials from a range of 
sources who are involved and employed indirectly in the EU 
% See note 88 McNeill (1998) p. 100 
97 See note I Peterson; Bomberg (1999), p.5 
98 See note 85 Mintzberg (1989) p.283 
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since the Papacy is rather more venerable it can also assist in the analysis. The book; 'EU: 
Papacy Reincarnated?' written by myself, examined the many similarities between the two 
systems of government and should allow an organic analysis of both to be made, more details 
on the book are given later. Given that the similarities are present the lessons from the medie-
val Papal period should be able to provide insights into the younger European project of the 
EU. 
Briefly put, the military anarchy that resulted from the break up of the Carolingian Empire 
and the invasions of Western Europe by various nationalities resulted in a state of chaos 
which the Church strove to contain. The weakened Germanic Empire which emerged was de-
pendent on the church to administer what government there was. There was increasing need 
for new government methods as written laws became important and the old Imperial system 
with its over-dependence on personal rule by the Monarchs broke down. The Papacy essen-
tially stepped into the vacuum and provided the idealistic, knowledge based organisation, nee-
ded to round off the period of instability. As churchmen were the expert, educated govern-
ment in most monarchies, so the Papacy was in a position of enjoying an information monop-
oly. Initially a growing layer of church employed bureaucratic experts took over government 
in the Kingdoms and in Rome, and not only ensured peace but provided the necessary eco-
nomic impulses needed to revive Western European countries and to allow for their expansion 
in the near future. Over time the Kingdoms learnt the lessons of government, took over the 
experts and were able to rule without the Papacy 
1.2 IMMUNIZATION THEORY OF INTEGRATION 
1.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having introduced the main theories that the thesis will use and also the Immunization theory 
itself, we will now explore the latter in greater depth. In general the EU is a project which 
proceeds by crises and convulsions. At times it appears almost to have been feverish and fac-
ing imminent collapse" if not death. Observation and consideration of the literature suggest 
that the evolution of the EU is just that, an organic process with the evolution of a govern-
mental system. Hallstein seemed to consider that there was a sort of 'automatic endogenous 
dynamic' which contained 'an in-built logic leading to further integration in Europe; the 
Commission was given the historic task of pushing for and executing an inevitable "law" of 
European evolution.'100Acceptance of this point and awareness of the work of McNeill, allow 
the generation of a variety of organic models which can be of explanatory and or illustrative 
value in analysis of the EU and in particular the Commission. Whilst a range of organic mod-
els can be used in the study of the EU,101an immunization model is developed by the thesis. It 
99 See note 18 Wallace (1990) p. 81 'Between 1969 and 1979 the European Community...and recovered from the collapse of 
the plan to launch a more modest European monetary system.' 
100 Rometsch, D and Wessels, W. The Commission and the Council of the Union in Edwards G (ed) The European Commis-
sion, (1997) Cartermill, London p.2I6 
101 Bacteria are a pathogen which generally makes its host ill not by devouring it as such but rather by generating toxic by 
products which then make the host ill. A certain amount of toxins may serve to heat and ameliorate another more dangerous 
illness but too many and the host will be overcome. Legislation is just such a toxin, in moderate doses it is helpful if not vital 
to the health of a society, too much and rigidity and suffocation can result. It might seem controversial to associate legislation 
with toxins but following McNeill's linkage of political/military structures and civilisation as a whole to Macroparasitism it 
is just a further logical step. Laws are negative insofar as they restrict or forbid something usually a certain activity; in ex-
cess, of course, they will either lead to no activity or via inflation to themselves becoming worthless and not implemented. 
The resources which are required to make and enforce legislation are considerable and have to be taken from other activities, 
probably more obviously productive and wealth generating ones. Certainly there is a balance in society about how much eco-
nomic activity can be absorbed to deal with legislative activity. It is easy enough to argue that most laws are beneficial in 
some way, in fact it is very hard to argue the opposite which is why law making has been so successful an occupation. The 
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uses McNeill's 'Macroparasitical' outline of an immunization process as a starting point; the 
European project is certainly in accordance with McNeill's theory as a warfare prevention 
scheme. It is important to stress that the European project is not over, the process is not com-
plete and the same is true of the immunization process detailed below. A further point is that 
organic immunization is an exceedingly complex field, where the experts are themselves 
seemingly unsure about exactly how the various organic elements interact and what exactly 
happens, and thus the field has a provisional feel about it at times although it is an essential 
branch of medical science. 
Several aspects of the work of McNeill examine the parallels between organic disease and 
human equivalents and consideration of a section of the quotation already provided from his 
work supports the inoculation idea.I02The High Authority - Commission functioned like a low 
level disease, soft warfare, with warfare characteristics. It mimicked the effects of war for 
MSs with occupation of key industries in competing MSs, and seizure of their economic re-
sources often those with military potential. Other economic benefits accruing to MS govern-
ments came via trade. Alliances of MSs would be formed to pressurise other MSs, another 
foreign policy standard tactic, and to press their causes. Collaboration of competing MS na-
tional officials and ministers was openly encouraged by the High Authority -Commission via 
the engrenage method discussed later. The European project was substituted for war and re-
placed it, creating in the process a new layer of bureaucrats in Brussels and in the MSs. This 
was a new layer of civilisation, which carried costs, and a form of Macroparasitism as defined 
by McNeill, but in more beneficial form. The inoculation perspective of European integration 
is supported by the essentially positive effects of the European project, from a human per-
spective, initially at least, rather than the brutal, savage ones that seem to accompany the pure 
Macroparasitism of warfare. The species of Nation States of the EU, the MSs, were success-
fully inoculated against the all too frequent plague of warfare which had dominated its his-
tory, in its place economic competition generated wealth improvements. Surplus population, 
the important ingredient for Macroparasitism was initially not present in Western Europe, 
later it was accommodated by the new economic wealth created, 
In order to understand the structure of the High Authority - Commission it is necessary to 
consider more closely the political-social-economic reality that it was developed in. Then it 
can be seen as an excellent immunization for a Western Europe worried about war, suffering 
from mutual mistrust, economic crises, and ideologies. Indeed the confused, pathological state 
of Europe after the Second World War required a remarkable organisation to remedy the ma-
EU is the main regulator of the most regulated societies in the world The result has been in the EU that some legislation 
seeming to benefit all helped some sectors more than others, and non implementation has increased. This last point, com-
bined with the use of Commission Legislation Impact Assessment procedures to raise legislative standards and the declared 
goal of the Commission to reduce (he amount of legislation currently available, prove that the generation of legislation has 
reached deleterious levels requiring attention. Statements from the Commission of less but better, and slowing down legisla-
tive production, and striving to raise standards reflects the toxin status that some legislation has been having. 
Its abundance and wholesale production has much to do with the Commission logic that surrounds it. This has been exten-
sively examined in the chapter on DG ENV and the willingness and ability of officials to use windows of opportunity to get 
legislation through. Basically, the officials need to generate quality legislation to obtain status and associated benefits in the 
Commission which itself is most protective of its rights to initiate legislation, and guard the treaties. The generation of legis-
lation seems to be of greater importance to politicians and officials than its actual effectiveness and in the EU case whether or 
not it has been implemented (Peters B.G. 'Agenda Setting in the European Community' Journal of European Public Policy 
vol. 1 no.l 1994 p.21. ..prospects for agenda setting appear to be almost the opposite of the rather gloomy scenario for im-
plementation.' in Nugent, N (ed) At the heart of the Union, second edition, (2000) Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 2000 
p.279)Thus MS non implementation is possibly a smaller price for the Commission and its staff to pay than generating less or 
no legislation at all101. Which also helps explain the growing reluctance of DG ENV to over zealously pursue infringement 
proceedings against the MSs with regard to environmental legislation. One of the results of which could be political and 
mean the Commission being allowed to produce even less legislation. From a MS 'host* perspective non implementation 
without excessive penalties is like being immunized against a toxin, there is no reaction to its presence. (Peters B.G. 'Agenda 
Setting in the European Community' Journal of European Public Policy vol.1 no.l 1994 p.21) 
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ny negative forces that had dominated the continent. The twenty odd years between the two 
wars had seen an extraordinary mixing of the political, social and economic spheres which 
have to be considered in their theoretical 'pathological' enormity, to see the Commission and 
the EU in a true light. Several Nation States with Democratic Parliamentarian structures had 
come to be dominated by ideological parties, determined to destroy both the Nation States and 
their political structures; Communists wanted a borderless workers' paradise reached by vio-
lent revolution; Nazi's raised up race above everything, even borders, and had not a whiff of 
respect for 'weak' democratic structures; Italian Fascists wanted a Roman Empire again and 
not just their borders. All these three had little problem with marching over other people's 
borders and waging warfare if necessary, ideological ends justified inhumane means. Some 
Nation States were riven with savage, internal conflict with their respective political-social-
economic establishments even contriving at times with the removal of their own political 
structures as happened with the Weimar Republic. Finally, of course, came the absolute dicta-
torships, annihilation of internal political dissent and partial replacement of it with bureau-
cratic - economic division and strife. Economically, depression, inflation, protectionism, cor-
poratism, were the order of the day, finally topped off by national bankruptcy concealed for a 
time by the Second World War. Tribute and occupation rather than trade were pursued by the 
European Nation States in their dealings with each other with the German-Italian occupation 
of France, the Netherlands and Belgium and much of Eastern Europe, and then the German 
occupation of Northern Italy and finally the allied occupation of Germany and Italy, Vast 
numbers of workers and populations in general were shipped over borders, along with raw 
resources in a form of tribute to keep the various manpower starved economies going. In addi-
tion of course came intolerance, rampant nationalism, hatred and warfare. After the end of the 
war came the period of the cold war which was heightening during the period in which the 
ECSC and EEC were founded. Thus war in its many forms and effects can be seen to have 
dominated the thoughts of many. The Commission, and High Authority before it, had to have 
a pretty unique range of capabilities to match the impressively, unique range of deficiencies 
prevalent in Western Europe then. Thus the High Authority - Commission would be expected 
to be 'pathological' and deviant from the standard democratic 'norm' to deal with the Euro-
pean political-social-economic scene after the war. The political systems after the First World 
War had been simply unable to adjust to accommodate the new forces unleashed. Their peo-
ples' pressing needs were all too easily combined with 'new' ideologies which were able to 
contest with the democratic political systems. The European project would offer alternatives 
not just opposition to the new forces. It would also provide an alternative to the failed system 
and method of managing European inter state relations. 
A brilliant tactic of the European project was to offer elements of what a majority of the vari-
ous political, social actors and forces wanted and needed, but not the extremes which were 
demanded. It immunized Western Europe from the extremes. To those that wanted rational 
control over resources rather than rampant capitalism and cartels it offered technocratic con-
trol of competition in limited sectors. To those that wanted revolution and a new system, it 
offered gradual, partial revolution and change, steps towards a European Utopia. To the war-
like competitive instincts of the MSs, it offered trade competition and control (shared) over 
neighbouring Nation States' economic resources. To Nation State nationalism it offered Eu-
ropean nationalism. It brought a mission based, but non violent ideology to cancel out the o-
ther more dangerous and potentially violent ideologies; supranationality to cancel out exces-
sive nationalism combined with Nation State anarchy; an emphasis on non political govern-
mental activity to cancel out the political domination of all other aspects of society found un-
der dictatorship; non democratic, but limited bureaucratic efficiency to cancel out the unlim-
ited, destructive bureaucratic efficiency which had finally been plagued by illogical competi-
tion in the dictatorships; self serving, rigid, national bureaucracies would be opposed by flexi-
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bility and lateral thinking technocrats able to prioritize and so achieve efficiency; trade and 
competition tinged with corporatism would gradually cancel out the protectionist corporatism 
of the dictatorships. Idealist, non - aligned, rational individuals would decide politically sen-
sitive sectors rather than politicians and demagogues. The same individuals would offer po-
litical leadership for further European integration to balance out the opposite tendencies in 
MSs. 
The analogy most fitting the basic facts and functioning of the Commission and Union is that 
it is like observing a beneficial 'pathogen'/ irritant of sorts at work, most likely an organisa-
tional immunity jab which was designed for a specific purpose. Examination of immunization 
techniques reveals that there are two main methods of performing it and they are; Active Im-
munization and Passive Immunization. Passive Immunization involves the injection of anti-
bodies directly into the organic host and does not require any direct involvement of the host's 
immune system; it makes up for the immune deficiencies currently present. It is stated to have 
a shorter term effect than Active Immunization. Unlike Passive Immunization, Active Immu-
nization creates long term effects by the injection of a disabled version of a real pathogen or 
elements of it into the host. The host's immune system is stimulated or provoked to react to 
the pathogen and to generate antibodies of various forms to destroy it. The immune system 
retains memory of the essential elements of the weakened pathogen and is able to destroy any 
sign of the real pathogen on its penetration of the body's outer defences. Vaccines are, in ef-
fect, generating a much modified version of the disease in the host and some are quite capable 
of producing similar symptoms. 
Where the European project is concerned it appears to function as a dual vaccine, with both a 
Passive and an Active Immunization occurring to the Nation State hosts. On the one hand the 
Higher Authority-Commission contained most of the antibodies required in a Passive Immu-
nization form to neutralize and provide immediate protection from the pathological elements 
in Western Europe in the 1940's and 1950's. As such it was essential for the survival of the 
Nation States and democracy. By neutralizing the many dangers to both, the European project 
ensured their survival; consideration of the work of Millward provides ample evidence that 
the European project enabled Nation States to survive, deal with internal enemies and reinvent 
themselves.10 It would seem that this immunization was expected and intended by Monnet 
and the founding fathers. On the other hand the introduction of the Higher Authority-
Commission with their antibodies, which were also 'pathological' from a 'pure' democratic 
perspective and no doubt seemed to some to be rather similar in certain points to the recent 
regimes many Europeans had suffered under (they could be said to be uncontrolled bureau-
cratic dictatorships of sorts) then generated, probably unintentionally, a democratic and Na-
tion State reaction. Antibodies were generated in the form of the various other European insti-
tutions which then set up to surround and control the 'pathogen'. This point will be returned 
to later but the broad concepts need to be laid out now. That Monnet and others expected or 
planned for a future federal government is probable, quite possibly with similar institutions to 
those which sprang up when they did, but he did not expect it to happen so organically and 
quickly. It was certainly a bit unrealistic in a democratic political environment to expect the 
democratic and Nation State institutional safeguards of the EP and the Council to be missing 
from the ECSC. Monnet's final acceptance of institutions like the European Council as being 
useful and necessary seems to indicate that the project was not totally against the involvement 
of politicians, if it had to be, only the manner and speed with which their involvement oc-
curred as well as their often suspicious attitude to the Higher Authority-Commission was not 
expected or desired. Possibly their negative attitude was why they were intended for the end 
of the project rather than the beginning. But having European institutions like the Council and 
m Millward, A. The European rescue of (he Nation States, (2000) London, Routledge 
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the European Parliament was and is a defence against rabid nationalism and military build-
ups. Apart from anything else national elites are forced to work together to contain the High 
Authority - Commission, and this being forced together to work on a common, collective so-
lution was also one of Monnet's principles. Without the passive immunization, at least in the 
air as it were, the active immunization would not have been so likely, as it was both occurred. 
We can now consider the basic structure of the vaccine itself, the High Authority - Commis-
sion, but in particular the Commission, contains a mixture of governmental arms and types of 
governmental structure which is thought provoking. It is possible to see federal elements quite 
clearly in its institutions and legal system and consider the Commission to look like a federal 
executive. Monnet saw federalism as a process of problem solving in which 'elements of fed-
eral powers and institutions' were installed as they helped to solve certain problems; higher 
authority and the Commission were to contain these and deliberately 'lead' the process.104 
This view was held by Monnet and Delors and emphasises the build up of federal power in 
institutions step by step and the ECSC institutions can be seen as standard federal ones 'pre-
figured.'105Other authors play down the federal elementsl06but stress that the Commission is 
certainly political; certainly the Commission of today would need some major overhauling 
before being fit to be called a federal government. These authors offer four possible roles for 
the Commission, that it is an: 'Enlightened technocracy'; 'Federal government'; 'Expert and 
administrative secretariat'; 'Promotional broker'. 107Whilst accepting that there are or were 
elements of these to be observed, they state that the Commission is a 'co-player with political 
ambitions,' to the Council. 108The Commission is able to be different things at different times 
and different things at the same time with different political players. This ambiguity is a great 
strength and it means that the institution has the potential at any moment to act in a different 
unpredictable manner. With a Hallstein or Delors it can be perceived by some to be a dynamic 
proto federal government increasing the federal elements of the EU; at the same time under 
Hallstein the technocratic elements were very clear.109After both the leaders came a period 
when the Commission appeared to be little more than an international bureaucracy. As will be 
argued all these elements are present all the time, emerging as is possible or required, which is 
reflected in the ability of Intergovernmentalists and federalists to see what they expect to see 
for most of the major Treaty conferences. More recently President Prodi is stated to have 
shown leanings towards the federal model for the Commission; 'The early decisiveness 
shown by Prodi in declaring the Commission to be a putative government, which led him to 
locate Commissioners and their cabinets in the same premises as the Directorates-General for 
which they are responsible - just as ministers in the Member States are based in their depart-
ments - has not been followed up. ,110The interesting point is the wide range of possibilities for 
the Commission, and that each of these models has been perceived to be present in it, to a 
greater or lesser extent depending on the author. If the academic audience are ambivalent or 
even confused about the organisation they have observed for the last fifty odd years then the 
Council and others will be equally so. 
The High Authority - Commission, are in a way, a miniature, complete governmental system 
folded into one organisation, the vaccine's viral RNA as it were, This gradually provokes the 
growth of the appropriate governmental arms in the MSs over time, hence the idea of winning 
104 Dinan, D (ed) Encyclopedia of the European Union (2000) London, Lynne Rienner Publishers p.231-233 
105 ibid p.233 
m See note 100 Rometsch; Wessels (1997) p.218-219 
107 ibid p.215 
108 ibid p.235 
109 ibid p.216 
110 Kassim, H and Menon, A. EU Member States and the Prodi Commission in Dimitrakopoulos.D, D. (ed) The changing 
European Commission (2004) Manchester, Manchester University Press p. 100 
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over the MS officials to be the governmental arms that the supranational brain would guide. 
Policy networks no doubt being, at first at least, a useful tool in this process. At least one au-
thor considers that the national administrations have been fused into the EU framework.1 n O f 
course, the final complete governmental body, an equivalent of that of a MS or the USA is not 
present yet, what we have is the gradually forming of a blue print network. Giving things up 
is anathema to such an organization and indeed against its ethos and mission to accrue politi-
cal power and competences. On arrival in an unprepared host an infection can expect to have 
the element of surprise on its side and to spread rapidly with few defences to overcome. The 
initial sweeping success of the Commission and the Community project reflect just such an 
advantage. The new organisation, with its blend of idealism and expertise, was extremely 
adapt at getting past the defences of the hosts and spreading its message or 'genetic code' of 
Europeanism to the officials and politicians it met. In effect acting like a virus and using the 
resources of the host's cells to produce more 'European' officials willing to join the project. 
The High Authority before and the Commission later were intended by their founders to be 
the government of the new European sphere of political-economic interaction. The other insti-
tutions were added as unintended and at first unwanted controlling factors on the 'true' gov-
ernmental layer. Both the supranational authorities were called upon to perform a range of 
activities involving all the traditional arms of government,112as the central European govern-
mental layer, generating the legislation and carrying out the organisation needed to perform 
its tasks, what else could they have done. The current legacy of European institutions which 
have roles which are not clearly defined enough and seem to overlap, originates in the differ-
ing perspectives present in the 1950s, from those who saw the supranational organizations as 
government enough and those who wanted to add safeguards in a somewhat ad hoc manner. 
The notion of the Commission being a compressed, compacted European government in wait-
ing is helpful in explaining a series of paradoxes which have continued up to the present de-
spite the existence of the other European institutions. The Commission is political, legal and 
bureaucratic and it is hard to separate these at any point. It is political without being democ-
ratic and weakly bureaucratic without even remotely shaping up to the Weberian ideal as will 
be shown. It is as well to consider the definition of the word 'political' at this point, it is de-
fined as 'of or relating to the state, government, the body politic, public administration, policy 
making etc, 'n3and seems contrasted to the work of administration. By this definition the 
whole of the Commission is particularly political in the last meaning of the word, 'policy ma-
king' and only weakly connected to 'state, government, the body politic.' This is both its 
strength and weakness, and explains the lack of responsibility which it sometimes seems to 
show and also its impotence. If the full definition could be brought to bear on the Commission 
and of course the Union insofar as it relates to the Commission, then it would be healthily po-
litical and in the modern era inevitably democratic. The Commission can in fact appear to be, 
more or less, any of three governmental arms. It has legislative powers, executive ones and 
even judicial to the point where it is said to have all the trias politica ' . . . it plays the role not 
just of policeman but also of judge and jury.'114It is stated to be the 'executive arm of Com-
munity governance, ultimately responsible for ensuring the effective implementation of the 
policies decided upon by the Council of the Union.'11 And it is stated to be 'the major EU 
legislator.'116As the guardian of the treaties it is also said to be 'enforcer of Community legis-
111 Wessels, W referred to see note 23 Wallace; Wallace (2000) p.532 
112 Nugent, N. Themes and Prospects in At (he Heart of the Union (2000) Basingstoke, MacMillan press p.293 
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26 
117 lation. Its activities would normally be performed by 'elected politicians' at a national or 
internal level and not officials.118 
Some general comments should be made on the Commission's organisational form which can 
be and has been exceptionally effective for what it was intended to achieve. The Commission 
has been described as porous and open to the policy-making environment.Ii9This could be 
seen as a weakness when facing well regimented ministries and sometimes this is the case but 
it has also the virtue of making maximum use of top quality personnel resources. Most of the 
tasks of the majority of the officials in the Commission reflect the tasks of the organisation as 
a whole, which explains why it is called a flat organisation by some. Each official (policy ma-
king official) represents the Commission in a very full capacity in dealings with the Council, 
advisory committees etc. They are in a sense mini Commissions, to use the pathogen termi-
nology they contain the full RNA and genetic code of the organisation to spread on, and are 
empowered, with the Commission's legal position and role and the supranational sovereignty 
available to it, to make legislation with considerable discretion allowed and to act like diplo-
mats in running and organising dossier networks. They perform, almost exactly, the full range 
of tasks associated with the Commission itself.12012 Combined with the Commission's po-
wers they represent the spikes on the virus, perfectly formed, and ready, to dock onto MS go-
vernmental levels. The notion of surface area of compounds in physics also comes to mind; 
basically the greater the surface area a compound exposes to heat or another compound the 
greater possibility there is of a reaction taking place. Thus sawdust is highly inflammable and 
a piece of wood less so. If an experiment is to work fast and involve the maximum amount of 
the other compound or heat, then increasing surface area is paramount. If the Commission had 
been rigid from the start and only permitted a minimum of interaction between its staff and 
the policy-making environment then little reaction would have taken place. The sheer open-
ness and loose structure of the Commission has traditionally allowed highly expert officials to 
fully exploit their skills and at the same time encourage national officials to have full access 
to them and to share somewhat in this discretion. Monnet's idea of engrenage, which is exam-
ined later, and having a loose structure for the Commission was perfect to promote fast reac-
tions and in the early days of the EEC this meant fast integration. Of course increasing the 
discretion of officials is a sensible way of compensating for restrictions in resources, it maxi-
mises the possible policy-making transactions that each officials can have. The flexibility and 
porous quality of the Commission has been extremely effective in allowing the officials to 
gain large amounts of information from the MSs and other groups and to achieve dramatic 
tactical moves which catch the MSs off guard; 'This bureaucratic openness is an important 
cause of the sometimes quite dramatic changes in EU policy as draft Directives are revised 
following diverse representations from affected groups. This can "throw" national govern-
ments as much as it can interest groups.'123This point was also discussed in the core-periphery 
theory mentioned earlier. It underscores the notion that the core, the EU institutions, has to be 
porous in order to gain the initial input of information from the peripheiy on which it de-
pends, which then enables, in particular, the Commission to exploit its information surplus.124 
117 Usher. J. 'The Commission an the Law in Edwards and Spence in Edwards G (ed) The European Commission, (1997) 
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Another important quality that porous materials have is that they have plenty of surface area 
for bonding to take place on. This explains why materials like clay have traditionally been 
used to encourage bone formation when repairing fractures or broken limbs, as well as in ma-
king the joints of some artificial limbs. So again the openness of the Commission was ideal 
for building up EEC wide policy networks and finally a governmental layer that could be cal-
led a polity of sorts. After a while though, the general rule will be that bone and clay become 
so intermeshed that their separate identity is lost, the clay served its purpose in helping the 
body to heal itself. 
Another important element in the structure of the 'pathogen* and vaccine is its defences, the 
most important of which, for the Commission, has been to alter its outer form to that most ap-
propriate to its external environment. When talking about Commission forms, inevitably the 
topic of its bureaucracy and bureaucratisation crops up. The Commission has, after all, often 
been criticised for having an extremely old fashioned, archaic, bureaucratic organisational 
structure requiring reform.,25If the Commission were dependent on its organisational structure 
to work effectively and efficiently as the bearer of the supranational idea, then it would indeed 
need reform. But the archaic elements are part of its identity and in combination with its po-
litical elements the key to its being different from MS ministries. For the staff, rigid bureau-
cratic elements are evaded by using complex internal networks and so as a real bureaucratic 
control they usually lack teeth, an example being that a communication between staff and 
management in one DG is required officially to go via the entire process of receiving signa-
tures from the various levels of the hierarchy, in practise a parallel means of communication 
using e mails is in more frequent use. Under Santer and Prodi the amount of bureaucratic 
tasks that the officials were required to do by the College soared. A range of bureaucratic re-
forms began which meant adopting merit based strategies and modern management methods 
of working. The bureaucratisation seems and seemed to many to be negative and a waste of 
skilled personnel's abilities but maybe they are not as negative and random as appears to be 
the case. There seems to be a pattern to Commission bureaucratisation and it recurs as a re-
sponse to a problematic situation and the reforms show some signs of becoming another fea-
ture of bureaucratisation and in the negative sense of word too. There often seems to be super-
ficial bureaucratisation for a period which does not seem to be intended to be complete and 
total, but rather a survival tactic, but more on that later. 
We will now move on from the organisation of the High Authority - Commission to the EU 
environment in which they were active. Logically enough the EU which the Commission has 
helped construct and has evidently affected seems to contain several possible governmental 
systems and their respective structures both implicitly and explicitly. Whilst it seems strange 
to say that a political system is: Federal, Confederal, a Technocracy all at the same time, this 
is seemingly the case with the EU. Some authors see federalism very clearly in the TEU;126o-
thers see the treaty as continuing 'the EEC trend of underlining the role of the Coun-
cil.'127Thus the ambivalence of the central organization has had a knock on effect on the gov-
ernmental system as a whole. 
What becomes apparent, quite quickly, is that the Commission in particular, but also the EU 
as a whole, by not being clearly any specific type of organisation evade the usual natural con-
trols which would apply at every level. A normal bureaucracy with the Commission's power 
would have more controls applied to it and be held directly accountable to a political author-
ity; a political executive would be accountable to voters; usually an international secretariat 
125 See note 30 Edwards; Spence ( 1997) p. 17 
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has less powers than the Commission and serves its members more who provide the legitima-
tion and control. This lack of control permeates the EU and Commission: Weberian control 
over staff in the Commission by its hierarchy and College is difficult as will be seen; control 
of individual Commissioners by anybody was particularly problematic and is still so to an ex-
tent today; control of the Council and COREPER is equally difficult. Legal recourse is gener-
ally available only for actions of the EU not so much in how it is organised and performing 
although staff can bring cases in it. The whole pattern of the EU and Commission is therefore 
one of lack of control, in part since no-one is altogether clear about what sort of organisations 
they are and how they should function. Any control seems to be linked to a limitation of pow-
ers or so it is perceived in the Commission. Absence of limitation is perhaps understandable 
for an organisation which wants to evolve freely and keep its options open, particularly if its 
future is unclear. As we will see, resistance to reform and control exists at every level of the 
Commission, and is linked to a tradition of resistance to controls of any sort. In part a healthy 
suspicion of other institution's goals of limiting the Commission's competences explains this, 
but this suspicion and actions taken on it, can only lead to suspicion in other institutions, like 
the EP in the case of OLAF the EU anti fraud agency which was seemingly resisted by the 
Commission but promoted by the EP. The OLAF question discussed later shows this quite 
nicely; the Commission ardently resisted any sort of control over its activities, although were 
it to be a normal bureaucracy or organisation more control would and should be and have 
been inevitable. 
The European project was not meant to be controllable, and certainly not until by a truly de-
mocratic European demos.128An end, an overall objective, was set and whatever means re-1 HQ 
quired would be tried to achieve it. The means would be changed as required and in an ex-
tremely pragmatic manner. It was not designed by a politician or a lawyer and it was not in-
tended to function in the traditional manner. It was designed by a statesman with extensive 
experience in various organisations and business and it was intended to be different, radically 
different. Usually constitutions are planned and drawn up by lawyer politicians and bear their 
general characteristics of orderly attempts at making an intelligible whole. Monnet planned 
the European project and whilst no doubt lawyer politicians and bureaucrats filled in the de-
tails the planning and underlying motives were decided elsewhere. 
The mixture found of government and tasks in the Commission is 'pathological' from a stan-
dard democratic standpoint where separation of powers, ministerial responsibility and ac-
countability are important. From a Weberian perspective it is 'pathological.' Weber saw bu-
reaucracy as being essentially neutral and owing allegiance to the political authority which 
directed and controlled it, and that this was essential in democratic regimes; the authority was 
then accountable for the actions of the ministries. A politicised bureaucracy that was its own 
master would have to be considered from a Weberian stand point to be 'pathological'. Bu-
reaucracies should be there for efficiency of delivery and political legitimacy must come from 
another source as must overall political guidance. He was fully aware of the dangerous trend 
that was present in the political - bureaucratic system which would leave the latter more in 
control of the former than was desirable, indeed he thought there was a degree of inevitability 
which was rather ominous; 'Weber argued that the conflict between capitalism and socialism 
must be extinguished by the triumph of bureaucracy, which would prove indispensable for the 
rational attainment of the goals of any organisation in industrial society. The result would be 
the creation of an increasingly centralised, increasingly impersonal and increasingly "routi-
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nised", kind of authority.'130The potential power of permanent tenure experts to set a corset 
around the activities of their shorter term political masters and to indirectly set a political 
agenda, in the interests of efficiency and the achievement of concrete goals rather than ab-
stract ones like democracy, is present in the Commission, but by itself it could be opposed by 
equally long tenure experts from the MSs. If however they can be combined then their politi-
cal masters will have increasing problems. An open porous Commission could encourage a 
shareholder mentality in MS officials, although over time there would be the danger that bu-
reaucratic divisions in sectors would replace political ones as bureaucracy replaced political 
power de facto. Ironically a MS official shareholder mentality would force even national poli-
ticians along the path of integration, the greater the officials cohesiveness the greater the inte-
gration over time. The Union is from a Weberian stand point 'pathological' in its bureaucratic 
functioning and broad organisation and the organisation of the Commission matches this, only 
a 'pathological' organisation can be expected to operate in the reality which is the Union. The 
Commission can also be expected to fall far short of basic Weberian requirements for a bu-
reaucracy in how it functions internally. The first major study of the Commission itself by 
Coombes showed the contradictory nature of its tasks and the ongoing problems that there 
have been with it; 'As Coombes pointed out, such diverse roles have demanded different 
types of organisation.'131 
There were more capabilities which the Commission needed to achieve its task, but the point 
is clear; its structure would have to be 'pathological' from a traditional theoretical point of 
view to achieve its tasks and contain many elements which were probably going to exist un-
easily next to each other. So long as its governmental niche was uncontested and the need for 
it was there, destructive internal forces could be channelled externally and contained inter-
nally, but when opposed then its frail unity could well unravel. More fundamentally, an or-
ganisation perfectly formed to remedy the bizarre circumstances of the 1950s, which carried 
out its task remarkably successfully to the point where the 1950s and its own organisation can 
from a modern stand point be considered 'pathological' and odd, can become a liability in the 
new environment. Monnet's lateral thinking move of changing the European inter-state envi-
ronment in which war occurred, from one dominated by politics to one dominated by technoc-
racy and bureaucracy, could finally result in bureaucratic disorders, 'disease,' becoming the 
rule of the day, with general fragmentation emerging from: sectoral fragmentation, turf wars, 
complexity and incoherence. There is also a tendency for bureaucrats to generate too much 
output legislation as a result of their fragmentation; this will be discussed in the chapter on 
DG ENV. 
In order to facilitate the development of the theory we will now proceed to refine the defini-
tions of'Commission' as the 'pathogen' and 'MS' for the following theory somewhat; what 
the theorist is observing are snapshots of the state of a process and the latest predominance of 
one of the two basic ingredients; the Monnet Method located at the heart of suprantionalism 
and Democratic Parliamentarianism (DP), by Democratic Parliamentarianism is meant the 
traditional governmental structure, rationale and methods of the Nation States in much of 
western Europe. This somewhat unlikely pair have been considered to need each other and 
this is the case. And yet they should not, according to a traditional political perspective, exist 
harmoniously together in the structures that they have formed but rather compete. This has, in 
fact, been the case and the forces of the Monnet Method and DP have constantly striven to 
take over the leadership role and DP has sought to return the supranational element to a sub-
130 Scruton, R. A dictionary of Political Thought, 1982 Basingstoke, Macmillan p.46 
131 See note 30 Edwards; Spence (1997) p.5 
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servient position. The supranational elements have, not surprisingly, withstood this effec-
tively enough over time. The result of the struggle for dominance is the EU as it is today. No 
real equilibrium has been reached rather a plateaux and abatement of conflict whilst one side 
or the other regroups. Now the basic actors in the drama, DP and the Monnet Method will be 
examined. 
1,2.2 DEMOCRATIC PARLIAMENTARISM AND ITS BENEFITS 
Nation States seem historically to, in some manner, generate systems of government which 
enable them to survive. In the 1930's betrayed by capitalism which had appeared to under-
write them and faced by dissolution in a Communist Eurasian wide revolution, the Nation 
States and their ruling establishments seem to have been tacitly willing to accept various right 
wing, or rabidly nationalist, fascist systems of government which sprang up, kitted out with 
ideologies and a willingness to meet revolution with more violence and 'illegal' methods of 
suppression than a democracy could have done. Survival required such extraordinary systems 
and many in the establishments seem to have thought they could use the new systems of gov-
ernment. However like many reflex reactions, which serve in the short term but are problem-
atic in the long term, the right wing nationalist, racist systems of government used the Nation 
States and, in particular, their economic and military resources to achieve their own survival 
and agenda. Extraordinary situations maybe required extraordinary governmental systems but 
once those situations were past, the general rule settled in again, that Democratic Parliamen-
tarianism was the best of a bad lot of governmental systems. In combination with the promise 
of economic improvements and a European organization to form a bulwark against Commu-
nism and Fascism, Nation States reverted once again to Democratic Parliamentarianism. Al-
though it has to be said there was great belief in state planning which Monnet excelled in 
France with his Commissariat du Plan. Before going further it is necessary to say a few words 
about Monnet's Commissariat which will be referred to throughout the next chapters. 
The Commissariat du Plan which Monnet created to modernize France seems to have served 
as one of the important sources of inspiration for him in the creation of the ECSC High Au-
thority. The Commissariat's most important goal was to organize the priorities and so the 
work of the other national ministries. It served to coordinate their efforts and 'to submit to the 
government "practical proposals concerning France's essential industries and the targets to be 
attained within a stated time."' l34It was to be small, flexible and somewhat vague in its de-
tailed operation. It was not to be bureaucratic like the ministries it was organising and it was 
to be directly attached to the Prime Minister's office to 'command the widest authority'.135 If 
it sank down from its almost political leadership level into the melee of ministries then it 
would have had major problems. The High Authority and Commission, or rather elements of 
them, have at times adhered to the Commissariat du Plan ethos but not sufficiently, which has 
increasingly become a problem with sectoral fragmentation. The attempt to replace the elected 
political authority, which for the Commissariat was the Prime Minister's office which gave 
the Commissariat its prestige and kept it above the melee of bureaucratic politics, with, in the 
case of the Commission, the unelected College of Commissioners lacking a political mandate 
and a weak president, has not always been successful. The Commissioners essentially head 
sectoral DGs and represent them rather than a common collegial interest. There often seems to 
be a lack of the overview and ability to prioritize that the Commissariat strove for. In fact the 
132 De Schoutheete, P. The European Council in S hack le ton M and Peterson J (ed.) ; The Institutions of the European Union, 
(2002) Oxford, Oxford University Press 
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College has not proven to be an effective equivalent for the French Prime Minister's office on 
which Monnet's previous organization had so depended. But more on that later. 
In general, democratic systems of government seem to generate better quality decisions than 
others. Even in war this seems to be the case, consideration of the Second World War showed 
the inability of a dictator to take the best decisions in a sustained manner for his country, in 
fact often they took the worst. Ideology rather than rationality was allowed to dictate all gov-
ernmental action in the dictatorships. The superiority of DP presumably lies in the require-
ments of accountability and the need to achieve re election, which refine politicians' thinking 
and assist them in distilling out the tendency to over vagueness and grandness that they along 
with rulers over the ages share. After all, democratic parliamentary government in Britain at 
least grew from the Monarch's chamber of advisors who were often the more powerful nobil-
ity and better educated churchmen. In order to carry out grand schemes such as Monarchs and 
aristocrats from the Roman Empire onwards have relished in order to win glory, and renown, 
first parliamentary and then democratic parliamentary government forced budgetary tags and 
limits onto rulers activities and so onto the rulers themselves and their administrations (budg-
etary limitations, such as they are, are something the Commission has been very able to get 
around and this needs to be altered).136l37This is not to say that democratic systems are not 
capable of making terrible decisions, but within parliaments and systems of checks and bal-
ances, there are going to be more powerful actors who must be persuaded to support the 
scheme than in despotic governments. A pleasant side effect is that the need to persuade 
widely, acts as a unifying force in a political structure so that the scheme cannot achieve suf-
ficient support without also creating a more unified, coherent governmental coalition. A po-
litical system only distantly or not at all related to democracy or at least representative democ-
racy seems likely to make bad decisions in an ever increasing number until the system itself 
collapses. 
An important doctrine of DP is the separation of powers, and following as a corollary from 
this well-honed doctrine is the dominance of the political head over the bureaucracy of the 
state; both have been basics in political theory and proven their worth as a simple and effec-
tive recipe for political stability and accountability. The doctrine conceives of the various 
branches of government holding the others in check; they are in a sense in limited competi-
tion. Often the balance of power between the powers of the various organs of government is 
closely defined in a document like a constitution with a related court to interpret and apply the 
rules. Clearly designating the governmental roles and competences is important for the bal-
ance of power and the clarity of the governmental organisation. It helps maintain transparency 
and hierarchy between organisations and ensures that the various actors behave according to 
their defined position. Such clarity prevents or at least limits informal structures emerging 
which are opaque and allow bureaucrats and politicians a 'good' which they value, unob-
served application of power without accountability. The EU, according to some observers, 
| ^ A 
deviates from this clarity and accountability: 
136 Majone G. Cross national sources of Regulatory Policy Making in Europe and the United States, Journal of Public Policy 
Vol.11(1) 1991. p,96. "Any satisfactory explanation of the remarkable growth of Community regulation must take into ac-
count both the desire of the Commission to increase its influence ~ a reasonable behavioural assumption - and the possibility 
of escaping budgetary constraints by resorting to regulatory policy making." 
1,7 The Commission during the 1990s employed large numbers of 'officials' externa! to the Commission itself, using various 
obscure budgets, and so got around the staff limitations set by the other institutions 
138 Booker, C and North, R. The Great Deception (2005) London, Continuum, p.70 
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'EU decision making . . . is primarily intergovernmental. It is dominated by national interests 
and allows governments to "escape" from pesky domestic pressures that limit their room for 
manoeuvre at the national level.'1 9 
Within a ministerial sector, a minister and related bureaucrats can enjoy Prime Ministerial sta-
tus unless curbed by a cabinet which is itself restrained by other organs of government de-
manding transparency and accounts of how and why decisions were made. Patronage and the 
use of power to build up alternative governmental structures and to benefit personages blos-
som in opaque systems to the detriment of the economy and society as a whole. Parliaments 
should, first and foremost, be protecting the voter and not a lobby; they are paid to do just this 
by the voters and to manage the taxation funds the voters put at their disposal for the achie-
vement of stated collective aims. 
The notion of some balance of power and separation of powers being essential for a healthy 
functioning political system, is mirrored in the realm of economics with both horizontal and 
vertical integration of industries being eyed with considerable care if not concern, as there is a 
natural propensity of economic actors to want to control those companies which compete with 
them whether in the same or another sector to themselves and thus decrease risk, transactional 
costs and increase stability. The final stage of this tendency is the monopoly situation which 
whilst it can offer certain advantages to certain consumers is not perceived by national legisla-
tors to be helpful for the majority. A healthy economic system is considered to be one in 
which the companies' natural tendency towards developing a monopoly or oligopoly struc-
tures are curbed. The domination of all the sectors relating to a given product by a single firm 
can be dangerous,MOunless it is amply compensated for by horizontal competition and ease of 
new company entry into any of the sectors being operated in. The EU has been labelled by 
some influential academics; 'a cartel of elites'141 running a system of policy making which is 
6a costly' and 'time consuming' l42 'elite process'143; these last points can be considered signs 
of inefficiency. It is generally considered that ideal levels of competition within certain con-
straints are desirable for a healthy economic system. In summary, monopoly situations usually 
benefit the monopolist at the cost of the end user, be that a consumer or voter. Would-be mo-
nopolists yearn for such situations which minimise their costs but raise the costs for others. 
Oligopoly exists currently in the EU as the cartels quotation indicates and this is a major step 
towards the monopoly position. A certain level of competition exists between officials but 
there will be and is a tendency towards collusion and monopoly, to the benefit of officialdom. 
This is not to say that all checks and balances are a good thing and that they cannot lead, in 
excess, to difficulties. The USA has a refined system which is so elaborate and pervaded with 
so little trust that it has spawned vast numbers of committees and encouraged lobbying to 
such an extent that the democratic will, at times, appears to be somewhat lost in the labyrinths 
of power. But in the American system limits are set and the executive is held responsible and 
the bureaucracy held in some form of check. Whilst it could be argued that size leads to com-
plex structures of government, many of the US complexities were chosen and imposed in or-
der to balance the system. This lack of trust in a central government and the executive also 
exists in Europe, and helps explain the contorted system of government but with a crucial dif-
ference; the EU complexity has evolved and is evolving seemingly without a plan or necessar-
ily a democratic will. The complexities of the US system were planned to ensure democratic 
139 See note I Peterson; Bömberg (1999), p. 7 
140 Seel ion 4 of the "U.S, Department of Justice Merger Guidelines," June 14, 1984 http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/-
guidelines/2614.htm 
'41 Paul Taylor and Ralf Dahrendorf referred to see note 23 Wallace; Wallace (2000) p.533. 
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control of the central government, the EU complexities are responses and only sometimes of a 
democratic nature and only sometimes curbing the executive at times it appears to be rather 
enhancing its power. 
Whilst it could be argued that complexity is in the eye of the beholder much like beauty and 
that the insider is unlikely to find the EU complex whereas the lay man will: this seems to 
miss the point; the complexity of the EU is not useful for the creation of a demos, such as the 
EU seems to need to win referenda on treaties and constitutions. Nation States in their rela-
tionship to their citizens are often rather simplistic, at least superficially, encouraging primi-
tive patriotism and emphasising belonging to a nation rather than anything else. That is what 
the EU has to learn to do if it really desires to be a government or if the MSs wish to turn it 
into one. It must simplify to unify and encourage the European peoples to identify with it as a 
demos. To wantonly appear complex might appeal to a few in the know, and offers them a 
sense of exclusivity, but for an organisation that desires to have a demos, to be appearing 
complex and opaque means it is doing a rather a poor publicity job if nothing else. In general 
in life, if it is possible to consider something simpler that does the same tasks, and it certainly 
is where the EU is concerned, then it is often better. Why choose the complex option, unless 
of course there are vested interests involved and certain individuals are unwilling to make the 
necessary changes? Whatever else, complexity in government and contorted paths of account-
ability are not beneficial for democracy. 
In DP governmental systems, the ministers in power are either of the same party or have for-
med a formal coalition often in a contract form with stated goals, competences and the means 
of achieving them laid out. At a very minimum they share the same training, nationality and 
often work experience in national ministries. They run for power on a manifesto with clearly 
stated goals and related arguments, winning the support and backing of the electorate for the 
right to govern for a fixed period with the prospect of constantly defending a track record. An 
MS cabinet will usually consist of the victors intoxicated with the euphoria of success and the 
need to perform and live up to expectations; and this is fundamental for the formation of col-
legiality. Party political manifestos need to be more concrete than purely idealistic statements 
of intent. Democratically elected governments have a four or five year term in office to help 
concentrate their thinking and which forces them to select enough goals in which they will be 
able to succeed, in order to persuade the electorate to re elect them. The official opposition, 
also made up of elected politicians, will be offering an alternative programme of government 
and an alternative perspective usually critical of the work of the current incumbent of power. 
This opposition is usually vocal and well informed and broadcast via the media to the elector-
ate during the period of government as well as during the election period. The effect of the 
these elements quite apart from the parliament as a whole combined with: party grass roots, 
the judiciary, a constitutional court and a conscientious civil service which leaks if required, is 
to force policy selection onto politicians and coherence and unity to the government and an 
awareness of responsibility. There will be failings, ridiculous projects may well be agreed u-
pon, but they will be fewer and less permanent and insulated from change than in a non de-
mocratic system. 
An often overlooked benefit of DP is that opposition to the government is built into many, if 
not all, parliamentary systems. In the UK system the opposition are paid by the state to run a 
counter government as it were and to thus keep the current incumbents of power on their toes. 
Having a formal opposition allows for criticism to be aired and debated and encourages in-
formed public discussion on a range of subjects. The discussion is then expanded by the many 
media correspondents. This forces the government to close ranks and coordinate and control 
their ministers to avoid unpleasant surprises in question time and subsequent embarrassment 
34 
in the press. The public are involved in the debates and kept informed about alternative ap-
proaches to dealing with the needs of the country. 'Facts' are shown from a range of perspec-
tives and given a range of interpretations as should be the case. The post modern world has 
bestowed one good at least on European culture and that is scepticism about 'facts' and their 
stated objectivity. The many facets of facts can be better approached by the wholesaler dealers 
in them rather than their believers. For every 'scientific fact' that is relevant to the govern-
ment and requires regulation there is likely to be discussion about its scientific validity and 
there will be other views about its applicability and, of course, its relationship to other 'facts' 
which may well alter its perceived status and relevance and the opposition stresses this. Par-
liamentary opposition, however imperfect, deepens policy debate, understanding and coher-
ence as well as reducing the likelihood of abuses of power. One last benefit of a parliamentary 
opposition is that opposition to government can be kept to a large degree within the confines 
of the parliament and regulated. Voters whose party has lost one election know that their 
views will be heard in the parliament and that there is good chance that they will prevail at a 
later date. This lends inclusive and representative legitimacy and stability to the system. Quite 
apart from anything else opposition to the current government and the policies which are con-
nected with it, which could be essentially negative by its very definition, is effectively chan-
nelled through the parliamentary opposition and into the creation of a potential new govern-
ment, quite literally practising governmental skills and waiting for future election. Public op-
position is thus recruited via the parliamentary opposition into opposition to the current gov-
ernment and not the system as a whole. Elections are not held to decide on whether or not to 
keep parliamentary government but rather as to the selection of policies and choice of person-
nel. 
The actors and their competences in a parliamentary system of democracy are reasonably easy 
to identify for the public and the other organs of government. Ministerial responsibility en-
courages identification with a particular decision both for convention sake and for prestige, 
quite apart from duty. A minister will be allocated a policy to decide on, even an unpopular 
one, and be identified with it. Since power and related competences are much valued articles 
and competition for resources intense, encapsulation of ministries, ministers and related offi-
cials is a natural tendency and a real danger. Dual or more constituencies will be pressing for 
the minister's attention and motivation; officials, lobbyists and of course the voters and the 
democratic mandate as contained in the manifesto. It is all too easy for self contained sectors 
with related ministries to operate alone for defensive purposes, and to engage in turf wars 
with others to detach competences from them whenever possible, The results can be corrup-
tion and lack of governmental: cohesion, efficiency and effectiveness and also often coordi-
nated policies. Some personal risk and responsibility for public office is essential. Quite apart 
from anything else it is desirable for certain actors to be allocated the right to decide some is-
sues and not others, and so to keep a politician making maybe an imperfect and ill considered 
decision with a democratic mandate, rather than a higher quality maybe more effective from a 
sectoral perspective decision being reached by a bureaucrat alone. It is quite likely that more 
efficient and effective decisions can be generated for a particular sector144 if the 'buck stops 
here' principle of ministerial signature is ignored and bureaucrats working closely with stake-
holders simply generate decisions and policies for themselves and manipulate political mas-
144 See note 3 Monnet (1978); p.235; 'In their separate areas, the civil servants had worked very well, each doing his best to 
develop that sector of industry for which he was responsible. But while they had incidently consulted a few industrialists, 
they had not collated their respective inquiries, with the result that their plans were neither well coordinated nor ranged in any 
order of priority. On the contrary, all were competing for the same limited resources of energy, manpower, and foreign cur-
rency, which at this rate would soon be exhausted. .People in different administrative departments or different branches of 
industry spoke to one another, but their respective intentions remained secret and uncoordinated. Everyone was entrenched in 
his own position.' / 
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ters from within Policy Networks. 145However, democratically reached decisions have their 
own effectiveness and whilst maybe less sectorally effective and efficient are often better for 
the body politic as a whole. Thus, ably run parliamentary democracies with a centralised ca-
binet based around a Prime Minister or equivalent and clear lines of actor accountability and 
power allows for coherence, coordination and policy prioritisation. 
Rational choice literature alleges that the goals of the executive or rather the ministries are to 
increase their budgets and power often vis-à-vis their fellow ministries and that the legislature 
has to check this growth. Also officials seem to desire to maximise their policy discretion and 
proximity to power and related 'goods'. It seems fairly obvious that the executive, the minis-
ters, will also desire to maximise their ministries' power and prestige and thus their own. The 
rounds of budget negotiations and thus resource increases and decreases will be performed by 
the ministers usually striving to increase their ministries' allocation; a better more powerful 
ministry is good for ministers' careers too. Accountability for the budget spent and the per-
formance of their officials will force a degree of control on the growth of bureaucracy and 
related budgets, unchecked the growth appears to be limitless. Ministries can always find mo-
re work to do and more ways to spend money. The more control that the parliament has over 
the executive and over its budgets, the greater the limitations placed on the growth of the bu-
reaucracy and its output. Transparency rules such as exist in Scandinavia empower the media 
and the citizens to apply pressure to the parliament and also the executive. These societies are, 
unsurprisingly, said to be the least corrupt; those that champion governmental secrecy often 
have a less savoury reputation. A basic rule seems to be that an information empowered pub-
lic and active parliaments using budgetary and accountability tools are the democratic solu-
tion to excess bureaucracy, bureaucratic growth, myopic ministries and the symptoms of bu-
reaucratic disease ' . . . such as internal conflicts, problems of coordination and a lack of stra-
tegic direction.'l46This restriction has been evaded by the Commission.147 
Where bureaucracy exists it equally needs to operate within a set schema in order that the va-
rious elements of which it consists remain in a healthy balance and in optimal working order 
and do not become 'pathological'. The elements spoken of here are: superior knowledge and 
expertise, networks of governmental contacts, safe tenure and top quality policy making indi-
viduals. These elements make them excellent alternative governmental material to the politi-
cians who are intended to head and set the policy for the bureaucrats. The notion that bureau-
crats know best what society needs and really wants may or may not be true, but it is certainly 
a view held by many and is dangerous for any non Platonic system of government. It is at 
odds with reality to conceive of bureaucrats as being neutral and more balanced than the ma-
jority, they are more sectorally expert maybe but not more neutral. In fact, many have quite 
distinct views about how society should be run which are both ideologically and sectorally 
oriented. Setting that misnomer to one side for a moment, the Weberian view which sets out 
ideal versions for organisational forms should not be set aside lightly and they are quite clear 
about the healthy schema for the machine which is the ideal bureaucracy. The bureaucracy 
should be tenure and merit based and answerable to the political leadership which consists of 
quite different individuals to those in the ministries. The political leadership make the deci-
sions and set the direction which the bureaucrats then put as efficiently as possible into effect. 
145 Sec note 1 Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p.31; 'The EU's treaties are astoundingly vague. Links between societal interests 
and EU decision makers (*agents') are weak in the absence of traditional structures-such as strong political parties-for aggre-
gating interests, EU policy networks may be 'captured' by agents who shape major decisions in ways that effectively prede-
termine them before Member States can 'make1 them.' 
146 Donelley, M and Ritchie, E. The College of Commissioners and their Cabinets in Edwards G (ed) The European Commis-
sion, (1997) Cartermill, London p.45 
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Bureaucratic methods of doing business in general and that found in the EU do not seem a-
menable to accountability that should belong in the political sphere.148 
No system is perfect but in an economically sound, stable, inter-European MS system made 
up of democratic parliamentary systems seems to be the least dangerous and negatively char-
ged of those available, and secures a modicum of freedom and safety for the citizen and sta-
bility for the governments which can be held accountable and at the same time enjoy legisla-
tive freedom for a set duration. Via a neutral civil service sensibly deployed, the same gov-
ernments can secure their legislation from future tampering by bureaucrats and future gov-
ernments. The political masters hold the bureaucrats accountable and decide the policies to be 
followed for which they have been voted in by the populace. A useful summary of the two 
systems of government49 is found in the following quotation: 
'National representative democracy rests on a set of institutions and practices that includes 
regular elections, freedom of speech and the press, the right to vote and run in elections, con-
stitutional guarantees about the conduct of executive power, and the accountability of gov-
ernments to their electorates largely through national parliaments. Political accountability is 
the EU is highly problematic. The EU has a very fragmented and opaque range of highly 
complex decision making rules that gives rise to a weakness of accountability. European law 
emerges from discussions and negotiations within myriads of advisory and working commit-
tees surrounding the Commission, working parties of the Council of Ministers, European Par-
liament committees, and inter-institutional dialogue. Informal politics and backroom deals 
characterize the process.'150 
More details about how the EU deviates from DP principles will become increasingly appar-
ent through the thesis, 
1.2.3 THE MONNET METHOD INOCULATION 
Now that we have described the benefits of the democratic parliamentary system we will con-
sider the Monnet Method. The Monnet Method is here defined not only as the deliberate, 
stealthy promotion of spillover from one sector to another but also of engrenage, technocracy, 
functionalism and, all in all, of the breaking down issues, problems and governmental struc-
tures.151 At times it is a 'negative' process of fragmentation somewhat along the lines of divide 
and rule. Breaking problems and organisations down into their constitutive parts is essentially 
'negative'. The removal of the means of waging warfare by effectively occupying the prized 
coal and steel sectors of the MSs was also 'negative5. And yet 'negative' only in the sense of 
the removal or breaking down of something, from the bureaucratic point of view breaking 
problems down into rational solvable pieces, is normal enough and efficient and it was just 
this efficiency that Monnet aimed to exploit combined with the effectiveness that a sense of 
mission provided. Engrenage is effectively the same as collaboration with an occupying po-
wer; something which had proven to be very effective and easily enough done in France un-
der Nazi occupation, only this time it was for a positive reason. 
148 Page. E. The People who run Europe. (1997) Oxford, Oxford University Press p. 162 'The problem of identifying respon-
sibility and generating accountability results more from the need to mobilize support from representatives of member states 
in diverse, but predominantly bureaucratic, arenas of decision making. While it is not possible for EU policies in reality to 
"emerge from nowhere" as Mazey and Richardson (quoted in McLaughlin and Jordan 1993: 129-30) put it, the fact that they 
may appear to underlines the special difficulties of identifying responsibility in Brussels,' 
149 See note 23 Wallace; Wallace (2000) p.528 
150 See note 104 Dinan, (2000) p.325 
151 See note 62 Spence (1997) p.98 
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The Monnet Method basics involve fragmenting a political issue/problem and the related gov-
ernmental organisations which could not be agreed/agree upon to one until a situation is rea-
ched where the circumstances and details which generated the 'problem' dominate and can be 
solved.,52Usually the individuals who are best with details, technocrats, can and will decide. 
Functionalism follows a similar logic and was one of the main intellectual strands of the Me-1 
thod which 'preferred' fragmentation on the whole. Usually the issue would thus be re-
moved from the political sphere to the technocratic. Whilst this had the admirable goal of 
dodging political stalemate, it is important to note that the detachment of the detail from its 
place as part of a understandable if simplistic entirety, to one of existence in a mass of details 
of infinite complexity is, once again, essentially a 'negative' action. It involves the breaking 
down of an entity into its parts, with the well meant goal of enabling agreement. It also results 
in serious problems of sectoral fragmentation: 
'The highly technical content of EU policy reinforces fragmentation at the sub-systemic level. 
The problems of trying to construct an EU rural policy in the face of the competing agendas 
of CAP, cohesion and environmental policy networks is indicative. Even in trade policy, whe-
re the EU has clear incentives to speak with one voice, battles are rife between trade and agri-
cultural policy networks and their "sherpas".'154 
Recently the Commission has seen a combination of increasing power devolving to the sec-
toral DG top bureaucrats, more technical detail dominating and arrogance on the part of the 
bureaucrats as the following quotation shows: 
'In an interview with German daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung, the German commissioner in 
charge of the important industry portfolio said "the whole development in the last ten years 
has brought the civil servants such power that in the meantime the most important political 
task of the 25 commissioners is controlling this apparatus . . . The commissioners have to take 
extreme care that important questions are decided in their weekly meeting, and not decided by 
the civil servants among themselves . . . Noting that the way some commission officials 
communicate is technical and arrogant, which he finds "appalling", Mr Verheugen said that 
only a "change in political culture" in the commission would improve the situation.155 
It must be emphasised that the EU was deliberately fragmenting in its activities and fragmen-
tation is not just an unfortunate side effect of growth but rather a deliberate choice and means 
of action; 'Functionalists prefer fragmented networks, developing common interests within 
limited fields... '156 
The process of conflict between the Monnet Method and DP is particularly problematic as the 
two are different in goals, methods and actors. The goal of democratic politics has been to 
cumulate issues and details into entire policies and then manifestoes, and party programmes 
which can be used to trade with the voters and find popularly supported solutions via the elec-
tion process.,57The Monnet Method sought to replace this with a trade in details between 
technocrats. It raised up the technocrat and inevitably the executive, in particular the officials 
in it, at the expense of all the political representatives and, in particular, the parliaments. This 
is the less promising aspect of Monnet's Method and goals, that he was in favour of a federal 
Europe, and a democratically elected one, seems clear, but he did not seem over concerned 
152 See note 3 Monnet (1978) ; p.291 
153 See note 23 Wallace; Wallace (2000) p.528 
154 See note 1 Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p.269 
155 See note 52 EU Observer 05.10.2006 
156 See note 23 Wallace; Wallace (2000) p.528 
157 See note 1 Peterson; Bömberg (1999) p.31 
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about formally specifying the DP elements that would be necessary and when they should be 
included. Presumably because these were expected to just happen at some point in the future 
when the project was so advanced that they had to be enacted. The result is that the EU does 
not just include less democratic elements but rather is founded on their predominance and 
considers them a virtue.l58Fragmentation of government in Western Europe was deliberate 
and intended 1 . . . the Commission has created and captured a whole new level of pluralist 
politics in Western Europe and appears in a para-governmental light.'159As will be discussed 
later some degree of resulting confusion can or at least should have been expected to have re-
sulted. Monnet would appear to have had ambivalent feelings towards democracy; or rather 
democracy as it functioned around him, probably justifiably so.!60He was frequently frus-
trated by the parliamentary democratic process he worked with and the politicians who were 
involved in it.161He even seems to have got so annoyed with the French parliament, after the 
passing of the ECSC, which made 'daily administration* very difficult, that he considered ha-
ving its constitution changed 4 A young professor. . . worked with me on a plan for constitu-
tional reform which we thought would remove the temptation for parliament to overthrow 
governments with such unconcern.'}62He seems to have wanted to design or have designed a 
better democratic system for France, and finally a new system was created so he was not far 
wrong in his views. The true goal of this technocrat and business man par-excellence seems to 
have been to create, temporarily at least, a non political source of power at the centre of Euro-
pe, 163as the following quotation suggests 'As Hobsbawm argues, it is therefore "misleading to 
speak of the "democratic deficit" of the European Union. The EU was explicitly constructed 
as nondemocratic (i.e.nonelectoral) basis, and few will seriously argue that it would have got 
where it is otherwise ",164PossibIy Monnet was also interested in downgrading politics, gov-
ernments 165and politicians, elements as they were of failed problematic Nation States;16 cer-
tainly he felt that serious issues like going to war should be removed from their sphere. The 
Monnet Method raised up the technocratic ideal which at its core perceived of the world as 
being better off with more limited politics, with the experts, the technocrats making the major 
decisions in a political free zone.1 7There is not the faintest glimmering of democracy in the 
initial design of Europe, and this was not intended to be the case.I68169Even the much praised 
openness of the Commission to sectoral interests combined with MS officials, which is said to 
be currently the case, was frowned upon by Monnet, who saw in it a chance for MSs to use 
such interests to force the Commission and the project along national lines again. The tempo-
158 See note 148 Page. (1997) p. 146 'Second, the civil service in the guise of the Commission is given the unique constitu-
tional responsibility to initiate legislation. It is not simply an institution for the administration of decisions taken elsewhere-
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rary, non democratic essence of the Monnet Method helps explain what followed in the EU 
and reinforces the thesis approach that the present structure of the Union should be radically 
altered and that this could enable citizens to accept the project as their own. Democracy was 
not planned into the European project in its initial stages by Monnet, the 'democratic' controls 
that there came to be simply occurred, evolved in the truest sense. 
Technocrats or rather Monnet, in this instance, considered that MS politics and political sys-
tems were responsible for much of the misery and warfare which had dominated the first half 
of the twentieth century. The solution was to depoliticise issues and raise up technocrats to 
discuss170and decide on detail and apply rationalism, something technocrats were considered 
to excel in and politicians not.17IThe following quotation outlines this: 
'He saw it as a sphere that required expertise, not involving the conflicts of values that are the 
core of politics, or at least, no conflicts that could not be solved by the application of knowl-
edge and expertise and the involvement in the search for the right answers of interest groups 
with relevant experience. Informed rational people presented with a problem will come to 
agree upon the solution. In other words, the objective was the "depoliticisation" of the issues. 
It was the insistence of Belgium and the Netherlands that resulted in the creation of the Coun-
cil of Ministers . . . , 1 7 2 
By placing the emphasis on detail and experts who could be expected to happily form a caste 
apart from the nationalism dominated societies in which they lived, the message of European-
ism and technocracy would thus be spread. Technocrats in all European states would be 
drawn to the possibility of operating in a politician and politics free sphere and thus would 
expand it still further. Indeed the emphasis was always on individuals getting involved in the 
European project and then developing a European identity as in Haas' 'Neofunctionalist the-
ory; 'the emergence of an ever expanding network of formal and informal relationships 
among policy professionals and civil servants would instil the habit of acting and thinking in a 
"European way" which, in turn, would have a positive spillover effect on the political psy-
I 
chology of those elites.' Hallstein said something very similar, '"these constant contacts at 
different levels help to create an intellectual and psychological climate in which cooperation 
comes easily and naturally. People become involved and work together to find solutions to the 
Community's problems in accordance with the Treaty,"l74This was exactly what Monnet had 
had in mind only he would have preferred a much smaller Commission; 'Monnet had been 
concerned to establish a small, non hierarchical, flexible organisation, well able to establish 1 *7\ 
close contacts with national officials and technicians . . . ' Accountability in a technocratic 
society was akin to a slur on the technocrat's reputation, like assessing their performance. 
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A problem became visible which was shown to be how the Commission came to handle the 
depoliticising of the problems: 
4 . . . the tendency (in the Commission) of bureaucratic decision-making to occur within pol-
icy communities (especially those of a technical nature) has been able to depoliticise what 
could have been highly divisive issues, and thereby the less overt politics of the EC has been 
able to force, or perhaps cajole, integration along.' 77 
The concentration of decision-making in sector-restricted policy communities in a Commis-
sion that was evolving into a; 'segmented and pluralistic administration,'l78held the danger 
that sectoral loyalties and politics would replace the national ones. Monnet was well aware of 
these dangers and given what happened later he was justified in his fears; he was convinced 4 . 
. . of the need to prevent the development of sectoral hierarchies, which he believed would 
similarly threaten the supranational and collegiate nature of the High Authority.' 179He was 
worried that MS officials would be able to influence the Commission indirectly in a national 
direction if an overly large bureaucratised Commission relied on them too much. His two ma-
jor worries were that national splits and sectoral ones could undermine supranationality, and 
he was right. 180Finally they could bring down the whole project. Where Monnet was wrong 
was in the idea that they could be avoided in the EU. Finally it can be said that national poli-
tics and political problems were replaced by bureaucratic ones; 'As Peters has observed, "the 
politics of the European Community is best understood as bureaucratic politics".'181 
The positive effect of the fragmentation that occurred was the creation of a European unity 
and policy and political layer that had not been there before. It was pointless to deny there 
was a new European scope to domestic political issues, the recent wars had been all European 
affairs affecting the entire populations of the countries involved. Ignoring this dimension was 
not an option it was rather a question of how to address it. The Monnet Method fragmented 
but it did so in order to allow for new structures and organisations to form. The European pol-
ity would be firmly held together and strengthened, essentially by breaking down the outer 
defences of the individual MSs. Spillover effects saw the spread of the immunising agent 
from one sector to another via officials and fragmented ministers forced together with the 
main actors in the sectors concerned, but more on that in a minute. Unlike the united national 
governments, and politicians acting together in a cabinet; their officials were very vulnerable 
and easily tempted into the project once the unified national governmental system accepted 
the project. Monnet's Method took all these factors into consideration. 
The goals of the European integration project were to secure peace and prosperity in Europe, 
these were to be the sweetener of the immunisation; much like the polio sugar lump immuni-
sation for children. War was to be made impossible and the temptations of ideologies like fas-
cism and communism were to be weakened by prosperity and economic growth.182Monnet 
knew too well that the Nation States, here the MSs, would balk at relinquishing real sover-
eignty to any organisation. Equally so long as the MSs remained in their historical setting of 
independent, competing Nation States then neither peace nor prosperity was likely to last 
long. What was needed was to weaken them, in a positive sense, by removing their control 
over the industries essential to war; coal and steel. The loss of sovereignty would be impossi-
ble to secure unless a sweetener was offered, namely, the prospect of prosperity and control 
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over the old enemy's coal and steel and peace. Quite apart from the sweetener, the immunisa-
tion seemed safe, harmless compared to the consequences of the full blown disease war. But 
the goal of the project was clearly stated to be to get past the hosts' defences, much as patho-
gens do, and to then set to work to secure peace; This proposal has an essential political ob-
jective: to make a breach in the ramparts of national sovereignty which will be narrow enough 
to secure consent, but deep enough to open the way towards the unity that is essential to pea-
ce.'183This the Commission has also followed through in practice. Indeed the language of 
the quotation just provided is indicative of immunisation; it is warlike language and imagery 
illustrating the project's war against war. 
The inoculation was necessary, but it would also be painful; to get it up and running vague-
ness, innocent idealism and promises, were also important ingredients in the sweet outer sur-
face covering the Monnet Method that would set to work within the patient the European bo-
dy politic and its members: 
'All he would allow himself was a reference to the pool being, "the first step of a European 
federation", a vague term which could mean different things to different people. Although 
what Monnet really had in mind was the creation of a European entity with all the attributes 
of a state, the anodyne phrasing was deliberately chosen with a view to making it difficult to 
dilute by converting in into just another intergovernmental body. It was also couched in this 
fashion so that it would not scare off national governments by emphasising that its purpose 
was to override their sovereignty.'183 
Schuman agreed to Monnet's plan despite the fact that 'according to one historian, although 
the plan was immediately greeted with great excitement by the press, the curious thing was 
that literally nobody knew exactly what it was about, not even Schuman.'186 The project was 
vague and idealistic from its onset187 and it is this unending vagueness and lack of clarity 
which makes for the surreal feel of the Union and is, as Monnet was fully aware, part of its 
intoxicating appeal and also its danger and evasiveness from control. l88The EU is still stated 
to be extremely vague; 'Moreover, in EU decision making the rules are often vague, conten-
tious or "shiftable". The rules, like nearly everything else, may even be negotiable.'l89The Eu-
ropean project was fully intended to be "flexible" and evolving, very much along the lines 
that Monnet had developed for the Planning Council set up to modernise France after the war, 
the words he used to describe this are applicable to the ECSC and EEC as well: 
'The first instructions were vague: "to determine French productivity and the arrears to be 
made up; to propose production levels to be attained" - it might be, to regain those of 1929 in 
fact, the most important feature of this description was its flexibility, enabling plans in any 
sector to be constantly readjusted in the light of the others. Comparing notes and continual 
adaptation were the Cardinal rules.'190 
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There was to be an "overall view" as a starting point and the rest would be discussed and ne-
gotiated. J91For the British the lack of detail about the project; its vagueness, was a problem 
from the start; the practicalities of the project were simply unclear, only the method of carry-
ing out the negotiations had any procedure. Vagueness as a method of doing business in the 
EU has remained constant; 'The people weren't ready to agree to integration, so you had to 
get on without telling them too much about what was happening.' 193An extremely effective 
element of the strategy was to fragment the really controversial issues into a mass of techno-
cratic details and to cover them up; "'European bureaucrats' have consciously tried to 'bury 
the controversial issues under a mountain of 300 technical directives. . , "'I94It was extremely 
hard for politicians to really oppose heady mixtures of idealism and pragmatism without see-
ming reactionary and maybe even bellicose. 
An often overlooked element of the Monnet Method was the mixing of domestic and foreign 
policy. This was implicit in the project as whole since the foreign policy area of warfare re-
quired domestic economic support to be carried out effectively. What maybe seemed like a 
treaty of sorts, a foreign policy matter, was really opening the vulnerable domestic political 
spheres of MSs to a new force, alien to it.l95i96Foreign policy methods had been extended to 
domestic policy actors and sectors. Therefore it is not surprising to find that, 'Domestic con-
stitutional arrangements generally treat EU policy making as a matter not of domestic but of 
foreign policy . . . ' l97For Nation States conceiving of the European project as a foreign policy 
tool was probably conducive to their being willing to sign up to it; it is noticeable that the 
classic foreign policy method of a treaty was chosen to found the ECSC and EEC and not a 
constitution. Misleading, considering that it had distinctly constitutional overtones and would 
affect the internal political functioning of MSs, but necessary as MSs were expert at foreign 
policy and had large numbers of experienced diplomats to rely on, it would have appeared 
controversial, yes, but also safe and familiar. But the reality would be that domestic ministers, 
and their sectors, were, unusually, now acting like diplomats and surrounded by diplomats in 
COREPER. National politicians are trained to defend their portfolios against other national 
ministers, not carrying out what is effectively diplomacy to attain their goals both in the EU 
and domestically and are at a disadvantage. But they are also probably tempted by the pros-
pects of adding the prestigious area of foreign policy to their own, even if only for a day. The 
Commission, a foreign body not located in the national body politic, could now, once past the 
external defences, apply domestic political tools like mobilizing support in groups and institu-
tions in MSs for specific policies 9Sand so outmanoeuvre politicians.l99In general, domestic 
issues were, to an extent, being decided on by diplomats, given that COREPER officials de-
cide a large proportion of Council policy whilst not always seeming to be fully on the side of 
the minister as will be seen. Whether foreign policy Realpolitik is the appropriate method of 
seriously affecting domestic policy seems doubtful. Whatever else accountability and trans-
parency, those 'musts' of parliamentary government are not the first words that spring to 
mind when discussing diplomacy. It was another strange mixing of previously quite separate 
areas of governmental policy and will be discussed later. 
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Monnet was usually too wily a political expert to try for the grand Madisonian moment with a 
declaration of a new European federal government. Equally he knew that a Council of Europe 
and related organisations would not achieve the unifying of the MSs as he wanted. He would 
need to get past the instinctive defences of the Nation States, honed by centuries of experience 
and more than able to undermine any League of Nation's attempt at restricting their actions. 
His Method would be promoted by a minimal organisation, something that should remain out-
side the structures of European government and '"ought to remain a nucleus and confine itself 
to organizing and stimulating the work of others. For the rest, it could rely on the national ci-
vil services.' The Monnet Method deliberately masked what was happening to prevent the 
project being aborted at an early stage.200 It had to avoid detection and initial confrontation by 
the traditional defences of the body politic: 
'As the French statesman and arch federalist Jean Monnet saw it, a European state would e-
merge through the steady, cumulative effects of small incremental steps. This strategy would 
also avoid any head on confrontation with national governments, which would willingly sur-
render control to the Community, at first because Nation States would not feel threatened by 
their lost authority in apparently innocuous spheres of activity, and because of the economic 
advantages to be gained by joining a larger market. But later, as more areas of control were 
ceded, individual Nation States would become incapable of independent action until 'one day 
the national governments would awaken to find themselves enmeshed in a "spreading web of 
international activities and agencies" from which they would find it almost impossible to ex-
tricate themselves.'201 
The aim for the organisation was 'to maximize the chances of survival and influence in a 
world of entrenched bureaucratic interest.'202The organization would be both 'Human and in-
formal.' What he wanted was a process: 
"This was political institution building as a strategy: to promote economic integration, in the 
expectation that social integration would accompany it, that the functions, interests and loyal-
ties of elites - at least - would thus be progressively transferred from each Nation State to the 
broader institutionalised community, which would in turn "lay the foundations" for an even-
tual political union. It was a process which implied a beginning and an end: from and beyond 
the Nation State to the eventual achievement of European Union." One criticism of this ap-
proach, however, is that it tended to view political integration as a mechanical process; a nec-
essary by product of economic, legal and technical measures.'204 
In fact, despite the last view of the author just quoted this is just what happened although not 
quite as planned and perceived by Monnet; governmental bodies did emerge as a reaction to 
his Method, and maybe 'by product' is a fair way of describing them. Monnet like many of 
his generation was aware of the failed hope that had existed with the League of Nations, na-
mely, that it would ensure that the war to end all wars was indeed the last. 
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To achieve real peace, new legislation that would establish the practicalities of the European 
layer had to be accepted in future as domestic in origin and not external. That way, after the 
external line of defences, the national governments or their representatives, had been brought 
to sign the vague treaty, the more detailed legislation would go into force without needing fur-
ther treaties or parliamentary supervision and scrutiny. The foreign body, the Commission, 
would be able to use the resources of the MSs and be accepted governmentally as if it were a 
domestic political actor whilst remaining beyond the control of the domestic political scene. 
The method of having EEC legislation automatically incorporated into national legislation so 
that the difference between the two was simply not apparent was effective. Neither the demos, 
not its representatives would usually be able to affect the flow of legislation even if they could 
recognise which piece originated from where. Both the ECSC and the EEC treaties achieved 
just this point: 
' . . . and established the European Coal and Steel Community which differed from the previ-
ous international organisations in one vital respect: the parties to the treaty agreed to be bound 
by the decisions reached within the ECSC framework even if they did not explicitly consent 
to them. They also agreed that the ECSC institutions.. . should be able to exercise their pow-
ers within the MSs without requiring any further processes such as national legislation.'206207 
The Monnet Method was also that of 'engrenage' briefly outlined before but more detail is 
required and the following two quotations are useful: 
" . . . engrenage loosely means "getting caught up in the gears" It connotes the "Monnet Me-
thod" of integration: individuals, interest groups, institutions and national governments, once 
involved in a specific course of action, find themselves having to take additional, broader ac-
tions that unwittingly deepen European Integration.'208 
'Its "functions" are to integrate and socialise national subjects into the structures, norms and 
values of the EU: to draw individuals into the EU's institutional web of meanings in order to 
change the way they see themselves. Engrenage is therefore best understood as a "political 
technology" or administrative instrument designed to forge European consciousness and Eu-
ropean identity among those policy professionals who operate above the level of the Nation 
State. In short, it functions as a mechanism to "Europeanise" national administrative and po-
litical elites by socially and symbolically transforming them into a cohesive "supranational" 
elite that sees itself as distinctly and transcendentally "European."'209 
The French were even more explicit about how The Method should go into action; 'The 
French, indeed, tended to argue that the Community itself would benefit if the Commission 
was made up of seconded national officials who then returned "Europeanised" to their capi-
tals.'210The officials and politicians finally, were being drawn into the European system by a 
beneficial ideology.2nEngrenage was and is a brilliant method of effectively separating the 
officials from their direct political masters, by bringing MS officials over to the Community 
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side by increasing their interactions with the Union either via the many advisory and manage-
rial committees or via working together with the Commission on policy development. The 
problem is though that the seemingly intended temporary fragmentation of government with 
MS governmental officials transferring their loyalty from the nation to the Community in fact 
resulted in a less positive permanent situation, where 'obligations, identities, become diffused 
among different levels of community, rather than transformed, by continuing interac-
tion.' l2That national civil servants behave as Union ones in implementing it, is an extension 
of the engrenage method. The unfortunate result though is a distortion of lines of accountabil-
ity difficulties in identifying which actors were involved in legislative generation as will be 
shown. 
A vaccine or pathogen must spread, via the blood, around the host and the High Authority -
Commission were both intended to expand organizationally and, in terms of competences and 
policy fields, to spread. This is the natural tendency of organizations and, of course, patho-
gens and vaccines and is the essence of the spillover theory, mentioned earlier and given in 
detail below. Monnet was the architect of the EU and Neofunctionalism captures the ideals of 
the Monnet Method quite nicely; 'political actors in distinct national settings are persuaded to 
shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institu-
tions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing Nation States,'213 economic integration 
in one area and the engrenage of MS technocrats forces politicians to behave in certain ways. 
Essentially the European technocrats set the agenda and draw the national technocrats and in-
terest groups into a form of alliance214 which not only effects the immediate goals but then 
affects other areas of social, economic and political life. Alliances between groups and supra-
national officials first took place in the ECSC and this has continued since then.2,5The Euro-
pean technocrats are then, de facto, actors involved and affecting another area-sector. Politi-
cians cannot direct the technocrats and are not expected to do so, rather they face an endless 
succession of decisions which have effectively been decided on the ground in advance for 
them; 'The emergence of "regulatory communities" and "policy networks" at the EU level, 
within which affected interests play a key role, means that national governments increasingly 
find themselves reacting to an EU policy agenda which has effectively been set else-
where. '2 1^ classic example from a Weberian perspective of the tail wagging the dog, not 
only that but this situation is raised up as a virtue;217 thus doubly 'pathological' from a Webe-
rian ideal perspective. 
A spillover critical mass was expected to develop to force the formal creation of the federal 
layer but it did not happen, Monnet's hope of, in effect, presenting the MSs with a de facto 
federal system which they would have to then formally translate into a federal government 
unfortunately underestimated, firstly, the durability of the MSs in the face of the supranational 
project; secondly, the need to bind bureaucrats and executives, the ultimate accumulators of 
powers by gradual extensions of competences, into a formal, detailed allocation of compe-
tences to prevent this natural, hard to reverse accumulation taking place. He also underesti-
mated the extent to which bureaucrats and the executive would try to resist effective parlia-
mentary intervention, whilst playing the democratic card when convenient, and be content to 
continue with a working ad hoc system that provided them with what they wanted. And he 
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also ignored the 'organic' reflex of DP to try and contain the project immediately. Thus the 
Monnet Method was efficient from a bureaucratic perspective in achieving goals and targets 
but it came at a cost to less measurable things like democracy, accountability and representa-
tion, and finally efficiency itself.218 
One last point about the Monnet Method was that it used the notion of divide and rule as part 
of its struggle. The Commission often calls for efficiency measures in conjunction with enlar-
gements which it is usually in favour of. Logically the increase in the number of countries in-
volved in the Council will result in greater opportunities for the Commission to make deals 
with various Countries. But at the same time it is aware of the problems associated with this 
when applied to the Commissioners in its own College. Thus the perfect solution is to call for 
efficiency measures in the Commission itself. The MSs were and are equally aware of the 
need to have a solution to the numbers game in order that 'shared interests' could be followed 
' . . . which led to the Single European Act were completed in time for the Luxembourg Euro-
pean Council of December 1985: its acceptance of extended majority voting and strengthened 
powers of initiative for the Commission reflecting rather less the enthusiastic pressures for 
European Union from within the European parliament than acceptance of the necessity of mo-
re efficient procedures for the pursuit of shared interests through common decision in a 
Community of Twelve,'219But the MSs were not willing to allow this to be the gain of the Eu-
ropean Commission. Thus the MSs have deliberately kept their number of Commissioners 
unchanged, in part no doubt to maintain their own influence and status in the Commission but 
also it appears to be the case that their refusal to reform Commissioner numbers is also due to 
their desire to 'assert' power and to thus ensure that it is difficult for the Commission to 'carry 
out its responsibilities effectively.'220 
The Monnet Method, in summary, contained four major strands; it mixed bureaucracy and 
politics effortlessly endowing both with each other qualities; it fragmented everything; above 
all it was technocratic, bureaucratic in origin, as was Monnet himself, (and soon, inevitably, 
growing organisational size would lead to specialization and sectorization and the bureau-
cratic disorders or 'disease'); and lastly, it placed a lot of weight on small, flexible issue ori-
ented groups of officials and outmanoeuvred politicians. As soon as the organization of the 
High Authority - Commission failed to meet with Monnet's strict requirements to keep it out 
of the firing line, as it were, it was itself liable to become subject to the Monnet Method and 
become itself fragmented along the line of bureaucratic sectors, subject to bureaucratic disor-
ders, undermined by smaller flexible groups of politicians and officials with the emphasis in 
small informal settings of power going to the expert, the official, although the executive poli-
ticians and officials as a whole gain. If the organisation's mission derived identity and justifi-
cation i.e. European ideology and a dynamic political leader were to weaken, then it would be 
without internal defences. The 'carrier' would become the subject of the 'pathogen5. 
1.2.4 THE IMMUNISATION OF WESTERN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW 
Now that we have discussed the Monnet Method and the Democratic Parliamentary approach 
we will now move on to look at the actual process of immunization first of all from a broader 
perspective. The nascent European polity to begin the inoculation on, was available in the 
form of the Council of Europe and the other economic organisations created after the Second 
World War. It is a matter of discussion whether there is a European body politic now or if the-
re will ever be one. At the earliest stages there was the intention to create a European body 
2 , 8 See note 1 Peterson and Bömberg (1999), p. 275 
219 See note 18 Wallace (1990) p.86 
220 See note 110 Kassim; Menon, (2004) p.97 
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politic. 22lSome call the HU a 'Regulatory State'222whilst others deny that it has any state like 
characteristics. To talk about the beginnings of a European polity, seems a relatively safe no-
tion, backed up by the most respected of authors.223In post war Europe there was a common 
condition of exhaustion and disillusioning recent experiences, the MSs had shared a similar 
recent history of warfare, bloodshed, economic ruin, growing communist influence. Most we-
re too ruined to easily return to their previous status as independent Nation States; quite apart 
from anything else national governments had all shown their weaknesses and failures to their 
publics. There were also a few organisations able to act as nodes for a growing European con-
sciousness.224Whilst the Council of Europe was not a full blown body politic as such; it was 
the beginnings of one. Certainly the relevant elites with the required power to initiate its crea-
tion considered they had enough in common to seriously discuss various concepts of integra-
tion between France and Germany 225A degree of fusing of the Nation States and their body 
politics had taken place during the war and some was required to distribute the American fi-
nancial aid. The Council acted to socialize 'an entire generation of European politicians . . . 
,'226amongst whom was Adenauer who had been present in the Hague in 1948.227A11 the fu-
ture MSs of the EU were represented at the organisations with the political extensions of their 
national body politics sitting on the committees and councils. There was enough of an inter-
face between the MS 'hosts,' their bodies' politic, and the proto European polity based on 
them (from now on host or host(s) represent both) for the Monnet Method to be set to work. 
To sum up the situation the MSs were all exhausted, bled dry, and desperate for renewal and 
extremely sensitive to even the least threat of another war. This was the perfect moment for 
the MSs to be tempted into accepting a new path forwards, or at least to grab at the vague 
promises of peace and prosperity. 
The fear which overwhelmed the French government in 1950-51 at the prospect of the Ameri-
cans deciding on the method of control of the Ruhr coal and steel industries, finally made 
them more than willing to listen to Monnet's suggestion; thus they could offer a constructive 
solution on the Ruhr issue to the Americans which they would have to accept.228Schuman ba-
cked the plan without really discussing it with the rest of his cabinet colleagues and the Prime 
Minister who was not in favour of it, very much reminiscent of the method the Councils of 
ministers follow currently, with secrecy and ministerial deals deliberately avoiding the control 
of national cabinets and Prime Ministers: 
'It must be added that this was in no small part thanks to Schuman, whose loyal backing hel-
ped Monnet circumvent the French administration and cabinet, which, in being called upon to 
ratify the Treaty of Paris, faced what amounted to a fait accompli: Europe: oui ou non! This 
removal of the Coal and Steel pool from quondam politics had, given the vividness of French 
war memories a critical bearing on the outcome.'229 
The ECSC was intended to be the first step on the road to a federal Europe. The next step was 
the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC) and a European Political Commu-
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nity to supervise it. The EDC was launched on Monnet's initiative in 1950230 and was signed 
by the ECSC members in 1952, This was, however, unlike the ECSC, state formation on a 
grand scale and at an accelerated speed. What is interesting to note is that although the treaty 
was signed by all the governments of the MSs; it was severely treated by the parliaments dur-
ing the ratification process. The MS leaders saw the EDC and EPC as useful for their national 
interests from one perspective but the parliaments held a different perspective on those same 
interests and finally the French parliament voted it out in a burst of DP; 4 . . . the EDC was -j i  
destroyed by a political tidal wave.' The initial period of state formation was halted. The 
drive to solve imminent German rearmament by the EPC a supranational solution was re-
placed by the intergovernmental Western European Union (WEU) in 1954 into which West 
Germany was integrated and Britain too.232 
The European institutions were the result of the European polity attempting to 'catch up' with 
the effects of the Monnet Method and to encase the Method in a mass of DP antibodies. The 
instinctive response of the MSs and DP to the presence of the Monnet Method in its institu-
tional form of the High Authority and then the Commission seems all too organic. Each of the 
major provocations of the Commission or Monnet resulted in new governmental forms evolv-
ing to contain the next step of integration. Thus the intergovernmentalists and Supranational-
ists are both right; the latter provoked and the former attempted to contain the effect. A body 
is taught by the progressive effect of an inoculation mimicking often the real disease it pre-
vents, only in a much milder form; all the organs learning to act together to oppose the threat, 
with resultant swellings in parts of the body where the immunising agent is surrounded by the 
antibodies. Using this analogy, the various institutions, be they the EP or the Council of Min-
isters or the European Council all represent the swellings formed by the forces of DP to con-
tain the current form of the Method. And it has to be said the hosts have proven to be re-
markably healthy given the speed of the immune system almost too healthy at times. With the 
ECSC and the intention to make it even more expert oriented than it turned out to be, Monnet 
provoked a reaction by the MSs concerned who insisted on the creation of the Council and 
Assembly with their ministers involved however weakly, the resulting ECSC was thus tamer 
and the national governments more or less continued to control their industries. The EEC and 
its creation the Commission, were surrounded by an even tougher political safeguard in the 
EEC Council and even quickly provoked further reactions from the MSs. The first was an a-
bortive attempt by the French government with Italian support to create an intergovernmental 
sort of political organisation 1 . . . designed to bypass, throttle or even take over supranational 
economic activities,' it was evidently 'incompatible' with federal goals and hopes.233It was a 
first shot at a European Council which would finally be imposed on the EEC, but at this point 
the supranational project was too strong and DP was not in support of the intergovernmental 
organisation; 'The whole subject was referred by the six to a special committee . . . These ob-
jections amounted in sum to the contention that the plans left out all the principle features of 
the EEC's own constitution, since they contained no provision for a parliamentary element or 
for an independent executive or for eventual decision by majority vote.'234The 1965 Commis-
sion President Hallstein's provocation of de Gaulle235resulted in the Empty Chair crisis fol-
lowed by the Hague summit and the creation of the European Council. The Delors drive for 
integration resulted in a weakened Commission and the desire to involve national parliaments 
more. 
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A general rule seems to exist that officials and politicians are successfully caught in the gears, 
just as was intended and that as a result ever more MS governmental resources and elements 
are drawn into the gears to attempt to remedy or re-balance the equation. This progressive ef-
fect is seen in the fact that, initially, the ECSC Council was considered enough to contain the 
High Authority and the national officials who were easily drawn into the gears. Whilst, fol-
lowing the EDC provocation, the EEC was from the start less expert dominated; the Council 
of Ministers had more influence236 and COREPER was soon created. But the tendency of of-
ficials in COREPER and sectoral ministers to ignore national MS needs and thus DP showed 
that both were inappropriate watchdogs of DP interests. Constitutional courts and MS legal 
systems were also, as a whole, unable to prevent themselves being caught in the gears and be-
coming, in effect, co-opted into the European legal system. The next layer of Nation State de-
fence was drawn in, with the European Council the national leaders, extending their control 
over the project as a whole and so over their ministers.238But national leaders equally got 
caught up in the gears,239240 tempted in particular where planning grand projects were con-
cerned, and created controversy with national electorates over Political Union and the single 
OA 1 
currency. Not surprisingly electorates treated the national governments and the European 
layer as increasingly synonymous. The next layer of DP to be involved was to be the national 
parliaments or so the European Constitution intended. The apparent failures of the Commis-
sion and Monnet when the project was taken over by MSs and DP and attempts made to con-
tain it, in fact represent not so much failures but successes although probably unintended by 
Monnet, but more on this later. 
With each new stage in governmental building to contain the High Authority - Commission 
there is a large influx of new bureaucratic actors to take up the newly created posi-
tions.242These actors: ministers and officials developed organisational loyalty and also loyalty 
to the project they depended on for status and promotion: 
'No significant degree of integration could take place without the provision of personnel to 
administer the integrated sectors. And once these officials are appointed they will tend to ac-
quire a loyalty to the organisation rather than to the states of their origin, at least with regard 
to their won area of work . . . , 2 4 3 
Thus the new governmental development soon had a large number of officials generating e-
qually large amounts of work and developing contacts to guarantee its continuation. They 
needed to justify their existence so there is logically more and more Europe. The creation of 
the Council was originally not intended to include COREPER, but the Council members 'de-
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manded their own permanent staffs in Brussels.'244The result was COREPER which was ini-Mi c 
tially only there to get the decisions ready for the ministers. Over time this preparation was 
extended to include reaching the decisions themselves in the vast majority of cases, 'CORE-
PER was also criticised for undermining the role of ministers in the interests of further tech-
nocratization.'246 
Now that we have considered the broader immunization process we will examine the organi-
sations concerned in greater detail. 
1.2.4.1 COMMISSION 
The Commission and its two main elements the political 'leadership,' the 'College of Com-
missioners,' and the administration, the 'services', are now considered. The DP response to 
the ECSC and how it performed its supranational tasks, combined with the EDC experience, 
led to different structures being planned for the EEC than there had been in the ECSC. The 
perceived political accountability deficiency of the ECSC resulted in the strengthened posi-
tion of the Council247in the new EEC and a supranational attempt to appease DP concerns 
with the creation of the College of Commissioners. A comparison of the ECSC and the EEC 
shows that more political EEC Commissioners were to have a greater say in the new suprana-
tional organisation and the increasingly political and ministerial background of the Commis-
sioners over time248can be seen as DP attempts at reducing the 'danger of a technocratic ap-
proach' that ignored the public.249At first the College appeared to represent a strengthening 
and stabilising of the supranational position and organisation. It reinforced the political lead-
ership of the Commission and returned it to a level similar to that which Monnet had himself 
had enjoyed as President of High Authority at its beginning before opposition and problems 
began to develop. The developing notion that the College would function to ensure some po-
litical accountability of the Commission services is also indicative of its more observable po-
tential as a complete future government as compared to the High Authority. Elected legisla-
tures hold the executive and bureaucracy accountable, and considering the College as doing 
this shows it being treated as if it were a legislature which is problematic from a democratic 
perspective.250The creation of the College was also an organisational strategy to oppose the 
more political oriented Council in the less technocratic EEC. Organisationally the College 
was needed to re-balance the size and bureaucratic tendencies of the Commission services 
which could be expected to expand to the size of those of the High Authority. Monnet's desire 
for the ECSC had been for a small organisation but it had increased remorselessly in size, and 
developed bureaucratic tendencies, in part, to oppose the large MS ministries it dealt with. 
This increase in size had not been considered in relation to the capability of the ECSC leader-
ship to direct it; a more rational balance was required for the EEC. 
However, the College of Commissioners revealed after the de Gaulle crisis that it could also 
to be activated to allow MS pressure and influence and so DP; de Gaulle was of the opinion 
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that the supranational, non-elected Commission had no right to accrue the symbols of sover-
eignty and to behave as it did. There seem to be cyclical attempts by MSs to use their Com-
missioners to apply influence in the College and in the Commission. This seems to be a DP 
attempt at applying pressure to the Commission at tricky, tense times, usually after a period of 
Commission expansion, as under Hallstein and Delors. Increasingly Commissioners have 
been chosen who understood public and MS top governmental sensibilities after being minis-
ters, quite apart from enjoying close contacts with colleagues at home. After the Hallstein 
Commission the Commissioners became increasingly MS oriented.251252The extent of MS pe-
netration of these ranks was the subject of criticism in the Spierenburg Report 'Proposals for 
reform of the Commission of the European Communities and its services' of 1979, and the 
Commissioners' cabinets, on whom the Commissioners to a large extent depend for advice 
and ensuring their decisions are enforced, shared in a lack neutrality; 'Ross quotes an official 
from DGIII who argued that "cabinets are always pursuing their own national 
nc^  
interests.'" The result recently has been that, using the example of agriculture, the 
Commission can be considered to be another institution full of 'veto points' primarily for the 
MSs and can be considered in this respect similar to the Council; 'Although the Commission 
is a collective body, it divides along national lines.' 254 And ' . . . so, even within the 
Commission there are several veto points.' The amount of MS penetration of the 
Commission before and under Prodi is discussed further in the Conclusion. 
The increasingly high number of top MS politicians being appointed as Commissioners 
possibly reflected and reflects, in addition to the growing importance of the EEC, the MS's 
desire to appoint reliable politicians who will not go native. However the Monnet Method was 
at work as in the ECSC or in a higher gear; officials and politicians were appointed to the 
Commission and involved in its structures and quickly became co-opted into the technocratic 
European project. Too quickly for the liking of some of the MSs; the Commissioners institu-
tional identity proved stronger than some had expected.2570nce there, many became enam-
oured with the European ideal and the possibilities that it contained, and involved their do-
mestic networks to further promote the ideal and to bring in their expert knowledge to the 
Commission's dialogues and finally to help ensure that policies were enforced. The project 
was full of idealism which was strongest at its beginning and the first Commissioners were 
very much influenced by this. Under Hallstein Commissioners were not just to remain loyal to 
supranationality in the Commission, they were expected to ' . . . foster a European identity 
within the Member States.' Following from this logic, the higher the political profile of the 
Commissioners the better.259The Luxembourg Compromise ended that; 'The Luxembourg 
Compromise of 1966 appeared to set the limits both to the integration process and to the inde-
pendence and initiative of the Commission. It introduced a period of disenchantment with su-
pranationality . . . ,' and made the Commission and College more MS influenced than be-
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fore, which the MSs had probably wanted and expected from the start. Probably in the inter-
ests of DP, larger states aimed to ensure that the opposition in the national government were 
equally represented in the Commissioners designated by their MS, Where possible as full a 
representation of the national parliament would be present in the College. 
Whilst a political background is not a requirement for a Commissioner many have had one 
and certainly the more effective and influential Commissioners have had political careers, of-
ten, seemingly, the more powerful a Commissioner had been politically previously in his MS 
career the greater the impact of the Commissioner on the Commission and the European pro-
ject. Without the dynamic leaders like Hallstein, Delors, Jenkins, it is hard to imagine the pro-
ject getting as far and as fast as it did, Monnet stealth or not. Interestingly, national politicians 
acting in a democratic free zone with institutional and European loyalty, provoked their de-
mocratically elected colleagues to attempt to contain them and their organization, the Com-
mission. Only the presence of a strong, charismatic MS politician with a network to match 
enables the College and thus Commission to be anything more than a collection of individu-
als. In the normal run of things the Commissioners are a part of the problem of political ac-
countability and control. Just as the European Parliament made the European Project appear 
democratic whilst avoiding major changes and reorganisations that would have left a truly 
democratic European government in place, no doubt considerably weaker in terms of compe-
tences, but infinitely stronger in terms of democratic credentials; so the College does some-
thing similar to the Commission. 
Regarding the rest of the Commission, the 'services', the endless debate between the inter-
governmentalists and supranationalists seems to be a debate about the two sides of a coin, a 
point other academics have also noted.264The top ranks of the 'services' have at times pro-
moted national interests and at times purely Community ones, or probably more often than 
not mixed versions, compromises. MSs are stated to have a desire to 'secure a power base' in 
the 'internal organisation of the Commission' or to resist change which would damage their 
interests, which can create problems for the Commission in allocating its own resources inter-
nally.265Some DGs were/are flagged down (dominated in staff nationality terms) since they 
were of national importance.266It is known that if a policy is being begun in a DG that a MS 
dislikes or wants watered down, the various non bureaucratic methods of placing officials in 
the position in which the MS requires them, are known as, 'parachutage' or 'piston.' Or sec-
onded national officials come into play who are placed in the DG concerned, for a period of 
around three years, and charged with dealing with the policy concerned. Monnet was well 
aware of the dangers to the 'independent European civil service' he wanted, by MSs being 
able to overly influence personnel choices;267despite the possible benefits of more MS -
Commission collaboration. The placing of certain officials anywhere in the organisation oper-
ates outside the formal structure of promotion that the Commission controls. 
In fact, to sum up, the Commission recently, and no doubt at times throughout its history, has 
seemed remarkably similar to that, according to some, most intergovernmental of organiza-
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tions, the Council of Ministers. National issues and positions gradually became more impor-
tant in the College, for example, than before and this will be considered later. But more im-
portantly the sectoral breakdown of the Commission combined with nationality led, under 
Prodi, to that most Council of methods, avoiding a vote if possible. For an organization which 
should be collegial, indeed has to be, this was interesting enough. It should be said that the 
College has often had problems with appearing or behaving as if it were collegial or cohesive 
at all; Tor one thing, the College under Prodi was not a very collective or collegial Commis-
sion. '2 6^ point emphasised by the following quotation: 
'But the Commission often struggled to agree common lines on issues related to the Conven-
tion, institutional reform and its own future role. One interesting upshot was that a very pow-
erful culture of avoiding votes emerged under Prodi. Under the Commission's internal rules, 
any proposal may be put to a vote of the College, with positive approval by a simple majority 
(eleven of twenty in the Prodi Commission) after which all Commissioners must publicly 
support the decision, or else resign. Under Prodi, there appeared to be considerably fewer vo-
tes in the College than under santer or Delors, perhaps because Prodi feared exposing the 
Commission's potential for discord.'269 
1.2.4.2 THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
The Council of Ministers was the main DP bulwark. Originally the influence of the govern-
ments of the MSs and their representatives were kept a minimum by the High Authority: 
' . . . Jean Monnet regarded governments as minor players in the Community and disdained to 
deal with any national representatives other than ministers . . . Yet this understanding of the 
role of the supranational authority was an underestimate of the powers that the six MSs were 
resolved to retain.' 
Indeed the Council only came into being as a result of Belgian and Dutch concerns about 
the non democratic nature of the ECSC: 
4Monnet's supranationalism now came under further attack from those who disliked the idea 
of his High Authority being free from control by elected politicians. The Dutch chief negotia-
tor, Dirk Spierenburg, called for an intergovernmental "watchdog" to supervise the High Au-
thority." 
Forced to accept the Council, the Monnet Method then came into force to deal with it with the 
proposal for qualified majority voting (QMV) which then allowed for the fragmentation of the 
Council so that France and Germany could not outvote the other countries.272 
Despite QMV the "success" of Monnet combined with the failure of the EDC and EPC and 
the difficulties of the ECSC to actually control Coal and Steel industries when MS backing 
was present, finally led to a strengthening of the intergovernmental position. As stated earlier 
the EEC treaty saw the Council grow in importance; 'The new Communities' institutional 
frameworks emulated that of the ECSC but with a stronger Council of Ministers and a corre-
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spondingiy weaker Commission.' This was in part due to,4 . , . the seeming over ambition 
of the ECSC High Authority under Monnet's presidency,' which had resulted in the fact that, 
4 . . . supranationalism had acquired a bad name . . . '2 ? QMV was available but not used, and 
up to the present day on more important issues MSs stick to unanimity, according to some the 
majority of the time despite the SEA unanimity is in practise used.275 
The forces of DP closed around the Monnet Method and the Commission; 'The Council also 
helps to ensure respect for the democratic functioning of the system, insofar as each of its 
members is politically responsible to the national parliament . . . ,276This sounds good and 
was no doubt well intentioned but in practice the executives of MSs often, if not usually, en-
sured that the parliaments could not or they themselves did not inspect the legislation prior to 
the ministers' voting. The scrutinising of the end legislation by the parliaments also seems to 
have been inadequate. The Council has used and to some extent uses the budget and the ex-
pertise of COREPER to rein in the Commission and restrict its size. But the Method resulted 
in the Council itself being fragmented by the sectoral concentration of the project. It seems 
that the executive, like the officials, is rather easily lured into complicity with the various as-
pects of the Method. 
The Council is stated to be extremely fragmented, divided up into various policy sectors 
with all the problems that that brings in terms of accountability and transparency.27 Some of 
the sectors no doubt emerging in an evolutionaiy ad hoc manner as spillovers of one sort or 
another occurred.280 The Council is fragmented owing to the sectoral Councils of which it 
consists where most of the business of the Union is performed. Work is divided up into pretty 
insular sectoral Councils supported by related officials and Commission staff from the DG or 
sometimes DGs dealing with the sector. The difficulties in coordinating the various Councils 
and their sectors has had national consequences as well as just Council ones. The Councils 
can result in a separation of ministers and related officials from the restraints of national cabi-
net loyalty and accountability. Indeed the notion of ministers and officials desiring power and 
to be Prime Ministers for a day and carrying out politics aside from the political coercive sys-
tem of parliamentary control seems all too apparent. Within Councils ministers can and do act 
often as they think best like judges being rulers in their own courtroom. They can promote 
those important constituencies for their sector which enable them to get their work done well 
and efficiently: the stakeholders, lobbyists and officials. The voters of the government and its 
manifesto can be ignored. The accounts are manifold of ministers agreeing to things in Coun-
cils which the cabinets and governments of the MSs themselves would have probably pre-
cluded: 
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The ministers in the Council and the civil servants in the working groups tend to have, first 
of all, loyalty to the perceived interests of their own national ministry at home. Policy compe-
tition between ministries at the national or, as in Germany, the sub national level is often con-
tinued or begun at Council level. The competition may even extend to other Councils when 
the ministers experience a lack of congruence between their policy tasks at home and those at 
Council level. For example, a national ministry of transport may find to its chagrin that the 
dossier on Working Hours for Truckers is handled by the social Council, that is by the minis-
ter and the civil servants from a competing ministry at home . . . this partially explains why 
frequently more than one domestic minister shows up in the same Council meeting and why 
the country often prefers to abstain from voting, if a vote is taken at all. Such a vote could re-
veal embarrassing internal divisions.'281 
And again: 
'Thirdly, the Council meetings are used for playing home politics, for example to satisfy the 
national parliament or to bypass another ministry at home. The environmental Council in par-
ticular, in taking decisions without them being discussed by nationally based ministries, has 
acquired a reputation for t h i s . . . The Council's poly centric character and its limited functions 
make it, in a daily practice, more a meeting of competitive stakeholders that that of dominant 
shareholders. Some centripetal forces keep the competition under cont ro l . . . by co-ordination 
ministries at home a national government can limit competition with them at Council l e v e l . . . 
all this may be possible, and it happens sometimes and to some degree, but the centripetal 
forces at home are usually particularly weak. For example the civil servant in a working group 
may act as a self instructed trustee for the minister or the national co-ordination may simply 
be too late.'282 
The UK government seems to have strengthened the cabinet office to curb this tendency of 
ministers with their excessive loyalty to their sector, which can only increase, whilst they are 
at a sector Council amongst likeminded and motivated counterparts from other MSs. But this 
does not seem to be the case in Germany for example. It seems to be a fair enough question to 
ask as to whether or not MS governments would accept the decisions reached by their minis-
ters in the Councils if a complete cabinet discussion and vote were allowed after the event and 
allowed to have retrospective effect. Unfortunately there is a tendency in most MSs for sec-
toral fragmentation and thus most ministers and COREPER are often acting in a vacuum. The 
Union via the Councils and the voting procedures do a lot to fragment, divide up, MS gov-
ernments still further. 
It is interesting to note not only that the fragmentation process continues into the MSs them-
selves283but that it is accompanied by a removal of a large amount of policy from effective 
accountability. Not only are the divisions between MS domestic ministries increased by the 
Council but also the integration process has fragmented the area of public policy dramatically. 
What was once a fairly united whole, which the national parliaments could force some degree 
of accountability over, is now fragmented into that which is oriented towards Europe and that 
which is not, and so to that over which the parliaments can decide and supervise and that 
which they cannot. As more sectors have been absorbed into the EU so they have been re-
moved from the national legislative oversight remit of the parliaments. This obviously weak-
ens the legislature and by removing large elements of its jurisdiction from it, increasingly 
empties the UK notion of parliament being supreme of meaning. Voters are voting for less 
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and less in a national context, their votes are losing their value, democracy losing its value, 
and the big winner is the executive and finally the bureaucratic arm: 
'Integration has also affected national democracy by removing important areas of public pol-
icy from within the ambit of national parliaments. All national parliaments have difficulty in 
holding their national ministers accountable for what they do at a European level. Moreover, 
the technical nature of much EC legislation tends to enhance the power of the expert over the 
politician. Most decisions are taken by delegated officials . . . There is a weakness of political 
accountability in the EU system caused by the institutional balance, the technical nature of 
decisions, the lack of transparency about how decisions are reached . . . ' 2 8 4 
Another form of fragmentation is the emergence of multiple roles for national political actors. 
In a sense they are expected to be all things to all men, to represent MSs and the EU at the 
same time; 'Almost all actors in the EU policy process have multiple identities, and may play 
multiple roles.'285That tension, contradictions and confusion often result seems inevitable, 
that these were worse at the beginning of the EEC before the actors and their institutions gra-
dually began to merge the approaches to the issues in the interest of shortcutting and effi-
ciency also seems self explanatory. Again, stating that roles were split, that fragmentation was 
involved in integration processes is not meant pejoratively. For partial reconstruction there 
must first be partial dismantling. The cost will affect the ministerial level in particular which 
has additional tasks whilst the number of ministers remains strictly limited. More officials can 
be employed and have been as COREPER shows, and national offices which deal directly 
with the EU but the accountability holders have not been multiplied. It seems inevitable that 
multiplying roles for ministers in particular will lead to greater discretion for officials both in 
n n / 
the MSs and in the Councils. What is more a loss of effectiveness, coherence and direction 
which traditionally political leadership provides will result from the officials, serving various 
Councils, deciding policy. The creation of the European Council after a long period of CO-
REPER and Council activities and an apparent lack of EEC effectiveness reflects the need for 
leadership and direction.287 
The Monnet system was always a non democratic venture, if only on a temporary basis, with 
its emphasis on officials and their skills; but the extent to which the executive arm of govern-
ment has merged with the bureaucratic is astonishing. Over 80% of the work of the Council is 
completed by COREPER with only a portion of what remains even considered by the minis-
ters. Interestingly enough over 80% of the work that a Commission official puts into a text of 
legislation will often remain unchanged, presumably both organisations are remarkably in 
agreement and no doubt in close contact before hand. Regarding the ministers' input: 
'Alan Clark, who recorded in his diary his first Council as a junior trade minister, he was coa-
ched on "the line to take" by an official of the UKREP, the UK's permanent representation in 
Brussels, before she set about rewriting the speech he had been planning to make. "Not that it 
makes the slightest difference to the conclusions of a meeting what ministers say', he went on 
: " . . . everything is decided in advance, horse traded off, by officials at COREPER . . . the 
Ministers arrive on the scene at the last minute, hot, tired, ill or drunk (sometimes all of these 
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together), read out their piece and depart." Another minister described how, when he arrived 
at his first Council, he was startled to see that the first item on the agenda was the commu-
niqué to be issued when the meeting was finished. When he protested to his officials that this 
should surely come last, after the rest of agenda had been settled, he was condescendingly 
told, "oh no, minister, all the other items have already been agreed at last week's CORE-
PER.'"289 
Usually a proposal for legislation will originate in a MS ministry, continue via the Commis-
sion and COREPER and be implemented by the same ministry and similar ones in the MSs, 
democratic control exists in the ministers, whose ministries brief them and the EP to some 
extent. The same proposal for legislation could, of course, follow the normal route to the min-
ister first who could then suggest it go to the Council, however usually this is not the case. 
Which seems to suggest that the more effective route for the national ministries to see their 
proposals acted upon is to deal directly with the EU, thus 'The most remarkable achievement 
of this new system of government had thus been the extent to which the power to make the 
vast majority of laws had been transferred from politicians to officials. The only useful role 
left to the politicians in this process was to lend it a veneer of democratic legitimacy.'290 
One last point, regarding the Council and the problems of DP with it; as long as there was a 
national veto in the Council of Ministers over policy then, openly, there was little at that level 
that the Commission as the active agent could do to alter the balance, but it has constantly 
promoted the extension of the qualified majority vote and accepted the logic of ever more en-
largements. The combination of these two lead to increased possibilities to divide and rule, 
with the Commission facing ever larger numbers of states in the Council. The desire of the 
Commission has always been to break states away from the single vote or veto, and into coali-
tions, pressing them into amalgamations which are easier to mould. What is more it is ex-
tremely hard to say who really voted for what and to so identify which actor was really re-
sponsible for the passage of a certain regulation. Certainly where accountability is concerned, 
not that ministers are really held accountable by national parliaments for their behaviour in 
Councils, it is hard to see how a national voter or parliament can really hold a group of minis-
ters from various MSs responsible. Even when national positions are known, the details are 
usually not, and neither are the subsequent bargains and compromises. One of the many diffi-
culties is that voters are not voting for the European positions of their MS in the manifesto of 
the parties or not in depth. How could they, given that outcomes in Europe are so complex 
and involve so many actors? At best they can be informed about what a party might like to 
take up with Europe if it has the chance and such statements are going to be even vaguer than 
the usual political promises. 
1.2.4.3 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The Assembly of the ECSC, which had appointees from national parliaments on it, was forced 
on Monnet and his Method by the French finance minister who 'had then proposed the inclu-
sion of an Assembly, which would retain the ultimate power to dismiss the High Authority, 
much as a shareholders' meeting has the power to dismiss a board of Directors.'29,Other 
changes had already been taken on board to get the ECSC as far as it had already got.292Pre-
sumably these were done to assuage some of the domestic concerns about DP which the Gaul-
lists expressed clearly enough; 'Instead of delegating our powers to a democratic Assembly, 
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we are asked to abandon an important sector of our economy to a stateless and uncontrolled 
autocracy of experts.' 
When presented with the Monnet inspired EDC in 1952 one year later, the Socialist Group 
refused ratification complaining about the lack of democracy in it, 'the Socialist Group wan-
ted a "more democratic" EDC, with a European Assembly elected by universal 
suffrage,' The French leader at this point, later voted for the rejection of the EEC treaty, al-
though it had the potential to be more democratic and intergovernmental than the ECSC, stat-
ing 'France must not be the victim of the Treaty. A democrat may abdicate by giving in to an 
internal dictatorship, but also by delegating his powers to an external authority.' 95 
Although it was not democratically elected to supervise the High Authority, the ECSC As-
sembly represented an attempt to surround it and control it with some DP. And the story of 
the Assembly and the later EP has been one of increasing powers as greater integration has 
occurred. Organically this is logical as the progression of the immunisation would work in the 
same fashion, provoking from liberal democratic parliamentary systems a healthy response of 
attempting to surround the growing irritant with increasing amounts of democratic institu-
tions, and / or greater competences for them. The greater the political content of European in-
tegration and thus the greater the penetration into the competences of the National parliaments 
the greater have become the powers of DP. 
The history of the EP showed both DP gains but also long periods of executive resistance to 
allowing parliamentary control. The reasons are several but the trend is that the excessively 
executive nature of the Monnet Method has led to the ever increasing dominance of the ex-
ecutive and officials in the EU, and finally this has all come at the expense of democracy. The 
executive and officials represent the first line of DP defence so long as they are answerable to 
a parliament and remain within the DP model. However, as we have seen increasingly this has 
not been the case. The forces of DP were activated as was to be expected and a parliamentary 
body was formed in the ECSC and EEC Assemblies but their hollowed out weakness, as a 
result of national governments, stands out. The national leaders were the ones to decide to 
grant the EP a direct mandate and no doubt they were the most important, if not the only, 
forces to decide not to allow the direct election of the earlier two assemblies. 
A process of fragmentation for the Assemblies began almost immediately, more is the pity. 
Both the ECSC Assembly and the EEC Assembly could have been directly elected from the 
start and involved the MS electorates in national elections which could have been held to-
gether and created a sense of a European identity for subsequently elected parliamentarians 
and the citizens alike. Instead, for both assemblies, the choice was made for national parlia-
ments to select members, on a national basis, and no doubt, as nationally oriented as the ex-
ecutive, at first at least. It is interesting to note that the MSs were legally bound to carry out 
elections to the EEC Assembly, but did not. Thus immediately the Assemblies were divided 
along national as well as, no doubt, domestic party lines. The positive bonus for the Assem-
blies and DP was that they could make somewhat more real the notion of parliamentary con-
trol, insofar as they were able to report back to national parliaments the activities of the High 
Authority and later the Commission. 
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Both Assemblies had little real power unfortunately, and the EEC Assembly failed to push for 
the allocation of power which the Treaty of Rome had foreseen for it. Under the Treaty it was 
to have an advisory power over legislation which was an increase on the power of the ECSC 
Assembly which had only had a supervisory role over the High Authority. One can only guess 
at the reasons for the weakness of the EEC Assembly which led it to fail to press for its le-
gally binding powers. The national parliaments have seen in the EP and so no doubt in the 
assembly a competitor and not a complementary force.296Given the either- or approach for the 
Assemblies, consisting of either national parliament appointees or European MEPs elected 
with a European mandate, the national parliamentarians could be seen to have been protecting 
their rights and competences over their own executives acting on a European level. The 
strength of a new EP with extremely limited powers and no real backup in terms of a national 
parliamentary base from which to hold the MS executive to account, would have seen a rather 
poor replacement for the parliaments and their appointees in the Assemblies. There was, no 
doubt, also plenty of nationalism at work and also a desire to keep organizational rights. Also 
there may well have been little incentive for the appointees to strengthen the EEC Assembly 
which was, quite apart from being pretty powerless, also at best, legally a temporary phe-
nomenon until the legally required elections took place. 
The long delay in deciding to create the EP as the Treaty intended is odd. Since the EEC was 
no doubt sold to the parliaments who ratified the treaty as an EEC with a directly elected par-
liament, not to grant the Assembly its legal powers seems dubious to put it mildly. As if the 
democratic part had been reluctantly attached to get it past the parliaments and then quietly 
ignored. The motives for the national parliamentarians accepting this situation have been con-
sidered, but the Commission and MSs accepting the new governmental set up with the fully 
democratic part noticeably missing is glaring.29 A partial explanation is that the project itself, 
as a whole, was not fully achieved and effected, the single market was not achieved until 
1992. Also full Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was late in coming, thus for the EEC as it 
stood, the Assembly was good enough. However, the Council still retained its full powers and 
used them and the Commission likewise retained its rights. Thus once again the European le-
vel saw an empowered executive and a weak parliament and DP only being represented by the 
MS executives. 
Looked at frctn the above perspective; the decision to launch the EP as a directly elected par-
liament in 1979, twenty odd years later is curious. On the one hand, no doubt, it reflected the 
growing size of the Community budget and the planned political re-launch of the project. But 
the reluctance of the national governments of the MSs to share the European project with par-
liaments full stop is shown in the phrasing of the following; 'They agreed that "a European 
Parliament, elected by universal suffrage, would have to be associated with the development 
of the European construction " ,298The move from the Assembly to the EP had a sort of or-
ganic DP feel about it: 
'Giscard's conversion to this project, reversing his party's previous policy stemmed more 
from political calculation than conviction. For domestic reasons, he needed the support of the 
smaller independent parties in his national assembly, for whom "commitment to European 
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Integration was an article of faith". Offering an elected parliament for Europe was enough to 
woo them into his governing coalition.'299 
The combination of motivations for the direct election, which is shown by the following, 
stress this organic feel, there was pressure from several sources through the governmental 
structures of the MSs for the EP; 'Under these circumstances, there was a strong body of opi-
nion amongst governments, notably the Dutch, that national parliaments could no longer ex-
ercise effective control over Community finance and that the task should be passed on to the 
European parliament.'300The attitude reflected here is good old fashioned DP in parliamentary 
form, 'what touches all must be approved by all', in the face of ever increasing amounts of 
Community independent funding under the category of 'Own Resources.' The Community 
had the legal right to a share of taxation. It was a parliamentary DP reaction to the increase in 
Community power. 
The MS governments maybe felt forced to act and chose the lesser of two evils, a directly e-
lected but otherwise still weak EP rather than a no doubt strengthened in some other way As-
sembly. As it was the EP was directly elected but did not see any increase in its legislative 
powers for another ten years. More formal democracy was required and the more fig-leaf 
like the better. The EP's right to be consulted was to an extent forced on the MSs by the EC J 
in the Isoglucose judgement of 1980 in which the ECJ ' . . . made it clear that Council could 
not adopt Community legislation before receiving Parliament's opinion, where the treaties 
require it.' The ECJ was clear that the Treaty had intended there to be a balance between the 
institutions, which was quite obviously not there and had not been there for twenty years. 
The EP would take a while to learn its way through the institutional set up and to establish 
itself. Unlike the Assembly it would have no way of forcing the executive to account, in many 
ways its powers were as weak as those of the Assembly without the bonus of national parlia-
ments to amplify it and deal with the executive accountability issue. In some ways it was an 
ideal executive's parliament; it provided the appearance of democracy and accountability 
without the teeth. Creating the EP on the eve of re-launching the EU303 with the large amount 
of legislation that this would involve might seem cynical. European legislation, in ever in-
creasing amounts, could be enforced domestically on the basis that it had been democratically 
agreed upon, indeed the whole EU apparatus could be sold domestically as democratic and 
parliamentarian whereas the EP was far too weak to be able to provide such an assurance. 
Another point is that the MSs were probably also aware that the Assembly members were in-
tergovernmental ly oriented like themselves and probably more fixated on their national minis-
ters in the Council. The supranational EP with its supervisory powers over the supranational 
Commission would be fixated on the latter; 'Institutional developments within the Union have 
also served to enhance Member State control and to limit the influence of the Commission. 
The further strengthening of the European Parliament (through the extension of co-decision to 
seven new areas) in the Nice Treaty is one example.'30<lYes, the EP could give the Commis-
sion some semblance of democratic legitimacy, but given the extenuated lines of accountabil-
ity this was and would be weak.305Whatever assistance that the EP gives in adding some de-
mocracy to the system is weakened by its position institutionally and lack of a powerful man-
date; 'The democratic credentials of the EP are weakened by the low turnout in EP elections 
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(58 percent in the 1994 election).'1'"This is stressed again in this quotation 'It was under 50 
percent in the 1999, matched by a decline in support for EU membership from 73 percent in 
1991 to 46 percent in the Euro-barometer report of 1997.' 
The spreading EU with its intrusion into ever more spheres of public life and politics in part 
provoked the constitution and a DP re-balance. DP in the form of national referenda have 
shown that national democratic perceptions are clearly dissatisfied with the EU actual DP re-
ality. The EP in itself contains not enough DP principles to allow the EU to be accepted by 
the democratic forces represented in referenda. This will be considered later. Whilst the draw-
ing up of a constitutional DP re-balance is entirely to be recommended and the EU needed 
and needs more DP, the actual constitution reflects the other trend in the integration process. 
The problem is the executive build up308and that the executive and officialdom are reluctant to 
share power with parliamentary forces of DP, in particular if those forces are able to really 
force accountability on it. Thus, the inclusion in the proposed constitution of greater powers 
and influence of the national parliaments in the legislative process sounds plausible, but in 
reality might well have succeeded in diluting the power of the EP in more ways than one but 
above all by adding more actors and or procedures to the EU with the greater lack of clarity 
and even more complex lines of accountability. The parliamentary forces of DP would have 
been fragmented rather than reinforced. The national element would be reintroduced to the 
European level where it is inappropriate. One could almost wonder whether the EP has been 
too successful in its activities and strengthening its role and this is the reason for the MSs 
playing the card of adding in national parliaments. What is lacking from parliaments is the 
ability to force accountability and responsibility on the European level executive, in particular 
the MSs and their executive members. This most basic of parliamentary powers is weak e-
nough in national parliaments but almost non existent in the EU. The big winner from the 
constitution would have been the executive and in particular the MS executive members, and 
the suspicion has to be that the executive will do whatever it can to avoid the radical overhaul 
that would leave it facing a real parliamentaiy system, demanding protection for taxpayer's 
money and an end to those vested interests like those surrounding CAP and the Structural 
Funds. 
1.2.4.4 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
The European Council's creation in 1974 was a step in the MSs and, initially at least, DP gai-
ning control over the general direction of the Community. The political leaders of the MSs 
were now to be involved in the Community on a regular basis and not just in the founding of 
it. Initially at least, the Council started out as part of the trend of MSs seeking other more ef-
fective methods of doing business outside the 'blocked' Community channels. De Gaulle and 
the impasse with Hallstein had led to a weaker Commission and a less efficient one as well. 
The perennial problem for the MSs is how to have efficient channels to do business in and 
just enough supranationality to guarantee policies without encouraging a political ri-
val,309which could be argued from a de Gaulle perspective, to have been behaving like a para-
site, drawing powers and competences away from the MSs. The channels were blocked but 
they were also perhaps better so, given the potential the Commission had showed, any new 
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system would require greater MS control than had existed before, presumably especially for 
the French but also for the new entrant Britain. 
Implicitly, there is the sense that the ministers in the Council had not being coordinating their 
activities well. Although the following quotation was written with regards to the recent situa-
tion the fundamentals are unlikely to have changed over much; 'The Council's polycentric 
character and its limited functions make it, in daily practice, more a meeting of competitive 
stakeholders than that of dominant shareholders. Some centripetal forces keep the competition 
under control . . . '310 under these are listed COREPER, the General Secretariat, the General 
Council and the European Council.3nThe latter seemingly 'can overcome stalemates among 
and inside specialised Councils. By co-ordinating ministries at home, a national government 
can limit competition with them at Council level.,312CertainIy some of the work done by the 
European Council is to locate possible "package deals" and construct them from ' . . . transec-
toral compromises,' in particular between MSs in disagreement.3nSome, around the time of 
the founding of the European Council thought that 'the heads of state and government would 
undermine the Commission's monopoly of the right of initiative, would downgrade the Coun-
cil of Ministers to some kind of subordinate chamber and would effectively circumvent the 
limited rights of the European parliament'3I4In some respects the European Council is the top 
Council of a 'pyramid' of Councils and their officials represented by COREPER and the 
Council of Ministers.315 
The summits attended by the European national leaders, in part owing to the failure of the su-
pranational institutions, had had a distinctly negative slant on the Community and its meth-
ods; it was only after considerable pressure and lobbying by small states that the Commission 
President was allowed to participate in them at all.31 The European Council grew out of simi-
lar summits and gradually became more formally recognised over time and it can be sus-
pected that the attitude of the MSs was similar in these. Observers of the time were equally 
critical about the development of the European Council for the integration process: 
'Observers of the integration process noted its creation; There the European Council, com-
posed of the political masters of Council members, is given responsibility for providing the 
EU with "the necessary impetus for its development," and for defining "the general political 
guidelines thereof' (Article D, paragraph l(TEU)). The earlier doctrine that characterised the 
Commission as the "motor of European integration" is displaced. Accordingly, the "decision 
making process evolving in the Community gives a key role to governments.'"317 
The MSs seemed to be taking the Community over and introducing large new doses of inter-
governmentalism into them. And yet, soon enough, there seemed to be plenty of integra-
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tionary activity going on. In practice it was not long before the Method drew the leaders into 
the project and in its characteristic manner: 
'It may well require considerable time and energy on the part of the national leaders, but the 
further development of the EU is highly dependent on this summit-style of bargaining. On 
such occasions, the heads of government and state find themselves, contrary to their nature, in 
situations where they are forced to discuss concrete formulations in great detail. It is only by 
discussing the technical details of a text that the real political issues upon which there is dis-
agreement can come to the fore, and it is only then that the tough decisions can be ta-
ken.'321322 
The process is familiar; it is once again the Monnet Method at work, the method of breaking 
major issues down to the level of details. Only now there is the acceptance that the details re-
flect political problems and not a de-politicisation of them. Any naTve functionalist belief in 
technocrats being able to rationally solve details with political issues stripped away that there 
might have once been was gone. Only now the leaders of MSs had been reduced to the level 
of technocrats and forced to abandon their expertise in coordinating others, and instead they 
have to be coordinated to reach agreement on details. 
Appeasing the leaders' desire to achieve historical grand schemes was achieved in granting 
them their right to give the Community general direction.323The ability of the project to at-
tract, provoke ministers and leaders to 'take it over' at critical times and to place their names 
on its activities was first carried out with Schuman when Monnet let the supranational project 
seem to be his creation. The European Council seems to follow in this tradition with the 
Commission allowing and working with the Council on the grand direction of the Union, and 
so to an extent satisfying the leaders need to be or appear to be in control. The extent to which 
this is and was a deliberate strategy is not entirely clear but there seems to have been a clear 
proposal made by Monnet promoting the concept of a 'Provisional European Government' to 
replace the summits which he found not to be satisfactory. Arguably the leaders took the bait 
and allowed the grand notions connected with the European Union and European Council to 
sway their judgement. However, given the track record of the European Council acting in 
much the same ambivalent manner that the MSs always have towards the Commission and the 
supranational federal solution, the creation of the European Council, which was not included 
in any of the formal 'Community' constitutional set up, and is still only marginally so, seems 
to have been again a case of MS leaders accepting the grand project whilst ensuring that that 
their control was increased as a result. Whether this would have pleased Monnet in the long 
run seems doubtful. One last point about the European Council's right of setting the general 
direction of the EU; what was implicit has become explicit in the post Maastricht era, the 
Commission's monopoly of legislative initiation has been 'restricted' whilst the European 
Council has become more assertive. Furthermore, the leaders, when possible, use the pow-
ers of the EU to achieve unpleasant but necessary goals domestically without the political 
costs that this would inevitably result in.326 
320 See note 132 De Schoutheete, (2002) p.32 
121 See note 104 Dinan, (2000) p. 189 
n 2 See note 1 Peterson; Bömberg (1999), p. 274 
323 See note 3 Monnet (1978) p.287 and note 1 Peterson; Bömberg (1999) p.255 a winning combination that de Gaulle began 
and Mitterrand continued. 
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326 Smith, M. The Commission made me do it in Nugent, N (ed) At the heart of the Union, second edition, (2000) Basing-
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The above points indicate that the MSs in the European Council have been reasonably suc-
cessfully co-opted into the supranational project. The decisions of the seemingly 'intergov-
ernmental* European Council have proven to often be quite integrationary in their nature: 
'Far from being the champion of a realist, state-centric approach to European Integration, the 
European Council will continue to exemplify the pooling of member states's policymaking 
tools and decisions. The European Council can, therefore, be seen as a manifestation of the 
way in which the interdependent welfare states of Western Europe have chosen to integrate 
their activities and instruments in virtually all areas of public policy in order to meet the over-
all economic, social, and foreign policy expectations of their electorates.'327 
This has been noted by others,328This leads to the paradoxical conclusion; 'Accordingly, the 
European Council is as much a symbol of the member states' struggle for unity as a manifes-
i on 
tation of their obstinacy.' Most of the institutions of the EU represent this, they are 'mani-
festations' of MS 'obstinacy' and desire to contain and thus control supranationalism as a po-
litical force benefiting the Commission in particular, whilst wanting unity and integration for 
themselves. The overly simplistic idea of integration as being the work of the devoted few 
ignores its attraction as a common good to the many. 
That said, a lot depends on the character of the Commission and its President. An over effec-
tive President and a Commission which appears to have over played its hand and striven for 
too much political profile, will result in a European Council which is more controlling and 
suspicious about it. 30So whilst Delors worked well initially with the leaders and had them 
very much on board, in the nineties the pendulum swung back after the Commission pushed 
too far for both some leaders and their various publics. The weakening of the Commission's 
powers in the Maastricht treaty is stated to show this attempt to 'rein' it in.33lThe European 
Council is described in less rosy terms, from an integrationalist perspective: 
'More broadly, throughout the decade, the Member States asserted their authority and institu-
tionalised their leadership over the direction of integration. IGCs became more frequent. Their 
agendas were longer, the level of detail greater, and their expansion into policy more exten-
sive. The Commission was relegated to a secondary role . . . The volume and scope of busi-
ness transacted at European Councils also increased. In policy matters, heads of State and 
Government no longer concentrated only on high politics, nor limited their attention to trou-
110 
bleshooting. Instead, there was evidence of "creeping competence". 
It is interesting to note that one academic is quite explicit about the sort of political manoeu-
vrings that go on between the MSs and the Commission and how one side 'learns' and then 
adopts a new strategy: 
'The Member States . . . were re-orienting the Union in an intergovernmental direction. 
Through a process of "learning", Member States had become increasingly wise to the Com-
mission's ability to exploit possibilities of expanding EU competencies. Since Maastricht, 
they have shown far greater vigilance in institutional matters, limiting opportunities for entre-
preneurial expansionism on the part of the Commission.'333 
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The European Council continues its ambivalent career as pro integration but not pro an overly 
politically powerful Commission. What seems clear enough is that the MSs and European 
Council have and have had the potential to effectively block the Commission institutionally 
when required. 
1.2.4.5 ECJ AND LEGAL FRAGMENTATION 
Legally the European project is a model of first fragmentation and then re construction. Fun-
damentally the European Court of Justice created a new legal system by its act which added 
another judicial level to those already in existence arguably, at the cost to the national courts 
which had dealt with international issues reasonably before. MS legal actors abruptly found 
themselves no longer supreme but also possible defendants in a court where they were on a 
similar level to the companies who could challenge them. National jurisdiction was split in a 
sense to allow the new European sphere of action. National courts, like ministers, found 
themselves having their roles split, so they could have to act as effectively European judges 
where legislation of EU origin was involved,334where the highest Court was the ECJ, or as 
national judges as before in the national context where the national court hierarchy remained 
in force. National courts saw direct effect and supremacy set the ECJ above national courts 
and legislation of a European origin above national legislation. The move was political which 
made it difficult for any effective legal response to be made against it, when a law court ma-
kes a political move which creates a legal system and sets itself up as the supreme arbiter of 
that system. The response of MSs to the Gend and Loos case and challenge was unsurpris-
ingly rebutted by the ECJ. Only a full scale political crisis and new treaty could possibly have 
remedied this situation. On the positive side the goals of the Monnet Method seem to have 
been met in the ECJ which first by declaration in its judgements effectively fragmented legal 
systems and created a European layer, but at the same time it welded these together into a co-
hesive, coherent whole. It was, maybe, the first really fully empowered supranational institu-
tion as the supranationalists would have approved.335 
That said, as a short digression, the ECJ has something of a fragmented and mixed govern-
mental nature. From a purely legal perspective it seems dubious for the ECJ to have created 
the new legal system which should belong to a legislature or clearly consenting states. Sup-
posedly the establishment of an international jurisdiction requires the express consent of states 
in the context of the decentralised international legal system. In the Gend and Loos case sev-
eral of the MSs concerned seemed to be fairly clear that the teleologically arrived at interpre-
tation of the ECJ, was not what they had intended and consented to when they signed the 
T Til 
treaty, it also does not to have been expected by any of the founders of the Community. 
The ECJ interpretation certainly seems to have been a political interpretation of the 'facts'; 3 ^w 
and there are other interpretations. The Court the Member States seem to have intended to 
334 See note 1, Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p.45; 'Similarly, the evolution of the Community's legal system was not foreseen 
by the EEC's founders, nor was the central role of the ECJ in EU decision making (Alter 1998), Community Law has been 
expanded and strengthened largely through the co-opting of national courts and legal administrations (see Armstrong and 
Shaw 1998; Dehousse 1998) 
335 ibid p.46-47. 
336 ibid p,45; 'Similarly, the evolution of the Community's legal system was not foreseen by the EEC's founders, nor was the 
central role of the ECJ in EU decision making (Alter 1998). Community Law has been expanded and strengthened largely 
through the co-opting of national courts and legal administrations (see Armstrong and Shaw 1998; Dehousse 1998) 
The teleological argument proceeds along the lines that the MSs founded a Common Market which could only function 
effectively if a legal system was in place to enforce it. The problem with this logic is whether the MSs did indeed consider 
the Common Market to be the goal, or was it rather a political statement of intent. Was the Common Market element not a 
useful reason to work closer together, to extend trust and co-operation. It was merely a useful vehicle and form to express 
these desires and intentions. The ECSC was still in existence and so kept the danger of war aside and it had taught the MSs 
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found, at least going by the treaty they signed, seems to have been more of a neutral mediator 
_ ^ ^ f t 
than a Court, particularly when the following is considered; ' . , . the Court could declare 
that the member state had failed to fulfil its treaty obligations, but no sanctions or penalties 
could be levied.'339A court with no real enforcement capabilities seems problematic if not a 
contradiction in terms. 
1.2.5 THE IMMUNE SYSTEM'S METHODS OF ARRESTING AND DISSOLVING 
THE COMMISSION 
We have seen that containment of the Monnet Method was the first approach used by the 
host's immune system to deal with the organization that seemed to be becoming a threat. The 
next stage we will see involves the immune system coming to grips directly with the threaten-
ing organization, The immune system of the body does not just cause the lymph glands etc to 
swell to contain the pathogen but it will also generate the means to arrest the pathogen and 
dissolve it. The pathogen will not remain inactive, it will try to hide and re-invent itself. This 
is the subject of the following section. 
The reactions of the Commission to its rejection by the nascent European body politic in the 
1950s, 1960s and 1990s are revealing. The rejection of the Commission by de Gaulle led to 
the bureaucratization of the Commission; T h e Luxembourg compromise had led to a lack of 
coherence within the Commission itself, reinforcing the increased bureaucratization of its op-
erations, with a resultant adverse impact on efficiency as well as morale.'340Accompanying 
factors were from 1967 onwards 'collegiality and cohesiveness declined and bureaucratic A i | 
pressures exerted themselves.' This is exactly as has been apparent in the Commission re-
cently. Increasing bureaucratisation is also due to the Commission accepting managerial tasks 
which require different skills to those of policy making, but the reason for it accepting these 
tasks seems to be linked to the desire to compete with MSs and also a sense of insecurity and 
wanting to appear like a normal bureaucracy. Certainly, its skills are more in the field of pol-
icy making than policy management, but given less scope for policy making maybe it had less 
that it was quite possible to have a project that failed to achieve its economic goals, but could successfully serve important 
political ones (See note 104 Dinan, (2000) p. 181), which is no doubt what they wanted to ensure came of the EEC. The 
Common Market element was not popular when it was agreed upon, and many of the MSs signed it for the political reason 
that it was a gesture that symbolised German French reconciliation (See note 104 Dinan, (2000) p. 183). The irrelevance of 
the economic aspect was shown by the suspicion of the German finance minister Erhard who wanted for economic reasons a 
looser economic association with a wider membership, he was over ruled by Adenauer who wanted the political bond be-
tween Germany and France. The fact that of ten fundamentals in the preamble six of those mentioned stress political and 
social aspects and only four are explicitly about the Common Market underlines the MSs' political preoccupation. Article 2 
stresses again that the Common Market has a merely facilitating role to achieve higher political social goals. There is a real 
sense that neither for the supra-nationalists nor the MSs was the EEC about a Common Market, it was always a political tool. 
To use Monnet's perspective, the project would get people around the table working together, negotiating, finding common 
perspectives and goals and that was the main intention, which is why the treaty ; 'provided no more than general guidelines 
and statements of principle/ (See note 104 Dinan, (2000) pi 83), The Common Market seems like heads of state swapping 
well thought of gifts or hostages, to show their good will and intentions, rather than setting up a trading route or slave trade, 
requiring detailed rules and a system of control to run it. 
338 The role of the ECJ in the EU system, from a purely treaty based perspective, is oddly legal if the usual notion of a court is 
considered. Usually courts make judgements which can be enforced, until 1991 there was not the possibility of financially 
sanctioning the Member States at all, and it was the TEU which returned the possibility of fines being issued, In fact it is 
stated; the ECSC had had the possibility of fines being issued with Council approval, the EEC removed even this option. The 
legal system that the MSs seem to have agreed upon and desired was one where the Court could advise them and appeal to 
their peers but not sanction. This combined with the fact that the treaties were so deliberately vague, that the court could, 
several years after the treaty was signed, fit a legal system between the lines, does not seem to support the view that the MSs 
consciously agreed on a new binding European legal system. Rather it supports the notion that they desired an independent 
umpire to act as a focus for other MSs to stand behind. In its generation of new, treaty based non enforceable, procedures 
more akin to the Commission which generated unenforceable neutral proposals. The use of bench marking by MSs seems to 
be more what they expected and desired to happen with the EEC and the ECJ. 
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choice than might seem to be the case. The ECSC went through a similar problematic period 
and behaved in a similar manner as will be seen. 
When the Commission is idealistic and has a charismatic MS politician at its head it can a-
chieve much and seems at its most political, cohesive and in general united and the MSs seem 
on the contrary disunited. Once however the Commission presses too far and too fast as it 
seems bound to do, then rejection follows swiftly: 
4In addition, there is a curious disjuncture between Member State suspicions and the reality of 
the Commission's role and ambitions. . . the Commission no longer has the ambitious, impe-
rialist aspirations that arguably characterised it under Delors. The obsession with control that 
they reveal implies that member States have failed to take this on board . . . The Member Sta-
tes' assertiveness, their determination to circumscribe the Commission's power and impose 
their control . . . '342 
A ^ ^ A A 
After the Hallstein period the MSs representation became stronger in the Commission 
and remained a problem as was stated in the Spierenburg report 1979;345346 The report 
stressed 4 . . . the importance of the national dimension as a major cause of fragmentation.'347 ^ i Q 
The same seems to have happened after Delors. The reasons for this are that the Commis-
sion has proven itself too effective and attracts attention from MSs to use the new power it 
has for their own uses, and also to ensure that they are warned earlier the next time round. 
There is of course also the suspicion that the MSs want to be able to stop expensive legisla-
tion and policies which are potentially damaging to them within the Commission, whilst of 
course also protecting the policies which they benefit most from. But above all the MSs seem 
to want to apply the brakes to the Commission. 
But that rejection is not complete and the overstretch of the Commission has its purpose in 
preparing the way, by placing further integration moves on the agenda, breaking the ice as it 
were and then tactically retreating to let the moves seep into the MSs and sectors and onto 
their agendas, ready for the next integrationary step.349Traditionally bureaucrats, and the 
Commission was and is no exception, enjoy long memories, longer than the short lived politi-
cians period of power, and the Commission can re-introduce once controversial integrationary 
moves into an environment which has been slowly accepting them as inevitable and probably 
positive (the October 2006 attempts to re-launch the EU constitution fit into this tradition). 
The move is the same but the climate has changed. 
The MSs have the right to choose the College of Commissioners and President. The link be-
tween the leadership, in particular the President, and the 'plight' of the Commission as a who-
le, and thus the power of the MSs' choice has been shown time and again in EU history and 
the link between the 'environment' and the choice of the President.350The MSs' choice is usu-
ally, in part, made by the preparation for an integrationary period set up by Commission hard 
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work. Commission lobbying resulting in the selection of Delors began in part by the MSs' 
appetites being whetted for more integration in the form of the Single European Mar-
ket.351The time and political environment were right and ready to allow, and pressurize, for a 
Commission President who would head the next integrationary period, Delors.352353354 But 
that does not mean that they expected what Delors in fact did when in his new institutional 
setting, far from it as a member of Delors cabinet stated with regard tol 985 and 1991 and the 
changed views of the MSs: 
6 . , . Before we could count on being ahead of other people strategically. We knew what we 
wanted and they were less clear, partly because they did not believe that anything much 
would follow from the decisions we asked them to make. Now they know that we mean busi-
ness and they look for all the implications of our proposals. There are huge numbers of new 
things on the table and it will be much tougher from now on.'355 
The MSs seem to have been taken aback and finally reluctant to go along with Delors pro-
jects. The forces of DP came into play, provoked by the bureaucratic identity of the Commis-
sion; 'Paradoxically, it was because Delors was the first Commission President to act charis-
matically in the broader sense of the Weberian term . . . that his presidency highlighted the 
Community's problematic democratic credentials.,356The peoples of Europe and those repre-
senting them were not prepared to allow this.357Thus, after a major period of development and 
a dynamic leader the MSs apply the brakes by putting a political layer in place in the College 
of the Commission which will effectively shut it down; Hallstein and Delors were, after their 
successes, neither reselected to head the College again, and other European enthusiasts were 
likewise turned down.358359360 
When the immune system latches onto a diseased cell; an antibody fixes onto the cell wall and 
turns it from being an incubator to being a prison. The insides of the cell may well then begin 
to disintegrate and any foreign body with it. There seems to be a clear cycle present in relation 
to the appointment and selection of Presidents.36lThe selection of a less dynamic Commission 
President will act like the antibody does to the cell. 
The next stage after the non reselection of a dynamic President of the Commission is that in-
creasingly MS appointees are placed ever deeper in the organisation.362When the MSs suc-
ceed in arresting its supranational development by removing its leadership and reducing its 
ideology drive, built as it is on MS willingness to allow 'supranational' achievements to oc-
cur in the first place, as they did after the Hallstein and Delors Commissions, they also auto-
351 Lawton, T. Uniting European Industrial Policy in Nugent, N (ed) At the heart of the Union, second edition, (2000) Bas-
ingstoke, Macmillan Press, 2000 p. 132 
3 5 2See note 104 Dinan, (2000) p.419 As a result, by the early 1980s pressures were mounting within the EC institutions and 
the private sector to address in a comprehensive and systematic fashion the problems created by the "incomplete" internal 
market Thus, the circumstances were right when Jacques Delors assumed the presidency of the Commission in 1985... * 
353 See note 168 (2000) p,245 'Delors* leadership, while logical given the Community's design, represented (and was repre-
sented as) both an overestimation of the extent to which the peoples of Europe and their leaders felt inclined to enter into ever 
closer union... ' 
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matically it seems begin a penetration of the Commission. They attempt to place their nation-
als deeper into it and to promote a natural dissolving of the multinational, supranational 
'pathogen', by dissolving it into nationalities.364They do this when the desirable inoculation of 
some supranationality and greater cooperation and coordination seems to them to have been 
replaced by the virulent strain of federalism and political ambitions of the Commission, These 
more openly political moves of the Commission are more easily countered by the political 
MSs which can recognise political competitors for sovereignty.365 
Usually there is a sense in which the MSs feel that enough has been achieved for the moment 
and maybe it would be better to remove the dangers of a federally minded, over political 
Commission possibly for good. The MSs have had as much Europe as they can digest and sell 
domestically. 66Economic downturns accentuate this awareness and restrict the grand projects 
of the leaders. Dramatic new projects offering the possibility of a lot of legislation are no lon-
ger on the agenda. Idealism and charismatic leaders in the Commission's history run together, 
remove one and you remove the other. The beginning of the slow down sees a disintegration 
of the Commission internally into warring DGs and a breakdown in coordination and com-
munication. The Monnet Method 'carrier' can fall foul of it as well. Fragmentation can work 
internally as well as externally with DGs pulling apart. It is and was a generally known fact in 
political science that parties which lose power are in danger of splitting apart, disintegrating. 
Loss of power results often in loss or removal of the leadership and a free-for-all to acquire 
the remaining resources and try for the top post. It is likely that the MSs knew this and hoped 
as much when curbing the Commission in the Maastricht Treaty and then the removal of its 
dynamic leader. 
The Commission for its part, 'hides' from the immune system and also thereby seals itself off 
from the intruding MS influences. Its normally little used bureaucratic potential is then dra-
matically increased. This serves multiple purposes firstly sealing it off from external influ-
ence; secondly allowing it to restore control over the elements into which it has increasingly 
become dissolved and thirdly it turns a dynamic political-bureaucratic competitor of the MSs 
into something more akin to a MS bureaucracy, or the Council's secretariat, something that is 
not a threat anymore. It has hidden its proto-federal governmental form extremely effectively 
from view, but more on that in a minute. The reduction in the sizes of cabinets by Prodi seems 
a response to their becoming 'mini 
Councils.'JO/The porous body of the Commission would 
be and is a liability to an extent in this situation and for survival purposes needed to be modi-
fied. The Commission reforms with their merit enforcement also places promotion back in the 
hands of the Commission and not the MS networks within it; loyalty can thus also be 
strengthened to the Commission. Finally, this all results in increases in rigid bureaucracy 
which results from the energies of the Commission which were put into generating legislation 
and bureaucratic tasks for the Community now being directed against itself. Bureaucratisation 
in the Commission is thus generally used to try and regain control of its various elements 
which also results in rigidity.368 
The Commission in its reclusive phases then becomes more bureaucratic and shy of political 
'intrusions' even though these will form the next stage in the revival phase; the MS appoint-
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e e s in the Commission are gradually are won over to a new loyalty369 much as happens in 
M S s themselves and all the MS defences against the Method: 
A reverse process of gradually penetrating national ideologies can be supposed to get under-
w a y . . . If permitted to operate for any length of time, the national groups, now compelled to 
f u n n e l their aspirations through federal institutions, may also be constrained to work within 
t h e ideological framework of those organs.'370 
M o n n e t was aware of the defensive bureaucratic tendency to shut out beneficial political con-
t a c t s and its danger: 
' H i s opposition to the bureaucratization of the Commission, at all levels, including the Col-
l e g e of Commissioners, was based on his perception of its growing habit of reacting, "suspi-
c i o u s l y and fastidiously to intrusions of the political world upon well ordered administrative 
a c t i o n " with all the dangers that that entailed for the Commission's role as the political motor 
f o r integration.'371 
C o n t r a r y to Monnet's worries, in the short term at least, the state of bureaucratization seems 
t o serve the Commission and the other elements of the EU rather well, it slows it down, al-
l o w s it to effectively hide and regroup and reinvent itself. When confronted by the inevitable 
' p o l i t i c a l and popular' backlash of DP it goes from a ebullient 'excessively maximalist posi-
t i o n ' under Delors onto the defensive372and effectively adopts a minimalist 'nuanced and cir-
c u m s p e c t ' 3 7 3 approach, reducing or hiding political aspirations and appearing more of a mun-
d a n e , gradually evolving modern bureaucracy which seems innocuous to the MSs and the Eu-
r o p e a n public and not worth acting against. Indeed the defensive turn was a necessity in the 
C o m m i s s i o n ' s struggle for survival.37 
S o o n enough though the Commission begins to emerge from its deceptive modesty and de-
v e l o p s the momentum for more integration that it set in motion previously. The preparation 
f o r this having been made, in part via an agenda setting process and the 'mobilizing' of 'epis-
t e m i c communities. ,375The single currency and the Euro elation that that brought and the goal 
o f completion of the Union with a re-launch of European governance with a white paper in 
2 0 0 1 and then a constitutional document with the governance of and surrounding the institu-
t i o n s laid out resulted from the Santer - Prodi Commissions temporary reclusiveness. The bu-
r e a u cratisation and related reforms never seem to go that deep; they usually remain superfi-
c i a l , and are ignored or subverted by elements in the organisation itself, with the tacit support 
i t seems likely of the top ranks themselves. 
A remarkably similar cycle as the above occurred with the ECSC; Monnet the dynamic Presi-
d e n t resigned in 1955 under French pressure, he had become too much the symbol of over 
d y n a m i c supranationalism376 and then a period of bureaucratisation set in377with a 'more hier-
3r ,{? Bel Her, I. The Commission as an actor in Wallace and Young (eds) (1997) Participation and Policy Making in the Euro-
pean Union Oxford Clarendon Press, And 
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archical, functionally segmented bureaucracy.' A good summary of the plight of the ECSC 
follows: 
'As Gerbet has observed, the supranationalist principle of the High Authority was in fact rap-
idly eroded by national cleavages and sectoral conflicts within the executive. Such divisions 
were most visibly reflected in the development of cabinets within the High Authority which 
tended to be used by member governments and sectoral interests as a vehicle for promoting 
national interests within the ECSC. Predictably the internal divisions which developed in the 
High Authority reached down to the administrative level. Here, national and sectoral cleav-
ages were reflected in the introduction of national quotas governing the allocation of adminis-
trative posts, and increasing functional specialisation within the bureaucracy.'379 
It could be argued that the EEC was the next stage in integration which emerged from that 
state of the integration project. 
1.2.6 MOTIVES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE ORGANIC HOST(S), THE 
EUROPEAN POLITY -THE MSs 
Now we will consider the motives and perceptions of the organic hosts in all this in greater 
depth, after all why have they gone along with integration and how should that 'going along 
with' be considered. One group, the Liberal Intergovernmentalists, claim the major successes 
in the European project to be the work of the MSs and point out that they are present at every 
stage in the process as legislators, implementers, proposers of legislation to the Commission, 
members on the various committees that advise and supervise the Commission, Not just that 
but they also apply pressure on the Commission and EU via stakeholders in their own states; 
they are also often lobbied first by stakeholders and then apply pressure in the Union organi-
sation. This view of the role of the MSs has the support of some eminent academics; 'It has 
been national governments which have borne the burden of formal integration.'380 
Supranationalists, on the contrary, claim that the Commission has itself made moves which 
led to integration and not the MSs, or they grant the MSs a less important role. What seems to 
be the case, is that an extremely useful role of the Commission and the European project has 
been to force and provoke the MSs to make determined effort to take back control over the 
project and to clamp down on the Commission. It has both lured MSs into projects and goa-
ded them. This may have been Monnet's intention that the Method would finally stimulate a 
reaction form the MSs at a European level although this can be doubted as has been said. The 
Commission's provoking function is enshrined in the current legislative procedure which has 
the Commission making a proposal to which the Council and EP respond, their response is in 
effect institutionally provoked from them. 
Most of the governmental structures of the EU have been the final, 'formal' work, not of the 
Commission but rather the MSs, the existing European body politic. They have negotiated 
and signed the treaties and struggled to control or increase their involvement in the project at 
various times. The motives of the MSs are complex, as was suggested earlier, senior politi-
cians enjoy and desire grand schemes and the notion that they have more power over other 
countries. 8,There is also the tendency of MS leaders, as heads of the governmental executive, 
to whereever possible increase the power of the executive over and against that of the legisla-
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ture. In many, if not most, parliamentary democracies there has been a steady increase in the 
power of the government and executive usually at the expense of the legislature-
parliament.382The following quotation examines the attitude of the executive to the legislature 
in EU matters: 
'European policy making is an elite process, into which non-governmental organisations, the 
EP, and national parliaments and opposition parties intrude, without succeeding on most pol-
icy issues in attracting much wider public attention,' 
More motives can be identified to explain why top politicians sponsor the European project, 
firstly some degree of pure idealism is involved and this would appear to be the case where 
Helmut Kohl was concerned and also Mitterrand. Speaking about Chancellors and Prime 
Ministers, there is a real sense that they also became more involved in the project to attempt 
to reassert their position and authority over the actions of their executive and individual min-
isters.384 
MS politicians like Hallstein have played, in a different manner, another important role in the 
European project, they have provided the political raw resources necessary for the project to 
live and grow. These individuals enjoyed extremely close contacts to the political leaders of 
the day and had held top, politically significant positions in their states. They were embedded 
in political administrative networks in the MSs. MS executives have been the ones to appoint 
their skilled, top players to the European project. Thus the project in its more successful mo-
ments has been a product of political skill often at an intergovernmental level and not just a 
technocratic success story.385 
The motives of the MSs are usually supposed to be negative towards supranational ism and 
voting procedures and vetoes are supposed to reflect this. More formal QMV procedures is a 
sign that MSs are behaving in an increasingly supranational manner and QMV386seems to be 
increasing. MS's willingness to use QMV then shows that their motives are pro integration. If 
they try to keep or use their veto this is supposed to mean the opposite. However the reality is 
more complex. As has been stressed the MSs constantly make the EU theirs, reclaiming it re-
peatedly and reinforcing their ownership whatever other rhetoric is expressed by both si-
des. So the MSs, with their more inter governmental mind-set, as opposed to the suprana-
tional organisations, are said to have taken over the European project whilst at the same time 
they have accepted, formally at least, more QMV, odd. Monnet was stated to have said t ha t 4 . 
. . cooperation meant nothing unless national vetoes were curtailed.'388Contrary to popular 
belief vetoes and voting procedures seem to be more symbolic than anything else. The exis-
tence of the veto seems to have been, initially at least, not a problem at all for integration: 
382 See note 104 Dinan (2000) p. 287. "Empirical studies suggest that many European policies and practices-for example, the 
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'Marjolin saw the period 1958-65 as a sort of honeymoon and one particularly productive "in 
that the proposals made and put before the Council of Ministers were certain to get a favour-
able reception or, in any case not to encounter an outright veto which would have left no room 
for negotiation."'389 
Furthermore, up until the SEA and then the Maastricht Treaty any voting procedure but una-
nimity seems to have been rare. At least one author considered that intergovernmentalism was 
the rule until the SEA and that the Commission had become little more than, 1 . . . a kind of 
secretariat for the Council.,390Indeed even since then it is stated that actual voting is 'rela-
tively rare.'3910n the contrary the governments strive ' . . . to find positions that all could ac-
cept.'392Whatever the theoretical possibilities for different voting procedures " . . . the con-
ventional political wisdom in most (member states) urges governments to get broad agree-
ment on major political acts even if the constitutional rules might allow for a narrower margin 
of majority."'3 3Whilst it is probably true that knowing that formally QMV is a possibility 
will stimulate MSs to reach agreement whereas maybe the Veto would have the opposite ef-
fect, equally the SEA and other major steps in integration have occurred owing to the MSs re-
capturing of the project despite the possibility of using an empty chair procedure or veto.394In 
the agricultural field, even after the SEA, the formal acceptance of QMV still left MSs threat-
ening to use the empty chair Luxembourg compromise method to block legislation: 
'Although the Treaty of Rome states that agricultural policy decisions can be adopted by the 
use of qualified (weighted) majority voting, the norm in the Council of Farm Ministers has 
been to make decisions which are "acceptable to all Member States and to the Commission, if 
necessary leaving some Member States room to vote against without blocking the decision-
making process.'"395 
And: 
'The Single European Act adopted in 1987 extended the use of qualified majority voting to 
other spheres of Community competence. This development has raised questions as to 
whether the Luxembourg Compromise is still in force. It has not been abandoned. For in-
stance, in 1988, the Greeks successfully threatened to veto the CAP price package and the 
French declared in 1992 that it could still be used and threatened to use it in 1993.'3 6 
The MSs, or at least the MS governments, have learnt to see the usefulness of the project and 
to realise that it is and was not as dangerous as they had imagined. They have gone native in a 
real sense. EU decisions are very much their decisions, and reflect their views.397Vetoes are 
often not in place but they do not need to be owing to their having been updated into a more 
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cooperative achievement of unanimity, with differences of opinion being ironed out either in 
the Commission or COREPER. Integration it could be argued has more to do with MSs get-
ting familiar with the system and developing trust in it and experiencing successes in it than it 
does with any supranational developments alone. Indeed some might argue that the Commis-
sion is not even necessary for integration and that it has in fact been detrimental for some po-
sitive integration at times, certainly there seems to be room for some to doubt that integration 
is the exclusive success of the Commission.398The development of the European institutions 
were vital props for confidence building and so integration; the High Authority and Commis-
sion, for example, provided the perceived neutrality and security which were so vital for MSs 
to gradually trust each other and work together. The veto worked in a similar manner; it al-
lowed the MSs to move closer together with a perceived sense of security and to trust the new 
cooperative system more; one New Member State official who was in favour of greater inte-
gration in theory stated the sense of relief and reassurance that they had sometimes that, in 
theory, the veto could be used as a brake. It seems more than likely that without the existence 
of the veto even less integration would have occurred than has in fact been the case. 
The theoretical antipathy between the supranational organisations and the MSs has over time 
proven an illusion; the MSs accept supranationality in theory and will act in accordance with 
it but not when forced. So to sum up, there are a range of 'safeguards' which the MSs have 
insisted on over time but never seem to use or only extremely rarely. These have been inter-
preted as set backs for the integrationary movement and in particular those federalists who 
typically ' . . . believed that interests, loyalties, and power must lie at one level or another: to 
be retained by states, or transferred to a new entity.' "The much maligned veto and subsidiar-
ity are two of these safeguards which immediately spring to mind; both represent more a reas-
surance prop and indication of the formal level of willingness to integrate than they do the 
real integrationary situation. After the SEA the veto still existed formally, but informally was 
simply not used, 00formally there were eminent observers who thought that SEA was a 'seri-
ous setback' for integration.401However in practice this was far from the case, informally the 
MSs were quite prepared for more integration. 
There is a real sense in which the veto and other safeguards are aimed at calming the domestic 
organs of government in particular the national parliaments. These reflect the duality in the 
term 'MSs' very neatly. At Treaty discussions, MS Heads of State will be more conscious 
than usual of their constitutional role as defenders of their national parliamentary system and 
its sovereignty after all future national parliamentary debate that will have to be carried out 
prior to ratification.402403The national position will have to be sold in parliaments, and media 
attention will be at its highest. In many MSs overtly handing over sovereignty is political sui-
cide, in countries like the UK the main parties will be split in their views about Europe. That 
said, quite apart from awareness about potential parliamentary difficulties in ratification, the 
Heads of State and their ministers will have their own personal reasons for not formally wea-
kening their parliaments constitutional discretion; they know that there is real danger that they 
will be in opposition in the future and that their only power will be that which is 'formally' 
derived from the parliament in question. Therefore formal surrenders of real sovereignty will 
be more limited than informal ones. At a Treaty signing conference the Heads of State are ex-
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pected to be both championing the national corner, protecting its constitutional position, 
whilst also promoting that of the Union. The Commission can be formally constrained again 
by a clause which will keep it politically impotent and distant from the national demos, with 
the excuse that the national parliaments and demos require it. Thus treaties usually contain 
improvements for integration process, efficiency combined with formal mechanisms for pre-
venting Commission political presence in the national demos and keeping it under control. 
The differences between the Council and Commission in terms of their being supranational or 
not seems somewhat artificial at times. The following quote seems to imply this quite clearly: 
The Community system, as Wolfgang Wessels describes it, has become "a golden triangle of 
Community civil servants, national civil servants and interest groups . . . based on elite inter-
actions, trust and reputation, by people whose loyalties remain primarily national but modify 
their expectations and behaviour to hold this valued system together.'404 
The Council was considered to be a Community organ which became intergovernmental after 
the Luxembourg accords up until at least the early 1980s.405With QMV, in theory at least, 
some authors consider it now to be pretty supranational,4Q6which shows an organisation which 
has gone from being, theoretically, reasonably supranational at the signing of the Rome Trea-
ty through a period of intergovernmentalism back to being more supranational again. The 
Commission is also not the supranational bulwark that it is perceived to be. The political di-
rection of it, the Commissioners and Cabinets are affected by national interests4074 8 as well as 
holding to organisational loyalty and loyalty to the European project as a whole.409Some 
would go to the extent of saying that cabinets are veiy oriented towards national inter-
ests.'410This is not the place to go further into the presence of 'intergovernmental' elements in 
the Commission; the important point is that supranationality or willingness to put the Union's 
interest first or to preserve it at least, is present in the Council and the Commission.41 ]The re-
ality for every official is that they are MS citizens as well as European ones and that some in 
the Commission, maybe more than in the Council, hold to the project and its idealism or at 
least organisational loyalty, and the same applies for COREPER and the Council members. 
All of them are subject to the same pressures of discussion, proposal and compromise and the 
need for awareness of other national positions. One of the major advantages listed often for 
the multi-national officials of the Commission and the Commissioners maintaining close con-
tacts to their national governments, is to enable meaningful discussion to take place at every 
level of the EU. The vast number of committees and Councils that surround the Commission 
and with which it is in constant communication reinforce the need for awareness of the na-
tional positions. It could be argued that much of the Commission's work with the committees: 
Management, Advisoiy and Comitology, which are at the heart of its operations involve in-
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tergovernmentalism (Comitology committees are explained at length in the conclusion chap-
ter). The Commission official is chairing the committee, yes, but in a minority of one. Since a 
large amount of proposals for legislation come from these committees and a tiny amount of 
proposals are really initiated from within the Commission, it might be argued that the Com-
mission works for intergovernmental organisations. Ironically the experts on these commit-
tees are the real technocrats with mastery of detail and the Commission official has the 'po-
litical' advantage of the overview. However, the experience of officials seems to be that the 
committees are far more collegial and the sharp division of interests that might be expected 
simply rarely happens.412 
Less ideological positioning and greater clarity in definitions in general would be helpful for 
the debates surrounding the EU. Both Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the supranationalists 
offer a coherent account of the integration process. If both sides are blatantly opposed then the 
contradiction seems glaring. But it seems to be far more the case that supranational solutions 
were increasingly in vogue with MSs. An all too often forgotten fact is that the EU is the re-
sult of constant intergovernmental bargaining which often results in more supranational ism. If 
the EU had not have served national interests at various stages it would never have been 
founded. In such an environment it is inevitable that almost every aspect of EU history, poli-
cies and politics has intergovernmentalism stamped all over it, of course it does. Its very 
founding came down to a deal whereby the French got militaty security; the Germans got so-
me sovereignty and recognition and the other members gained economically. One of the first 
major policies created under the EEC was the CAP very much a French national interest, in 
return the Germans gained markets for their industrial goods and so on. 
There were politicians in the MSs who were drawn to the supranational ideal but equally the 
evidence gathered by Millward seems to show that even individuals like Adenauer were often J I A 
quite hard nosed about their national interests as well. They were drawn to and at the same 
time suspicious of the useful elements of the project Like any sound individual they tried to 
take the positive whilst reducing the risks from the negative. That the ECSC finally began was 
due to deft political manoeuvring but also because the supranational idea served national in-
terests; 'Rather than relinquishing sovereignty to a supranational authority, European states-
men hoped to use European institutions to augment the capacities of their states and to en-
hance their abilities to win the allegiance and support of their citizens.,414Some might argue 
that it was always a covert means of ensuring French influence,'^economic and foreign pol-
icy goals4l6Supranationalism serving national foreign policy in a similar manner to war as 
foreign policy by other means as Clausewitz pointed out. Like warfare and its officialdom the 
military; supranationalism was useful but also dangerous. There is no doubt some truth in the 
allegation that the French dominated the EEC, for all its alleged neutrality. 
There seems to be plenty to suggest that the MS politicians treated supranationalism with the 
same suspicion that they traditionally did their armies. It would and should be controlled by 
them and should serve each national interest in much the same way as the army. It was essen-
tial but, like the army, had its own agenda which would always be expansion and greater con-
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trol over the state itself and its budget, the same went for and goes for the Commission in its 
more ambitious supranational moments; although it has had to resort to; 'regulatory policy 
making' to get around budgetary restrictions.417CertainIy the French initially saw the suprana-
tional method serving a militaiy purpose that usually would have been fulfilled by the army, 
namely, that of containing a rearmed resurgent German state of whatever size.41 Given that 
the army had failed repeatedly to keep the Germans out, supranationality superseded it in this 
function, particularly in the minds of the French foreign office under Schuman. Political post-
ings or approval of the rank of general in France and in Germany, the flooding of the army 
with conscripts to keep it democratic, is rather similar to the MS tactic with the Commission 
with the Commissioners changing regularly with their Cabinets and subject to MS choice and 
the existence of national quotas of officials from MSs419 and national securing of important 
DGs via national flagging methods.420Indeed the initial French idea in the 1950s of there be-
ing barely any officials in the Commission and rather a constant flow of seconded officials 
from the MSs bears this notion out .42iArguably such a process could socialise the officials to 
be European but equally behind this stated goal could be the opposite, the Commission would 
be kept MS oriented. 
Regarding national interests, national governments who are perceived to have a set bundle of 
national interests that they define and defend, but this is wrong. Different political actors will 
have radically different views about what is in the national interest; parliaments have one in-
terest and the executives another, the former stress representation and accountability the latter 
efficiency. A vast range of national issues are traded internally and their sponsors struggle to 
have the right to include them as national interests that should be promoted in the EU. As 
soon a policy has a beneficial effect for a MS or part of it, it will inevitably come to be con-
sidered a national interest of those beneficiaries. These will then ensure that it is considered 
part of the national interest in future. The ability of officials and Interest Groups, not neces-
sarily in the government, to decide the national interest in their specific field is considerable. 
Ironically, with the growing interpénétration of the various governmental levels of the EU it is 
quite possible for Commission officials to propose and manage policies and, via close contact 
with beneficiaries in a MS, to decide the national interest of a certain MS. This will be more 
closely examined later but the CAP and Structural Funds (SF) both show these tendencies. 
So long as the Commission and the federalists do not push too hard MSs are quite happy to 
use the supranational solution as another method of bargaining.422MSs are fully aware of the 
need to mix national interest with the Union's in order to have any chance of success.423Thus 
there are a vast range of solutions available in which MSs national interests have been be 
combined with the Union's and the solution with most support by the Commission and the 
other MSs is chosen. The MSs will also compete for formal Commission support for their 
proposals, as well as for each others, in the Commission and Council. Informally, the MSs 
seem to be quite aware of the likelihood of greater integration than what the formal treaty ac-
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tually states. This seems rather bizarre, that formal integration seems to proceed at a far more 
cautious although steady pace than the informal and at times they seem to run rather oddly 
parallel to each other; the formal with major set backs and dramatic long night sittings and 
empty chair crises, the other a quiet, calm deepening integration of MS states and a growing 
use of compromise and EU consensus tools. And yet this parallelism is deceptive the two do 
work together. 
The organisational logic of the vaccine is to drive to maximise its own position by achieving a 
'formal' federal Europe as quickly as possible, and to opportunistically try for this and/or su-
pranational-federal governmental elements and policies, which represent steps on the federal 
road, at every possibility. The deal which MSs, however, seem prepared to make with the 
Commission allows it to quietly pursue in an informal manner an increasing amount of inte-
grationary activities whilst formally its powers remain relatively weak. MS politicians views 
are reflected in the following; 'Politicians are likely to answer that the system has worked 
well enough for their purposes, without too visibly or abruptly depriving existing national go-
vernments of authority or power.'424Formally the Commission will often be blackened with 
the reputation for introducing unpleasant regulations but informally the MSs allow integration 
to continue apace. So long as the Commission is not directly elected it cannot really suffer at 
the hands of the public, unlike the national executives. They do not want to remove the Com-
mission but it certainly doubly serves their purposes that complaints can be directed away 
from them at the faceless bureaucracy in Brussels, which also ensures that the Commission 
political ambitions can be continually undermined and its reputation ruined in the eyes of the 
national demos. To the demos as a whole the simplistic concept is presented of the Commis-
sion being kept in check by loyal politicians with subsidiarity paragraphs, vetoes and so on, so 
that the dangers of integration appear to be controlled but in reality integration spreads with 
continual extensions of the 'principle' ofQMV. 
A form of European integration benefits by the Commission accepting its MS inspired role 
and accruing de facto power as integration spreads and not appearing to be ambitious for po-
litical power. But that is not the logic of the vaccine and it could be argued that if the MSs get 
along over cosily with each other then its very survival is in danger. It is maybe worth asking 
the question whether or not European integration and supranational political power are syn-
onymous; maybe also whether explicitly 'supranational' organisations are really necessary 
now that mainstream supranationality resides in MS officials and the Council. What exactly 
does supranationality actually mean now, has it become a myth which prevents close scrutiny 
of it? If the term means anything it means in the EU context holding a community perspec-
tive, inevitably this will contain elements of national ones too. It has been argued that the 
Council and officials are quite capable or thinking in terms of the Community now, and know 
too that this is how things must be done. So if there is a supranational thinking Council in 
place most of the work of the Commission has been done. It can ensure that this remains the 
case, but it is unikely to change, given that the MSs need the current system. It seems that su-
pranationality is confused with federalism;425 the latter can only have as a goal a federal gov-
ernment, the Commission. 
It has to be said that the Commission sometimes seems to be so overly ambitious426427428as to 
be politically inept, so much so that it might be better for it to set aside any ambitions to be 
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to extend the authority, within the Community, of the Commission and the Assembly at the expense of the Council of Minis-
ters and in particular to expedite the taking of decisions in the Council by majority vote instead of unanimously. These pro-
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other than it currently is; 'Hallstein's ambition, coupled with a misreading of his immediate 
political environment, especially the likely reaction of de Gaulle, led him to go too far, as 
perhaps did Delors, though in radically different circumstances in the Maastricht negotia-iAQ 
tions. Prodi shared similar problems in particular over the European constitution: 
'Even those who share the same vision as the Commission President worry that damage has 
been done to their cause, either because they consider that the timing was wrong or that they 
believe a more subtle and strategic approach should have been devised . . . In tactical terms, 
by declaring such ambitious objectives, the Commission President may have committed a se-
,430 rious er ror . . . 
As a policy making organisation filled with motivated, well qualified individuals it does an 
excellent job, but as a political organisation it is lacking. Given the slap on the wrist that it got 
at Maastricht to have then launched the European constitution during a period of economic 
downturn and enlargement anxieties was asking for trouble at the best of times. It is hard to 
think of a time when variant national interests are so closely linked to and defined in terms of 
national sovereignty and awareness of it in the national demos' than at major Treaty and Con-
stitutional conferences. National teams in football competitions stir similar nationalistic sen-
timents. That any integrationary steps occur at these times is remarkable, maybe these happen 
just enough so that national audiences have of a sense that their governments are winning and 
being successful. Maybe it is also the presence of MS politicians, with all their natural desires 
to make a political splash that will be noticed, at the helm of the Commission, that drives it in 
the openly political direction. Or more likely its organisational logic and mission simply 
forces the Commission to behave as it does. 
It would seem to be the case that quietly accepting the job the MSs have given it is the best 
for the Commission's organisational goals of increasing competences431and also for its supra-
national mission to promote integration; being branded as a future ambitious federal govern-
ment might appeal to intellectuals but does not seem to assist the Commission very much in 
its PR with the demos. But part of the deal which the organisation the Commission appears to 
strike with the MSs is that of useful integration for them in return for the gradual development 
of political profile for the Commission in every Treaty. This is understandable enough for an 
organisation that will be the future federal government. The political ambitions of the Com-
mission seem crazy but apparently, after the rejection of the European Constitution in the 
Netherlands and France, there seemed to be a few indications that the constitution, were it to 
be re-submitted, might actually succeed and be adopted. So maybe there is method to the 
madness and the perceived blows to the integrationary movement which no doubt relieve ma-
ny of the anxieties are in fact more noise than anything else. The idea has been broached, the 
reactions made, duly noted and ignored and the real integration can then start to build to the 
new goals.432After the initial shock has passed the national publics calm down and consider 
posals were a direct challenge to de Gaulle's views and some of Hallstein's colleagues warned him that he was going impru-
dently fast. Moreover, by presenting his proposals first to the Assembly instead of the Council as the rules provided Hallstein 
gave de Gaulle an opportunity to put his foot down with some show of justification.' 
See note 18 Wallace (1990) p.30. The famous Luxembourg crisis was also largely due to Hallstein desire for symbols of 
sovereignty 
429 See note 30 Ewards; Spence (1997) p.6 
430 See note 110 Kassim; Menon, (2004) p. 101 
431 See note 195 Dinan; Nugent (2000) p.253 
432 See note 1 Peterson; Bomberg (1999), p.56. 'When radical new initiatives are first tabled, they often provoke so much 
opposition that it initially appears they will never be agreed. Member States frequently attack them to placate threatened do-
mestic interests, as well as to enhance their leverage in later negotiations, before they begin real bargaining. To illustrate the 
point, all 15 Member States in one way or another denounced the Commission's (1997b) proposals for quite radical changes 
to the CAP. Yet "what is unthinkable one year may become the root of a crisis the next, and an ingredient in a 'package deal' 
the third. (Lindberg 1965: 63) 
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their nationalistic outburst in a somewhat embarrassed fashion, the sober rational need for in-
tegration is put as a solution to the rather real and pressing problems. Over time the notion of 
more federalist moves by the Commission and the EU gradually become less shocking the 
more times they are aired around Treaty conferences. Maybe the exercise also has a useful 
cathartic purpose from a supranational perspective, nationalistic emotion is released and gone 
and a feel good effect sets in after such episodes. Furthermore, the Commission and EU are in 
the headlines and debated by the various demos' and attain some relevance, the demos' are 
diffuse but for a brief period all the MS citizens are aware of the European project in a man-
ner akin to a national election or football match. The European Parliament elections, unfortu-
nately for it, have the same lack of appeal and sense of boredom that local government elec-
tions have and attract similarly low turnouts and enjoy low media coverage and excitement as 
'events'. Their audiences are usually going to be the intellectual and or the conscientious and 
not the majority. State building requires mass excitement, preferably war to motivate citizens 
to change and or develop loyalty to a polity, and media attention good or bad combined with 
excitement is often better than none at all. The supranationalist hope is that there will be e-
nough of a sense of demos at some point to allow the Commission real political power and 
credibility. The problem is that any change will be slow in coming and real referenda, as op-
posed to stated sentiments and / or re-votes afterward a referendum has taken place, are likely 
to stay negative, or possibly get worse if the EU is perceived to be as undemocratic as ever, 
particularly if re-votes are demanded, and at the same time getting closer to the citizen than 
before. Of course, so long as the economy seems to be in a problematic state with high levels 
of unemployment, low growth and the Commission seemingly responsible then its position 
will worsen. 
Whether the MSs really want a demos to form is questionable, whatever their stated posi-
a ^  
tions. This was shown by the apparent lack of concern that some MSs showed with selling 
the European Constitution even in the face of national referenda. MS governments are willing 
to participate in treaties where plenty of bargaining can take place but when they have politi-
cal implications for the Commission in particular, the referenda card is played. Halfhearted 
referenda are sure to be difficult, and putting a divisive matter like European integration up to 
be voted on in referenda by several states seems to be fairly likely to involve problems. Rein-
troducing them for better coordinated referenda may allow the treaty to finally succeed but 
inevitably in the short term the Commission loses its sense of having a mandate. Thus the real 
motives of national politicians in agreeing to a constitution with associated referenda seem 
open to some discussion. 
MS politicians seem at times to be content with the EU as it is whilst the Monnet Method and 
its carrier cannot be and are not. If the current state of the EU were positive and politically 
beneficial then the Commission's restless ambition might seem extremely problematic. If ho-
wever, the EU is considered not to be positive, and in fact to be overly undemocratic and ex-
ecutive - officialdom dominated and fragmented then the Commission's position that integra-
tion is not complete and that major changes are still required in the political field is to be wel-
comed. That is not the same as saying that a full federal government built around the Com-
mission is necessarily desirable, but it is saying that the vaccine's restless insistence on its 
mission and goal is beneficial for the EU and its citizens. Oddly enough the vaccine and large 
elements within the Commission favour federal political power and DP for a European gov-
ernment. The vaccine might be non democratic in some senses, but it provokes DP, and it 
seems to constantly do this. And it has to be said DP seems to be implicit in the federal gov-
ernment it favours. Aristotle might have said that the organisational potential of the Commis-
4,33 See note 18 Wallacc(1990)p.l07 
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sion is that which forces it remorselessly towards a new governmental form in the same way 
as the potential of a seed to be a plant forces the former to change. 
1.2.7 MONNET AND STATE FORMATION 
We have now been introduced to the immunization theory and its main protagonists, now we 
have to answer an inevitable query. The astute reader will rightly object and wave the text to a 
standstill and say; 'but what makes the EU different to any other example of state formation?1 
The answer to this is that of course some state formation elements do seem to be present but 
there are crucial differences these are explored below. 
The Monnet Method did employ some typical state forming elements434and the circumstances 
in the crucible of historical evolution were those which are commonly associated with state 
forming activities. That Monnet and the European Federalists tried for full blown state forma-
tion is shown by the historical record. The EDC and EPC were both attempts at state forma-
tion and floundered on national ratification processes; other major integrationary drives had 
serious problems albeit often as the result of referenda, and various forms of MS opposition; 
as with EMU even pro-integration national leaders had their stances altered by their divided I« £ 
nations. Whatever else, after these failures classic state formation was over in terms of di-
rectly creating a Nation State structure. Something different would happen and was happening 
as will be shown. But first to look at the similarities which European integration has with state 
formation. 
Monnet had various strategies available for European State Formation and he made full use of 
this personal pool of expertise, his friends, much like the organisation he wanted to see up and 
running. One of his good friends, Salter had promoted the historic example of the Zollverein 
of 1820 as a useful strategy for state formation.436The many German states had agreed to cre-
ate a reduced customs and tariffs geographical area which could be argued to have assisted in 
the creation of Germany by Bismarck. The removal of 'the commercial and tariff policy of 
European states* would he argued 'on effect reduce the latter to the status of municipal au-
thorities.' Whilst the chronology cannot be denied the causality can. It seems more than 
likely that without Bismarck and his willingness to march Prussia to war three times with the 
major continental powers of the day and most of the other German states, a damp squabbling 
squib would have been the result of pan-German nationalism. The states might have been 
more prosperous and shared a certain romantic feeling for being German but concrete political 
results would have remained elusive. But the perceived causality was there and it is likely that 
this idea was involved in Monnet's plans for the EEC, particularly once the more direct ap-
proach had failed. Others of course like Spinelli and the Federalists favoured a declaration 
and constitution which the citizens would be involved in. The Functionalists, with Mitrany as 
the most vociferous, had concepts which Monnet was happy to mix into his programme. But 
he was the diplomat statesman, rather like Bismarck, and he was not bound to the non-
territorial approach of Mitrany who disliked the idea of a regional institutions which he right-
ly saw would want to extend their power beyond that intended. This was, though, what Mon-
net wanted and functionalism could help in dissolving Nation State borders and making way 
for something else, but that was it. 
434 See note 18 Wallace (1990) p.30, 'As the British, French, Italians and Germans had done in their deliberate nation build-
ing efforts in the nineteenth century, the founders of the EC set out to create new myths and legends to replace the old.' 
See note 195 Dinan; Nugent (2000) p.256,257,263 
436 See note 138 Booker; North (2005) p.16-17 
437 Salter (1931): p.92 in see note 138 Booker; North (2005) p.16-17 
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State formation is closely connected with war and conquest, and certainly a good dose of na-
tional bleeding whilst fighting a common enemy serve to weld a nation together and allow the 
state elements to be added to it. The subsequent gain in nationalism which usually accompa-
nies war is important in state formation. For the European project these have been missing 
from the start which probably accounts the missing demos. In fact it has been a negative force 
for war and nationalism and as such perceived by the demos as alien to it and 
A*IQ 
unnatural. Governmental pieces were and are forming a polity but without a joint traumatic 
event state formation will remain absent. Its very success in its perceived mission has perforce 
prevented it achieving classic statehood. That the project has had the success it has is owed to 
the indirect trauma that the MSs and their citizens experienced in the war and the myths 
which surround the project's beginning; that it alone has prevented another European war and 
that there was a common European sense of nationhood strong enough to replace or weaken 
at least the national one. Thus a European identity is not totally absent but as vague and 
variable as the trauma and experience of war was. 
Certain key circumstances for state formation to take place in were certainly present in the 
1950s, in particular, war and exported governmental systems. International politics is less 
readily divided up into historical epochs than historians might like to have it. It maybe makes 
more sense to see the years between the Napoleonic wars and the 1950s as whole, certainly 
where causality is concerned. The Prussian and later German predilection for marching on 
Paris began after Waterloo in 1815 and was repeated frequently up until Hitler's march into 
the French capital. By warfare, first the French revolutionary armies and then Napoleon broke 
down borders and then exported an ideology of enlightenment, already familiar to, and held 
by, many intellectuals throughout Europe, and with it legal administrative methods of gov-
ernment which proved to be a potent mix. French armies were beaten back but the ideology 
and legal administrative methods, best encapsulated in the Code Napoleon, were directly or 
indirectly absorbed by many states as an efficient method of carrying out governmental busi-
ness. War, ideology and governmental improvements of efficiency combined in a variety of 
forms are useful in state building internally as well as externally. All three seem to be able to 
have an intoxicating effect on populace and elites which is rather crucial in overcoming the 
pain of the initial state formation period. The intoxication begins usually with the intellectuals 
and only gradually trickles down to the populace at large. Governments and elites in power 
will find the efficiency increases offered by the new system finally to be too tempting to be 
ignored and will absorb them. This pattern was repeated in the 1950s with a French heir to its 
rational bureaucratic traditions making the link between war and useless borders, an ideology 
and governmental improvement, and exporting the current French interpretation of their long 
governmental tradition to the European dimension, Monnet applied the skills that he had ho-
ned as an economic planner during the First World War, when he ran almost the whole 
French economy, to rebuilding the French economy after the Second World War and after 
that to the construction of the ECSC. He also seems to have applied his skills in enabling na-
tions to cooperate closely together to fight War to the task of preventing another one: during 
the First World War he played a vital role in setting up the Allied Maritime Transport Execu-
tive, 'the most advanced experiment yet made in international cooperation.'439 
Given that borders are very important for Nation States few things explicitly mock borders 
more than war, shocking citizens whose states fail to protect the borders and leaders who are 
suddenly themselves reduced to the status of servants. Often the leaders of the conquered sta-
tes will have found themselves serving not just the leadership of the conquering states but also 
438 See note 195 Dinan; Nugent (2000) p.269 
43y See note 104 Dinan (2000) p.346 
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its civil servants.440The bureaucrats in many of the conquered territories remained servants 
and retained power and influence in good civil service fashion, happily or unhappily able to 
serve which ever political master was available. Leaders and politicians saw a decrease in 
their position and status, becoming puppets if they were lucky, or imprisoned if they were not. 
It was the politicians who lost credibility in the aftermath of the Second World War and were 
swiftly changed. Bureaucrats, Nazi or not soon found themselves back in power, if they had 
ever been removed from it. Politically correct or not, it will have been a fact that throughout 
Nazi occupied Europe bureaucrats had spent years working together to achieve joint European 
aims, albeit with a strong German slant. The arrival of the American forces 'conquering' or 
liberating the same states and promoting European cooperation will have continued this col-
laboration process. 
Borders and territorial integrity, essential to Nation States and established States had become 
irrelevant in Western Europe, which should have opened the way to a new State. Troops and 
homeless individuals had marched backwards and forwards over borders. Borders did not ex-
ist for bombers; ideologies; armies in general so why have them? Indeed with the advent of 
NATO, the military threat that the borders might have possibly deflected was now projected 
outwards beyond them to the east. There was a new common enemy and a hegamon with the 
power to stamp out any trouble between the old Nation States.44 *That the borders and Nation 
States remained for as long as they did is the puzzle. Militarily the border must be seen to ha-
ve run globally with the Western coalition protected by a nuclear power, if a military border 
existed in Europe then it had to be the one between East and West and certainly in terms of 
troop figures this was the case. Economically the border equally ran in such a manner that it 
left Western Europe as an 'ancillary to the American economy,' and this continued until 
!958.442PoIiticaIIy borders were also confused, many of the founding countries of the EU had 
large portions of their populations who politically-ideologically had more in common with 
their counter parts in other countries, than with the Communists for example in their own 
countries. With large portions of domestic populations adhering to an ideology which drew 
them towards no borders and alliance with the military enemy;44 the Christian Democrats for 
example in several states found themselves thrust into each others' arms so to speak. 
Revived nationalism amongst elements of the population and self interest amongst the na-
tional governmental elites were important reasons for the maintaining of borders. It has to be 
that there were enough vested interests remaining in the MSs, combined with the habit of in-
stitutions to long outlive their functionality, to have allowed the longevity of national borders. 
They created an illusionary sense of security and identity that was more important than their 
flimsy reality. But this came at a cost in terms of economic gains by lower tariffs and freer 
trade across borders. This was clear enough to the Americans who pushed for the removal of 
tariffs in Europe and proposed a customs union. Their pressure combined with a growing a-
wareness of the new political realities pushed European Countries towards the EEC. In reality 
western Europe was forced together; 'Social, technical and economic changes ever since then 
have undermined the autonomy of national governments within the confined geography and 
dense society and economy of Western Europe, forcing governments to pursue their objec-
tives through common policies, as interaction across borders takes economic and social be-
haviour beyond the control of any single national authority.'444 
440 Interviews with NMS Officials A little aside here, one New Member State official stressed their shock during an interview 
at how a Mow grade' Commission official had shouted at an elected minister in his state. 
441 See note 18 Wallace (1990) p.42 
442 ibid p.42 
443 ibid p.39 
444 ibid p. 103 
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However, whatever might have seemed logical; that military and economic pressures would 
have forced a new western European State into existence, it did not happen. In fact, the Euro-
pean Project offered a tantalising solution to the problem of the growing uselessness of bor-
ders for many 'new5 Nation States. This sounds odd and must be explained. Increasingly 
throughout the twentieth century the world was fragmenting and European empires breaking 
up into smaller units with more flimsy hopes of independence and border integrity. The Aus-
trian Empire was the first down after World War One, followed gradually by the rest of the 
West European countries after World War Two and finally the Soviet Russian Empire col-
lapsed piece by piece. The resultant mass of insecure, smaller states were inevitably far more 
dependent on each other than the empires had been, but they had some sovereignty. For states 
like Britain and France it could be argued it came as shock being 'just1 Nation States; in some 
ways humiliating and hard to come to terms with as the Suez crisis made abundantly clear. 
For them, as much as for the relatively new Germany and Italy, (Germany too saw itself re-
duced via dismemberment, zonal division and federalism from a German Empire to a federal 
state with power once more being distributed to regional state authorities) being Nation States 
was a new experience; their ministers and officials were used to dealing with vast armies of 
multinational officials in very different countries. For the United Kingdom the first steps of 
empire building were bound together with the creation of the Nation. England began empire 
building with the setting up of colonies in America under Queen Elisabeth the First and dur-
ing her life and at her death the first steps in the creation of the United Kingdom took place 
too with the increasing occupation of Ireland and the joint crowning of the Scottish King Ja-
mes as the first King of both England and Scotland, The formation of Spain as a concept was 
first in conjunction with the discoveries of Columbus of the soon to be South American Em-
pire, Castile and Aragon became Spain and a nation under the same rulers who founded the 
Empire. The British defined themselves often by their empire and its mission and civilisation, 
bereft of that there has been an increasing question of identity and the gradual dissolving of 
even the Union. Britain, France and most European States defined themselves by their 'role' 
in the world, without colonies in a sense adoring them, their cultures seemed to have been 
hollowed out and have had to be reinvented without the security of superiority gained by be-
ing in positions of power. 
The physical borders of the empires ran through the world as much as if not more so than just 
in Europe. It is likely that the British had as many soldiers distributed throughout the empire 
as were actually defending the channel coast. Certainly psychologically the borders were im-
perial, with the British feeling more at home in Hong Kong and India than with the French. 
The 'new' Nation States thus defined could be expected to be confused in their perspective on 
Europe, and themselves, and so in favour of Monnet's goal of restoring European prosperity 
and position in the world, and, at the same time nervous and touchy. The relationship between 
empires and the EEC was reflected in the founding treaties which stressed the importance of 
the empires and which allowed and still does financial support to be provided to territories 
which were parts of empires and are still closely related to MSs 
'This role was promoted as well as constrained by the rapport de force between Member Sta-
tes during the negotiations for the treaty of Rome and the wider framework set up with regard 
to the status ('association') of overseas territories. For France, association was an essential 
condition for the mere establishment of the European Economic Community.'445 
The large numbers of officials looking for new challenges and used to greater scope for their 
ambitions than just the white cliffs of Dover or the snow caps of the Pyrenees and ministers in 
445Dimier, V, Administrative Reform as Political Control Lessons from DG VI11, 1958-75 in Dimitrakopoulos.D (ed) The 
Changing European Commission. (2004) Manchester, Manchester University Press p. 76 
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these 'new' Nation States could be expected to increasingly be in favour of a new project, in a 
step by step manner matching the dismantling of their empires. Particularly when what re-
placed them, the British Commonwealth for example was shown to be a weak replacement. 
This notion seems to be supported by the large number of ' former French colonial administra-
tors' who populated DG VIII (development).446Maybe, therefore, it can be argued that supra-
nationality had problems with the Nation Empires with which it,447as a potential 'empire' or 
multi national polity, naturally competed and that the Nation States which gradually emerged 
from these, step by step, were more in favour of the EEC. With reference to the years (1958-
1968); 'These were also the years in which European countries completed their disengage-
ment from empire - sometimes tragically, sometimes successfully.'4 8Indeed real 'suprana-
tional integration' is often stated to have happened in the late eighties with the reintroduction 
of QMV; notably after the end of the European Empires. 
Thus the EEC could be argued to have helped the creation of the 'new' Nation States in Euro-
pe. Financially and psychologically the French Empire in particular was, initially at least, ai-
ded by the EEC.449The political profile that France gained within the EEC was of consider-
able importance to it. Millward has argued similarly that the EEC helped rehabilitate the Na-
tion States after the Second World War by downgrading domestic economic opponents and 
facilitating the change over to welfare state basis for the MSs.450The EEC enabled the MSs to 
reinvent themselves as welfare states which their citizens naturally felt even closer to than be-
fore, thus nationalism would grow. The 'new' Nation States of Western Europe could and 
would serve as foundation building blocks for the developing polity. The EEC paradoxically 
initially strengthened its; 'opponents,'45'but with hindsight, as with the creation of the MS 
dominated institutions to contain the Monnet Method, this was an essential step towards Eu-
ropean integration however unintentional it appears to have been. 
European leaders were slow to grasp that the values of the world were gradually being chan-
ged and that the USA was economically the new power452 quite apart from militarily and that 
money and not military domination of other countries made for real power. Monnet on the 
contrary had lived in the US and recognised as a businessman the potential of its power. The 
Wall Street crash and the subsequent economic depression should have made the connection 
between cash and power very clear but did not. Economics and the market remained low poli-
tics for the European countries. Thus Monnet was able to achieve economic integration and 
potentially improve the financial situation in Europe which was the key to US success,4530ld 
fashioned concerns with foreign and defence policy remained and remain high politics and 
out of reach of supranationality, although they were less important for territorial security, in 
an age of Nuclear Weapons and transcontinental military alliances, than ever before. The 
main security threat that concerned citizens and should have concerned governments was that 
of poverty and economic instability with the potential return of extremist politics, it should 
have been a high politics issue; certainly the Americans were very conscious of the Commu-
nist or return to Fascism threat to the countries of Western Europe. 
446 Dimier, (2004) p. 76 
447 See note 18 Wallace (1990) p.4 'Britain and France, of course, were still substantial imperial powers, their hesitancy over 
any irrevocable commitment to a more politically integrated Western Europe partly reflected their continuing extra European 
ambittons-and their need to maintain national armed forces to protect those ambitions.' 
448 ibid p. 43 
449 See note 3 Monnet (1978) p.300 
45(1 See note 103 Millward (2000) 
4M See note 168 Drake (2000) p.247 
452 See note 18 Wallace (1990) p. 37 
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Following on from the above discussion about the importance of money and the false percep-
tion of the MSs that economic matters were low politics it must be added that this was an area 
where the MS governments were losing or going to lose control anyway. The determination 
of the US to promote trade and extend markets drove the GATT process forwards and was 
strengthened by the awareness that protectionism had exacerbated the international situation 
prior to the Second World War. The days of easy protectionism were over, and the integrity of 
borders where tariffs and duties were concerned were being and would ever more challenged 
by the new superpower and the new economic system it was promoting. The MSs were there-
fore willing to pool their economic interests since they were steadily losing individual value 
anyway. Forming a regional common market might help counter balance GATT; certainly 
conversely the USA hoped GATT might counter balance the common market.454The ability of 
the EEC and its key elements like the CAP to create difficulties with rounds of tariff reduc-
tions has been shown repeatedly with the Uruguay Round being but the latest where the CAP 
came close to wrecking the whole process, which reflect the EEC's essentially protectionist 
potential; a point which was not lost on the MSs. 
But often peace in the aftermath war has proven to be important for Nation building, in par-
ticular where ideology and war have been combined. Reactionary forces came into play after 
the Napoleonic war as they did after the First World War as war torn societies almost nostal-
gically tried to undo the revolutionary effects of the ideology which was now linked to vio-
lence and repugnant in the populace's perception. This repugnance was useful for the 'reac-
tionary' victorious power structures. The aftermath of Second World War saw Parliamentary 
Nation States reinstalled in the West, bringing back into power some politicians who had been 
dismissed by the previous regimes. Thus in post war Europe there were reactionary forces 
present particularly in the Nation States, but there was also a European layer of bureaucrats 
who had never really lost power and now were also to most long lived element of government 
and ironically the least discredited. The real steps in nation building in Germany and Italy in 
the nineteenth century came from the reactionary forces of Monarchs. These were often ma-
nipulated by their bureaucratic ministers (Bismarck and Cavour) who saw better than they did 
that more power was to be had by combining reactionary governmental structures with na-
tional idealism than by resisting the latter. Clever reactionary ministers were more than capa-
ble of getting their political masters and the public to play their parts in planned Nation State 
building, at times playing the idealism of the latter against the reticence of the former. When 
performed sensibly, reactionary governmental forms like Monarchy, absolute Monarchy at 
times, could in fact be strengthened by a bit of state building and idealism. Something similar 
happened with the Nation States after the Second World War, as Millward argues in his 
book.455 
One of the vital elements of state formation has always been the co-opting of the ruling class 
of the old elements to be involved in the new state. With Prussia the aristocracy were 'co-
opted' into the new state; the higher offices and ranks of officer were reserved for Junkers and 
their male offspring. Eventually some sort of merger between the state and the Junkers took 
place, with a military bureaucratic ethos as the dominant culture. If the Member States of the 
EU are considered to be the equivalent of the aristocracy, after all the aristocracy were the re-
gional powers often derived from feudalism, then something similar took place. Monnet's en-
grenage method of involving officials from all over the EU either as officials within the insti-
tutions or as seconded officials working for a three year stint in the institutions served to form 
the unified bureaucratic whole that can be related to the Prussian situation. Of course not to 
the same extreme but, via the College of Commissioners, top politicians from the MSs are 
454 See note 104 Dinan, (2000) p.248 
455 See note 103 Millward (2000) 
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also co-opted into the EU and something similar works with the Council and COREPER 
and the vast number of officials who visit Brussels or implement EU legislation in the MSs. 
The EU has some of the characteristics of the frontier state as described in the work of Siep 
Stuurman in his work on state formation.457To understand this it is necessary to return to the 
situation of the 1950s. Western Europe was very much economically and militarily an ap-
pendage of the USA, the new hegamon. It had gone from being central to a world of empires, 
to being divided and the respective elements attached to two superpowers whose centres of 
power were far away. Western Europe was the front line of the West with a vast military force 
facing it. In the situation of the frontier state there seems to have been a strong aristocracy 
(Member States) and a weak Monarch or central power. The example of Poland with the Sejm 
was given in the book mentioned above. In this the regional aristocracy dominated but they 
agreed to the need to have enough of an organisation to keep their key economic factor, their 
farmers in check. It is possible to imagine that the farmers to be kept in check by the new col-
lective organisation were the workers and Communists, often one and the same, and the em-
ployers1 organisations and cartels that dominated Coal and Steel. 
The weak Monarch is an interesting notion. Certainly the EU institutions are weak in the ex-
treme and deliberately so. The 'aristocrats' of the 1950s only wanted to give the EU the mi-
nimum power necessary to achieve its task. Hobbes's notion of Monarchy is useful here when 
explaining the creation of that essential element of state forming theory, the Monarch. Hobbes 
saw that people were so busy being unpleasant and fighting each other that they finally agreed 
to create a Monarch with the power to stop them fighting and so improve the common lot. 
Two important criteria for him, Monnet would have applauded, firstly that any agreement be-i Cn 
tween states had to have some force available to enforce it; this was one of the problems 
with the League of Nations in Monnet's eyes,459 secondly he stresses that it is the essential 
lack of trust between individuals which means that they must all agree to give up their rights 
to self defence together, and grant these to the sovereign power.460His single centralised Mon-
arch/sovereign power was to be absolute and no doubt, given the desperate state of things as 
he perceived them, a desperate measure was needed. The Member States and their publics 
wanted to have an end to war and were prepared to see the creation of a Monarch of sorts to 
control them, but evidently their desperation was not as great as some would have it, maybe 
since NATO was in the offing. If all the MSs allowed their hands to be tied in the regard of 
war then all would be better off. Thus a weak Monarch, to use traditional parlance, was cre-
ated to keep war at bay. Unsurprisingly the regional powers were suspicious of the Monarch 
they had allowed to be created and sought to keep it in check.461 
Whilst on the subject of political philosophy and the Community project Hegel has to be men-
tioned. The Monnet goal was to put an end to the Nation-State international anarchy that al-
lowed these entities to operate in a legal vacuum more or less as they wished. If Nation States 
456 See note 173 Shore, (2000) p.219 'Much more than simply an abstract theory of 'cognitive change1 engrenage clearly 
does work as a key mechanism in the creation of a new type of'European* subjectivity. This process also appears to be hap-
pening in the Council of Ministers... particularly among the seconded national civil servants working in its various permanent 
and specialised working groups.' 
457 Stuurman Siep, Staatsvorming en palitieke theorie. Drie essays over Europu, (1995) Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 
458 Hobbes, T. The Leviathan, Chapter 17. 'Covenents, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man 
at all' 
4S<) Bromberger, 'Jean Monnet' quoted see note 415 Fransen (2001) p.30-31 '.,, in Geneva I was impressed with the power of 
a nation that can say no to an international body that has no supranational power. Goodwill between men, between nations, is 
not enough. One must also have international laws and institutions. Except for certain practical but limited activities in which 
1 participated, the League of Nations was a disappointment.' 
4 Hobbes, The Leviathan, Chapter 17. 'I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assem-
bly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner... ' 
See note 110 Kassim; Menon, (2004) p. 102 
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could be bound into a legal framework of which they were themselves a part and to thus make 
them subject to legal restrictions and finally penalties then warfare and activities leading to 
warfare would be minimalized if not entirely removed. The cost would be in terms of the Na-
tion States' freedom, a basic fact that Tacitus had noted centuries before, that liberty was the 
cost that had to be paid in order for there to be peace,462Hegel considered the state to be a 
means of making people do what they knew to be correct but were not motivated to do with-
out its intervention. In itself not a new idea as biblically Kings had enjoyed this status for a 
long time; they were there to keep society Godly and to make people behave morally via co-
ercion. But raising the state to this level was new and the dialectic that helped provide an ex-
planatory framework for this situation was also. Monnet's raising up of a supranational au-
thority to act in a state like manner to coerce, guide and finally to bind MSs into a legal sys-
tem which would end the legal vacuum fits into Hegelian philosophy quite neatly. If Hegel's 
state can be said to have made people into more conscientious individuals than they would be 
naturally, then the same can be said of Monnet's Method and the Nation States concerned. 
The often suspicious and negative behaviour of the MSs towards the supranational ambitions 
of the EU reflects antagonism and competition and not cooperation: 
T h e history of the Community's development, however, and specifically the evolution of the 
Commission's position, attests to the fact that the Community has often been seen by Member 
State governments as a zero-sum game, in which the Commission's authority challenges their 
»463464 own . . . 
To explain this suspicion, a glance away from the continent is needed as what happened is 
reminiscent of two Anglo Saxon political events which some have seen as clearly related and 
certainly they were if only from an idealistic way. The Magna Carta and the US Declaration 
of Independence are the events in question and no doubt have a lot of mythical content swill-
ing around in them but they do both show regional authorities (feudal knights and the states) 
dealing with their respective central body in a manner which might seem to border on the hos-
tile. Certainly they reflect the suspicions of strongly independent regional governmental or-
gans towards a central government which is maybe necessary but also as dangerous to them 
as maybe the enemies beyond the borders. It's these qualities of caution combined with an 
awareness of strength and yet also a willingness to accept an unfortunate evil so long as it is 
hedged in with limitations which is special. Both tried to build into the 'contract' with their 
central governments, institutional safeguards which would allow armed resistance if neces-
sary. The Magna Carta has the central power authorising rebellion against itself with the com-
mittee of twenty five barons who are allowed and instructed by the Monarch to 4 . . . distrain 
and distress us in everyway they can . . . '465as the 'security clause' states. 
Both the US and Medieval England had just had rather unpleasant experiences with central 
authorities which they had recently defeated and which affected their whole approach to the 
idea of central government. Europe had, prior to the Second World War, been more inclined 
to adore absolutism in one form or another. Hitler had changed all that with several states 
simply becoming regional entities with little authority. With the arrival of the Americans 
West Germany also found itself in the curious position of being a regional power once again. 
462 Tacitus. Histories I. 
463 See note 168 Drake (2000) p.247 
464 See note 195 Dinan; Nugent (2000) p.263 He emphasises that the Commission has at times pushed for an; "Excessively 
maximalist position' which 'dangerously insensitive' and created a political and popular backlash against 'supranational poli-
cies and institutions.' Always some backlash can be expected, a reaction to supranationality with it is argued often enough 
peoples and politicians acting together, the latter no doubt responding to the DP force in the former. 
465 Magna Carta para 61 
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The negative central power was gone, violently defeated and removed and sovereignty was 
back on the cards. Only the European Nation States had had a sharp reminder of being domi-
nated by a power beyond their borders reducing them to weak regionalism, and this they 
would resist. Thus Europe found itself at a Magna Carta moment or elements of a Madisonian 
one and they behaved accordingly. The uses of a central authority were clear if only to resist a 
return to regionalism as US or USSR satellites. The latter version, with its ideological and to-
talitarian qualities no doubt bringing back memories of more recent domination by Germany. 
Often there appear to be and to have been two diametrically opposed forces at work in the EU 
and its evolution.466This certainly does not fit into the classic state formation theories and is 
more at home in a Hegelian dialectic structure. On the one side there was Monnet and the Su-
pranationalists with their concept of a federal Europe and on the other the MSs with their po-
litical power but also their economic and military impotence and fears. The former pressing 
for a single functionalist technocratic organisation which would expand and become the fu-
ture government of a federal Europe; the latter hemming it in on every side with organisations 
dominated by the democratically elected MS governments. This positioning of clear alterna-
tive visions and methods of government and the fact that the supranationalists were pretty 
much an interest group with a concept and some political connections but no real power and 
the MS governments in the absolute opposite situation underlines the differences between this 
situation and classical state formation theory where it is the governmental forces of states 
which are the key players in the development of their own state. 
In summary, war and occupation provided ideal conditions for state formation to take place 
combined with potential changes in trade and the existence of NATO and Western Europe's 
new position as a Western appendage to the US dominated west. Monnet's deliberate creation 
of a weak central power (Monarchy) able to prevent war, was similar to state formation strat-
egy as was the external border. The deliberate fragmentation of MSs discussed earlier implicit 
in functionalism was another step but more importantly from a positive perspective the co 
opting of politicians and bureaucrats into the new system was vital and a typical step in state 
formation. Reactionary forces were also inevitably present as the de Gaulle incident showed 
but over time were overcome. But the EU is not yet a state as such, the Nation States proved 
to be more resilient than had been expected, but it is heading in that direction. The speed with 
which it has occurred leads some to call it a young organisation, and bearing in mind the cen-
turies it took to develop France and its absolutist Monarchy, the few years that were required 
to get the basics into place were remarkable. There are enough state formation features about 
the EU to suggest that some elements of it have taken place. Since the standard historic ex-
amples fail to grasp the dynamic in its essentials another has to be sought for. Given the re-
cent memories of the 1950s leaders it is rather amazing that any central authority at all was 
agreed to, however weak. To account for this, more venerable history must be dusted off and 
outlined. All these humiliated and suspicious Nation States had also known more benevolent 
forms of central authority. Indeed the German States are said to have been against the nation-
alism of their new nation in the past owing to their 'old allegiance to the Vatican's supra na-
tional authority.'467 
466 See note 168 Drake (2000) p. 247 
467 Economist 25,02.06 page 79 Book review section 
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1.3 AN ORGANIC EU-PAPACY MODEL 
Having considered the reader's possible objection we can take the argument one stage further 
and beyond the reach of standard state formation theory. Since this theoiy only covers certain 
aspects of EU integration any historic example to cover more elements is hard to come by. 
However all is not lost, a look back into a more distant period of time offers a pretty useful 
example of something similar going on. If standard state formation belongs to the more mod-
ern period of history we need to look at that preceding it, namely, the medieval ages. One ex-
ample which fits several of the more important requirements for comparability is that of the 
medieval Papal Monarchy which emerged in 1050 and lasted for the next few hundred years. 
Here two forces were at work the papacy and the monarchies, in particular the Germanic Holy 
Roman Empire. These can be, with a bit of care and elaboration, compared with those in-
volved in the evolution of the EU. Before that it has to be stated that any such comparison is 
going to be broad and details will differ as the historic periods are far apart. 
A large range of similarities between the EU and medieval papacy exist: 'EU: Papacy Rein-
carnated?' explores the surprising parallels between the medieval papacy and the European 
integration project which has resulted in the EU.468The book starts from the premise that there 
are few truly new ideas and concepts let alone organisational structures in the world, There 
have been a vast range of attempts at uniting Europe but only two can be said to have had 
long term success. The medieval papacy and the EU were startlingly effective in their histori-
cal periods and served very similar roles in a nigh on identical geographical area. The Euro-
pean Community project has many idealistic if not openly spiritual overtones with Catholic 
Social Teaching integrated into the founding treaties and every treaty that has followed. Both 
European projects had curiously comparable economic, political and spiritual goals. Generally 
speaking the medieval church provided the domestic governmental administrative services 
that the monarchs increasingly relied on and the Papal layer provided the 'European' dimen-
sion that had been so lacking. The Roman Church and Christendom were both political and 
social and a neat secular - clerical split such as exists today was unforeseeable then. The me-
dieval papacy and the Roman Church it ruled was one of the most economically active and 
powerful medieval institutions; bishops and clerics ran much of the economy of Christendom 
and controlled much of its wealth into the bargain. 
Systematic comparison shows that the Vatican institutions and their structure are not very dif-
ferent to those established in the Late Medieval period. These institutions and their structures 
are very similar to those of the European integration project, thus the EU institutions bear ma-
ny similarities to those of the medieval papacy. The Community institutions share in a rather 
confused manner legislative, executive and judicial competences just as happened in the me-
dieval papacy; nation states have always sought to keep the competences separate. This re-
sults in a system where the European Parliament, Council, Commission and European Court 
of Justice act in a similar manner to their medieval equivalents the Councils of the Church, 
the Pope, the Cardinals and their staff and the constantly present in Rome ambassadors of the 
rulers. 
European law and Romano-canonical law are shown to have shared the quality of regulating 
economic activity with a strongly social tinge. Both were very involved in ordering economic, 
social, institutional matters and ensured the success of their respective European projects and 
were actively promoted by the papacy and the Community institutions. They served/serve the 
function of being international alternatives to national limited law and legal systems-often if 
46S Stout, M. EU: Papacy Reincarnated? Metajuridica Books (2005) 
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individuals or merchants from different states were/are involved. At a very early stage both 
organisations used identical logic and methods (even the wording is almost the same) to claim 
supremacy and direct effect for their law and legal system over that of the states/kingdoms 
they desired to mould and organise. Both types of law were promulgated using similar in-
struments: Community regulations, directives and decisions. These have direct predecessors 
in the medieval papacy. Both the European and the Romano-canonical legal systems ex-
panded rapidly to fill the new European niche and used the 'national' legal personnel to 
achieve this. Both sought to extend rights of to the common man and to rendered MSs or in 
the medieval times, monarchs, liable to legal rulings and punishment. The casting of an 4 im-
moral' king from Christendom was possible then and a MS government can be suspended 
from the EU as happened recently to Austria when a right wing party gained some role in that 
county's government. Then as now, the 'supranational' authorities found themselves largely 
without an army or police force as these were and are functions which the member states/ rul-
ers jealously guarded and guard. 
De Gaulle clashed in the nineteen sixties with the European Commission in a dramatic dispute 
essentially over the distribution of power between the supranational organisation and a Mem-
ber State. Around 900 years earlier Pope Gregory VII clashed with the German King Henry 
IV at Canossa over the same issues, the rights and powers of the new supranational Reform 
Papacy created a couple of decades before vis-à-vis the kingdoms and their rulers. The Re-
form Papacy had overtly political goals as had/has the Commission. Vast bodies of literature 
were generated by the academics of the respective periods to explain the curious political real-
ity that now existed, a strange and very unusual and original governmental system with pow-
ers divided between a new supranational governmental force and the traditional member 
states or rulers. Nowadays the discussions are between intergovern men tali sts and neo-
functionalists; then it was between supporters of the Monarchical theory of government or 
those in favour of Papal Monarchy-in essence the arguments and positions are the same. 
The first fifty years of the Reform Papacy and the European integration project reveal many 
parallels from the creation of a new currency to the 'moral' duty to enlarge eastwards. Re-
cently it was to rescue in a sense the other half of Europe from the USSR or Russia as it now 
is. Then it was the moral duty to rescue the eastern Christian Empire from the clutches of the 
Islamic forces and to so in a sense re-unite the old Roman Empire again was similar to the 
motivations of the EU. Indeed many of the initial stages in the developments of the EU and 
the medieval papacy are comparable. Application of some of the theories involved in explain-
ing European integration to the Reform Papacy period prove, to a large extent, that the two 
European supranational organisations served very similar purposes, used matching methods 
and in general approximated to each other.469Coincidence is a possible explanation but it is far 
more likely that the EU is directly descended from the medieval papacy and has fitted neatly 
into the European governmental niche created by the latter. 
A short digression is needed here. The reader may wonder what such a backward period like 
the medieval one can possible have to do with the modern EU and the twentieth century. The 
great writer Dryden pondered the same question in Preface to Fables, Ancients and Modern 
and reached the following conclusion 
'For mankind is ever the same and nothing is lost out of nature, though everything is altered.' 
However, the reader might still say, surely, the medieval period was one of extreme primitive 
backwardness combined with extraordinarily parochial tendencies, with individuals living in 
small villages and with even more limited loyalties than they have today. To answer such 
46v Stout, M. Elf: Papacy Reincarnated? Metajuridica Books (2005) 
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points it is always handy to have an eminent source to refer to; with this in mind the classic 
work on the period; 'The Papal Monarchy' will be quoted from to give the reader a truer 
sense of what was afoot in this period 
'This pattern of care, control, and repression was an international one, and this too was a new 
development of our period. True, if we could visit medieval Europe we would be struck by its 
intense localisms. Major churches had their own liturgical customs, cities championed their 
own saints or protected their own heretics from among their favourite sons, and noble ran 
courts of warfare, love and piety in whatever combination they thought fit. Yet the elements 
of growing internationalism were powerful. The most dramatic of all was perhaps the vast 
struggle of western Christendom to extend its boundaries through the crusading endeavour. 
There were international religious orders: Cistercians required the same daily routine to be 
applied from the Scottish borders to the mountains of Calabria, and the friars expected their 
members to be available for transfer between houses and if necessary between countries and 
continents. Paris and Bolonga were truly international universities. At the heart of this process 
stood the Roman Church itself, which during these years completed the process of develop-
ment from the local church of Rome to a Curia which recruited personnel from many parts of 
the west to run an international organisation, which had largely lost its local connections in I flA 
Rome and which for long periods was unable to enter the city at all.' 
Earlier we noted that there seem to have been two opposed forces working partially against 
each other which resulted in the EU of today; the supranational forces and Monnet Method 
and DP and the MSs. These forces could not be absorbed into each other or rather taken over 
by the other as they were too dissimilar. Each had a degree of sovereignty within a given 
sphere and related expertise; they were at one and the same time opposed to and dependent 
upon each other. To function effectively both had to retain some degree of independence for-
mal and informal. The MSs need the Commission, the supranational force, to remain inde-
pendent to provide desirable integration and the Commission requires the MSs and Council to 
provide the implementation skills and political mastery of the European demos that it lacks. 
Both supranational and Papal forces longed and long for greater control and power over the 
secular-monarchs or MS authorities, if for no other reason than to further their idealist pro-
jects. Both the MSs and the secular monarchs of the medieval period are and were drawn to 
the dream, however misunderstood, of a prosperous European Unity such as is and was per-
ceived to have existed under the Roman Empire. However, any form of unity involving large 
losses of sovereignty were and are vigorously resisted. It is interesting to note the touchy sus-
picion with which the medieval French and English monarchs regarded Holy Roman Em-
pire's imperial claims to jurisdiction over the whole of the old Roman Empire;471 which at 
times the Popes seemed to approve of. The leaders of the various European Countries have 
always wanted to maintain their power over their territories and if possible to forcibly extend 
it over those of others, and yet they desire unity and prosperity. Of course, their ideal goal is 
and was that of a Roman Empire under French, German, Spanish hegemony. But this goal has 
never achieved lasting success although certain military figures like Hitler and Napoleon got 
closer to it than most but also for a briefer period. Any unity would have to be won by a dif-
ferent force to that of military or political power emanating from any one region. 
The solution came under the Reform Papacy and in the 1950s from cohesive, well educated 
social groups then the clergy and in the fifties the technocrats. Both of these had in general the 
ambition and ability to re-structure their societies. In the European/Christendom context both 
were motivated by desires to re-forge European Unity, reduce or remove war, and to apply 
470 Morris, C. Papal Monarchy (\99\) Oxford, Clarendon Press p.58l 
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expertise to ruling. Both recognised that Aristocratic-monarchical or in modern times MS self 
interest rendered sensible government impossible. By the standards of their day rationality 
was related to purity from secular or MS interference. The clergy were deliberately separated 
from their loyalty to secular powers regional and monarchical and so from dynastic problems 
as a whole which plagued the medieval period. They were encouraged into redirecting their 
loyalty to the Pope and to Rome, which offered them increasing possibilities for influence and 
power by protecting them from the secular powers and opening up a range of new tasks for 
them to effect. Many were encouraged to visit Rome and to become more directly involved in 
Papal government.4 Technocrats were encouraged to work in Brussels and to become caught 
in the gears and to shift their loyalty from the MSs. One of the big issues that the Reform Pa-
pacy opposed was simony or the purchase of clerical office by secular regional authorities. 
Monnet had similar views, albeit in a modern form, about MS governments and loyalty to 
them making European objectivity in officials impossible. Both clerics and an expanding 
corps of European officials had to be guaranteed independence from regional authorities in 
the name of the international objective mission. Technocrats were, like the clergy, deemed to 
know what was best for society and how to achieve it. MSs, like monarchs were to be down-
graded and treated as under the law in order to remove the international anarchy which was in 
the eleventh and twentieth centuries. Then as now the demos, the people however defined, 
were initially not the target of the integrationalist forces but rather the clergy or bureaucrats. 
DP in the medieval period has to be defined as the empowered national governmental systems 
with their interested parties: nobility, monarchs, who were expected according to the political 
theory of they day to protect the church and clergy, and above all clergy who represented the 
citizens of Christendom, the Chr is t ians ; ' . . . the ministers of the church at every level are the 
A  
representatives of the communities for which they speak and act. The 'people' were then 
considered to be the groups mentioned.474 
Both supranational organisations were desirable to the regional governments of their day and 
offered oddly similar immunisation from similarly undesirable things combined with the pos-
sibility of wealth creation via: economic innovation, governmental improvements and the em-
ployment of more officials and social political stability. They were both reform movements, 
holding out creative, fresh approaches to old problems. It seems they managed to avoid, at 
first at least, direct opposition from political or administrative authorities which would have 
quickly snuffed out their respective integration attempts. European unity was not to be had by 
domination or hegemony, which simply provoked overwhelming opposition which could not 
be broken down. Instead unity was made to seem pretty innocuous and even beneficial. The 
limited bureaucratic integration of the ECSC and the integration of the clergy under the Re-
form Papacy seemed to serve good governmental purposes for the MSs and monarchs. They 
wanted the Popes or the Higher Authority to rein in the national cartels of coal and steel bar-
ons or in the case of the Reform Papacy the regionally controlled clergy apparatus. The rulers 
had effectively lost control over these already in any case.475The prospect of Church purity 
and unity and also peace were positive goods for monarchs and they were willing to tolerate a 
more centralised and powerful papacy if that was the price to pay. If the Popes wanted to do 
the dirty work of reining in the rulers' opponents and then be blamed for it so much the better; 
much the same logic as MSs seemed to hold with the supranational governmental layer. 
The determined opposition the rulers finally faced in their respective supranational organiza-
tions was so unexpected and radically unusual that it quite took the governmental forces of 
472 See note 470 Morris (2001) p. 113 
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the day by surprise and left them very wrong footed. The Popes and supranationalists were 
not a domestic class or traditional group within the countries with familiar competing de-
mands for power. That the MSs and the monarchs could have dealt with, rather the 'suprana-
tional force' they confronted was pretty much intangible more an ideal and ideology than a 
force at first; which sought to take over their administrations by supplanting their loyalty to 
their ruler with loyalty to a higher authority. For the rulers then and in the nineteen-fifties, 
they were out of their depth playing a game where others had set new rules to play by. The 
new rule makers were located externally to the major countries of the day and so had that 
most poignant of power positions; they were able to act domestically within these countries 
whilst remaining outside the direct control of the rulers. Unfortunately for the rulers con-
cerned their usually openly obedient clergy and bureaucrats found the new regime quite 
tempting to collaborate with, since it valued their skills highly and combined idealism and ex-
pertise which they found most palatable. 
The inexplicable willingness of rulers of every age to have their hands tied and, of course, to 
be seen to be having their hands tied is worth discussing. Rulers are of course most willing to 
have their hands tied when it also results in their opponents being as, if not more, handicapped 
than they are. The desire of the Reform Papacy to ensure that direct secular involvement in 
the selection of clergy was accepted by monarchs in principle because it seemed to be related 
to secular aristocratic appointments to clerical positions. Thus the monarchs' regional aristo-
A 
cratic opponents were most affected. When the Pope's demands were directed at the mon-
archs themselves and vital powerful interest groups they depended on, namely the higher 
bishops close to the rulers who had bought their offices, then there was more of a struggle, 
what they had accepted in theory was less pleasant when applied to themselves. The MSs 
agreed to the ECSC and the common market, since it tied their hands but also since it weak-
ened domestic forces, 'As Millward argues, given substantial domestic opposition, "The gov-
ernment might be able to use the new supranational authority to enforce a restructuring policy 
on the industry and do so in the name of Europe."'477When confronted in the Gend and Loos 
case with the results of what they seemed to have sort of agreed to, they opposed it but were 
overruled. It was vital for peace that all MSs had their hands tied as they were and the same 
was true in the medieval period. In a sense all the monarchs478in Christendom found them-
selves equally under the heel of the resurgent Reform Papacy claiming more rights to decide 
when wars were to be fought and providing or depriving the monarchs of the means to fight 
the wars by use of the availability of clerical taxation for monarchical purposes.479 
Both the supranational organisations approached the political field of their day with multiple 
strategies and highly flexible, evolving organisations capable of several seemingly contradic-
476 See note 470 Morris (2001) p. 96 
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478 UUmann, W. The origins of the Great Schism; a study in fourteenth-century ecclesiastical history (1972) Hamden, CO 
Archon Books p.325 
479 Examining the notion in the last paragraph of rulers having their hands tied in greater depth it is interesting to note that 
this is not as aberrational as it might seem. Rational choice theory explains the current civil service structures in some Anglo-
Saxon Countries and apparent protection of their neutrality as being an example of respective legislatures preferring to have 
less patronage powers over civil service appointments in favour of increasing the likely longevity of their legislation. In prac-
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tory functions. The Papal Curia and the Cardinals were initially church based and dealt with 
church matters and not 'secular'; they literally served the pastoral needs of the Roman chur-
ches and congregations.480And yet they were capable of being turned remarkably quickly into 
an imperial senate, with a form of regional representation of the whole of Christendom. The 
selection of the Cardinals and the changing Curial structure seem to indicate that the Popes 
j O 1 
were well aware of the possibility and desirability of them serving another function. 
At the same time the Curia became gradually more bureaucratic maybe to counter balance for 
the increase in secular influence. The new Curia seems to have been modelled on the Imperial 
model, with less emphasis on a senate to run Christendom and more on the need to administer AQ'J 
the newly won competences. The High Authority was first of all a small group of dedicated 
experts isolated from external influences. As it faced the growing complexities of detailed 
mundane administration as opposed to grand sweeps of strategy so the emphasis went towards 
bureaucracy rather than policy making and the organisation came to look similar, in part, to 
MS bureaucracies. Set backs and direct opposition by the Empire and for the European feder-
alists that of the failed EDC and or the Luxembourg crisis ended the initial attempt at state 
formation and forced the organisations to adopt less dangerous organisational forms. 
The Commission like the Cardinals contained the dangerous but useful force for compromise 
and decision reaching and making, of individuals often representing and or from different re-
gions and representing different countries, whilst being formally independent from these re-
gions and loyal to a supranational organisation.483As with Commissioners, sometimes Cardi-
nals were more loyal to the church and sometimes to countries-regions. Thus both Curia and 
High Authority-Commission were capable of being superior governmental forms (universal 
Monarchy or federal government executive in waiting) and or less dangerous bureaucracies 
with strong regional tendencies or something in between. The problem was of course that it 
was hard for the organisations to run mundane governmental matters and cany out grand po-
litical schemes at the same time,4844S5something which David Coombes stated was the prob-
lem of the Commission.486The ambiguity of function, structure, ambition and information 
maximization can be argued to be a great strength as the resultant organisation is unpredict-
able and less easy to contain or absorb. It has, in a very real sense, the right of initiative and 
plenty of possible avenues to execute this right. 
The Curia is said to be an organization which is pretty unique as it never seems to have been 
planned but rather evolved, thus it did not reform or change whatever the pressures to do 
so.487Rather than reforming itself, it added on more bits to other obsolete elements. This 
seems to be reflected in the Commission 
'The Commission has never gone through a major reorganisation. Instead, obsolescent sys-
tems have been stretched beyond their reliable range of operation and structures have been 
added without adapting the organization as a whole.'488489 
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484 See note 474 Southern (1985) p. 132. ,They aspired less and less to provide the leadership which always seemed just be-
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This situation is explicable from the perspective of organizations holding a degree of sover-
eignty, which perceive of themselves as under constant challenge in which internal actors 
have to be placated. Thus both were full of vested interests which could ensure resistance to 
reforms and divide the organization internally. Only a stick and branch reform with the whole 
of Christendom being reformed as well could have ensured the longevity of the Papal medie-
val system of government, the same applies to the EU as we will see. 
A brief development of the theme of mundane governmental tasks vis-à-vis grand political 
leadership in the Commission and papacy would be illuminating at this stage for the purposes 
of comparison. The growth in the performance of comitology and management tasks in the 
Commission reflects the unwillingness of the Commission to pass over the opportunity to ha-
ve governmental powers. But the Commission has neither the resources nor the expertise to 
adequately perform the required functions. Its supranational credentials and essence are pretty 
irrelevant in these tasks. It is an interesting aside that Monnet wanted the supranational insti-
tutions to own their own territory and to be sovereign in it, much like the Vatican. The Papal 
obsession with the Papal States began as a traditional search for security and status in a world 
where these were directly linked to feudal rights over land. However different and grand the 
Papal project had seemed with its vocal idealist principles and claims for political supremacy 
on the basis of these, deep down there was always a hunger and need for secular political po-
wer and thus security. The Popes tried to have their cake and eat it; claimed universal power 
at the same time as desiring political supremacy in Italy. In its most banal form this led to Po-
pes who 4 . . . called in the universal power of the Pope to support his Italian policies . . . ,490A 
problem was that the papacy was not a very good ruler of the Papal States, it was after all not 
a secular monarch. But perhaps it too had a vaccine mission which forced it to strive for a 
new governmental structure; for a more real Papal Monarchy, or possibly a new Roman Em-
pire of sorts, with an Emperor in a subordinate role to the Pope. 
Regarding the functioning and underlying assumptions and principles of both integrationary 
projects; many would see in them both something problematic and 'pathological.' With re-
gard to Pope Gregory VII's dealings with German bishops his actions and plans 4 . . , ap-
A ftl 
peared to the German bishops as the subversion of traditional order.' To state that the me-
dieval Papacy, surely a spiritual religious power if ever there was one, would consider itself to 
be a political power with the right to demote, crush and rule the monarchs and in particular 
the God appointed Emperor would have been branded as 'pathological' by clergy and rulers 
alike prior to the Reform Papacy. It was turning the order of things on its head; the Emperor 
called the Church Councils and his word decided theological issues. Efficiency was gained by 
mixing secular and spiritual arms and not keeping them separate. The Emperor protected the 
church and appointed Popes and bishops alike, the church and clergy served the Emperor and 
secular powers and this was all biblically stated. It was the right way to do things; it was 
healthy, correct and effective. Without the Emperor, the Popes and church were weak and 
powerless at the whim of the Roman nobility and other regional nobles. The rulers provided 
protection and the church administered the state such as there was. Ruling and government 
were to do with the ability to decide and power to act, often with military power, internally 
and externally. The monarchs with powerful nobles did this harshly and effectively. In primi-
tive times the sword was more powerful and important than the pen. And yet within a genera-
procedures: new ones are fastened onto old ones in the same way that lichens adding layer upon layer, overlapping but never 
shedding. In the EU, the result is enormous procedural differentiation, with the number of different, formal decision making 
procedures increasing steadily...* 
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tion of the great Emperor Henry III who had selected a range of Popes and restored them to 
some degree of purity, Pope Gregory VII had declared himself the political superior, theoreti-
cally at least, of the Emperor and all monarchs and delegated them to the position of obeying 
his and the church's instructions. The separation of clergy from the secular was to take place, 
effectively depriving the latter of any say in the church and theoretically denigrating them to 
obedient servants and executioners. Priests and Cardinals were raised from more spiritual 
concerns to becoming the Pope's senate and representing the nations of Christendom to some 
extent. The pen and not the sword would rule, in fact the sword would do just exactly what 
the pen decided it should, it was after all there to serve the experts. It should be stressed that 
much of the above is about changes in degree as the church was involved in governmental 
matters, but under the Reform Papacy this increased for some cleric ranks. 
The supranational tendencies of Monnet and those that followed him went in a similar direc-
tion. To an extent politicians and MSs should be made to serve the technocratic experts who, 
on account of their education and training, were more impartial, objective and able to rule in a 
post national-political age. From now on rationality, the functionalist dream, would decide 
policies and not primitive national and political self interests. Politicians and MSs could exist 
but they should be increasingly subordinated to the 'High Authority.' The sword or rather the 
resources to make it were too dangerous to be left to national politicians. Interestingly enough 
both projects initially at least remedied problematic democracy with even less. The secular 
influenced voting procedures for bishops in cathedral chapters were finally replaced by Papal 
appointments493and the democratic election of governments and ministers to decide on Coal 
and Steel nationally were replaced by the unelected High Authority. 
The position of the Emperor was interesting. The radical political programme of Pope Greg-
ory VII saw him gathering Imperial symbols of authority to himself. This was unsurprisingly 
openly resisted by the Emperor, as was briefly mentioned earlier, who had previously ac-
cepted the Pope more or less but who was unwilling to see his political position downgraded 
however willing he might have been to have his domestic opposition tamed and his clergy 
spiritually integrated into a revived Papal Christendom. The de Gaulle clash with Hallstein 
was likewise fought over symbols of state and pretensions to state power which were undesir-
able for France and the French leader just as the Popes were for the Emperor and Empire. In-
tegration was wanted and its benefits but a competing, seemingly aggressively presumptuous 
'political' Pope or Commission President (from the Imperial or French point of view) was 
not, particularly since this new political ruler was subverting their own domestic, political 
administrative resources.494The demands of the Pope widened to order that several of the Em-
peror's most powerful advisors, clerics who had purchased their offices, should be removed 
from office, effectively weakening him domestically. The Emperor then resisted and added 
the Imperial office to the opposition against the Pope which consisted of many German bish-
ops. At times the Emperor successfully contained Pope Gregory VII and, in particular, raised 
up a counter Pope. Many Cardinals adopted or openly expressed Imperial leanings. The 
counter Pope agreed with much of the message of the Reform papacy but acknowledged the 
right of the Emperor to rule as before over the church. Many of the other monarchs supported 
the counter Pope and strengthened their national churches and their leaders. The Emperor 
played the trump card and called for a Church Council to decide which Pope should rule and 
in the absence of Pope Gregory VII declared the counter Pope to have the right to rule495 
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494 See note 18 Wallace (1990) p.30 and p.62. 'De Gaulle as a political leader...had little difficulty in exposing the weakness 
of the assumption that national governments would not resist the erosion of their sovereignty by technocratic elites, working 
to detach the loyalty of their citizens.' 
495 See note 470 Morris (2001) p. 115 
98 
If the process of the institution building of the EU and medieval Papacy and Christendom are 
looked at in more depth then both differ similarly from classic state formation and both show 
institutions being reactively formed or given new meaning; with medieval versions emerging 
similar to the EP and European Council. As the Reform Papacy or supranational programme 
became better known and dogmatic and began to be enforced so, progressively, the effective 
governmental forces of the day reacted against them. Broadly speaking for the Reform Papacy 
this process started with the German archbishops; 'The first stage was one of conflict with the 
archbishops.'496These in both England and the Empire moderated the decrees of the Pope and 
essentially refused them 497The bishops were by this point also drawn fully into the dispute 
and were summoned to Rome. Some were then punished by the Pope via excommunication 
when they failed to obey. The next step was for some of the German bishops to draw the Em-
peror into the fray and to invoke an imperial synod and for the Emperor to depose the Pope. 
Part of the method of dealing with and containing the Reform Papacy was by accepting the 
broad demand for purity in the church and a stronger Papacy but separating this from the stri-
dent demands for political power and right to depose rulers that Pope Gregory VII favoured to 
achieve the same end. The imperial bishops raised the argument that the new Pope, Pope Gre-
gory VII, had been wrongly elected and that he had no right to make decisions over them. The 
Imperial and Monarchical body politic was stage by stage resisting and attempting to contain 
the Reform Papacy. But this too was at work; effectively the Pope fragmented the loyalty of 
the bishops and the clergy and barons in general 49SBishops were required to serve the Pope 
first and foremost and yet they still owed allegiance to the Emperor, at times two individuals 
were appointed to clerical positions by the traditional authorities or those of new Papacy. Ba-
rons were likewise reminded that they were barons of the Empire but also members of the 
new Christian society and 'state' which was forming of which their ruler was but a servant. 
Some of the bishops and the regional powers saw opportunities in the Papal measures or were 
moved by the idealism and swapped sides. But in Rome there were plenty of Cardinals and 
other clergy who were equally split in their views and finally drawn into the struggle and a-
bandoned the Pope,499who had arguably abandoned many of them for his close confidantes 
who he felt he could trust or at least who did not resist him.500 
The progress of Papal governmental construction was unusual; the reform Popes advanced at 
synods their programme for Papal state formation. These were countered by Imperial syn-
ods301which advanced the Imperial thesis of the Emperor heading the church with the Pope 
serving under him. This was obviously opposed by the papacy which excommunicated the 
Emperor and tried to fragment his administration and baronial support. The Emperor, sup-
ported by other monarchs and many of the episcopacy502then matches papacy with papacy, 
propaganda with propaganda, excommunication with excommunication. Later monarchs 
raised Curiae up against Curiae whilst strengthening their hold over their national churches 
and appointments to them. This remained a method of secular - Papal interaction throughout 
the period with Popes and Curiae raised against resident Popes and Curiae. Neither side fi-
nally totally won, it proceeded with crisis, duplication, compromise and then a gradual prepa-
ration for the next crisis. The existence of two competing forms of 'European' government 
each claiming some sovereignty and the necessary arms of government ready to supersede 
their opponent is not overly dissimilar to the EU situation laid out earlier. 
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The end result of the stalemate between Pope Gregory VII and the Emperor was that several 
important elements of medieval government and that of the papacy were decided by the con-
flict. The first was that the College of Cardinals, many of whom came to represent the politi-
cal forces of the day, was strengthened and its electoral rights extended. After the first shot at 
Papal imperial power under Pope Gregory VII, and what one might call a form of instant state 
formation, had failed then the Cardinals became more inclusive and increasingly allowed to 
represent the regional political forces in Christendom particularly via them constitutionally 
replacing the papal synods (church assemblies). These the autocratic Pope Gregory VII had 
called and selected the attendees. The Cardinals were then named the consistory, the cabinet 
of the Pope and they also gained the right to sign Papal declarations the absence of their sig-
natures made, some state, the declaration inva!id.503They were now the senators of the new 
Papal 'empire' and represented a wide range of opinion. Many of the Cardinals had switched 
sides or maybe revealed their true Imperial leanings during the Schism (the creation of a 
counter pope) following Pope Gregory VII.504The strength of their position was acknowl-
edged by Pope Urban II when he allowed them to remain in office and even confirmed the 
privileges that the imperially oriented counter Pope had granted them. Thus whilst formally 
Pope Urban II remained rigidly in support of the ideological stance of the Reform Papacy, it 
can be argued that he adopted many of the characteristics of the Imperially dominated 
counter-Papacy, even in terms of turning a blind eye to simony. That many Gregorians (sup-
porters of Pope Gregory VII and the radical reform Papal movement and related political 
claims) felt shocked by the compromises made by Pope Urban II505and Pope Paschal II who 
followed him showed the extent to which the compromises had gone. 
With exceptions, the Popes gradually left the monarchs alone within their traditional areas of 
government and encouraged them to become directly involved in the Papally summoned 
Church Councils. The apparent dramatic right of the Pope to control the administration of the 
Empire was severely moderated by the agreement reached at Worms which saw many eco-
nomic sectors which bishops had operated for the state separated from their position as bishop 
under the Pope. For these areas they served the Emperor. One might argue that the separation 
of state and church began here. Monarchs were then generally willing to accept the Papal sys-
tem in this diluted form where their rights were more or less intact and in fact steadily in-
creasing domestically, often with Papal help, with increasing numbers of officials implement-
ing modern governmental methods, whose salaries were paid for by the church. 
To summarise, when Monnet wanted his Method and members of the High Authority to be 
able to rule independently, the MSs quickly put the Assembly and Council in place to contain 
this, effectively a chess board move, the new sovereign power would face counter organisa-
tions. Much the same as happened with the counter synods of the Emperor, both Emperor and 
Pope wanted similar things but with accent was to be on Imperial leadership and sovereignty 
of the system in the synod, or the Papal equivalent. The EDC debacle and the weakness of the 
supranationalists resulted in the EEC having a stronger Council and MS presence on it and a 
Commission with Commissioners from MSs who would be officially independent and yet un-
officially increasingly represent MSs. The result of the Pope- Emperor/ monarchical stand off 
was first a counter Curia and Pope; which once the problematic Pope (from the monarchical 
perspective) had been removed and died then allowed for a new organisational structure. The 
choice of a new moderate Pope with a set of Cardinals with greater powers and evident con-
nections to the Empire was then effected. Bearing in mind that the Cardinals equate, to a cer-
tain extent, to the EU Council and College of Commissioners combined then this is like the 
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classic method that MSs use to control the Commission and its staff. The MSs appointed a 
less dynamic President and College after Hallstein and Delors to moderate the Commission. 
Thus organisational compromise was reached in the re-organised College of Cardinals with 
moderate imperial Cardinals involved and major regional independence concessions granted 
to monarchs to ensure they accepted the new Pope. Their domestic sovereignty safe and their 
external sovereignty safer via Cardinals able to counter balance the Pope more and therefore 
allowing greater regional representation; the balance between the two sovereign powers was 
gradually restored for a time. The Church Councils or synods became increasingly inclusive 
and often had an ambiguous status serving at times like a sovereign parliament for Christen-
dom or just an advisory chamber. Not only that but they were capable of being combined with 
Emperor or Pope. At important moments in our period we have a more or less united national 
episcopacy gathered in a synod or Council summoned by a Monarch deciding on Papal posi-
tions, and threatening counter Popes to face off the incumbent Pope and or Council - synod 
and so forcing compromises. Church synods and Councils which although they had existed 
prior to the Reform Papacy took on a new role afterwards were excellent constitutional weap-
ons which allowed for anti Papal forces to focus. Monarchical agreements, such as the one 
at Worms, acted like the veto did and does in the EU, effectively limiting the scope of supra-
national actions. The empty chair policy is rather akin to the counter Pope method. In a sense 
medieval Christendom had surrounded the 'Gregorian Method' with constraining, more re-
gionally oriented and finally 'democratically' inclusive organisations, 
1.4 THESIS THEORETICAL DEDUCTIONS 
We are now at a point where various deductions can be drawn from the previous pages of 
theoretical considerations. As a vaccine 'pathogen' the Monnet Method has been set to work 
to break down barriers by engrenage, legislative output and spillover and so allow the MSs to 
integrate and form a European polity. It has done this successfully by fragmenting the ele-
ments of the MSs, however, the Delors era overshot the mark which led the MSs to attempt to 
arrest the Commission. According to the model the MSs should be dissolving the Commission 
along national lines to an extent and also be seen to have put into play their national networks 
within it, even more than usual, MS attempts should also be attempting to regain ground lost 
under Delors with drives to re-nationalise key policies. Effectively trying to achieve what the 
Treaty of Worms did as was mentioned a couple of pages back. 
The Commission should find itself at a difficult point in the 'pathogen' cycle. The subsequent 
lack of Commission leadership after the 'arresting' of it by the MSs would leave the big gain-
ers as the MSs, the sectors and Policy Networks linked to them. In the absence of major ex-
ternal areas of activity the Monnet Method would be expected to be at work in the Commis-
sion itself, fragmenting it sectorally. The lack of Commission leadership should be resulting 
in even greater sectoral ideological coherence and loyalty and so fragmentation of the Com-
mission and EU. 
Reforms of policy areas and the Commission itself should be being undertaken but, owing to 
leadership and ideological weakness, be being resisted by the DGs and Policy Networks. In 
some DGs the resistance could be successful. Commission leadership weakness could be 
problematic for the enlargement, with the sectors able to pursue and pursuing agendas which 
506 Keller, H. Zwischen regionaler Begrenzung und universalem Horizont, Deutschland im Imperium der Salier und Staufer 
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might not be favourable to the NMSs. The Commission and DGs to an extent are expected to 
be seen to be dissolving into warring factions, with problematic internal communication and 
coordination. Resultant inefficiency and policy problems should be observable and in the lit-
erature. 
The Commission would be expected to be extremely bureaucratic to try and appear innocuous 
to the MSs. The Commission should be defensive as an organization. The Commission should 
show signs of trying to bring its sectoral fragmentation under control, in part via the bureau-
cratic controls. It is also expected to have used the controls to shut external interference out 
and to reform itself ready for a new integrationary burst. The reforms which have resulted in 
the bureaucratisation should, however, not be very deep or total, so that the vaccine can re-
emerge with its essential capacities intact, ready to promote intense integration again when 
the environment is favourable. At the same time there should be the beginnings of Commis-
sion recovery and re-organization. 
Bearing in mind the Papal model, the situation in the EU is expected to have worsened, and to 
be getting more serious. Each immunization cycle and burst of integration should be followed 
by a worse period of organisational self doubt by the Commission, fragmentation and bu-
reaucratisation. Organisational complexity and additional actors and procedures rather than 
reform should be the rule of the day with growing problems for democracy however defined. 
A window of opportunity to adopt a new governmental system and be ready for the future 
should be present. But the decline in idealism and integration momentum should lead to less 
MS solidarity, less willingness to accept idealistic rhetoric and related payments as a useful 
lubricant to liberalising economic benefits. 
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2. OLAF AND THE ENLARGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
We have now considered the theoretical concerns of the thesis and laid out the model. The 
case studies of the six EU organisations that were investigated will be presented starting with 
that ofOLAF, the anti fraud agency of the EU. Each case study will introduce the policy area 
and any related history before doing the same with the organisation operating in the area. The 
recent relevant changes to the organisations are examined and connections to the model made. 
The involvement of the organisation concerned in the enlargement process is analysed and 
where possible the effect of its strengths or weaknesses on the process are discussed. The rea-
der will gradually become more familiar with the EU and in particular the Commission by 
sharing in the investigative probing into the organisations of which the Commission and EU 
consist. The sometimes long introductions to the policy area are necessary to show the organi-
sation concerned operating in its environment. So onto OLAF! 
The decade which began after the fall of the Berlin Wall saw the gradual reintegration of the 
countries of Eastern and Western Europe. The search for a new identity led the newly democ-
ratic states of Eastern Europe to apply for membership to international organisations e.g. NA-
TO and the European Union (EU) which required certain democratic standards to be met and 
maintained and offered in exchange specific advantages. NATO offered security to states 
which had been invaded from the east and the west in their recent history and suffered foreign 
occupation. It also provided assistance in the form of advisors and technology. The EU was 
perceived as an organisation offering economic prosperity and thus political stability. It is the 
economic power in the region and not the US. The majority of the countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe which have applied for EU membership, (NMSs) have huge flows of imports 
and exports to and from the EU. Indeed the EU accounted for 70.5% of Polish exports in 
1999, in 1998 it was 68.3%1. This is matched by their population flows; students, migrant 
workers etc. 
The EU was founded to establish the peaceful interaction of democratic states with shared ba-
sic fundamental values. The EU has encouraged both economic prosperity and political stabil-
ity and has discouraged war and intolerance. Would-be member states (MSs) are required to 
have a functioning democratic political system with respect shown for the rule of law and 
human rights. The goals of a common market and political stability are considered to be in-
separable. Most applicant states have desired to join the EU for two clear reasons, firstly to 
avoid exclusion and the loss of inward investment from firms seeking to exploit the NMSs 
low labour costs and their potential membership of the EU, and secondly to enjoy the benefits 
that membership brings. Many major investors have confirmed that potential membership of 
the EU was and is a vital reason for their investment decision.2 The benefits relate to im-
proved economic performance, eligibility for structural funds, and the resultant political sta-
bility. As all states are required to be democratic and ruled by law, the EU thus rewards good 
government with economic prosperity. 
1 The EU Commission's regular progress report on the Poland 2000. P.68. .http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargementA 
dwtt/report_l l_00/pdf/en/pl_en.pdf 
2 Ms Hübner. Select Committee on European Communities Tenth Report 
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The newly democratic NMSs desired both good government and prosperity. Faced by the re-
moval of their communist heritage and the structures and institutions that had held it in place 
for so long, these countries sought to find new rules, ethics and cultural orientation. Member-
ship of various international organisations and the importation of their rules and policies were 
perceived to be the best and quickest solution to the vacuum which had come into existence. 
The prosperity and stability of the EU and its MSs was enough to attract the NMSs. It offered 
seemingly instant solutions to problems and the means to implement them. Membership of the 
EU was perceived as a means of ensuring that the NMSs were not relegated to developing na-
tion status. 
But both the EU and the NMSs were in a state of flux, in part due to the enlargement but also 
due to problems in their governmental systems. Both seemed to have problems of corruption, 
the Commission's being related to mismanagement and problematic structures. One effective 
solution to the problems of inefficiency and corruption in both, would have been a powerful, 
well organized and resourced Commission department to lead a drive for top quality man-
agement and a corruption free environment. For the Commission and EU a major reorganiza-
tion and rationalisation were also essential. Both these would have helped ensure that the 
Commission and the other institutions were corruption free and thus able to concentrate on 
assisting the NMSs efficiently. The new Commission anti fraud agency OLAF was widely 
heralded as the Commission's immediate answer to its internal problems and, as to the prob-
lems facing NMSs. The question was would OLAF live up to expectations, or rather would it 
be allowed to? 
2.1 EU AFTER THE SANTER CRISIS 
In 1999, the European Commission resigned. A wide range of problems and mismanagement 
in the Commission were identified by the Committee of Independent Experts in their report. It 
revealed that the Commission was suffering from the worst aspects of negative bureaucratisa-
tion, namely, mismanagement and behaviour by officials bordering on the corrupt. What was 
most alarming was the absence of control mechanisms, channels of responsibility and ac-
countability. The absence of such controls ensures that negative bureaucratisation can take on 
the forms of corruption and inefficiency that affect processes like financing enlargement pro-
jects. Corruption was implicit in many of the allegations made against the Commission. Some 
are listed below: 
Concerning the Commission's financial control in the 1990's, corruption could be perceived 
as being almost encouraged. The Commission failed to control the external companies it con-
tracted work to, and seemed, in fact, to have been controlled by them. Many of these points 
are typical examples of corruption. Indeed, a situation prevailed not unlike that in the NMSs 
which the same Commission was evaluating. Only, in the cases discussed in the report, the 
unit did not consider it necessary to do very much apart from comment. 
Regarding the need for collaboration, there was little co-operation between UCLAF (the pre 
OLAF anti fraud department) and the national authorities, who are, according to EU legisla-
tion, responsible for judicial investigations.4 In fact, two of the investigative organs of the EU 
3The Committee of Independent Experts First Report on Allegations regarding 
Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission 1999 http://www.europarl.eu.int/experts/4_en.htm ; 
5.4,2; 5.4.3; 5.4.4, 
4 ibid sections 9.4.14,9.4.15 
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actively impeded each other.5 As far as the need to guarantee a specialised and properly 
trained unit was concerned, UCLAF had over half its staff on three year contracts, data bases 
were not totally functioning and files were not managed properly.6 
Immunity or rather the over use and abuse of immunity regulations was a major problem for 
both the supra-national Commission and the NMSs which, all to often, appear to be unwilling 
to suspend immunity from prosecution, even when clearly criminal acts have taken place. 
This naturally was not the intention of the Treaty of Rome when it allowed immunity to be 
extended to EU employees working in the institutions, so as to maintain their sense of inde-
pendence from MSs. There was a need to provide for disciplinary action and the dismissal of 
officials and personalities which was notably lacking in the Commission. Often, implicated 
staff were left within the organisation even though evidence was there for prosecution. Only 
rarely were disciplinary procedures launched and all too often there were no guidelines re-
garding administrative investigations.7 
There were, in fact, other difficulties which the Commission had in common with the NMSs. 
These are; lack of clear definitions, confusing rules and legislation, problems with outsourc-
ing, lack of skilled personnel and an environment which was seemingly ambivalent towards 
corruption. These points will now be addressed in turn. 
If the problem of the definition of corruption is considered, there was a definite need for grea-
ter precision and consistency.8 Confusion regarding legislation, rules and procedures pre-
vailed during the 1990's.9 As stated earlier, this deficit can be crucial when combating corrup-
tion. 
The problems relating to reliable staff were referred to earlier. In addition there was an ab-
sence of any security vetting procedure to ensure that the delicate information in daily use 
remained confidential. It should be pointed out here that other Commission departments in-
volved in financial control had also not been vetted.10 
The problems relating to outsourcing have already been referred to, but any implementation 
of EU programmes by private contractors should only have been accepted if proper controls 
had remained in the Commission's hands, something that had not occurred.11 In general, the 
manner in which outsourcing had been managed by the Commission was far from effective 
with some of the basic rules relating to public procurement being ignored. 
As to the existence of an anti-corruption environment, a zero tolerance policy had yet to be 
implemented implying that this was not yet the situation.12 As the example of Mr Paul Van 
Buitenen, the auditor who exposed many Commission weaknesses in a letter to the EP sho-
wed, any member of the Commission who spoke out against corruption and fraud and ex-
posed such practises was at risk of himself being disciplined, hardly a positive environment to 
suppress corruption. 
5 Sec note 3 The Committee of Independent Experts First Report sections 9,4.19 and 4.2.14 
6 Court of Auditors Special report 8/98 on UCLAF, Paragraphs 1.6, 3.10-3.18, 3.30-3.34, http://www.eca.eu.int/EN/-
RS/1998/rsc_230en.htm 
7 ibid section 6.10; 6.11 
8 Communication from the Commission on the protection of the communities' financial interests 28.6.2000 states; "the crea-
tion of common definitions will facilitate information exchanges and co-operation." 
9 Mr. Brilner; OLAF first report, http://europa.eu.int/comm/anti_fraud/documents/rapport_en.pdf 
10 See note 6 Court of Auditors Special report 8/98 sections 2.28,2.29. Namely DGXX 
1 ' See note 3 The Committee of Independent Experts First Report section 5.8.3 
12 See note 6 Court of Auditors Special report 8/98 section 6.9 
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The Commission's role in fighting fraud was clear enough although its implementation was 
often far from comprehensive and therefore often criticised, but in the field of corruption this 
was not the case. UCLAF was after all an internal department of the Commission and not in-
dependent, how could it be expected to carry out investigations on the institution of which it 
was itself part? As was to be expected, the position of UCLAF was far from clear and as the 
Commission held it to be responsible for internal investigations, this in turn left a vacuum 
which was methodically exploited. Most of the internal mechanisms for inquiry and control 
11 
lacked any real legal basis. After UCLAF the Commission emphasised that it would take 
measures to deal with internal fraud and corruption.14 
The Commission often cited under-staffing as being the cause of many of its shortcomings15 
for both under-spending and its inability to control corruption and fraud, but, although staff-
ing was an issue, in reality, technical assistance offices (TAOs) had taken over vast amounts 
of the Commission staffs work. The MSs had tacitly accepted both this status quo, and also 
the fact that large numbers of staff were employed indirectly through many, so called, subma-
rine methods and personal connections.16 Furthermore, the MSs were willing to accept in-
creases in staff numbers but only on condition that the Commission reorganise itself and its 
procedures first.17 Otherwise, as is so often the case with bureaucratic institutions, the quality 
changes in terms of procedures and staff allocation and training that are necessary, would on-
ce again be substituted for simple increases in the quantity of staff and complexity of ineffec-
tive paper controls. The Commission had reluctantly met some of the criteria thus enabling 
staff increases to occur, but more needed to be done before more staff could be recruited. 
An interesting digression, Commission reform was essential for efficiency and for enlarge-
ment. However, this logic was turned into a circle by politicians in the NMSs18who stated that 
without enlargement no meaningful reform would occur in the EU and inefficiency and bu-
reaucratization would be the result. They may well be right and that the enlargement forced 
the Commission to undertake many reforms that it would probably have preferred to avoid. 
But it was also the case that the inefficiency of the Commission with regard to enlargement 
was, at times, problematic. Unfortunately, the Commission reforms were bitterly resisted and 
it remained inefficient in its activities and in particular where the NMSs were concerned. 
What was necessary was a reform of the Commission's financial procedures and a streamlin-
ing of the decision making processes. Instead, in response to corruption allegations, the 
Commission tightened up its procedures still further, adding complications to an already over 
complex system. 
The reform embodied in the new agency (OLAF) was no exception to the Commission's re-
luctance to radically reorganise and reform. Real radical reform was accepted in principle but 
not fully in practice. Yet, public funds were at risk, since corruption was not likely itself to be 
affected by the new rules, and the socially needy in the applicants states remained 'un' or un-
der funded. In fact, enlargement was itself at risk as negative bureaucratisation threatened the 
13 See note 3 The Committee oflndependent Experts First Report sections 9.4.18-19 
14 ibid section 2.2. ' . . .and again the Commission stresses that, "in the area of internal policies and external actions, the Com-
mission, which has direct management responsibility, will arrange to take all the requisite measures to prevent and combat 
fraud or corruption."* 
15 Select Committee of International development First Special Report (1999) http://www. parliament, the-stationery-
ofnce.co.uk/paycml99900/cmselect/cmtrdind/835/83502.htm accessed 30.9.2001 
16 Select Committee on International Development Ninth Special Report (2000) http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office,co.uk/pa/cml99900/cmselect/cmintdev/949/94902.htm accessed 30.9.2001 
17 See note 16 Select Committee on International Development Ninth Special Report (2000) 
18 House of Lords - European Communities - Twenty-First Report.htm. http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/-
cgi-bin/htm 
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speed of the NMSs' accession and the Commission's ability to function effectively after-
wards. 
2.2 THE CREATION OF OLAF 
The creation of UCLAF, OLAF's predecessor in 1989 was as a result partially of the EP's in-
sistence. The EP again applied pressure to create OLAF in 1999. It had wider powers than 
those of UCLAF which reflected, in part, the need of the Commission to be reformed before 
enlargement. However, the real reason for OLAF were the negative reports made, by the Aus-
trian MEP Bosch of the EP19 and the Committee of Independent experts20 in response to the 
Court of Auditor's report of 8/98.21 It was the snowball effect that these reports that caused 
UCLAF to be so rapidly superseded by OLAF in June 1999.22 Most of the recommendations 
made were acted upon, but finally OLAF was very much the result of an EP-Commission 
compromise. And yet it is possible to consider that the Commission itself was evaluated and 
goal posts set by external institutions and corruption emerged into a politicised force with the 
resignation of the College of the Commission and the institution Commission itself facing a 
credibility crisis. The application of external pressure and evaluation methods often alien and 
foreign to the NMSs being evaluated was similar to the experience of the Commission in the 
light of the reports and then the recommendations made by Commissar Kinnock, The recom-
mendations made in his consultation document "Reforming the Commission" were regarded 
by some influential forces in the Commission as being an attempt to "force" an alien "north-A J 
em" or "British" model of public service management onto the Commission. 
The fall of the Santer Commission showed that mismanagement and corruption could become 
politicised very quickly and were seemingly a very effective political tool. The European Par-
liament (EP), in part, used the corruption instrument not only to remove the Commission and 
to extend its own influence. The new agency founded in 1999 represented a development in 
the system of checks and balances in the communities and that it was possible to say that the 
legislative control of the executive had been somewhat extended and the democratic deficit 
had been somewhat addressed. This could have been perceived as a positive outcome were 
it not for the fact that members of the EP were also instrumental in hampering the workings of 
the OLAF. 80 of its MEPs brought a case before the European court to try to restrict OLAF's 
right vis-à-vis the MEPs and the EP to carry out investigations.26 This last case seems to have 
been successful as the 2002 ECRII - 00579 case of 26.02.2002 confirmed that OLAF had the 
right to search premises in the European parliament. Which left the question open as to the 
EP's real motives, greater accountability or simply power brokering and using corruption as a 
tool? 
The creation of OLAF was a decision to favour an administrative solution to the Commission 
problem. OLAF was also an integral part of the integrationary process encouraging the co-
19 Bösch, H. European Parliament report, http://\vw\v2.europarl.eu.int/omk/OM-Europarl?PROG=REPORT&L=EN-
&PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A4-1998-0297+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN&LEVEL=3 
20 Select Committee on Trade and Industry Twelfth Report (2000) http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/-
paycml99900/cmseIect/cmtrdind/835/83502(htm accessed 30,9.2001 
See note 6 Court of Auditors Special report 8/98 
22 Dr. Lothar Kühl and Harald Spitzer; Das Europäische Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung (OLAF). EuR-Heft-2000 p.l 
n Kinnock, N. Reforming the European Commission a white paper. 1.3.2000 COM (2000) 200 finat 
24 House of Commons select Committee oil European communities seventeenth report section 162 http://www.-
parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/cgi-bin/litm 
" See note 22 Kühl; Spitzer (2000) p. 15 
26 OJ C 102/30 EN 8,4.2000. http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/thematic/coj/2000/c_102/c_10220000408en00300031.pdf 
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operation of the MSs and ensuring that this followed. It was able to advise and to operate n *7 
within other MSs to combat fraud and corruption which endangered EU funds. That said, 
the main aim of the office was to directly address the threat of corruption and mismanagement 
within the EU institutions.28 The Communication from the Commission on the protection of 
the Communities' financial interests, made it very clear that fraud and corruption were ut-
terly intertwined and very much the Commission's concern throughout the area of the EU and 
this concern would of course also stretch to the NMSs. OLAF was necessary to effectively act 
against corruption in numerous countries, as only it was able to be effectively pro-active in 
this field, implicitly the agencies available in other states were less so.30The Commission em-
phasised that it would take measures to ensure that internal fraud and corruption were dealt 
with.31 
It should be stressed that the Commission and the EU apparently chose a quick fix administra-
tive adjustment first rather than a major reform. At the same time, in a paper addressed to the 
Commission in October 2000, the intention was stated to finally implement in the future more 
effective agreements that had actually been made a year previously. That was to make the 
Commission's staff regulations compatible with the obligations placed on staff in the Inter-
institutional Agreement of 25.05.1999, to report wrong doing. Again, the real reform lagged 
behind, the office was created first with considerable powers and responsibilities, but under-
resourced and without a supportive change in staff regulations. 
OLAF was granted extensive rights to carry out investigations throughout the EU institutions 
and given a semi-independent status within the Commission.33 It was to organise and co-
ordinate all anti-corruption activities within the institutions and can be directly contacted by n i 
any concerned official. In addition, it was to co-ordinate with MS police and judicial forces, 
to ensure that prosecutions were effected if necessary. The office was responsible for coordi-
nating MS efforts at combating organised crime and therefore corruption.35 Tasks which 
UCLAF carried out lay also within its remit, namely training, providing information and 
analysis of fraud and corruption statistics to EU institutions and proposing legislation to fraud 
proof legislation and encourage transparency.36 It is fair to say that OLAF lies at the heart of 
the Commission's anti-corruption activities and is its favoured method of combating corrup-
tion. 
To approach the topic of the enlargement of the EU; there were many hindrances to it and one 
was that communism encouraged the proliferation of bureaucratic structures and institutions 
throughout the NMSs. Not surprisingly these structures had proved to be as vulnerable, as 
their western counter parts, to bureaucratic inertia, stagnation and reluctance to reform. Ineffi-
ciency abounded as these bureaucracies became more complex and this had serious repercus-
sions for the societies in these countries. The only way of cutting through red tape delays was 
probably the use of corruption which flourishes where complex, opaque rules and laws are in 
27 Article 280 EC Treaty developed from Article 209a EC Treaty and Communication from the Commission, 29.09.2000. 
COM (2000) 608 final p. 10 
28See note 22 Kuhl; Spitzer (2000) p. 1 
29See note 8 Communication from the Commission on the protection of the communities' financial interests 28.6.2000 
30 ibid section 2.1 OLAF is described as being an; "observatory of fraud and corruption so as to supply the logistical support 
to member states and institutions" 
31 Section 2,2 and again the Commission stresses that; "in the area of internal policies and external actions, the Commission, 
which has direct management responsibility, will arrange to take all the requisite measures to prevent and combat fraud or 
corruption." 
32 Communication from Mr. Kinnock to the Commission; Raising concerns about wrong doing. 25.10.2000. p. 7 
33 See note 22 Kuhl; Spitzer (2000) p. 5 
34 ibid p. 11 
35 ibid p. 12 
36 ibid p. 6. 
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force, where there is inefficiency in the distribution of resources and services, leading to de-
mand dramatically exceeding supply and where accountability systems are lacking and effec-
tive management is minimal. This was true of the NMSs and it was something which the EU, 
the Commission and the international community would be expected to be serious about 
combating. They would also be expected to be strengthening the democratic, social, economic 
and justice institutions, and media of the NMSs. In other words in order for negative bureauc-
ratisation and corruption to be tackled, radical reforms were necessary; one of which had to be 
addressed was a total reform of bureaucratic structures, in part achieved by empowering indi-
viduals and groups, both inside and outside the structures in question, to hold erring civil ser-
vants and departments to account. Unfortunately morale and wages in theNMS bureaucracies 
had fallen badly, which also encouraged some corruption as officials seemingly used their po-
sitions to make up wage losses. 
2.3 OLAF AND THE ENLARGEMENT 
A closer examination of the actual process of enlargement being implemented by the EU is 
useful at this point. The suspicions of the EU with regard to the NMSs' ability to fight both 
corruption and crime, and to compete fairly and effectively in the Union led to a period of 
transition, in which both parties attempted to prepare themselves for the actual enlargement. 
The Commission and MSs adopted a strategy for guiding and modelling the NMSs, implicit 
was the notion that both represented functioning models for the NMSs to observe and copy. 
NMSs had the opportunity to participate in some aspects and projects of the Union. Their rep-
resentatives were often invited to attend summits and discussions at which relationships and 
networks could be fostered. They were expected to accept and participate in the many pro-
grammes and projects,37 which were set up with the intention of rapidly upgrading bureaucra-
cies whilst gradually incorporating the NMSs into EU decision making processes. Many 
'twinning' arrangements between MSs and their opposite partners in their NMSs encouraged 
the modelling of the latter to achieve standards laid out in the projects mentioned above. Ac-
cession partnerships between the Commission and the NMSs allowed the NMSs to actively 
work together with the Commission to reach certain goals in the preparation of their countries 
for accession. So whilst formal enlargement had yet to take place a gradual integration pro-
ceeded and reached a point where some institutions, procedures and laws of NMSs reflected ^ n 
the standard of other MSs. 
The second element is the adoption and incorporation of a huge amount of EU laws and direc-
l û 
tives, otherwise known as the acquis communautaire {acquis). The NMSs had to submit 
their entire political and economic systems to be scrutinised by various EU delegations which 
issued reports on their progress. In particular, a yearly progress report was issued by the 
Commission in which all the major chapters of the acquis were listed and the country in ques-
37 PHARE; OCTOPUS, etc. Projects jointly funded by the EU, Council of Europe and the US government, 
38 See notes I progress report on the Poland 2000 and EU Commission's regular progress report on Bulgaria 2000 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/report_ll_00/pdf/en/bg_en.pdf p.17 and EU Commission's regular progress 
report on the Czech Republic 2000 p.21 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/report_l l_00/pdf/en/cz_en.pdf 
39 A collection of rules, conventions and directives are the legal foundation of the Community and include a lot 
concerning fraud and corruption, with both first and third pillar origins. The first pillar refers to where the Supra-
national Community has control and the third pillar refers to the inter-governmental element of the Union, crimi-
nal justice falls under this pillar as part of Justice and home affairs. In addition, there are many conventions made 
by international organisations, which applicant states are required to accept and incorporate into their legislation. 
Additional information available from Van den Wyngaert .C: 26.9.2000 Study on "Penal and Administrative 
Sanctions, Settlement, Whistle blowing and Corpus Juris in the Candidate Countries" p5-7 
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tion was examined to ascertain in how far they had incorporated and implemented the re-
quirements of the given chapter. In the 2000 reports the issue of corruption was highlighted as 
being a major cause for concern.40 
The significance of corruption and its associated ills; fraud and organised crime, for the enlar-
gement process was clearly shown in the progress report 2000 for the Czech republic.41 Few 
other issues were raised as often throughout the chapters. Indeed, the problems of corruption 
were mentioned under the basic criteria for membership, the so called Copenhagen criteria.42 
These criteria were listed at the front of the regular reports and then sub-divided under politi-
cal, economic headings. Under political criteria, the Czech report stated that although the 
Czech Republic continued to fulfil the political criteria more needed to be done to combat or-
ganised crime and corruption.43 This concern was repeated under the heading, "Democracy 
and the rule of law" and the connection between corruption and a decrease in investment was 
A A y f f 
made. It occurred again under obligations for membership. Under the individual chapters 
corruption was a recurring theme. As these chapters remained unclosed for a somewhat long 
duration they were clearly important for the Commission and the NMSs. Corruption was ad-
dressed directly and or indirectly as a problem under the following chapters; Co-operation in 
the field of justice and home affairs; Financial control and Financial and budgetary control. 
Finally the conclusion and accession partnerships in the reports stressed the importance of 
corruption several times.46 
The Commission could, directly as joint evaluator of the NMSs applications, and indirectly as 
arbiter of article 280 EC and creator of anti-fraud policies and instruments included in EU 
projects,47 put great pressure on NMSs to combat corruption. OLAF was responsible for the 
Commission's anti-fraud and corruption policies and sent regular statistics and analyses on 
fraud and corruption to the Commission. The Commission favoured OLAF not only to com-
bat internal corruption but also to set a model for the NMSs. This was made clear in the 
communication from the Commission on the protection of the communities' financial inter-
iD 
ests. The same communication stated that the existence of other anti-corruption agencies 
within the NMSs would not be sufficient for the Commission,49 
The EU to which the NMSs aspired to acquire membership was itself vulnerable to misman-
agement and corruption as has been made clear. The presence of corruption and mismanage-
ment in the institutions50 prior to enlargement eastwards, and a general inability to take realis-
tic measures to bring the situation under control, endangered enlargement in the short term 
and the institutions themselves in the longer term. In the short term because the NMSs had to 
reach certain strict criteria related to fraud and corruption in their progress reports in order to 
40 EU Commission's regular progress report on Bulgaria 2000 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/report_l l_00/-
pdf/en/bg_en.pdf 
EU Commission's regular progress report on the Czech Republic 2000 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/-
report_l 1 j)0/pdf/en/cz_en.pdf 
The EU Commission's regular progress report on the Poland 2000..http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/-
reporH l_00/pdf/en/pl_en.pdf 
41 EU Commission's regular progress report on the Czech Republic 2000 
42 These arose from the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and stipulate that countries must achieve, "stability of institu-
tions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities." 
43 See note 41 regular progress report on the Czech Republic 2000p. 16 
44 ibid p.2! 
45 ibid p. 40 
46 ibid p. 88; 97; 102; 109. 
47 See note 8 Communication from the Commission on the protection of the communities' financial interests 28.6,2000 
48 ibid 
4<J ibid 
5£) See note 3 The Committee of Independent Experts First Report ( 1999) 
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be allowed to accede, and because the Commission became even more stringent with regards 
to payments made to the NMSs after the 1999 crisis. In the long term fraud and corruption 
were a major problem for the Commission, which was vulnerable to both.51 The larger the au-
dit fields the more difficult it becomes to control resources. Enlargement will greatly enlarge 
such fields.52 The weaknesses in the NMSs' public administrations caused the Court of Audi-
CT 
tors anxiety. The Commission was fully aware of the potential dangers and no doubt this 
also resulted in harder requirements for the NMSs to fulfil which was shown by the priority 
set on the subject in the regular reports mentioned earlier. 
However, the Commission, which was organising the enlargement process, was going through 
an extremely bureaucratic period and logically enough encouraged similar bureaucratic ar-
rangements in the NMSs. Apparent Commission weakness and inability to resolve it also 
seemed to have lain behind the pressure applied to the NMSs. Firstly it encouraged them to 
more or less copy OLAF as an organisation, in part, it would appear for the NMS organisation 
to do the work that a fully resourced OLAF would normally do. Secondly it pressurised them 
in general to do more than had been done with previous enlargements, despite the over bur-
dened situation of the NMS administrations. There was a sense in which the Commission de-
cided to apply pressure on NMSs, to improve their corruption fighting capacities to avoid real 
reform in Brussels. Routine, time consuming work was seemingly delegated back to the other 
MSs and NMSs along with most of the responsibility and criticism. The NMSs in particular 
came in for considerable amounts of the latter. They were less able to resist the Commission's 
pressure and are therefore more malleable. Was OLAF appropriate as a model for agencies in 
the NMSs? Whilst no doubt it made sense for the Commission to have organisations in the 
NMSs that could easily deal with OLAF, it seems to be equally clear that OLAF was a veiy 
specialised, compromise solution for a specific EU problem. Many of the criteria for which 
OLAF was created, for example investigating police free institutions using administrative 
measures, simply were not the situation in the NMSs. And yet the progress reports made it 
clear that an OLAF organisation was essential and nothing else was sufficient.5 55 The suspi-
cion must be that the Commission needed to export its administrative problems to the NMSs. 
The NMSs with their problematic civil services and struggling states were required to help the 
Commission out, or that is how it could be considered. Similar things have been said by NMS 
officials with regard to the Cohesion Policy; that the Commission's insistence on NMS ad-
ministrative capacity was to cover for their own lack. 
The desire of the Commission to protect its financial resources as effectively as possible is 
clear. OLAF had been set the task of organising anti-corruption measures internally and to 
some extent to set the example externally. The office should have been in a position to fully 
implement anti-corruption investigations in order for the Commission to seem to be credible 
in its reform impulse. If this were not the case then comments made in the past that; "attempts 
to manage change within the Commission have tended to lose momentum,"56 and, that the 
failure of the Commission to reform may well endanger other areas implicitly including en-
c ^  _ 
largement, may well prove correct. The failure of the reforms made by the Commission 
would lead to a double crisis of credibility, in the eyes of the general public in the present 
51 Communication from the Commission. 29.9.2000. COM (2000)608. p.5 
52 Mr Karlsson of the EU Court of Auditors stated in 1999 to EUR-OP News. Mr Karlsson, EUR-OP News 4/99 
http://www.eur-op.eu.int/opnews/499/en/t0111,htm accessed 30.7.2001 
53 ibid 
SA See note 1 progress report on the Poland 2000 section 2,3 4 p. 80 p. 109 
55 See note 41 regular progress report on the Czech Republic 2000 p.91, p.109 (p.80), 
56 Select Committee on European Scrutiny Fourteenth Report mentioning the Court of Auditors comment. 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/cgi-bin/htm 
57 ibid 
111 
MSs who had had their awareness of corruption in the Commission and the EU steadily raised 
as a result of Media coverage, and in the eyes of the NMSs who had had high targets set for 
them to fulfil with regard to corruption as well as other areas.58 
2.4 THE PROBLEM WITH EU CONTROLS 
We will now consider the dangers of Commission anti-corruption measures to the financial 
flow side of the enlargement process. Negative Commission bureaucratisation had links with 
EU corruption, particularly in the attempt to be seen to be fighting all corruption. Unfortu-
nately complex financial procedures combined with a plethora of financial control agencies, 
often duplicating and hindering each others' work, ensured that little if any impact had been 
made on the high fraud and corruption figures.59Despite this the Commission favoured further 
apparently not terribly effective, bureaucratically complex anti-corruption measures to combat 
the problem,60 However, these only served to put off some honest project organisers from 
making an application for funds in the first place. All of these worked to the detriment of 
enlargement preparations. It must be stressed that recent allegations about corruption and 
fraud in the EU have understandably fostered an environment of even greater caution and un-
willingness to allow vital payments to be made unless there are enough reports and paper 
work to protect the Commission from responsibility.61 However this knee jerk reaction was 
unlikely to improve either the implementation of projects or the soundness of payments made. 
PHARE, the EU project aimed at preparing the NMSs for accession by improving their insti-
tutions, revealed many of the weaknesses and limitations of the Commission in relation to or-
ganising and implementing projects. A curious fact was that PHARE consistently underspent 
its budget with only 60 per cent of the money available spent.62 The Commission was unable 
to disburse the financial resources made available to it and as a result they were restored to /a 
national treasuries and with a couple of exceptions spent on national requirements. The pro-
jects themselves were subject to long delays between project identification and implementa-
tion, administrative inflexibility and excessive costs and delays in amending contracts.64 Sig-
nificant backlogs existed which led NGOs to complain that they were not paid on time.65 
Sometimes contractual obligations were unmet.66 Constant administrative delays in making 
funds available added to the problem.67 Delays were caused by the complex and confusing 
contracting and tendering processes.68 In fact the nature of the PHARE projects would appear 
to have been one of delay, complexity and inefficiency. The Commission also preferred large 
projects and western consultants to smaller more effective projects and locally trained con-
sultants.69 This of course also resulted in delays and extra costs. 
58 Volker Wagener, Deutsche Welle 18.03.1999, Kommentar; Hochmut kommt vor dem fall 
%iJ See note 3 The Committee of independent Experts First Report 
60 See note 16 Select Committee on International Development Ninth Special Report (2000) 
61 ibid 
62 Parliamentary examination of witnesses in 1998, question 273 it was stated that the, "PHARE programme are underspent 
and only 60 per cent of the money available has been spent", http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/cgi-bin/htm 
63 ibid 
64 Select Committee on Trade and Industry Twelfth Report http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/cgi-bin/htm 
65 ibid 
66 See note 15 Select Committee of International development First Special Report (1999) Government's response. 
67 See note 64 Select Committee on Trade and Industry Twelfth Report 
68 Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence. 1998 Report http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/cgi-bin/htm accessed 12.11.2001 
69 Select Committee on European Communities Thirty-Third Report (1998) http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
oftice.co.uk/pa/ld199798/ldselect/ldeucom/157/15701.htm accessed 30.9.2001 
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Part of the reason for the malaise outlined above seemingly lay in the Commission's depend-
ence on antiquated, complex administrative techniques, financial regulations and paper work, 
combined with a deep seated lack of trust in other evaluation methods and the beneficiaries 
7 1 
themselves. The budget was very complicated with many different budget lines often in-
volved72 and had been called upon to be simplified. Political priorities were over emphasised 
during budgeting allocation leading to inefficient and ineffective budgetary decisions being 
made.73 There were over 47 different procedures for accessing money which the Commission 
wanted to reduce to seven.74 Several reports constantly stressed the confusing, highly complex 
financial regulations which dominated Commission spending and ensured that delays oc-
curred.75 Time durations of over four years were referred to between the date that money was 
committed for a programme and when it was disbursed by the Commission, The constant 
delays which plagued every stage in many a project's lifecycle resulted in expensive consult-
ants' time being spent in discussions, as targets were readjusted to face the changing situation 
on the ground and in contract management discussions with the Commission. As a result, 
management costs comprised a large proportion of total project costs.77 
More fundamental reasons lay in over-centralised control in Brussels, where political and; 
"budgetary spending pressures favoured a strong emphasis on financial and procedural con-
•trt  
trol rather than substantive programme design and performance." This meant that despite a 
decentralised approach to implementation, expertise in financial and administrative proce-
dures remained centralised. Long established power building strategies are not easily set 
aside. This could weaken the impact of a programme's progress.79 As a result of internal 
Commission problems many programmes were interrupted or; 'lost their sense of direction'. 
Controls are essential for any project and yet the type of control favoured by the Commission 
placed over emphasis on reports written about performance rather than performance itself.81 
The Commission relied over much on ex-ante controls and micro management in its imple-
mentation strategy.82 Financial controls are important but not the variety practised by the 
Commission. Rather, the EU needed to reform itself and to concentrate on planning and set-
70 See note 16 Select Committee on International Development Ninth Special Report (2000) 
71 Select Committee on European Communities Minutes of Evidence Examination of witness (Questions 280 - 293) Wednes-
day 1.07.1998. http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/cgi-bin/htm. Dr. Hindson stated. " EU is one of the worst 
donor agencies for relying solely on a lot of written reports. The EU receives a vast amount of documentation that no one can 
possibly read. It bases the success of projects on what people say they have achieved in reports." "The EU relies on written 
summary reports rather than evidence from the people it is working with. It is very easy to get that evidence—even photo-
graphs showing change." 
Select Committee on European Scrutiny Thirty-First Report (1999) http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/cgi-
bin/htm accessed 30.9.2001 
73 See note 15 Sclect Committee of International development First Special Report (1999) 
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ting realistic objectives. Further, it should have devised a better system of financial controls 
and a better division of responsibilities.83 
This led to a situation in which the Commission was accused that; 'the right hand did not 
know what the left hand was doing.'84 The Commission was generally seen as not; 'having 
got it right yet'85 so far as increasing the speed and efficiency of disbursements or project 
management was concerned.86 There were constant demands and plans for a streamlining of 
the financial regulations, the budgetary procedures and management methods. And yet the 
demands for change and at the same time for more anti-fraud and corruption protection will in 
all likelihood make the already under-spending institution spend even less.87 
This last point is relevent when the Commission and the EU's response to corruption are con-
sidered. The increased pressure for accountability was already resulting in a situation where; A Q 
'the system was starting to seize up.' The danger was quite evident that payments would be 
delayed even further, since reorganisations of the Commission often result in late pay-
ments.89The continuing and increased delays exacerbated the already strained relationships 
between NMS s and the EU90 and might have resulted in enlargement being postponed and 
endangered. The irony was that the delays in payment, due to more stringent anti-fraud and 
corruption concerns, might have hindered the implementation of PHARE projects aimed at 
relieving the corruption that gave rise to the concerns in the first place.91 There was a very 
real danger that anti-corruption reform in the NMSs for the Commission meant in practice 
incorporating procedures, employing more staff and cariy ing out staff training much along the 
Commission's own lines. In order to make progress towards receiving membership and fund-
ing the NMSs had to get used to writing Commission style reports and accepting its somewhat 
dubious role model. 
2.5 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OLAF 
Unfortunately the report made by the supervisory Committee of OLAF seemed to paint a far 
from glowing picture of the period of transition of the agency.92 The OLAF retained many of 
the weaknesses of UCLAF and was still dependent on the Commission for its budget. This 
affected its ability to recruit and obtain sufficient resources to effect the vast range of tasks 
given it. It was in any case far from being the agency necessary to combat the many deficits 
listed by the committee of experts, but it was the lack of adequate resources which could 
worst affect the fight against corruption. 
83 See note 72. Select Committee on European Scrutiny Thirty-First Report (1999) The EU must; focus on results in rela-
tion to strategic objectives, with clearer responsibilities and a better system of administrative and financial control.' 
84 See note 15 Select Committee of International development First Special Report (1999) 
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It was this last aspect, that of resources the most important of which is personnel, which alar-
med both the supervisory committee and those working for OLAF.93 The Commission's atti-
tude to the resources needed by OLAF was allegedly pretty negative. The refusal of the Com-
mission to allow and to fund the appointment of appropriate personnel inevitably affected the 
standard of work done, and investigations made; it appered to throw into doubt the Commis-
sion's real willingness to fully implement its own anti-corruption policy. It should be remem-
bered that the responsibilities of OLAF had been expanded and yet it employed approxi-
mately the same number of staff as its predecessor. 4 This came in conjunction with the 
planned enlargement and the vast increase in the amount of work that will have to be done. 
According to the committee OLAF had a problem with legitimacy, transparency, and effi-
ciency, not unlike its predecessor UCLAF.9 Its independence, from the Commission and in-
stitutions it was supposed to be inspecting, was not clear96. Its investigations remained admin-
istrative and not judicial (meaning that judicial searches of property can only be carried out if 
the office requests member state participation), which was a weakness.97 
The apparent reluctance of the Commission to provide staff or resources to OLAF was possi-
bly because of OLAF's operational independence from the Commission and the potential 
threat OLAF posed to its s taf fs hard fought for immunity from scrutiny and prosecution. In 
fact the Commission struggled hard for the UCLAF staff to be taken over by the new organi-
sation. Bearing in mind the following fact this makes some sense. Allegedly in the Commis-
sion, the person doing a task is important for the actual outcome finally achieved. Often staff 
are very independent in how they choose to run a case in every department of the Commission 
and UCLAF had been no exception with files allegedly run in a personalised sort of manner. 
In such a set up, who does a task will decide how the task is performed and what the contents 
of the result will be. Thus retaining the staff of UCLAF would have, in the Commission struc-
ture, probably meant that the work done by the new organisation may well have been re-
markably similar to that done previously. Whatever formal rules and task requirements, unless 
the staff are changed at times in the Commission, reforms are likely not to happen or rather 
are likely to be resisted. The apparent refusal of the Commission to grant more staff until the 
UCLAF staff were taken over was seemingly an effective method of preventing the intended 
reform from being terribly effective. In fact as a potentially effective reform OLAF had its 
teeth drawn before it could really have much effect. A curious development considering the 
Commission's declared need for more staff to deal with inefficiencies and new financial pro-
bity requirements, and the fact that the normally financially reticent MSs were encouraging 
more staff to be recruited for OLAF.98And yet maybe this was probably part of the problem, 
the enthusiasm of the MSs and the EP for OLAF inevitably had a political feel about it and 
was therefore resisted as such. 
The Commission had expressed intentions to change the staff regulations of those working for 
it so that they would be in line with the agreements made99 to combat corruption, but their re-
luctance to really give OLAF the necessary resources to perform its tasks threw doubt on their 
other intentions. As to making Commissioners and others responsible for their actions and 
accountable, there the Commission made little progress. The problem of immunity for em-
ployees was only gradually properly addressed and one of the most important changes seemed 
93 ibid and interviews with Commission Officials: OLAF 
w OLAF supervisory Committee progress report July 1999-July 2000 section 1 p. 10 
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somewhat confusing. The whistle blower rule which would allow an employee of the Com-
mission to disclose a corrupt act should they discover one seemed at first glance to be a posi-
tive development until it became clear that OLAF or an internal department had to be in-
formed first.100 The employee had to allow OLAF a reasonable period of time before taking 
the matter further, the problem here was how long a "reasonable time" is.101 It should be re-
membered that the Commission's one whistle blower Mr Paul Van Buitenen (who was almost 
dismissed) commented that UCLAF, which OLAF resembled very closely, had been reluctant 
109 
to respond to the requests made by other authorities for investigations. He stated that they 
had failed to efficiently handle information, and due to under staffing and lack of independ-
ence from the Commission, had not been capable of handling a fraud investigation effec-
tively.103 He concluded by stating that OLAF would only succeed if it was truly and totally 
independent from the Commission. 104OLAF's independence remains a somewhat difficult 
subject; its director is independent but depends for his resources on the Commission. 
A potential danger for the reforms and OLAF is that if they are considered to be too much of 
the EP's and MS's creature and part of an institutional struggle, then they will lose their le-
gitimacy and be conceived of as alien and a threat. The primary role of OLAF is that of an 
independent monitor located within the machinery of the Commission administration. But as 
the EP was instrumental in the creation of UCLAF and in OLAF, both served and serve, in 
part, as the eyes and ears of the EP in the Commission, as well as fighting fraud, corruption 
and mismanagement. The EP conceives of an important part of its duties and responsibilities 
as being that of legislative scrutiny;105 UCLAF/OLAF are a practical means for turning the 
theory of scrutiny into fact. One surprising development which throws some light on the mo-
tivations of the EP was an attempt by 80 MEPs to prevent OLAF from being allowed to in-
vestigate allegations within the EP.106The existence of such double standards or dubious mo-
tives was emphasised by one MEP who was quite candid about 'the pot calling the kettle 
black.'107 The Commission and the other institutions did not seem veiy serious about their a-
vowed desire to reform themselves. 
The apparent unwillingness of the Commission to accept the existence of OLAF as part of its 
internal structure, was shown in the Commission evaluation report on OLAF of 2003. It |AA * 
painted a gloomy picture. Reading between the lines of the document it seemed to indictate 
that the Commission disliked the effect that OLAF was having on disciplinary measures and it 
had created a new disciplinary office; 'the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC)' in 
2002109arguably to allow OLAF to concentrate on other issues. The Commission was appar-
ently keen to stress that OLAF should only follow up issues which; 'involve serious forms of 
economic and financial crime' or matters which involved 'criminal follow-up', the emphasis 
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was very much on the criminal element.110 The regulation setting up OLAF however read 
somewhat differently; 'investigating to that end serious matters relating to the discharge of 
professional duties such as to constitute a dereliction of the obligations of officials and other 
servants of the Communities liable to result in disciplinary, or as the case may be, criminal 
proceedings.' m T h e disciplinary element had been conveniently dropped in the Commission's 
interpretation of the regulation. The Commission stated in the fourth paragraph that; 'It is 
clear from the Commission decision and from administrative practice that IDOC exercises 
powers that are residual in relation to those of the Office, which avoids overlapping in admin-
istrative investigations.'112 But immediately afterwards stressed in paragraph five; 'to improve 
coordination and complementarity, the office (OLAF) must be asked to enhance the transpar-
ency of the limits to its action on the basis of various intervention criteria.'113 Evidently the 
smoothness of co existence existing between the new organisation and OLAF that existed in 
paragraph four no longer existed in paragraph five. The Commission stressed in the document 
that it would like to see OLAF focusing on external fraud matters and one cannot but wonder 
whether this was to encourage it to commit overstretch and thus have to leave the internal is-
sues more and more to the internal disciplinary office. It was also keen that OLAF become 
more involved in the other institutions of the EU. What appears important here is that given 
the almost doubling in serious disciplinary cases in six years, the Commission seemed to ap-
pear to want the evidently reasonably effective, independent OLAF to concentrate on external 
fraud and leave the internal policing of the Commission to the Commission itself, unless of 
course very serious financial crimes are involved. Granted that OLAF had only been in exis-
tence in its present form with the police-like powers over internal issues since 2000, the 
Commission's acceptance of the need for OLAF, internally at least, appeared to be diminish-
ing fast. That said OLAF's numbers had gradually risen to the required number after a longer 
time than should have been the case. 
Disciplinary Cases 114 
Date Total of Cases No Action Taken Dismissal/ 
Action Taken 
1994-1995 37 26 11 
1996-1997 23 9 12 
1998-1999 24 2 20 
2000-2002 24 6 20 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
We have now considered OLAF, a relatively new and controversial organisation of the EU 
born out of traumatic and controversial circumstances. Before more OLAF related conclu-
sions are provided it is useful to place the findings in the context of the theoretical model. 
OLAF finds itself well within the current cycle of defensiveness in the Commission as the lat-
ter's reaction to OLAF shows. The reform that OLAF represented was accepted but appar-
ently only allowed a limited impact, it appeared to be more for external audiences than for 
real effect. At the same time the Commission did seem to see in OLAF the possibility of mak-
110 Commission Report, 02.04.2003. 
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ing its officials more like a civil service and so removing some of the external influences and 
unhealthy link ups between industiy, MSs and Commission officials. OLAF was useful for 
the Commission's bureaucratisation moves to appear less problematic and a threat. At the 
same time OLAF was liked by external EU actors the European Parliament and the MSs and 
was therefore suspect for the Commission at first (although OLAF was the result of Commis-
sion and EP involvement). They seemed to favour the possibility of increasing their controls 
over the Commission; OLAF representing another organisational actor there to make the 
Commission's working more transparent, democratically controllable. OLAF would also con-
tain the really pathogenic behaviour which can break out in any organisation but in particular 
in one as loosely structured as the Commission can be, particularly when leadership is weak 
and a sense of mission lacking. OLAF seemed to have added to the general slow down in the 
Commission, particularly as Commission staff were made subject to increasing numbers of 
financial audits to prevent any OLAF investigation. The Commission was also quite capable 
of turning the threat into a benefit over time, above all by using OLAF in its own cycle of or-
ganisational bureaucratisation and then re-launch of the integrationary mission. The OLAF 
staff who were really there to control corruption and fraud, in particular in the Commission, 
were to help launch new integrationary moves like EUROJUST and the European Public 
Prosecutor. Furthermore OLAF staff were directed towards fraud investigations in the MSs. 
Negative bureaucratisation remains an issue in the Commission and in the NMSs and none of 
the reforms undertaken to date are likely to have much impact on it. Arguably the whole 
structure of the Commission and the other institutions of the EU should have been radically 
reformed prior to the enlargement eastwards. Otherwise, the enlargement could have been de-
layed, or endangered altogether. Both the NMSs and the EU needed to ensure that proper ac-
countability systems were in place, and that their bureaucrats were adequately organised and 
supervised to prevent abuses taking place. 
Some of reform points were addressed by Mr. Kinnock in his white paper. , ,5It contained pro-
posals which, if fully implemented, would no doubt alleviate some of the problems. However, 
as stressed throughout this chapter, reforms have been begun, discussed and partially imple-
mented before, only for the impetus to disappear once public attention wavers. The example 
of OLAF illustrates the unwillingness of the Commission and the other institutions to fully 
accept the implications of reports requiring reform. Any real radical reform necessary is and 
will probably remain elusive. 
Regarding the OLAF reform and the intention to turn it into a brake on the worst bureaucratic 
abuses represented by corruption, the situation is quite apparent that the Commission and the 
other institutions are not very serious about their avowed desire to reform themselves. OLAF 
was not totally independent of the Commission and its investigative powers were still being 
discussed, its resources were not much better that UCLAF's. Oddly enough though, it is 
worth reiterating, the Commission was encouraging the NMSs to model agencies on the then 
current form of OLAF even though that was not very appropriate. 
It should be apparent that the chosen solutions that the Commission has implemented are ty-
pical of its approach to the NMSs, unfortunately lacking in substance. Real change has to co-
me by empowering employees and the public to expose and challenge corrupt behaviour,116 
The Commission is beginning to accept this, but only slowly and reluctantly. There are many 
parallels between the experiences of the Commission and the NMSs with regard to corruption 
and the attempts to contain it. Removal of barriers and unnecessary secrecy are a partial solu-
115 See note 23 Kinnock, N. Reforming the European Commission a white paper. 1.3.2000 
116 See note 99 Communication from Mr. Kinnock to the Commission; Raising concerns about wrong doing 
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tion to corruption. What is required is an end to the apparently cosmetic changes which an-
swer the political needs of the moment but fail to address structural deficiencies and deep set 
attitudes. A fully functional OLAF, with proper resources will certainly assist in the creation 
of a zero tolerance environment for corruption, but unless the attitudes of the EU as a whole 
and Commission staff and Commissioners change, the problems will continue. 
With regard to the NMSs, the approach the Commission followed in combating corruption 
has created a lot of antipathy. This raises the danger that measures forced on the states by the 
Commission will not be fully accepted and legitimised and therefore become the subject of re-
negotiation. An increase in 'paperwork', and bureaucratic controls and delays as a response to 
the present climate of suspicion relating to corruption and fraud will exacerbate the under-
spending tendencies of the Commission to inefficiency, without having any real effect on cor-
ruption. In fact, if NMS administrations are not quickly helped and funded in their anti-
corruption activities, an increase in corruption may well occur. Well targeted efficient invest-
ment in these countries' infrastructures is still essential to enable them to leave the to operate 
fully within the EU with effective police and judicial systems in place. 
The most effective tool to fight corruption in the Commission as well as throughout the pre-
sent EU and the enlarged version of the future, would be an independent investigative agency 
similar to OLAF. If fully resourced and granted full rights of search, and fully supported by 
other law enforcement agencies, such an agency would be able help defuse the politically di-
visive effect of corruption allegations. Such an agency would assist and not add pressure to 
already struggling governments. It could provide the capabilities and objectivity they lack. 
Other reforms, which would help alleviate the problems of bureaucratisation in the Commis-
sion and in the NMSs, are the same as those implemented by many companies. The organisa-
tion structure has to be simplified, management should be by exception, and should set clear 
objectives, real promotion based on merit should be introduced. The layers of management 
should be reduced and effective flexible management brought in. Project management and 
financing, has to be totally overhauled. Channels of communication have to be simplified and 
clear lines of responsibility laid down, with real sanctions in the event of breaches of conduct 
and effectiveness. There should be clear goals and practical targets with performance bench-
marks set to enable evaluation at all levels. 
The reports on corruption and mismanagement in the Commission coincided with the same 
institution making high demands about the same problems to the NMSs, this could only dam-
age its credibility, both amongst the NMSs and the MSs. The irony in the situation was noted 
by some authors. One author commented on the Commission's role in putting pressure on the 
Romanian authorities to remove a corrupt trust fund manager, considering its own record of 
corruption and nepotism. The author comments dryly that the pupils (applicant states) will be 
looking askance at their strict teacher the Commission, which has been constantly upbraiding 
them for similar faults. The article suggests that the applicant states will ask who has the 
greatest deficits, Brussels or themselves. In general, the article considered the effect that the 
resignation of the Santer Commission had had on attitudes within applicant states, which have 
implicitly been looking to the Commission as a strict model. Hypocrisy seemed to be the most 
appropriate word to describe the Commission's behaviour.117 
1,7 Volker Wagener, Deutsche Welle 18.03.1999, Kommentar; Hochmut kommt vor dem fall. 
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Dates of Interviews 
OLAF Officials: 
Two officials interviewed between 1.12.2000 and 08.03. 2005 
DGXX Financial Control: 
Official: 28. 07. 2004 
European Parliament 
MEP 29. 07.2004 
MEP 11.03.2003 
120 
3. DG ENVIRONMENT (DG ENV) 1 
COMMISSION ORGANIZATION FORMALAND 
INFORMAL; INTEGRATIONARY DRIVE DYNAMICS, 
POLICY NETWORKS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL 
OFFICIALS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
We have considered the OLAF and its relationship to the basic theory and also the problems 
that have been caused to the enlargement by Commission weakness and overreaction in the 
area of fraud and corruption. Now we will move on to look at a Commission department itself 
starting with DG ENV. We will first describe Commission structures as a whole when appro-
priate using the DG as an illustration. After the reader has become acclimatised to these we 
will move onto the more specific details of the environmental policy field and the DGs opera-
tions in this. The chapter will explore and examine the Commission at its more entrepreneu-
rial moments from the perspective of a DG which has excelled in this regard. 
Vast amounts of EU legislation has been generated in the environmental sector, around 80% 
of UK environmental legislation and 100% of that of Spain originated from the Commission 
as will be shown later. The question arises as to how a seemingly small Commission manages 
to generate such huge quantities of legislation for all the nations in the Union. This is particu-
larly true when the vocal opposition of so many institutions and interest groups to Europe is 
considered. There would appear to be a need to try to account for some of the Commission 
activities which have resulted in this situation. The presence of legislative entrepreneurs in the 
Commission would be a useful notion in this respect. The thesis posits the notion of highly 
empowered, mission oriented officials fully representing the Commission, making connec-
tions and networks with MS officials and expanding the influence of the Commission and its 
legislation to a maximum. This will be seen to be the case in the DG and that this was very 
much in the interests of the Commission so long as it was expansive and dynamic. 
DG ENV is an excellent example of the above phenomenon and it reveals several structural 
and personnel elements which encourage legislation generation. One group emerged from the 
investigations and interviews on which this chapter is based as particularly efficacious in fur-
thering the legislative output of the DG, namely, that of Desk Officers and Heads of Unit, 
their tasks are discussed more closely later who operate in a legislative entrepreneurial man-
ner. 
In the Commission there is a unique combination of the political and the civil service spheres, 
and lawyers along with economists make up the majority of the officials, 36.6% were lawyers 
in the early nineties,1 and over a third are economists.2The political and legal aspects of the 
work in the Commission attract adventurous individuals. The rapid expansion of the Union 
and the competencies of the Commission can be expected to owe a lot to the officials in-
1 Page, E. The People who run Europe. (1997) Oxford, Oxford University Press p. 78 
2 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
121 
volved, but also to the type or organizational structure which often allowed them maximum 
discretion.3 
The behaviour of technocrats has been observed to include the following characteristics, that 
the various units of the technocracy can be expected to place their concerns first and foremost, 
and they will have the tendency to finally over produce their own outputs.4 The Commission, 
and the DGs, seem to be (a) technocratic institution(s) par excellence in which officials have 
enjoyed considerable discretion owing to their monopoly of knowledge in terms of the Euro-
pean dimension to policy making and individual policies. The Commission and the DG gen-
erated vast amounts of legislation which was at first desirable but finally seemed to have an-
noyed other sectors and politicians in some MS governments. This chapter will describe the 
positive aspects of DG legislative production and the next the negative. 
3.2 COMMISSION STRUCTURE 
It is to be expected that the Commission structure will prove to have been useful in allowing 
its officials large amounts of freedom and empowering them with its legal-political nature to 
advance the integrationary project and of course expand environmental protection. 
3.2*1 THE COLLEGE OF COMMISSIONERS 
The Commission consists of two main elements, the College of the Commissioners which is 
considered to be the political layer and the services which means the DGs, Directorate Gener-
als, the administration. Each DG covers a defined area of competence, usually sectoral; such 
as DG Competition, DG ENV, but occasionally DGs are set up to perform specific tasks. DG 
enlargement was created to ensure that the Community's decisions with regard to the enlar-
gement were fully implemented. The basis of decision making within the College is by means 
of voting, as a collegial approach used to be favoured. This results in the rather curious situa-
tion that the President is very much, one amongst equals, and the Commissioner in charge of 
the budget equally so. Until recently the President had extremely limited means available to 
ensure that all the Commissioners acted in a responsible manner. In reality only the extremely 
political decisions and in particular those which the Commissioners have proven unable to 
solve amongst themselves arrived for the vote. Each Commissioner is assisted by a Cabinet 
who act as a bridge between the Commissioner and the services. Each Cabinet has a Chef, and 
there are regular meetings of Chefs of Cabinets to reach decisions on as many of the decisions 
which the DGs have not been able to reach themselves. Only after this stage are decisions 
then submitted to the Commissioners. DGs are often in conflict with each other since the DGs 
have to get legislation through the inter service deliberations for it to be officially adopted by 
the Commission as a whole. The majority of decisions are reached by what is known as the 
inter service consultation procedure, which is now done in a purely written manner. Here leg-
islative proposals of one DG are put forwards to the others for discussion and, of course, 
amendment. Should the administrative process carried out by the DGs fail then the Commis-
sioners' Cabinets take over. 
3.2.2 COUNCIL AND MS OFFICIALS 
The services of the Commission have managed to become the EU legislative power centre 
partially since the Commission has the task of policy initiation. This power has been exploited 
3 See theory chapter 
4 Poggi, G, The state its nature development and prospects. (1991) Palo Alto, Stanford University Press 
122 
and become inclusive in such a way that the MS staff working for the various ministries as 
well as the various committees of the Council have been described as the Commission's assis-
tant bureaucracy.5 This may seem rather puzzling until it is remembered that the Council and 
MS staff are actively involved in Commission proceedings and committees, thus putting them 
in the position of having to participate in the creation of legislation rather than simply in its 
rejection at the vote. In practice it means that the Council's legislative activity is largely supra 
national in flavour, as its staff have been wooed over to the Commission's side.6 There can be 
many reasons for this, one is the sense that both groups of staff represent Europe more than 
their political masters, and that often they are the experts in a certain topic and not the politi-
cians. Thus the civil service dislike of political masters combined with a sense of common 
purpose shared with Commission officials, can have the effect that the MS staff are more than 
content to go around the backs of their ministers with the connivance of Brussels,7 or minis-
tries in one sector are happy to pursue a sectoral policy at the expense of another sector. The 
MSs are literally divided up and ruled by the Commission and the process of dividing and rul-
ing runs right through the Council. MS staff are divided into their sectors and ministries and 
often fail to correspond adequately with their central government masters, the MSs them-
selves are often divided by their different governments' political preferences which can via 
the backdrop of future QMV be played against each other. Whilst it is true that the Commis-
sion also has difficulties adopting a common position with its various sectoral DGs, the MSs 
have a harder position. Thus in reality the main legislature of the Union can be argued to be 
the Commission, it is the 'major EU legislator'8with the Council of Ministers rapidly losing 
what sovereignty and power over legislation that it ever had. 
3.2.3 THE SERVICES 
Having considered the Union as a whole and the Commission's position within it, an outline 
of the basic structure of a Directorate General is required. Each DG is headed by a Commis-
sioner who is chosen usually by MSs with the EP's approval. He or she leads the DG as its 
political head and is supported by a Cabinet whose members are appointed by the Commis-
sioner involved, usually for a five year period. The members of the Cabinet are either chosen 
externally or from the ranks of the officials in the Commission. The administration is man-
aged by a Director General, (grade A1-A2) who is responsible for the day to day work. They 
are also considered to be political appointees,9 and up until recently these individuals often 
ran the same DG for many years. Under recent reforms this has been altered, with the mobil-
ity being required by President Prodi Director Generals have to move from their present posi-
tions after seven years. The Director General is supported by either/and a deputy Director 
General and around five Directors (A2-A3) who are responsible for the Directorates which 
have to consist of at least two units to justify a Director. Staff members often consider Direc-
tors to be there to represent the units they manage and to fight for them politically with other 
DGs and with the MSs. The units are the real legislative engine in the DG and have Heads of 
Unit who are usually experienced officials of A4 grade who are not normally directly chosen 
by politicians. The rest of the policy making officials are A5-A7 grade staff called Desk Offi-
cers who are usually of international origin and full time officials very often lawyers or 
economists and motivated Europeanization supporters. Seconded officials from the MSs and 
MS experts and other experts advise and assist the Commission officials in the drawing up of 
legislation, usually for a three year period. Some sources state that these officials are also 
placed within the system by MSs to ensure that their views are respected, and that they are 
5 Van Schendelen, R. Machiavelli in Brussels third edition (2003) Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press p.66 
6 Shore, C. Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration, (2000) London, Routledge p.218-219 
7 ibid p. 18-219 
8 See note 5. Van Schendelen (2003) p.64 
9 ibid, p.52 
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fully informed of all prospective legislation. B grade staff are the basic clerical staff and are 
usually Belgian or Italian. 
The main criterion for recruitment into the Commission was originally that the applicant was 
a civil servant. In Germany and other continental countries, most higher level civil servants 
are lawyers, and this is true of the Germans working in the Commission, in the UK, however, 
a legal education is not as highly valued as a generalist humanities one and thus the UK civil 
servants in the Commission reflect this national perspective in their backgrounds. Desk Offi-
cers are normally full time permanent officials but in DG ENV seconded officials are an im-
portant part of the staff. The officials like to make a distinction between individuals with a 
legal education and those who are by nature lawyers, the latter are seen as more conservative 
and usually found in the Commission's legal services. Whilst it is reasonable to expect mostly 
lawyers to be involved in legislative generation, and economists in cost benefit studies etc, it 
is clear that officials without a legal education have acted in a pioneering manner for DGs, 
usually where institutional growth is concerned and it is quite possible in the Commission to 
be involved in working out policies and not be a lawyer. 
The majority of legislative proposals are put forward to the DG by NGOs and other stake-
holders, lobbyists, MSs, and the EP;10the administration decides what proposals are pursued 
and developed into policies, often the choice is down to the Heads of Unit or the Desk Offi-
cers themselves.11 According to one source over 80% of the final proposal adopted by the 
Council is the same as that prepared by the Desk Officer supervising the directive. The same 
source stressed the fact that the Desk Officer is alone in the initial process of developing the 
proposal.l3Formally before any proposal can be pursued for possible inter-service (between 
DGs) discussion it has to be approved by the DG management. Finally the Cabinet and the 
Commissioner have to agree with the legislation put forward by the administration. 
3.3 THE INFORMAL STRUCTURES OF THE EU WHICH 
ENCOURAGE LEGAL ENTREPRENEURS 
3.3.1 ORGANISATIONAL MENTALITY 
Having considered the formal structures of the Union and the Commission the grass roots re-
ality in fact promotes an entrepreneurial spirit. The informal structure of the Union is con-
stantly evolving and has proven to be veiy open to officials to mould. It implicitly encourages 
and creates a very distinctive culture. In part this is due to the origins of the Commission it-
self, The Commission has since its inception enjoyed an entrepreneurial, almost pressure 
group like mentality. In its first few years it was a flexible, highly active organisation like a 
partisan band, which took every opportunity to expand its competences and to move into 
other sectors. 14After the Single European Act, the same dynamic sense of enterprise drove the 
Commission towards the single market, the Maastricht treaty and the enlargements. The indi-
viduals which it attracted at the beginning were European enthusiasts who were willing to ac-
cept the unique approach of the institution;' . . . In this it behaves less like a normal interna-
10 Mazey, S and Richardson, J. The Commission and ihe Lobby in Edwards G (ed) The European Commission, (1997) Car-
termill, London, p. 179 
11 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
12 Grant, W, Mathews, D, Newell, P, The effectiveness of EU Environmental Policy (2000) Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 
p. 19 
ibid 
14 Coombes, D. Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Communities (1970) London, Allen and Unwin p.259 
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tional secretariat and far more like a promotional group, or even a political party with a firmly 
rooted ideology,'15According to one source this remains the case even after the significant 
time lapse that has occurred; ' . . . My research found evidence of a strong sense of Commu-
nity and esprit de corps among staff-even among new recruits . . . all of which suggest a 
highly developed sense of solidarity and consciousness of kind.'1617 
3.3.2 IRREGULAR PRACTICES 
MSs have used their power of patronage and appointment to great effect in their choice of 
Commissioner and often top civil servants within the Commission, despite the latter's sup-
posed independence. Certain DGs are 'flagged' as belonging to certain nationalities.18 It has 
been stated that the senior ranks in the Commission's DGs are chosen and 'parachuted' into 
their positions by MSs who desire to place their man or woman in a position where they will 
be able to affect policy outcomes. Openly MSs claim that their use of parachuting is so that 
candidates have a certain political status because they have an important promotional role to 
play vis-à-vis the MS ministerial level and politicians. In fact the Commission is far from a 
water tight independent institution: 
" . . . a number of dysfunctional practices have become virtually institutionalised, from nepo-
tism ('piston'), and 'parachuting' staff at the top to 'rigged exams' and back door recruitment 
10 Ofl ^ 1 
methods . . . 'National quotas and balance, parachutage, sousmarins, Cabinets, piston, 
seconded national experts, posts reserved for certain nationalities etc are all signs of disinte-
grative seeds lurking in the fruit of apparent integration.'"22 
3.3.3 CABINETS AND DIRECTOR GENERALS 
The Commission expects the College of Commissioners and the Commissioner directly con-
cerned to set general policy direction, whilst policy is developed by Desk Officers. The Com-
missioners appoint Cabinets of their own choosing and there can be conflicts between Com-
missioners and their Cabinets and the administrative management of the DGs. In the Commis-
sion there are struggles between the Cabinets and the Director Generals, with successive 
Presidents attempting to finalise a working arrangement with the Cabinets playing a lesser 
role. In some DGs the Director Generals issue bans on staff being approached by Cabinet 
members and vice versa although this usually occurs to accelerate policy making decisions. 
Every communication between the Cabinet and the administration has to pass over the Direc-
tor General's desk, whilst this improves the management's control over their staff, it can also 
be counter productive. It leads to the odd situation of individuals working in the same build-
ing, officially at least, having to pass paper slowly up through the hierarchy rather than 
knocking on a door two storeys up, which is far from efficient. 
3.3.4 DOSSIER NETWORKS 
The plethora of committees, lobbyists, MS officials and of course the Commission officials, 
operate in a policy arena that is both opaque and in flux and so offers huge scope for entre-
15 See note 14 Coombes D (1970). p.89 
16 See note 6 Shore (2000) p. 132 
17 ibid p. 140 quoting Virginia Willis (1982:4) 
18 See note 1 Page (1997) p.51; 52 
19 The placing of individuals in the top ranks of the Commission who have often not followed the usual path through the hier-
archy, 
20 A method of avoiding the common entrance examination. 
21 Use of influential contacts to achieve certain goals 
22 See note 6 Shore (2000) p. 197 
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preneurialism and even encourages it. The Commission official has a large amount of discre-
tion when drawing up legislation and there are few procedures and set administrative ways of 
doing things to guide the Desk Officer as they decide on the framework and contents of poli-
cies. Gathering a large network of officials in various European institutions is inevitable dur-
ing the life time of a dossier (policy file) and if one institution creates obstacles then appeals 
can be made to one of its competitors, European institutions are divided both along national as 
well as sectoral lines and there is little integration between the sectors and between the senior 
management and politicians in the various institutions. The existence of these multiple divi-
sions can result in a situation in which the lines of responsibility and accountability are con-
fused, potentially contradictory policy is developed in different sectors which compete rather 
than cooperate. For the entrepreneur the situation is ripe for devising complex individual solu-
tions which might well not be those which any given hierarchy or political leadership would 
have agreed to. 
Also beneficial for the entrepreneur was the weakness in the necessary clerical infrastructure, 
or clerical layer to allow enforcement of standardization. Apparently there was a vacuum in 
the DG when it came down to basic bureaucratic tasks and standardisation. The archives in 
the DG were apparently either chaotic or problematic. This absence of standardisation was 
continued in the files themselves, which were apparently constructed according to the meth-
ods favoured by the Desk Officer in charge. Their own highly personalised methods may well 
not be those of the individual inheriting the policy nor of the next person. A policy dossier 
will therefore often consist of several different methods of organisation and chaos can be ex-
pected to be not far away. Apparently there was no planned method for handing over a dossier 
to the next officer and this could result in long delays, if, of course, there was much of an dos-
sier organisation at this point. Part of this is linked to the organisation's need to expand and 
advance, the notion that an old document is irrelevant and can be forgotten seemed to be held 
by the Commission. 
3.3.5 UNDERSTAFFING AND OFFICIALS' DISCRETION 
The understaffing of the Commission, means that often there have been huge amounts of po-
tential work and too few to perform it and manage it. According to one source, officials in DG 
ENV there used to be more than enough possible policy regulations to be made, and low staff 
numbers was the issue. The levels of understaffing allow the officials some element of discre-
tion in which dossier they choose to follow and how. Heads of Unit have been known to de-
cide to make a new policy and to see it become law on all the MSs' law books.23Sometimes 
the lack of real management direction adds to the above to allow the official a unique amount 
of discretion in which dossier they choose to follow, although key dossiers will be allocated to 
certain units. There are statements made by officials that dossiers can be chosen or not by 
themselves and that it is possible for officials to simply decide to create a dossier even where 
none existed before. 
3.3.6 EXCESSIVE BUREAUCRACY AND NETWORKS 
Quite apart from the above, whilst the DG and the Commission are said to follow the French 
bureaucratic structural style, which is very hierarchical with every one checking everything, 
in practice, during Commission dynamic phases, these are routinely avoided, 4 . . . rules and 
procedures are rarely broken but are constantly distorted, manipulated and ignored . . ,"24 and 
again, "the annoying habit of people using national and party links to circumvent the sys-
23 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
24 See note 6 Shore (2000). p. 181 quoting Mole (1992:19) 
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tern." In larger DGs with longer traditions there are considered to be so many checks and 
balances built into them that it is almost impossible to follow a formal route. In fact the Com-
mission is known to be full of networks, 'If you're not catholic, socialist, or from the right 
class it is difficult to make your way here. By class I mean the system of networks . . . Under 
Delors the French got all the best jobs . , . Before Delors came it was the Italian lobby which 
held the reins of power . . . Then the French replaced the Italians . . . '26 and again, 'This pat-
tern of cultivating personal networks within the organisation by planting trusted supporters in 
key positions was extended even further during the Delors era . . . These positions placed one 
in an ideal position to cultivate "friends in high places" which was widely acknowledged as 
the "way to get ahead" in the house . . . ' 2 7 Some officials have been baffled as to why certain 
individuals are promoted and as to why certain decisions are taken, it is more than likely that 
one of the many networks provides the answer. For the entrepreneur with social skills, the 
Commission's infonnal administrative system would appear to be ideal ground for pursuing 
policy interests; 'The evidence from my research suggests that the 'informal' system based on 
pragmatic codes and norms is the effective system of administration.'28 
The presence of Epistemic Communities or Policy networks in the DG seems to be fairly 
clear as the following quotations from the literature demonstrate: 
'The environmental DG has close contacts with various organisations lobbying for the protec-
tion of the environment. It "is often depicted as a green colony" or even as being composed of 
"ecological freaks". In seeking to impose restrictions on trading or industrial activities in the 
name of environmental protection it finds itself confronting the very views of the DGs for 
trade, and for internal market and industry. Similar problems have arisen in relation to the en-
vironmental impact of agriculture. In a number of areas, including, for example, the proposals 
developed in the early 1990s for a carbon tax to restrain energy use and restrict its contribu-
tion to global warming; "its proposals are often watered down in negotiations with other 
DGs.'" 
" . , . sometimes officials may even have the opportunity to develop their own policies: for 
example, 'when the DG concerned finds itself stepping in to fill a policy vacuum' . . . simi-
larly, European Union environmental policy, which was formulated and codified into a large 
body of regulations in the 1980s, was for a long time the concern of a group of committed of-
ficials who gave their Directorate General the reputation of being 'dominated by . . , ecologi-
cal freaks'" 
' . . . officials have over the years gradually acquired for themselves a de facto policy role of-
ten supported by attendant interest groups and so called "epistemic communities" of experts. 
Thus, a considerable corpus of environmental law was developed without a strong Treaty base 
and finally legitimised in the SEA in 1986 . . . Only now, perhaps, do MSs realise the huge 
implementation costs of such environmental polices An effective advocacy coalition of 
Commission officials, the international scientific community, and a vociferous and skilful en-
vironmental movement acting as a "megaphone for science" made the running . . . ' 
25 See note 6 Shore (2000). p. 187 
26 ibid p. 198 
27 ibid p. 180 
2* ibid p.214 
2y Stevens, A and Stevens, H. Brussels Bureaucrats? (2001) Basingstoke, Pal grave p.200-201 
30 ibid p. 140 
31 See note 10 Mazey; Richardson (1997) p. 184 
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There are stated to be plenty of rather loose messy Policy Networks in the environmental 
fieid.32Since MS officials, environment ministers and MEPs seem to be actively involved in 
the promotion of environmental legislation even when the DG top management were against, 
and also national treasuries Policy Network seems the appropriate description. Certainly such 
a network would explain the success the DG has had at developing a sectoral area and associ-
ated legislation for which there was little real treaty base.33These points will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
3.3.7 LEGISLATION GENERATION AS A PERFORMANCE BENCHMARK 
In the Commission the DGs which are responsible for the core Community freedoms are rela-
tively secure. The other DGs like DG ENV have a less secure position and have therefore 
generated significant amounts of legislation to seemingly justify their continued existence, 
since for the Commission efficiency is apparently measured in legislation produced as this is 
traditionally how the Commission seems to have considered its existence to be justified. It 
should be stressed that whilst a DG justifies its existence on the strength of its legislative re-
cord,34 staff are not allocated according to results but rather to requests.35 Proposed legislation 
is submitted to the College of Commissioners with a suggested number of required staff at-
tached to it.36 In such an environment it is understandable that the DG will, for institutional 
survival, strive to get as much legislation accepted as possible. If it is considered to be appro-
priate and have a good chance of being passed by the Council and the EP, the College will 
accept the proposal. Considering the record of steadily increasing staff figures from the few of 
the early seventies to the 500 odd now, combined with the vast amount of environmental leg-
islation that the DG has produced, there would appear to be a clear enough correlation be-
tween staff figures and legislation. But there is often a major delay in the allocation of staff 
and the DG has complained about being understaffed from 1980 onwards.37Given that the DG 
is understaffed, a common enough complaint in the Commission as a whole, it might appear 
odd that it still apparently takes every opportunity to create more work for its already over 
worked staff. The answer lies in the Commission's internal measurement of success which 
leaves the DG in a vicious circle, to survive it must be entrepreneurial and propose new legis-
lation, but the staff increments are never enough or on time, leaving the staff working even 
harder and maybe subsequently producing legislation which could be improved. Which of 
course raises the risk that implementation will get worse. Many legal writers consider the le-
gal basis of much of the initial legislation to have been relatively weak. 38Given that this is the 
case, it is remarkable how the amount of European environmental legislation soared. The 
complaints procedure of the DG, which will be discussed later, backed up by the legal de-
partment have proven to be extremely effective at winning the cases which are brought before 
the Court of Justice (ECJ), despite the weak legal base. Either the opposition have been badly 
briefed or the creative approach to generating legislation on the environment found in the DG 
is founded on excellent legal arguments. 
"Peterson, J and Bomberg, E. (1999), Decision making in ihe European Union, New York, St, Martin's Press p. 192,193 
33 Edwards, G and Spence, D. The Commission in Perspective in Edwards G (ed) The European Commission, (1997) Carter-
mill, London p. 19 
34 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
55 ibid 
36 ibid 
37 COM (80)222 final 
3RZiegIer, A.R., Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community, Oxford, Clarendon Press (1996) p. 138 
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3. 4 MAIN ACTORS: DESK OFFICERS AND HEADS OF UNIT 
3.4.1 DELORS AND THE DESK OFFICER 
The Desk Officers and the administration can be said to be expected to play a political role 
and usually to take the initiative. This observation is confirmed by the statement of Jacques 
Delors when he said that Commission officials had six professions: to be a law maker, to in-
novate (generate policy proposals), to control respect for Community decisions, to negotiate 
with the different actors involved in the Community process and to be a diplomat. Rarely are 
national civil servants called on to perform such a combination of tasks, the use of the word 
5law maker' by Delors rather than any other phrase appears to place the Desk Officers on a 
par with legislators and emphasises that their work is political as well as bureaucratic. As one 
senior official put it, officials are paid to be 'creative'40 and by this he meant to find ways of 
promoting their dossier and getting around organisational, managerial blockages. 
The tough nature of the competition to enter the Commission encourages only the most intel-
ligent and dynamic individuals with a legal or economic background to enter the institution. 
However, this sense of elitism is compounded by a further twist insofar as even after success-
ful applicants have passed the competition their names are then simply on file. A position 
within the Commission is dependent on the individual approaching a DG and getting them-
selves known, noticed and finally requested. Thus initiative, social networking skills and whe-
re possible political connections and determination are required from the start. The applicant 
is in effect alone even before starting their career. This sense of being alone and solely re-
sponsible for yourself, your success, and that of your dossier permeates the whole Commis-
sion. As indicated above promotion is considered by officials to be, once more, down to the 
official acting informally. The formal method of achieving promotion did not seem to be con-
sidered by many officials to really matter. You have to network, get onto Cabinets, ensure that 
you are noticed, i.e. sell yourself and your dossier. They can choose to get themselves known, 
to make contacts to the Cabinet and higher management. The absence of a more effective ca-
reer structure forced officials to be self contained and dynamic, to show entrepreneurial quali-
ties in effect. The combination of a sense of elitism and the tough selection procedure pro-
moted a certain mentality and perception of their profession: 
'Many Commission fonctionnaires clearly do not see themselves as public servants or mere 
administrators , . . many preferred to see themselves in grander political terms as "policy-
makers", "innovators", "intellectuals", "architects" of the new European order whom the trea-
ties (and "history" itself) had proclaimed "custodians of the European interest."'41 
Thus a specific type of individual has traditionally been attracted to work at the Commission 
and this type can be defined as being both motivated, political and would probably in a free 
market setting be considered entrepreneurial-like. 
The process of adopting legislation can be very complex and chaotic, and the Desk Officers 
who are alone responsible for the dossier they have either chosen or been allocated were ex-
pected to promote and follow the dossier without any real support. The effective culture was 
one of backwoodsmanship with a lone official having to reach decisions often of a political 
39Spence, D. Stuff and Personnel policy in the Commission in Edwards G (ed) The European Commission, (1997) Cart erm ill, 
London p.95 
40 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
41 See note 6 Shore (2000) p. 144-145 
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nature and then interacting with MSs, MEPs, lobbyists and forming networks to achieve the 
adoption of their dossier. The absence of any real formal procedure to follow let alone a stan-
dard filing system for support, or the firm guidance of superiors meant that the official had to 
be a decision maker and that often their attitude was decisive in how a dossier was followed. 
The confusion of principals meant often the absence of effective checks and balances an ex-
ample of which is the following; environment ministers were said to often vote yes for legis-
lation when their national treasury departments would have rejected it out right, usually treas-
uries will notice later on but sometimes not and often it is too late. If the official can market 
his or her dossier effectively to the environmental ministers, who are often loyal to their sec-
A1 
tor, then national parliaments and governments can be avoided. 
There can be said to be a general culture of competition in the Commission which has proba-
bly been increased with the difficulties in getting legislation passed. It is common enough to 
hear about competition occurring within DGs, between DGs and their sectors, between the 
political layers and the administrative, between units, between Directorates etc. This culture 
necessarily affects the officials and can accentuate their isolation and reduce the number of 
natural allies that could have been expected from the formal structure of the Commission. 
However it also breaks down the rigidity of the structures as the DGs and Commission divide 
up into competing elements, and thus opened up possibilities for the official 
Usually the officials are the absolute experts, often in the whole of Europe, of the complete 
dossier. The Commissioner and their supporting Cabinet can only have the very broadest of 
ideas about the contents of the directives. According to some sources, a high proportion of the 
jk ^ ^ 
management from Heads of Unit to Director Generals are often not experts, and the higher 
their rank the more likely it is that they owe their position to factors other than ability44 and 
knowledge. Desk Officers are often guided by MS experts on the committees which are re-
lated to their dossiers and a close detailed knowledge network can evolve around a dossier 
with the Desk Officer managing it. That said, the initiative remains with the official and not 
the MS committee. For the directive on hazardous waste, apparently the technical adoption 
committee only met twice a year. Although such committees meet for one issue they can be 
asked to vote on more issues as well, which can leave scope for officials' discretion. This ex-
pertise means that the possibly less expert and possibly politically chosen and motivated DG 
hierarchy are dependent on the officials to generate the legislation necessary for them to sur-
vive as an institution. Obviously an amount of discretion is at the disposal of the official con-
cerned and it is also to be expected that a degree of loyalty to the dossier and the networks 
concerned will also develop, potentially at the expense of loyalty to a distant DG hierarchy. 
Given the many splits and principals the official has to overcome in the DG, the Commission 
and the rest of the institutions, their expertise has to be used carefully to win arguments often 
of a legal nature in order to complete their dossier. 
Without networking an official will not be able to complete their dossier and this takes time. 
They are expected to overcome the many splits mentioned above and to forge compromises, 
whilst the actors the Commission would expect the official to have to overcome, would be 
limited to the MEPs, the lobbyists and the MSs, in practice the skills are very relevant within 
the Commission itself and of course the DG. The Desk Officers are at the centre of a network 
of actors coalescing around the directive which is beginning to be formulated.45 It takes 9 
months for a member of staff to become operational with a dossier, so short term trainees are 
42 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
43 ibid 
44 ibid and see note 39 Spence (1997) p.75 
45 See note 10 Mazey; Richardson (1997) p. 179 
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not even put on them. A dossier's life can vary, mining waste was very quick, another took 
eight years, 4-5 years is a good average.46 The Desk Officer is alone in the initial process of 
jk ^ ^ 
developing the proposal. It is only once the policy has been adopted internally by the DG 
and adopted by the College that the official can be said to have been provided with full policy 
direction.48 The Desk Officers apparently initially decide policy direction maybe with their 
Heads of Unit,49 the DG hierarchy and the College sometimes provided reactive policy direc-
tion. 
In order to succeed, officials, the DG and Commission must be able to be extremely sensitive 
of the changing policy environment. They must, in economic terms, be very much up to date 
on the present market situation; they must know what products can succeed and what not. 
Application of SWOT, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, is a basic to compa-
nies in the market and a form of this is necessary for officials to follow. They must recognise 
the opportunities and the strengths of the Commission position, and its product, at any given 
time, and of course the weaknesses and threats. The basic Commission product is legislation 
in its various forms and in particular legislation that enhances the Commission's competen-
cies. Usually there will be the threat of MS opposition, other DG opposition and of course 
lobbies and the EP. However in the event of an industrial accident then it is suddenly easier to 
get environmental legislation passed, or in the event of a rise in unemployment then suddenly 
other DGs will find themselves in a position to rapidly generate legislation to exploit the op-
portunity. Unavoidable facts, media attention and public opinion are suddenly in the equation. 
The reason for this is quite simple the MSs and the EP will do all they can to avoid being seen 
to oppose obviously beneficial legislation at times of change and crisis. Officials have to pos-
sess this entrepreneurial sensitivity to recognise the perfect moment to either reintroduce leg-
islation previously put on the backburner due to opposition, or to quickly generate new legis-
lation before the political agenda moves on. Not only dramatic events and trends decide the 
time to re-launch legislation, if the EP committee concerned with the sector is more favour-
able owing to a change in its membership, then this is a favourable opportunity to be ex-
ploited, or if an unfavourable hierarchy changes an opportunity is there.5 Or if the balance of 
environmentally active MSs in the Council changes this is a moment to act, or if a MS decides 
to promote a certain policy domestically, then the Commission can suggest the benefits of a 
European approach, which would of course have the same domestic effects. The official has 
to remain 'on the ball' at all times, keeping in with his networks and ready to act. 
3.5 ENTREPRENEURIAL TACTICS IN THE COMMISSION 
3.5.1 THE ADOPTION OF A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 
When an official decides to work on a piece of legislation, and to act as an entrepreneur, he or 
she will face many opponents both legal and otherwise. The first struggle is for the legislation 
proposal and draft to be adopted by the administrative management of the DG. It is not un-
common for the official to have to sell their dossier to the hierarchy and the Cabinet.51 When 
the request for a dossier comes from the Cabinet it is possible for the DG hierarchy to oppose 
it and the official may have to sell his dossier to them. The same can happen if the hierarchy 
46 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
47 See note 12 Grant; Mathews; Newell (2000) p. 19 
48 See note 10 Mazey; Richardson (1997) p. 112; p. 120 
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request a dossier and the Cabinet oppose it, again selling is on the cards. Given that political 
motivations seemingly become steadily more important the higher in the hierarchy, it is not 
particularly odd to find that the official can often feel rather alone and having to hunt for allies 
amongst the management in order to see their dossier through to fruition. A degree of political 
and diplomatic ability and salesmanship are necessary for the dossier to be adopted by the 
DG. 
3.5.2 THE ROLE OF DIRECTORS AND COMMISSIONER 
As the DG will only adopt a certain amount of dossiers, competition can often occur between 
different Directors, units, dossiers and their officials. It can be extremely difficult to success-
fully compete at this stage and a lot can depend on the official's Director who has to sell the 
official's dossier.53 The other Directors will naturally promote the drafts prepared by their 
units and only a limited number of drafts will be passed on to the next level, thus the political 
ability of an official's Director may prove to be decisive, combined with the carefully created 
legislative product and the sales angle provided by the official. The arguments which are ma-
de at this point are both of an economic nature and presented by the DG's economic officials 
and legal from the lawyers.54 Often a draft will be required to carry out a cost benefit study 
c f _ 
before it is allowed to be considered at this stage. The next stage involves persuading the 
political level of the Cabinet and the Commissioner that the draft is worth sponsoring. Since 
1992 and the less but better legislation drive, the Commissioner is most likely to back a pro-
posal that: has a good legal coherence and content, makes economic sense but also which is 
likely to have powerful political supporters to give it a guarantee of success.56 The legal unit 
of the DG may well have a say on the proposed legislation, although their task mostly in-
volves taking legal steps against MSs. 
3.5.3 ECONOMISTS AND LAWYERS 
The problems between the economists and the lawyers in the DG and the Commission as a 
whole emerge at this point. The two professions seemed to find communication problematic 
and the style of argument in particular.57 Lawyers find it easier to argue legally than economi-
cally and a draft which may make excellent legal sense may well fail to stand up to the scru-
tiny of the economists.58 The problem is similar to that in the market where businessmen find 
red tape frustrating and often nonsensical, ironically in the DGs it is often the lawyers that 
perceive the economists as the bringers of red tape stopping their legitimate entrepreneurial 
legislation production.59 Recently the position of the economists and financial experts has 
been strengthened in the Commission as a whole. 
3.6 CIRCUMNAVIGATION OF VARIOUS OPPONENTS AND THE 
HIERARCHY (See Figure 1) 
In the event that the official faces opposition from their Head of Unit, they are apparently able 
to attempt to circumnavigate their Head of Unit and to get the proposal sponsored by the up-
per levels in the hierarchy. It is a curious fact that in many DGs whilst a Head of Unit is 
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above the official in the hierarchy, the official is responsible to a Director.60 If an official 
wants a directive to be passed which is likely to be opposed by senior management sometimes 
their own Director, or the other Directors, then apparently a useful method of avoiding man-
agement opposition is to get Cabinet involvement in the dossier and thus that of the Commis-
sioner too.6 Cabinets have sought direct contacts with the officials to avoid the sometimes 
slow hierarchy, officials, logically enough, will also try and attract Cabinet attention if possi-
62 
ble. It is apparently for this reason that some heads of DG management, the Director Gener-
als seek to forbid and prevent any contact between officials and the Cabinet, regardless of 
whether this would be more efficient.63 Even so, Director Generals seemingly will bypass 
their own administrative management to get policies enforced and so speed up the system and 
can also prove to be a useful ally in dealing with lower management.64 
Even if a dossier is not directly wanted by the Commissioner and or the management, so long 
as the proposal has strong sponsors like the EP or a MS then seemingly a certain amount of 
pressure can be brought to bear.65In the event of opposition from the higher management then 
apparently the official can to go around the hierarchy to the EP and the Commissioner or the 
MS's ministers concerned. This is what is said to have happened with the regulation on elec-
tronic waste, the environment ministers from the MSs were highly supportive of it, and the 
officials had to sidestep the more industry friendly Commission, which was, in this respect, a 
problem that had to be circumvented.66 This is a useful tool to force a directive past internal 
blockages, and the traditionally environmentally friendly Committee of the Environment of 
the EP, can usually also be counted on to apply pressure where necessary. Some MS envi-
ronmental ministries like EU legislation which costs them less and is easier to get into their 
countries' law books. 
Whilst MSs can be useful in overcoming management difficulties, the official has to deal with 
the MSs which have their own methods and tactics of attempting to harness the entrepreneu-
rial spirit of the Commission. The MS lawyers and officials can apply their pressure in the 
committee stages of the dossier, as the official concerned is gathering information, or they can 
parachute another official, manager, an END (Seconded National Official), into the DG to run 
a dossier.67As the MSs are not a block but rather a group of independent actors, the official 
potentially has the advantage of being able to appeal to different MSs for knowledge and sup-
port, MS lawyers and officials in the Council, and the same applies to the MEPs and any of 
the other institutions officials involved, all have a chance to press for amendments and 
changes and the DG official will have to answer questions and challenges from them. 
The next opponents that the official will face are in the so called inter-institutional stage. Now 
other DGs can apply pressure for changes and delay the passage of the dossier. It used to be 
the case that two months was a realistic period for the DG to wait before its dossier reached 
the final Commission agreement stage on adoption, now that time is more like twelve months, 
which reflects, no doubt the increased competition mentioned earlier. It is not unknown for 
other DGs to notify lobby groups about another DG's dossier and to thus encourage them to 
protest to the lobby sensitive, College of Commissioners and the Heads of Cabinet and as a 
result dossiers may well be altered. The official will have to defend their dossier from legal 
60 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
61 ibid 
62 ibid 
fi3 ibid 
M ibid 
63 ibid 
66 ibid 
67 ibid 
133 
challenges from other DGs representing industry or transport, and of course the lawyers of the 
lobbyists. The economists of the other DGs will also closely scrutinize the text. The final de-
cision on adoption will be taken by the College or the Chefs of Cabinet after compromises 
have been made, sometimes quite serious compromises, e.g. According to one source the offi-
cial who drew up the proposal for environmental liability policy, saw his text watered down 
after industry lobbied the Commission at the various stages, the directive had called for strict 
liability and this was changed to fault based liability.68 Two exemptions were added which 
toned down the legally enforceable implementation text, which apparently turned the strict 
liability to a negligence only liability. The Chefs of Cabinet changed the text even further, 
weakening it from the standpoint of the original draft.69 The legal service of the Commission 
will have to approve a law and this can be a stage at which the lawyers test their skills. The 
legal service lawyers are said to often be conservative in their decisions, particularly since 
they must be sure that they will be able to win any ECJ cases which may well result. But 
also they tend to concentrate on the Treaty and the four basic freedoms which can be both a 
benefit and a curse for DG ENV. On the one hand, sometimes the lawyers of the legal service 
accept that they are not environmental law specialists and allow legislation to proceed if the 
DG explains its case.71 On the other hand if the basic freedoms are in any way challenged 
then there is said to be tendency for them to be conservative.72The last hurdle can be reasona-
bly said to involve the ECJ and its lawyers. As stated previously the DG has had a major 
problem with implementation and many of the MSs land in front of the ECJ and once again 
lawyers are opposed, quite possibly the DG's lawyers will be called on to state the DG's view 
and the work of the original official will be crucial for the process of the case. 
3,7 ESTABLISHING DG ENV. 
The history of the DG has reflected that of the ecological movement in general, starting off 
from scratch as an idealistic group of individuals loosely organised with the desire to further 
an environmental agenda. At first it was given the limited remit by the Commission of provid-
ing other DGs with advice. In 1972-3 there were just six officials working for the nascent DG 
ENV,73 allegedly environmentalists rather than Commission officials by career.74 Originally 
the DG was a; 'special service on environment and consumer protection' between 1973-
1981. Owing to the inherent potential of the environmentalist agenda and the dynamic, ori-
ginal leadership of a French Director the number of officials leapt to around 40 with the ab-
sorption of engineers from the Euroatom project which had recently been halted. The motivat-
ing and organising force for the DG was the French Director. Around 1978 he was given the 
title "a titre personnel" and became a Director General. The final chapter of the first phase 
of Community environmental activity was completed in 1982 with the establishment of a Di-
rectorate General for the environment whereas before it had been part of a joint Directorate. 
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Originally environmental issues had not been addressed explicitly under the founding treaties 
and were dealt with piecemeal as required by the various DGs affected.79 Environmental con-
cerns had been; 'motivated by the strong desire to eliminate trade distorting regulatory differ-
ences in national environmental regulations concerning product standards.'80 After the 1972 
Paris summit the Community openly began its own environmental policy, primarily all of the 
resulting policies (70 legislative texts)8* and legislation were based on Articles 235 EC and 
100EC, but the Environmental action programmes were perhaps more important, as these and 
some broad frame work directives served to prepare the way for the gradual extension of 
Community and DG ENV's competencies into new areas; these acted as bridgeheads for fol-
low up 'daughter' directives.82 
The intention of the founding fathers of the DG was to find policy areas, like water and waste, 
which did not come under the traditional sectoral headings of agriculture, trade etc.83 There 
was in effect a deliberate desire to separate a purely environmental sector from the rest of the 
Community activities, and to thus derive independent competencies which would justify fully 
fledged institutional and later Treaty based autonomy. Policy integration with the other DGs 
was also deliberately avoided, to ensure that the nascent DG went beyond being an internal 
Commission pressure group. From the start the DG used eveiy opportunity to promote new 
legislation.84 One example of this opportunism came when the French decided to improve the 
quality of their bathing water, the Commission quickly stepped in with the idea of extending 
such a goal to the Community, six months later the Council adopted the proposal.85 It is inter-
esting to note that a lot of environmental legislation was and is increasingly discussed first in 
Brussels and then adopted by MSs, Today 75% of environmental legislation in Germany is of 
Brussel's origin, Norway is the same, 80% of the UK's environmental legislation is from 
Brussels and 100% of that of Portugal and Spain.86 Legislation is literally created at the Euro-
pean level or adapted from legislation already in existence in some MSs and then imported 
into other MSs. 
A second phase of legal and institutional development began with the 1983 Stuttgart Euro-
pean Council, which emphasised the need to clean up pollution and in 1985 the European 
Council decided that the environment should be included in the Single European Act. Finally 
in 1987 environmental concerns and Community activities were given their own clear legal 
form under chapter seven. How DG ENV expanded both its competencies and staff numbers 
surprised many, a good summary of the second phase of legal development is quoted below: 
'The case of environmental legislation is significant and not untypical . . . The SEA changed 
this by introducing a specific legal basis for environmental legislation, albeit requiring una-
nimity (and with a first reference to subsidiarity). The next stage was inclusion in the Treaty 
on European Union of new provisions switching the voting basis from unanimity to qualified 
majority. The question of whether the Commission is successful in its attempts to expand 
competencies is thus far from rhetorical . . . it is not unreasonable to suggest that the Commis-
sion has been a powerful catalyst in making environmental standards a European issue.' 
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The inclusion of the EP in the co-decision making procedure on environmental issues has 
weakened the Commission and the Council as a whole, and strengthened that of the environ-
mentalists, as the parliament was up until recently more environmentally oriented than ele-
ments of the Commission and Council.88 
Quite apart from the large amounts of legislation which the DO generated during the period, 
in 1986 a decision was reached to develop an instrument previously used for trade and indus-
try, that of a formalised complaint procedure. Individuals could now send complaints about 
MS failures to implement environmental legislation direct to the Commission. The Commis-
sion has traditionally had too few staff to effectively monitor the implementation of legisla-
tion by MS ministries. The decision was publicised and as a result the number of complaints 
went from 6 per year in the early 80s to 600 a year in 1986 and 1987. As each complaint had 
to be seen by the Commissioner, the limited resources available to the legal unit were in-
creased. The pro-active approach of the DG had once again resulted in an extension of their 
influence over MS implementation rights and also resulted in an increase in staff numbers. 
What also emerged from this move was that the Commission decreased their perceived dis-
tance from the European citizen, this was and is a desirable institutional goal.8 Also the DG 
and therefore the Commission probably also succeeded thereby in evading accepting respon-
sibility for the failure of the MSs to fully implement environmental legislation. The complaint 
procedure was not required of the DG and was deliberately created from a particular interpre-
tation of Article 169,90 It is in effect a voluntary service offered to the public by the Commis-
sion and as such has to be considered an extra, which could be removed, should the Commis-
sion consider it a liability.91 The Commission is at pains to stress this point when they receive 
complaints about the slowness of the process. 
It is a curious construction rather similar to the initial environmental legislation, founded on 
an elaborate interpretation of an article. A complaint sets off a procedure with the Commis-
sion alarming the DG about a potential failure of a MS to follow and implement 
legislation,93and inevitably plunges the individual making the complaint into the labyrinthine 
politico/bureaucratic world of the Community. Articles 26-28 allow the Commission to take 
legal proceedings against the MS should it be necessary. Complaints can take on average of 
50 months94 and can apparently be wound up for political reasons by other Commissioners or 
MSs,95 with the decision clouded in secrecy and often far from satisfactory for the person 
making the complaint,96 NGOs want to retain the process because there is nothing else avail-
able. Ironically the Commission and the DG have in a sense become victims of their own suc-
cess. According to some sources almost half of the infringement cases outstanding in the EU 
between the Commission and the MSs are environmental in their origin.97Environmental laws 
have become highlighted as a result and high level disputes have occurred between MSs and 
the Commission. The friction caused by the increase in infringement cases would appear to 
have led to the next phase in the development of the DG. Despite the increase in cases, aver-
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aging around 600 a year98 there was not been a parallel increase in staff numbers, in fact only 
fifteen employees are involved. 
3.8 EVIDENCE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY 
When considering the case of the DG in question it is noticeable that it appears to have be-
haved in an entrepreneurial manner both during its development and in its exploitation of 
windows of opportunity. One official stressed the connection between an environmental dis-
aster and the generation by the DG of a piece of legislation in response.99 Prior to the accident 
or disaster any Commission policy for the sector concerned may well have been opposed by 
lobbyists and MSs, afterwards there is almost a common consensus on the need for action 
which the DG uses to its advantage. On 10 July 1976, an explosion occurred in a trichloro-
phenol reactor of the ICMESA chemical plant near Seveso in Italy, A toxic cloud descended 
on Seveso and resulted in serious health problems for the local inhabitants. The Commission 
apparently produced, in response, the Seveso Directive, Directive 82/50 I/EEC. The genera-
tion of this directive resulted in the production of several more directives, jumping on the 
band wagon, in a manner of speaking: Directive 89/391/EEC, on measures related to occupa-
tional safety and health; Directive 89/654/EEC, on minimum safety and health measures at 
work; Directive 90/219/EEC, relating to biotechnology; Directive 90/313/EEC, on the free-
dom of access to environmental information and Directive 89/618/Euratom, on public infor-
mation during a radioactive emergency. An accident in Basel, Switzerland in 1986 which 
caused massive pollution of the Rhine was one of the main causes of the Seveso Directive be-
ing amended twice, by Directive 87/216/EEC of March 1987 (OJNo L 85 of 28 March 1987) 
and by Directive 88/610/EEC of November 1988 (0J No L 336 of 7 December 1988); "Both 
amendments aimed at broadening the scope of the Directive, in particular to include the stor-
age of dangerous substances."100 
The sinking of the tanker Prestige in November 2002 led to the Commission apparently pro-
duced a proposal for a directive on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of sanctions, 
including criminal sanctions, for pollution offences. I0IThe sinking of the tanker Erika in 1999 
was seemingly the last straw, which allowed the Commission to re-introduce the proposal for 
l  
environmental liability. The explosion at the AZF site in Toulouse apparently led the 
Commission to immediately consider the need for an amendment of the Seveso II Directive, 
although one of the Community commentators on the proposal stressed that the site of the ex-
plosion was already fully covered by existing legislation.103 In 2000 the serious mining acci-
dent at Baia Mare resulted in the Commission generating first a communication entitled; 
"Safe operation of mining activities" (COM (2000)664 final) and then the proposal for a 
complementary directive.1 4According to internal sources the DG had responded in a particu-
larly entrepreneurial manner with the mining directive.105 
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One final point is that the Commission also used the accidental existence of a common con-
sensus on an issue to press for legislation. In 1981/2 there was considerable concern about the 
acidification of rain and the woods dying, which forced governments to get together to find a 
solution. At the same time the UK wanted to introduce lead free petrol to deal with the social 
problems of children suffering from lead poisoning as a result of living next to major roads. 
The DG sensed their chance so in 1983 there were three to four successful proposals on air 
pollution. 106On a treaty level the disasters led to the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty expanding 
107 the rights of the public to information. 
Whilst the above are proof that the DG responds to accidents with legislation this could be 
merely the common-sense act of a government department. But the interviews which were 
carried out appeared to reflect an entrepreneurial approach beyond that of a normal govern-
ment department. Why was legislation generated at Community level when arguably national 
legislation could have been sufficient? As with the bathing water directive the DG was ex-
tremely pro-active in pushing for the Community to set standards for all the MSs despite the 
reluctance of many of them. At times the proposed Community legislation potentially dupli-
cated or confused already existing international and national laws. This raises the question of 
i fift 
motive; why not leave the already existing standards in place? The same question can be 
raised with regard to the Toulouse accident and the Commission desire to implement an a-
mendment although there was already legislation in place which should have been imple-
mented.109 
The apparent failure of the DG to generate legislation which results in implementation taking 
place by the MS ministries can be seen either as the problem of the MSs or of the DG. Ac-
cording to one DG source, when 15 MSs fail to properly implement legislation, as is true for 
one directive, then there must be something wrong with the law.110 An implication being that 
the law was not precise enough, or too precise and not easy for the civil servants on the 
ground to enforce. Possibly the entrepreneurial nature of some of the legislation is reflected in 
it being easier to generate than finally to implement, the goal of the generating legislation in 
the DG at all costs could be said to have been, at times, incompatible with the goal of creating 
legislation which can be and is implemented on the ground. This was also mentioned as a 
problem by the author of the EP's opinion.111 Another point is that little is done by the DG 
itself to ensure that implementation takes place, and monitoring is treated as a minor issue 
when compared to generating legislation, despite the general understanding of the need to im-
prove implementation. The Legal unit which has to apply legal pressure on MSs which fail to 
comply is badly understaffed and there has so far not been any reallocation of resources to 
ensure that it occurs. The infringement problem is discussed more in the next chapter but suf-
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fice it to say that there seems to be a sense that the DG needed to generate legislation but did 
not seem over worried about its implementation, if that caused too many problems with the 
MSs then it could be toned down. 
In part, the large amounts of environmental legislation could be seen to have been produced 
owing to sectorization. The limited amount of inter DG communication and coordination re-
sulted in some DGs generating policies simply aimed at their sectors and their organizational 
needs and logic, rather than considering the needs of the EU and Commission as a whole. 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
So now we have seen that at a macro level the Commission has often shown itself to be entre-
preneurial, flexible and ready to exploit situations in the interests of the European project. The 
appearance of the rigid hierarchical structures inside the organization appears contradictory to 
the notion of flexibility, and immediately suggests to the observer that rigorous non hierarchi-
cal possibilities must be available for the Commission to have enjoyed the success it has. 
Closer examination reveals that the micro level of the officials shows the entrepreneurial 
qualities that the hierarchy appears to lack. Furthermore the rigidity of the hierarchy seems 
less dramatic when observations are made about how the Commission works in practice and 
what sort of behaviour it tacitly encourages. There is a real sense that the bureaucratic rigidi-
ties are retained but ignored for certain phases in the EU cycle. 
The Commission has been shown to encourage self sufficiency in the officials with staff 
members having to fend for themselves. Initiative is promoted as any success gained is often 
down to the decision to act being taken by an official. Freedom is very present with the offi-
cial possessing incredible room for choice and discretion, quite unlike anything their equiva-
lent in the MS civil services would possess. The official must be able to network and thus 
possess the social skills which are basic to success. Officials are encouraged to compete for 
everything in the Commission, for their position, their promotion - the possibilities for which 
can be extremely scarce in particular to the position of Head of Unit, for their dossiers.112 And 
finally entrepreneurial sensitivity to the opportune moment to introduce a legislative product 
that is sure to succeed. The DGs which possess these officials, who have, as it were, been 
through fire, are in possession of a valuable commodity. If correctly placed these officials 
could be expected to carry their DG to success. 
The vast amounts of environmental legislation that Europe has produced combined with the 
information gained during interviews, appear to show a DG made up of extremely capable 
officials, often lawyers, who have not only been quite entrepreneurial in their behaviour but 
also successful in ensuring the passage of their laws, a task which involves political and net-
working ability. The DG created work for itself. The absence of European law at all in the 
1950s maybe meant that there was a vacuum waiting to be filled with few institutional oppo-
nents present, 'an ecological niche' as one official put it,113 or a market opportunity which al-
lowed the DG to be so successful In fact the combined evidence of the accident legislation 
correlation and the increased staff turnover, would appear to be suggestive evidence that en-
trepreneurs have been present in the DG combining very effectively with Policy Networks. 
The DG showed dynamic officials seemingly encouraged to circumvent hierarchies so long as 
this was deemed desirable by the Commission as a whole. The next chapter will show the 
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Commission using various methods to temporarily clamp down on some of this behaviour. 
OLAF also finally helped serve similar Commission goals. Both UCLAF and the DG show 
the importance of individual officials and their scope for taking action. 
Figures 1 and 2 Formal and Informal lines of Hierarchy and the choice of principals for 
the Desk Officer 
Cabinet 
Director General 
Head of Unit 
Desk Officer 
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Interview Dates 
DG Environment Officiais 
Interviews carried out with 16 officiais between 09.4.2003 and 16.02.2005 
DG Cabinet and ex Cabinet Members 
Cabinet Member 11.06.2003 
Ex-Cabinet Member 03.06.2003 
European Parliament 
MEP 24.04.2003 
MEP assistant 05.03.2003 
NGO Official 01.04.2003 
NMS Officials 
Hungaiy 
Official 1.03.03.2005 
Official 2. 17.03.2005 
Czech 
Official 28.1.2005 
Poland 
Official 31.03.2005 
Estonian Official 04.03.2005 
Lithuania 
Official 18.03.2005 
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4. DG ENV 2 
COMMISSION SLOW DOWN; MS INTERVENTION AND 
COMMISSION BUREAUCRATISATION: DG ENV 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter we saw the possibilities for dynamism in the Commission and for entrepre-
neurial officials. When the Commission is going through a positive stage in the EU cycle of 
integration and stagnation, then this dynamism and officials with the ability and will to recog-
nise chances to promote their DG and expand their legislative base are a valuable resource. 
Some sectoral loyalty is to be expected and so long as it is more than matched by organisa-
tional loyalty and the joint sense of integrationary mission then there is little to worry about. 
When the situation changes and legislative output needs to be curbed and a less strident and 
dynamic (threatening) profile is needed, then the inner equilibrium of the DG and Commis-
sion will be lost. Sectoral Policy Networks become less desirable and prove to be hard to con-
trol by a hierarchy which may well find itself increasingly isolated. OLAF showed us the 
Commission resisting OLAF and using it, seemingly split in its approach to the reform. The 
DG will show something similar occurring. 
By the beginning of the 1990s some of the major types of environmental problems were cov-
ered by EU policies and there were a broad range of policy instruments in position: environ-
mental standards, product norms, emission standards, economic instruments and agreements. 
Two trends began to emerge during this period, one was a general slow-down in Commission 
legislative activity which was more than matched in the environmental field. The second was 
a greater emphasis through the 1990's that environmental concerns and legislation could no 
longer be allowed to develop independently from main stream policies. Sectorisation had go-
ne too far and needed to be curbed. In the face of increasing sectoral DG fragmentation there 
was a movement in the Commission as a whole towards enforcing legislative consistency. In-
tegration units were created in other DGs to try and ensure that environmental concerns were 
considered in, for example, agriculture and vice versa. These units were apparently often trea-
ted as spies by the DG in which they were based and often isolated. The move towards more 
Commission integration heralded a general change in the Commission's attitude towards the 
DG, which was considered in some quarters to be ineffective for improving the environment. 
Seemingly the Santer Commission's iess but better' slogan meant in effect that although the 
unspoken benchmarking method of legislation generation proving a DG to be successful re-
mained true, the Commission wanted to assume a lower profile and that would mean less leg-
islation. In part the lower profile of the Commission was in response to the MSs hostility after 
the Delors period as shown in the subsidarity debate. The competition between DGs to get 
legislation adopted therefore apparently became harder and the hurdles that legislation was 
expected to pass became tougher. The introduction of impact assessments on legislative pro-
posals placed another hurdle in the way of the official; whilst it also helped to re-integrate the 
Commission and ensure more legislative consistency. Now the other DGs had to be involved 
earlier on and detailed assessments of the social, economic, environmental impact of legisla-
tion had to be carried out. DG legislation adoption by the Commission became more valuable 
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as it becomes scarcer. In a tough market place entrepreneurial instincts and abilities were even 
more called for in DGs and officials. 
Given that there had been a gradual move from environmentalism to concern about economic 
issues in the Commission and EU, the difficulties of selling environmental legislation to the 
College became steadily harder. The result was a DG which was concerned with backing leg-
islation which it was sure would be adopted by the College and the MSs. It became harder for 
officials to get their legislation selected by the DG let alone adopted by the Commission. The 
response of some DG officials was to leave the DG and to move where their legal entrepre-
neurial talents can better be used. There was seemingly a correlation between the level of staff 
turnover and the decline in the possibilities for legal entrepreneurial activities, particularly 
when compared to the possibilities available in other DGs and sectors. It was also difficult for 
the DG to succeed in having its proposals accepted during the inter DG discussion phase and 
many of the policies were drastically watered down or refused entirely,2 industry was said to 
have had a strong presence in at least four of the major DGs and DG ENV often only has one 
possible coalition partner in DG SANCO (DG Health and Consumer Protection). When com-
pared to the boom times of the late 1980s and early 1990s the rest of the 1990s were a time of 
stagnation or maturing depending on the perspective adopted. In the mid 1990s the DG began 
discussing policy chains, and the focus became more on policy outcomes rather than just the 
production of legislation. Given the impressive amounts of legislation but less impressive 
state of the environment and implementation this was a logical move. Other policy tools were 
introduced, like the industry voluntary agreements, to try and achieve what legislation previ-
ously achieved but some of these were quite unsuccessful.4 
The result of the changes in the Commission and the effect that this had on the DG was the 5 
Environmental Action Programme (EAP) of 1993. This was different to what had gone before c 
and apparently reflected a change in attitude/ ideology of some within the DG. One obvious 
example was the fact that the 5EAP stated the need for industry and the DG to work together 
more. This programme marked a watershed and it is worth mentioning some of the variant 
ways that it has been perceived. In some ways the 5EAP was argued to be an excellent strate-
gic move by the DG, an entrepreneurial merger or franchise operation with other DGs which 
recognised the changes in the operating field or market of the DG and quickly adapted to 
them, recognising the opportunities and threats that the status quo held. Generating legislation 
had become harder to justify in the Commission and the issues had become more complex 
and involved more sectors. Thus some officials considered it to be inevitable that the 5 and 6 
EAP of 2002 were more and more complex. The playing field had changed for policy making 
has changed, so DG performance has to be assessed bearing that in mind, 'Things are not as 
simple anymore not as proscriptive as in the old days.'7 Certainly with regard to the changed 
institutional balance between the Commission and the EP, strategy was very much in play. 
The growth in EP involvement meant that the 6EAP had to go through the co-decision proc-
ess, it was obvious that any targets included would be debated for months and more studies 
would be needed and analyses, which would have made it impossible to get the programme 
through. Therefore it made sense for the officials responsible to avoid listing targets and con-
crete goals as had been the case in previous EAPs. According to some the recent EAPs repre-
2 interview with Commission Official: DG ENV 
3Skjaersetb and Wettestad: Understanding the Effectiveness of EU Environmental Policy: How can Regime Analysis Con-
tribute? In Environmental Politics (2002) Vol 11 No 3 p. 100 
4 See note I Cini (2000) p.84 
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6 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
7 ibid 
143 
a 
sented a victory by the environmentalists since they were more strategic in their approach 
than the previous ones and showed that the DG had learned from previous mistakes,9 like the 
lack of environmental legislation implementation. 
The programme stressed the need to concentrate on implementation and less on legislation 
and of course more on the integration of the Commission implying; 'the inclusion of envi-
ronmental concerns into sectoral policy domains.' ,0The same author stated that it could be the 
case that DG Environment staff now had to consider the 'practical feasibility of their propos-
al s.'nSustainability was the guiding principle in the present programme and it aimed to en-
courage patterns of development, which would allow economic growth for future generations. 
The Director General was said to have felt the need to use seconded national officials to de-
velop the 5EAP rather than permanent officials, because of personnel problems which led to 
'tension and conflict112 with in the DG as staff formed into what were effectively blocks based 
on their backgrounds and interests. The detractors from the recent EAPs made a less polite 
assessment of the programmes stating about the 6EAP, 'it usually amounts to little more than 
"mission" statements, biased research objectives and pious "strategy jargon" to which few 
I 
strings are attached.' A major weakness of the programme was, according to some, that it 
lacked real goals and was far too vague,14 this last point could be seen as a strength, 'It is the 
vagueness and all embracing nature o f . . . that has made it acceptable to many political di-
mensions, environmentalists and industrialists. . ,15The sixth programme was said to be devoid 
of any timetable and even vaguer, continuing the process started with 5EAP. 
The dynamic, dominant side of the Commission, armed with legal powers to control the MSs 
is shown clearest in the infringement procedure. Article 226 EC Treaty allows the Commis-
sion to effectively take MSs to court for failure in putting EU legislation into force. It is here 
that confrontation and tension can be expected to be seen. During dynamic periods of integra-
tion the DG set up a complaint's procedure to facilitate and strengthen its infringement detec-
tion and subsequent prosecution powers. In the DG there is a section that deals with infringe-
ments, the legal section, and in conjunction with the Commission legal services decides when 
to submit the infringement to the ECJ. When however the Commission is reclusive, these po-
wers can be expected to be something of an embarrassment and a problem, and this was 
seemingly the case. A large proportion of the infringement cases before the ECJ were envi-
ronmental in their origin, this was a political problem and not just a legal one. Whatever the 
rhetoric, despite the declared intention of the DG to concentrate on implementation 16and a 
doubling in the work load17 the departments in the front line of implementation did not see 
their numbers increased,18 rather an attempt appeared to be underway to outsource or re-
nationalise part of the infringement process. I9Budgets, which were essential for ensuring im-
plementation i.e. for missions in MSs and for meetings in the DG, were apparently cut rather 
than increased.20 Instead of an active management regime reorganising the DG to concentrate 
on implementation, the last few years were said to have seen reactive management behav-
8 Liefferink, D and Andersen M X (eds): The innovation of EU environmental policy, (1997) Olso, Scandinavian Press p.l 19 
0 ibid p. 116 
10 See notel Cini (2000) p.8l 
11 ibid p.82 
13 ibid p. 124 
13 House of Lords session 1997-98, Select Committee on the European Communities, Second Report. Community Environ-
mental Law; Making it work (1997) p. 177 
14 Interview with Commission Official: DG ENV 
15 See note 8 Lieflerink; Andersen (1997) p.l 19 
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iour and no re-training staff in the managerial tasks needed in implementation took place. 
In the last couple of years the DG has apparently been favouring the use of 'strategies' rather 
than policies (which had been mentioned in the 6EAP). The problem with these is that they 
are said to be harder to control and enforce implementation on, than legislation, which sug-
gests that serious implementation is increasingly off the cards.23 There is said to be a "tolera-
tion of infringements" despite there being lots of discussion about monitoring implementa-
tion. In practice the DG states that it is "very complex" and infringements proceedings are 
expected not to be launched so often.24 
4.1 RE-ORIENTING THE DG 
Apparently the general slow down in Commission legislation generation was not enough to 
slow the DG enough to satisfy some. Some Policy Networks were more than capable of hold-
ing to their mission and pursuing an environmentalist agenda. So during the whole of the 
1990's period, there were attempts to directly influence the way that the DG was organised 
and the mentality of the staff by certain MSs and also increasingly the Commission. The in-
tervention into the DG probably also resulted from various pressures among which were the 
extension of the European Parliament's (EP) rights of co decision with its active environ-
r\ c 
mental committee, which threatened danger as the DG environment's environmental activ-
ists were able to co ordinate their activities with the EP,26and also with some of the MS envi-
ronmental ministers in the Council. In the 1990s both these institutional forces appeared to 
have been more environmentally active than the Commission as a whole and pushed for more 
staff to be granted to the DG, and the Commission as a whole had been weakened vis-a-vis 
the EP. The northern enlargement of 1995 to include several environmentally active MSs 
had strengthened the environmentalists in the Union. What followed has been described by 
Michelle Cini who stated the following: 
4A conscious attempt by elites within the Commission to alter DG XI's underlying cul ture . . . 
has led to a top-down exercise in altering the underlying assumptions, belief systems and e-
thos of DG Environment officials . . . what this amounts to is an attempt to go beyond struc-
tural and procedural change to change the underlying rationale of and justification for envi-
ronmental policy.'30 
Seemingly in the view of Cini the DG took on the appearance of being a recalcitrant problem 
case,31 and it was considered that it was necessary to create a new identity for the DG and a 
new ideology which was based on market views and co operation with industry and not on 
ecological purism. 
Some commentators linked the move towards deregulation in the DG to the growing presence 
of British officials both permanent and seconded.3 Seconded officials are appointed by a MS 
21 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
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for a period of three years to work in the Commission. More than many other parts of the 
Commission, DG ENV employed large numbers of seconded offlcials33almost 20 % in 1999. 
According to one source over half DG Environment's staff were 'non establishment' in 
1997,34 and it was heavily dependent on the specialised knowledge of NGOs as well as MSs 
and industry, this was said to be a sign of'organisational weakness.'35Both the 5 and 6 EAP 
were stated to be the work of British officials and the UK was noted as a having a strong pres-
o /• 
ence in the management of the DG. This was particularly the case in the second half of the 
1990's. Others have highlighted a clash in the Franco/Germanic proscriptive legislative ap-
proach and the UK one.37Up until 2000 the DG apparently remained to some extent divided 
with some units still producing impressive amounts of legislation,38 whilst some in the hierar-nn 
chy favoured less legislation and greater use of softer methods. The legislation generation 
can be said to be due to "epistemic communities" or Policy Networks, bearing in mind the 
active involvement of Environmental ministers and MEPs: 
' . . . officials have over the years gradually acquired for themselves a de facto policy role of-
ten supported by attendant interest groups and so called "epistemic communities" of experts. 
Thus, a considerable corpus of environmental law was developed without a strong Treaty base 
and finally legitimised in the SEA in 1986 . . . Only now, perhaps, do Member states realise 
the huge implementation costs of such environmental polices An effective advocacy 
coalition of Commission officials, the international scientific community, and a vociferous 
and skilful environmental movement acting as a "megaphone for science" made the running.' 
National governments (including Britain which now leads the opposition to these laws) went 
along with it, largely in ignorance of implementation problems ahead.'40 
Some of the MSs had seemingly come to regret the willingness with which they had allowed 
their environment ministers to have a free hand earlier, The following statement by a Com-
mission official illustrates this: 
'The process of adopting legislation is very chaotic with environment ministers voting yes 
when their treasuries wouldn't. Usually treasuries will notice later on but sometimes not. 
If you (Commission official) want a directive to be passed then environment ministries can 
put pressure on the DG and so force the directive past internal blockages; MS environment 
ministries like this too since EU legislation costs them less and is easier to get into their coun-
tries' laws.'41 
There was a real sense of some MSs, in particular allegedly the UK, wanting to deal with the 
DG at the first possible moment and to make sure that there were no more unpleasant sur-
prises in store. Throughout the 1990s Germany and the UK were stated to have been vying 
with each other to staff the DG.42ln 1995 with the northern enlargement came three new MSs, 
the pro-environment grouping on the Council went from 3 to 6 votes versus 9 which meant 
they had a blocking minority.43In particular the advent of Green ministers in 1998 in three 
33 Nugent, N. The European Commission, (2000) Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave, p. 165 
34 Grant, W, Mathews, D, Newell, P, The effectiveness of EU Environmental Policy (2000) Basingstoke, Macmillan Press 
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large MSs, Germany, France and Italy had Green ministers, would have meant problems for 
UK once things reached the council level. To counter this the UK was alleged to have lobbied 
hard for the position of Director General and got it and the UK could so 'stop laws at 
source. ,44The Germans and the UK in the DG seem to have been most at loggerheads.45The 
Director General was alleged to have favoured voluntary agreements with industry as opposed 
to legislation. 46 
4.2 MS VERSUS POLICY NETWORK 
There appear to have been a few methods for the Policy Network in the DG to be stopped by 
the more UK dominated top management. The first has been mentioned, seconded national 
officials, or just simply national officials were involved in a small group and used to draw up 
programmes for the DG. Informal usage was alleged to have been made of various organisa-
tional features like the Policy Group where the Directors and Director General met to curb 
policy, but more on that below. And finally reorganizations of large elements of the DG were 
stated to have ensured that members of the network were unable to easily maintain any en-
trenched positions, as we will see. This is a similar method to that which was alleged to have 
been used in DG Agriculture by the Commissioner to defeat various Policy Networks. 
Usually Policy Meetings in other DGs seem to have been intended for use by the senior man-
agement to discuss the running of the DG and not really to decide on policy direction and 
which policies (dossiers) were adopted. But in the DG this seemed to have become the case. 
Before any proposal could be pursued for possible inter-institutional discussion it had to be 
approved by the Policy Group Meeting. Present at the meeting were the top management and 
the staff member concerned. By that is meant the staff member who had drawn up a particular 
policy. Ostensibly in the DG the meeting was there to ensure that there was coherence in the 
policies further developed by the DG, In reality, it was said to often be the first time that the 
majority of the Directors had actually heard about a proposal previously agreed upon by one 
of their number. 
1 n 
The meetings themselves were alleged to have been hurried, badly prepared affairs whose 
end decisions appeared to lack rhyme or reason.48 Seemingly, no apparently predictable crite-
ria existed for knowing whether a proposal would be accepted or rejected. Directors were said 
to have rejected other Directors' proposals for personal or political reasons, or used the com-
mon excuse of requesting more studies be carried out prior to acceptance. Some decisions 
were said to have been made to stop new legislative proposals being accepted at all.49For the 
humble Desk Officer attempting to develop a policy the meetings seemingly became a series 
of hurdles to cross. The first was to even get their proposal accepted onto the agenda of the 
weekly held meeting. The second stage was to get it through the meeting without it being re-
jected or requiring more studies to be made. The best strategy was seemingly to either have a 
proposal that no one understood or cared about50 or to avoid the meetings all together.51 Ob-
viously some proposals failed to fall into these fortunate categories and frustration was the 
44 Interview with MEP 
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46 ibid 
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result. The situation was said to have become so serious that in 2002 a report was requested 
from a consultancy firm, a sure sign of desperation,52 which studied the meetings and came to 
some drastic conclusions. Firstly the staff did not understand the decisions of the meetings 
and what they were there for and secondly, the Directors did not seem to understand what 
their staff were doing, all in all, the meetings were dysfunctional. Yet despite that, the rec-
ommendations made were not acted upon and the meetings continued. 
After this stage a policy document, which succeeded in being accepted by the Policy Group 
Meeting, was then sent to the staff meeting.53 Here the administration (the services) and the 
Cabinet and Commissioner discussed proposals that had been fully developed and decided 
which should be put forward for inter-institutional discussion and final adoption by the Com-
mission itself. The Cabinet were alleged to have all too often been badly briefed and failed to 
understand the complex nature of the directives they were asked to comment on. The result 
was said to be sometimes confused policy direction and proposals being rejected.54Examp!es 
occurred apparently of the Directors and the Director General agreeing for a proposal to be 
fully developed but failing to attain the Commissioner's prior approval; the proposals were 
then rejected in the staff meetings.55 Again years of work appeared to go wasted due to a lack 
of communication often grounded in a lack of trust. The European Environment Agency was 
occasionally requested to comment and provide information on policies desired by the Cabi-
net.56 The Commissioner and Cabinet appeared at times to prefer to discuss issues with the 
agency rather than addressing the DG services which they headed.57This lack of trust or rather 
relocation of trust to another community organisation might possibly partly have been due to 
the Commissioner being Scandinavian and the agency being based in Denmark, Small groups 
of advisers like the Cabinet, working in a large and complex DG where communication flows 
were unpredictable, inevitably resulted in friction.58Cabinet members were said to have be-
come involved in networks within the DG and could help proposals to side track the formal 
administrative hierarchy and the Policy Group.59 This was called the Delors method and pro-
vided highly effective, at least one member of the Cabinet in the DG confirmed that circum-
venting the DG services hierarchy was routine practice and essential since it was so slow and 
inflexible and the management problematic,60 It should be noted that the Staff Meetings were 
seemingly abandoned presumably owing to their dysfunctional nature. Apparently all direct 
contact between the Cabinet and the administration was to be removed, instead it had to go 
via the hierarchy of the DG. This probably added to the problem of efficiency, supposedly in 
2003 by May/June the DG had only covered 15% of its planned work for that year.61 The 
Commissioner seems to have been environmentally active and a few long awaited pretty 
green agenda issues were finally adopted under her (environmental liability law) despite the 
Commission slow down. She was alleged to have had problems with the UK Director Gen-
eral.62 
The functioning of the Policy Group could have been interpreted as having a policing function 
within the DG: enforcing certain standards and hierarchical control. And yet for policing to be 
effective it has to be predictable and the Policy Group Meetings appear to have been far from 
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that. This raises the question of the function of the meetings, were they there to enforce policy 
choice? If that were the case then again some degree of predictability would have been ex-
pected. A possible interpretation of the unusual nature of the meetings would appear to be that 
the Directors and Director General participating in the Policy Group Meeting had the unspo-
ken goal of reducing productivity by the Desk Officers, and maximising the discretion of the 
senior management. All policies had to go via the policy group and this was then a controlling 
mechanism to deal with the Policy Network. Vague criteria for assessments would have en-
sured the hierarchy's room for manoeuvre. 
Maybe the reason for the odd way of doing business was that all bureaucrats have superiors as 
well as subordinates; the Policy Group was answerable to the EP, MSs, the public, their 
Commissioner and the College. The Desk Officers probably often had these superiors to the 
Directors in the Policy Group within their networks and thus had them as potentially powerful 
allies. There was maybe a sense in which the Policy Group was a desperate attempt by the 
Directors to exert control on the uncontrollable, namely, the Policy Networks. By demanding 
that further studies be made or rejecting a proposal outright the Policy Group is attempting to 
draw the fangs of the networks. Seemingly the Policy Group was only temporarily successful 
in this. Another aspect of the Policy Group which needs to be addressed is the independence 
with which they reached their decisions. In particular the role of the Director General has to 
be taken into consideration. The Director General apparently participated in the meetings as a 
full member and implicitly as the head of the meeting. Directors would want to make the dif-
ficult step to becoming either deputy or full Director Generals and to do this they required the 
right connections and also the approval of their immediate superior. 
The management in 2000 apparently finally used the reorganisation tactic in an attempt to re-
gain control of the DG. The Policy Group and Staff Meetings, effectively policing procedures, 
had not managed to stop the legislation that was still being produced by amongst others Pol-
icy Networks. It had become steadily harder to get proposals through the Meetings but still 
the existence of networks allowed the Desk Officers and their Heads of Unit to ensure that 
some legislation was accepted. A major reorganisation was carried out in 2001 which as the 
tables show involved half the management in the DG being re-deployed or their units re-
named and given new tasks. Although the stated reason for the reorganisation was the 6EAP, 
the timing and form the reorganisation took would appear to support the view, namely that 
personnel reasons lay behind the reorganisation.64 The fact that a couple of years later another 
major reorganisation took place, reversing some of the changes made in 2000 appears to rein-
force the personnel issue motivation since the DG was still following the 6EAP at the time of 
the second major reorganisation. Troublesome units were allegedly dismantled and, for ex-
ample, the Waste Unit was given a new head, a new Director, made answerable to the Direc-
tor General himself and allocated to a new member of the Cabinet; the DG hierarchy for the 
Waste Unit Desk Officers was utterly changed. This reflected the divided nature of the appar-
ently rigid hierarchy which had to be totally removed and changed. Evidently some elements 
of the previous hierarchy had been themselves unwilling actors in the Director General's at-
tempts at curbing the Waste Unit. Now the highest levels of the hierarchy for the Waste Unit 
shared Scottish nationality. This might have been an accident but one source, at least, thought 
it was obvious that the Director General had manoeuvred a Scottish Cabinet member into the 
/ 
position he then filled, and that the Director shared the same nationality. 
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Part of the reorganisation allegedly saw new potential networks being formed within the hier-
archy and allegedly between other DGs and DG Environment;66networks which favoured the 
policy style and content of the new Director General. Certainly less legislation appears to 
have been produced as the result of the changes but equally few voluntary agreements with 
industry took place, which was what the Director General had favoured. Voluntary agree-
ments were outside the remit of the co-decision procedure with the EP and by promoting this 
policy tool at the expense of the legislative option the Director General and the Commission 
were side-stepping the encroaching new powers of the EP. This approach could well have 
been in the interests of the UK and other MSs like France, which had had a bruising face 
down with the EP over environmental issues. The re organisation could then be seen as a 
direct attempt, similar to that of the Policy Group Meetings, to redirect the nature and content 
of legislative proposals.68 By shuffling dossiers and individuals in addition to the meetings, 
the hierarchy seemingly wanted to ensure a change in textual content and the whole legisla-
tive input. The Waste Unit was described as the motor of the DG, the Director General alleg-
edly effectively applied the brakes to the unit and the DG as a whole,69 slowing down the pro-
ductivity of the Desk Officers by every means possible. 
4.3 THE RESULT 
The DG was stated by the EEA (European Environment Agency) to have reached a low point 
in 2001, it was said to be; 'demotivated', with positions even more entrenched than ever. ^ A _ 
DG management and staff turnover reached 25%-30% or higher over this period which has 
meant that in one unit after four years only one member was left of the original team. The im-
pressive turnover of management and staff was matched by an equally rapid turnover in 
Commissioners with five Commissioners in eleven years. This led to the following comment, 
"as a result of these disruptions, 'DGXFs internal influence waned . . . "'? lThe numbers of 
promotions fell gradually since 1998 apart from promotions to A7 which fell dramatically in 
2001.72Promotions within the DG to higher management levels were almost non existent, (1 a 
year). About one third of the management (.33) changed in some form (from one unit to an-
other, or one policy area to another) on average from one calculating period to the next approx 
every 8-10 months. The ratio of unchanged staff to changed staff for five periods are as fol-
lows: 33/19, 34/11, 25/25,42/13, 36/17. For DG Competition, during approximately the same 
period, the figure for management change is about one fifth (0.21) with ratios as follows 36/5, 
25/19, 37/5, 34/7.73 The figures show 
a considerable difference with DG competition man-
agement being more stable for the same period. It should also be noted that whereas DG Envi-
ronment had three Director Generals from 1997-2003, DG Competition had only one. 
The high turnover of both staff and management in the DG as indicated in the tables, was 
matched by a predictable decline in trust and a slow down in productivity.74 The reshuffling 
resulted in what was described as an efficiency black hole75 of a couple of years, as officials 
had to learn each other's expertise afresh. The nature of the Commission legislative process 
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and its slender staff resources made this method of policy direction via Policy Meetings and 
reorganizations unwise both institutionally as the loss of in-house expertise and good will 
with the Policy Networks weakened the Commission vis-a-vis MSs and lobbyists and with 
regard to its own performance. Unless of course a slow down and some inefficiency could be 
argued to have been acceptable for Commission organizational survival reasons. The ineffi-
ciency was hardly useful for enlargement of the union. 
Given the disparity between the internal assets of the DG: knowledge, expertise and dossiers 
in the hands of the Desk Officers and Heads of Unit and final decision making prerogatives in 
the hands of the Directors, communication and trust between the managers and their staff and 
between the management themselves were vital for the organisation to function. The absence 
of these would lead to informal and ad hoc methods of management being used instead. This 
is seemingly what happened with seemingly innocuous meetings intended for management 
co-ordination developed into effective filters for policy proposals. The meetings themselves 
would have been unnecessary if trust and normal management staff relations had been in 
place and prevailed. Then early discussions could have occurred between Head of Unit and 
Directors in which information regarding proposals could have been exchanged and legisla-
tive proposals dropped very early on if necessary. The alleged absence of effective horizontal 
communication between the Directorates and sometimes, implicitly between units, and man-
agement and Heads of Unit and staff resulted in months, sometimes years76 being spent de-
veloping legislative proposals, and networks which were later summarily dropped at the Pol-
icy Meetings. This inefficient usage of scarce Commission resources and MS expert capaci-
ties seemingly owed a lot to lack of communication, and trust. And yet it also likely that it 
was deliberate, the DG or elements of it were to be braked, reined in hard, and this is exactly 
what happened resulting immediately in inefficiency. 
The motives of the Policy Network in DG ENV can be seen as highly motivated and highly 
idealistic. Indeed it might seem fair to consider its members to have been the true environ-
mental idealists who refused to allow this great good, the environment, to be abandoned for t n 
economic goals. The network was true to the founding goals and motives of the DG which 
had as an organization been changed from its environmentally activist line. According to 
Mintzberg resistance is pretty inevitable in such a situation.78 It was also true to the founding 
goals of the Commission as a whole in driving forwards integration and expanding the Euro-
pean sphere wherever possible. The problem for the network was that the times had changed 
and that the emphasis in the EU and the Commission as well was on economic growth. From 
the stand point of the then DG hierarchy and to an extent the Commission, the network ap-
peared an extremely resilient group which generated legislation which was no longer in mode 
and resisted reform and controls. It is hard not to see something heroic in the network that 
stood up for the old values and lost out. 
The DG was and is to some extent an organisation made up of many smaller organisations 
each with their own agenda.79 It was a divided organisation in which there were several major 
cleavages: between the old guard from Euroatom and the newer more environmentally active 
officials; between those who favoured the proscriptive legalistic approach and those who fa-
voured de-regulation; between the main stream officials and the idealists; between the new 
76 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV it can take 9 months for an official to master a policy dossier/proposal. 
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and the previous Commission ideologies. Furthermore there were and are alleged to be divi-
sions within the management between those who saw the Commission as a closed system de-
tached from the outside world, in which success was rated at getting policies adopted by the 
Commission, and those who focused on the Union as a whole and aimed to produce policies 
beneficial for it.81Lastly there were allegedly several serious differences in the personal mana-
gerial styles of the Directors and Heads of Unit and between the views of the Commissioner ft? 
and the Director General. However, the DG did not see a uniform centrifugal process occur-
ring, but rather some departments which held to a previous 'ideology' and method of work-
ing, and the management which do not share this approach. The House of Lords commented 
on this in their report which noted the un-coordinated approach within the DG. The struggle 
was therefore more between management and certain officials and their departments for con-
trol of the 'soul' of the organization. 
4.4 BUREAUCRATISATION OF THE DG 
In some ways the alleged desire of the UK Director General to slow the DG down and make it 
more industry friendly was tolerated by the Commission, which itself wanted to adopt a lower 
profile and see arguably a reduction in legislation, infringements and confrontation with the 
MSs, sectorisation, and more emphasis being placed on economic issues. That said, the UK 
Director General left soon after the reorganization and was replaced by another who was said 
to be 4 . . . very loyal to the Commission and. . . . doesn't have a big political agenda more a 
technical agenda.'4 There were changes in Directors, and generally more allegedly detailed 
management, "micro management." There was said to be more of an emphasis on proce-
dures and the DG was centralized.86 The following quotation illustrates this, 'The time doing 
bureaucratic procedures has doubled, now it is 70% of work, 5 years ago it was much easier, 
now 10 times more checks are needed and half of the time spent on procedures could be 
cut.,87Delegation allegedly went down and so did efficiency and the DG slowed even fur-
ther.88Desk Officers apparently had less discretion than before.89The trade off between bu-
reaucratic control and efficiency can be explained as follows: 
4 . . . official codes, rules, and procedures that typify formal structures often prevent individ-
ual initiative, forbid the deletion of unnecessary steps, inhibit the acceptance of risk and re-
sponsibility for terminating useless operations and impose other more or less similar inhibi-
tions. . . . all these actions have the effect of preventing actions that could increase effi-
,90 ciency. 
And yet despite all the bureaucratisation that took place in the drive to bring the DG into the 
Commission mainstream, it was stated that a new dynamic was finally coming to be evident 
in the DG and that it was gradually seeing an improvement in its situation (2003-2004) and an 
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increase in its activity again.91ln part this was possibly due to changes in the senior manage-
ment of the DG and the new Commissioner. The period of bureaucratization probably served 
a positive purpose, from the Commission's perspective; it seemed to reduce Policy Network 
activity, slowed the DG down and made it less of a threat to the MSs. The quiet understaffing 
of the infringement's section of the DG seems to support this Commission goal of confronta-
tion reduction with the MSs. To some extent, periods of bureaucratization also seemed bene-
ficial in the removal of MS influence and moderating of DG internal politics; this is discussed 
in the findings chapter under the Mintzberg section. 
4.5 THE KINNOCK REFORMS 
A portion of the bureaucratization which was put into effect in the DG was due to the Kin-
nock Reforms of the Prodi Commission. The reforms were motivated in part by the desire to 
prepare the Commission for the enlargement in 2004. The white paper which the college a-
dopted in 1.3.2000 contained the Kinnock reforms. In it the Commission stresses that it wants 
to be 'strong and independent and effective' and firmly in the middle of the EU. To achieve 
this situation again, the reforms aimed to reduce the number of staff-involved project man-
agement (around a half of total staff) and so to restore the Commission to 'its institutional role 
as the motor of European Integration5. Staff would be returned to the core functions of'policy 
conception, political initiative.' Much along the lines of the modern civil service the Commis-
sion declared that it wanted to form a culture founded on service. Codes of conduct would be 
made with the EP and the public by allowing them easier access to documentation. 
In order to achieve the above the Commission introduced Activity Based Management to 'in-
tegrate priority setting and resource allocation across the organisation, enable activity to be 
ft a 
monitored from the centre, and make management and evaluation easier at all levels. To 
improve activity planning and use of resources and to ensure that they were more policy 
driven, the SPP was introduced, Strategic Planning and Programming. Delegation of policy 
management activities and decentralisation to MS public bodies was promoted. Furthermore 
'performance-oriented working methods would be introduced throughout the organisation, 
decision-making and administrative procedures simplified, inter-service co-ordination, and 
the keeping of archives improved, progress made towards the e-commission, and quality ma-OT 
nagement techniques introduced.' 
The reforms also affected financial management quite seriously. A new financial regulation 
was introduced which came into effect 1.1.2003. The functions of auditing and financial con-
trol were separated and three organisations were set up to implement this. The Audit Progress 
Committee was to monitor the auditing of the Commission. The Internal Audit Service was to 
control the DGs 'management and control systems' and to provide them with advice. The 
Central Financial Service was to 'define financial rules, procedures, common minimum stan-
dards that departments must observe in their internal controls and advising the financial units 
created in each DG.'94 Activity Based Budgeting was introduced to 'identify the administra-
tive resources necessary for each budget line.' 5 A charter was drawn up on the duties of 
authorising officers with 'standards for internal monitoring and general guidelines on finan-
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cial circuits and the role of financial units.'96 The convention on the Protection of the Com-
munity's financial resources came into force in 2002 which aimed to deal with fraud. 
Staff performance and management were an important element of the reforms. One important 
element of the reforms was the intention that merit be rewarded and seen to be rewarded. Staff 
were to be appraised on a yearly basis with their line managers performing this task. The aim 
was to reward merit. Promotion was intended to reward merit more. This called for a radical 
change in the intransparent promotion methods that had been followed by the EU, Mobility 
was encouraged and for those with sensitive posts owing to handling financial transactions, 
then mobility was to be more strictly followed. But in general all staff were expected to move 
about every four to five years. Middle management in particular Heads of Unit, saw their jobs 
'redefined with management requirements specified and training provided, with trial period to 
ensure equal opportunities, professional rigour, disciplinary procedures, whistle-blowing 
rules, and overhaul of regime for temporary agents.'97 The staff regulations were changed as 
part of the reforms to allow for a new career structure that combined a reclassification of offi-
cials with a simplified salary scale. Rules were decided on concerning staff discipline and 
whistle-blowing. Recruitment was to be changed and procedures improved. Likewise training 
was to be optimised and officials given ten training days a year. Amongst top officials an at-
tempt was carried out to weaken the amount of MS influence that had accrued, 'the main ob-
jective was to end the system of national flags'98. Recruitment to the top positions was made 
more open and the length of time that the position could be occupied by the same person lim-
ited. 
The change to the promotion system was called CDR or Career Development Review. The 
reform aimed to make promotion more transparent and fair by giving more power to Heads of 
Unit to decide which of their staff should be promoted, and also to rationalise the system by 
only allocating a certain number of points to each Head of Unit which he could then give to 
his officials. The Heads of Unit had to have their decisions approved by their Director which 
was seen to be more a double checking mechanism than anything else. This method removed 
the oddity under the old system which saw most officials being automatically promoted (or 
having their salaries increased) year after year regardless of performance, for the obvious rea-
son that few managers are going to deliberately prevent an official from being promoted when 
the promotions are limitless. However, inflation meant that under the old system promotions 
or rather performance related increases in salary were seen more as a right than due to per-
formance. That change was necessary can be seen in the fact that several officials when inter-
viewed, expressed the view that it was often impossible to understand why certain individuals 
were promoted and others had their salaries improved and that the whole process was a 'paper 
exercise.'99 
Heads of Unit are the most important layer of management for the workings of the Commis-
sion, in particular for the generation of legislation. They back up and support the Desk Offi-
cers in bearing the brunt of the labour of the Commission. Often they are severely over wor-
ked and have to provide guidance in several different policies as well as manage personnel 
issues. Management skills have often played a minor role in the work of the Heads of Unit, a 
too minor role probably. Under the new system it appeared that those closest to the Desk Of-
ficers would be given the possibility to reward them according to their merit. This was a posi-
tive idea but it would mean a large increase in personnel related work by the Heads of Unit 
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and often this is time that they can ill afford to spend, if the heads have less time to fight for 
their units in the confrontational atmosphere of the Commission this could be detrimental to 
their work. However, leaving the more mundane aspects to one side the Heads of Unit were 
often the policy experts and instrumental in generating legislation and also heading Policy 
Networks. Turning them into personnel managers can only result in a loss of these skills. The 
same applies to the enforcement of merit throughout the organisation, it could show the desire 
to make the Commission into more of a Weberian bureaucracy and also to restore control 
over the promotion of staff and control of them to the top ranks of the Commission and away 
from Policy Networks, DG fiefdoms and MSs. 
Any change in the promotion system in the Commission is closely watched by the officials 
themselves. One source stressed that officials were cynical about the reform and consider that, 
'everyone is pretending it will work when it won' t /1 0 0 any flaw in the reform would easily 
cast shadow over the reforms as a whole. It was difficult to compare "tightly" performance 
since there were 15 different approaches to management (due to there having being at least 15 
different MSs and their respective cultures) it was hard at the best of times to arrive at a joint 
definition of performance. It was worrying but not very surprising to note that DG ENV, 
which has had a tortuous last few years, apparently chose to implement the reforms in a man-
ner which came close to turning them, quite literally, on their head. 
DGs were allocated a number of promotion points which they could award staff and the DG 
average had to be 14 otherwise a claw back mechanism existed which meant that a certain 
amount of internal coordination is necessary. However the DG allegedly chose to turn coordi-
nation into another hierarchical exercise. Instead of the Heads of Unit proposing the points 
they wished to see allocated to particular individuals and having them approved by their Di-
rector, the Policy Group Meeting took over the Heads of Unit's task and decided how the 
points were to be allocated with effectively no input from the Heads of Unit. In fact several 
Heads of Unit were said to have apologised to their staff for the way that the points had been 
distributed and stressed that their input had not been taken into consideration.101 Given that 
promotion is an essential element of personnel management this rather throws doubt on the 
real intentions behind the empowerment of Heads of Unit to be such managers. Usually the 
Directors were said to have little knowledge about their staff let alone their work and yet they 
decided on the points. What was worse was that apparently after enquiries were addressed by 
some individuals to their Director regarding the point allocation, the Director was unable to 
explain what had happened which implies that the Policy Group somehow reached broad 
sweeping point allocations which bore no relationship to the individuals affected.102 What had 
been intended to be a bottom up exercise has been turned into an arbitrary top down one. The 
need for coordination and confirmation by Directors of Heads of Unit decisions was seem-
ingly used as an excuse to keep the old arbitrary system in operation, only this time staff were 
not necessarily being automatically promoted or seeing their salaries rising, frustration was 
the result. The appeal system was supposed to allow officials to discuss and negotiate their 
points with their management before they were fixed, under the new system this was not pos-
sible, once the points have been allocated it is too late for negotiations. 
A further reform which was coming into force was that of mobility. Whereas before mobility 
was often not very high, now every official was expected to move to another position every 
four years, should they fail to do so this could be bad for their careers. Given the time it takes 
to learn about a policy dossier and to become fully functional, at least nine months, combined 
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with the absence of an archival system and the already high staff turnover in the DG, obliging 
the few that were still in their positions to move, removed whatever consistency that there was 
left in the units. It would also become harder for new staff to come to grips with the often 
highly complex details of dossiers, since they now had less people to turn to for advice and 
experience. Mobility was also expected of those in more senior positions which could well 
mean that Heads of Unit would also have to move. For an organisation which was dependent 
on expert knowledge of dossiers and individuals learning on the job, the chances are that pro-
ductivity would decrease and efficiency with it. The problem would appear to be linked to the 
Commission on the one hand effecting a reform which gives greater leeway to the individual 
DGs whilst at the same time attempting to effect the reforms in a contradictory uniform man-
ner. 
The result of all the changes and reforms were delays. After receiving a proposal for a new 
policy which either a member state or NGO considered to be both topical and important for 
the community to legislate on, it could take the Commission up to three years to develop a 
response. An example of this was allegedly the Environmental Health dossier which owing to; 
'heavy long winded procedures and delays,1103and general lack of expertise, was severely de-
layed from the point when the DG received several requests from MSs to the point at which a 
document was produced. Due to the delay in the Community-wide policy, many of the MSs 
and the NMSs decided to put the policy into effect within their own territories. The DG then 
apparently reached a decision and 'rushed' the policy through. Demands were placed on MS 
officials and NMS officials to attend thousands of meetings and working groups with a 2004 
deadline. The demands were described as 'totally unrealistic' and they clashed with the poli-
cies which had been set up already in the MSs and NMSs. This placed an unbearable burden 
on the experts and officials in the states, that were simply too few to manage the vast work 
load at the best of times let alone when legislative duplication takes place.04 This example 
was probably only one among many. Apparently this was 'typical' of the Commission, that it 
took a long time to prepare and respond and then rushed policies through sometimes too late 
as the agenda had moved on or the policies had already been put into force by the impatient 
states.1 
In part the problem was also due to the fragmentation of the Commission. The need to negoti-
ate every issue both inside the DGs and within the more fragmented Commission itself led to 
a 2 month inter-Commission discussion period being stretched to 12 months.106One reason for 
the delay was also the fact that the written procedure, whereby policy documents were sub-
mitted in writing to be commented on by other DGs before being adopted by the Commission 
itself was extended, and the more informal process of Chefs of Cabinets discussion of the is-
sues in their own meeting was limited as a result. The latter process was allegedly less trans-
parent and more open to lobbyists and MSs pressurizing their Chefs of Cabinet,1 7 who were 
often directly placed in their positions by MS, and there are examples of legislation being 
radically changed during these meetings after rather obvious interventions by national lobby-
ists. 108But the cost of less MS influence was delay and mountains of extra paper work.109 
• 
The new accountability procedures which were introduced as part of the reforms were another 
problematic area. Whilst accountability is important it seems to have been difficult to get 
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things done owing to the complexity of the present system. The over reliance of the Commis-
sion on complex paper controls has been commented on110 and as the recent scandal involving 
Eurostat showed they had little effect.11 lThe delays resulting, affected both policy making and 
also the enlargement process, with the Commission creating administrative capacity problems 
for the applicant states due to the late payments of PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance 
110 for Restructuring their Economies) funds and complex 1SPA (Instrument for Structural Po-
111 
licies for Pre-Accession) payments. 
4.6 THE ENLARGEMENT 
Regarding enlargement and the importance of the DG in the process in 1996 Commissioner 
for environment Bjerregaard stated, 'asked whether environmental shortfalls alone would be 
enough to prevent CEECs from joining, Bjerregaard said "I am absolutely sure - yes"'. Offi-
cials suggested this wouldn't happen within EU she said a lack of coordination between bilat-
eral and multilateral contacts was causing difficulties . . . for their part CEEC ministers com-
plained that the Commission was inflexible and difficult to contact the Commission said it 
would amend some of this.' 1,4 
The enlargement process within the Commission appears to be similar from one DG to the 
next. Enlargement units were set up and effectively left to themselves to develop strategies 
both to prepare the applicant states to join and to prepare their DG to be ready to accommo-
date them. Whilst certain units had to work with the applicant states in the pre accession proc-
ess, large portions of DGs did not have direct contact with the states concerned and therefore 
had little idea about what effects enlargement would have. The role of evangelising and 
spreading the message about the enlargement was left to the enlargement units. Exposure and 
training were the two approaches followed by the Commission with units being exposed to 
working with the applicant states and the latter being involved in Community programmes not 
involving legislation. The training element was the competency of the enlargement units and 
their responsibility. Often they had to adopt their own strategies to ensure that their DG were 
fully informed. Staff levels in units can vary; DG ENV's unit was well staffed with between 
22 and 25 staff members, which was curious considering that the average size of a unit is a-
round 7. DG ENT's enlargement unit had a total of 17 staff members although the DG was 
responsible for three of the chapters of the acquis as opposed to the single chapter that DG 
ENV was responsible for. Staff turnover in the unit was very low when compared to that of 
the rest of the DG. In both DGs the first task of the unit heads was to win over the Director 
Generals to their side. The Deputy Director General of DG ENV took charge of the unit and 
poured resources into it and also insulated the unit from the reorganisations which occurred. 
In DG ENT the resources were not immediately available and the Director General had to be 
'weaned' to support the unit. The unit had to make enlargement an issue within the DG and to 
adopt tactics to achieve this. DG ENV's enlargement unit did not appear to have been quite so 
pro-active maybe because the deputy Director General supported them from earlier on. 
The DG appeared to have taken a strict line with the applicant states which maybe accounts 
for the change in their attitude from 1999 to 2000. The states were, prior to 2000, being regu-
larly exhorted to make improvements in the field of environment and little progress was 
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made. After 2000 the tone was less negative. The reason for this change was due to the Com-
missioner putting pressure on the states during her visits and addressing the press and public 
and encouraging competition between e.g. Poland and Lithuania to close the chapter first.115 
The Commission allegedly threatened the states with the withholding of funds as the Com-
mission had done with Greece, pre-accession funding might have been withheld if impact as-
sessments were not carried out. DG Enlargement supported the DG in this and demanded to 
see proof of payments made, MSs were also supportive.116 Detailed timetables were set up 
and technical consultations carried out, extensive transitional arrangements were agreed upon 
t t ^  
which are not dissimilar to those that were in force with MSs. 
It should at this point be stated that some authors have expressed their surprise and alarm at 
the speed with which the environment chapter was closed:1 8 
"Knowing the enormous distance between the EC environment law standards and those of the 
candidate countries, one is astonished to see the ease with which the EC has been willing to 
close the negotiating chapter on environment, be it with considerable transitional periods, 
with nine of the candidates in 2001. It is very doubtful whether the majority of the enumer-
ated candidates are really capable in terms of human resources, know how, and infrastructure 
of complying with EC environmental law.. One cannot escape the impression that the 'nego-
tiation dynamics' may at times side-slip into 'easy successes' on paper but which may prove 
particularly difficult to achieve afterwards,"119 
According to one source, an explanation for this may well be found in the package deals 
which were used by DG ENV in its negotiations. The bad deal which the applicant states re-
ceived with regard to agriculture may well have been traded off against an easy deal with en-
I 
vironment. The high costs of improving the environment would rest with the states con-
cerned whereas the costs to do with agriculture would have had to be paid for by the Commu-
nity and in particular the MSs; for the Community the cheaper deal, in the short run, was to 
agree to close the environment chapter and thus benefit from a better deal in agriculture. It 
was hinted that the decision to close the chapter was a political one and not to do with the real 
state of progress within the states concerned.121 
The general problems that the DG will face with enlargement are those connected with the 
over quick closure of the chapter and the failure to have carried out sufficient studies and pro-
jects in the years of the NMSs pre accession. It was a time of missed opportunities and the 
DG failed to invest while it could.122 The DG allegedly had assessments made in 1999 on the 
NMSs which were supposedly the basis of its decision to close the chapter, oddly enough the 
information was kept secret and Desk Officers forbidden from discussing the finds with the 
EEA or anybody else, this was contrary to normal practice where the EEA would have been 
shown the reports. The suspicion was that the DG was all too aware that the information 
available may well have prompted some in the EEA to call for full appraisals and this might 
have led to the enlargement being postponed or at least the environment chapter.123 The deci-
sion had been reached that it was to be enlargement at the date set and that nothing would be 
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allowed to stop it. The result of rushing the closure of the chapter would, it was stated, be 
problems in the years ahead, particularly when the applicant states were full member states 
and demanding their rights.124 The EEA had experienced the change in tone that could occur 
once states began to pay for the projects they were involved in. The DG could and should 
have involved the applicant states more fully from an earlier stage. 125 
The Commission and the DG unfortunately continued their own lack of integration into the 
enlargement process. Allegedly sectors enlarged and set up their own networks largely with-
out coordinating with other sectors and their relevant DGs.126 Many of these networks were 
not necessary as the information was already available. This led to demands being placed on 
the applicant states to provide experts to work in various sectoral networks which are often in 
part duplicating information already available, but the Commission departments are not com-
municating it to each other. An example of this problem was that Environment and Transport 
did not combine for funding in ISPA. Many of the networks in existence were unaware of 
each other, and thus reporting requirements could have and should have been streamlined. If 
this does not take place then the already over burdened administrative capacities of the NMSs 
were stated to be in danger of not being able to function.127 The lesson these states learnt from 
the Commission was the opposite of sectoral integration, effective communication and strate-
gic management. Rather the Commission would appear to have over relied on these states to 
make up for its own internal deficits and inability to communicate between DGs and within 
DGs. 
The interviews carried out with NMS officials: in the DG itself, in the national ministries and 
in the permanent representations in Brussels revealed how the some NMSs experienced the 
enlargement and the DG. In general they seemed to have had a positive experience and con-
sidered the DG to have performed above average. Coordination between DGs was criti-
cised128 as were the DG management -Commissioner relations prior to the Commissioner re-
moving the old Director General. Before this occurred there was considered to have been a 
problem with DG coordination and Communication with changes in direction happening. The 
less environmental direction of the DG was noted, the DG was said to have lost out to the 
other DGs. One NMS official commented on the perceived superiority attitude that the DG 
had shown to the NMSs with a Desk officer shouting at a NMS ambassador. The current DG 
190 was perceived to have become 'over centralized', with micro management being a current I -JfV 
problem. There was a view that the DG had made 'administrative capacity' problems in the 
NMSs itself by ignoring the existence of perfectly adequate national legal provisions and re-
quiring unnecessary additional requirements.13Regarding implementation, the DG was said 
to have become slower at dealing with bad implementation and infringements and the legal 
unit dealing with it was said not to be so 'tough* since the enlargement began; and to be giv-
ing warnings and trying to use other methods to avoid the infringement problem.132 The aim 
was said to be to repeal problem legislation or to only have broad frameworks and to let the 
MSs fill in the detail.133 The change over to using strategies rather than policies was noted to 
ameliorate the infringement issues. This was said to be a problem for the future as infringe-
ments have got worse and policies are easier to control that strategies particularly in the 
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NMSs. The NMSs were stated to have a problem in implementing environmental legisla-
tion and that the Commission did not want to impose burdens on industry in the NMSs, so the 
Commission goal was on more competitiveness and less environmentalism.135The NMSs 
were stated to be getting more exemptions owing to difficulties in implementation. The NMSs 
were also stated to be likely to want to have less environmental legislation if possible as they 
are more market oriented. The Cardiff goal of integrating environmental concerns into the 
broader EU policy approach was said to be 'dead'. 36 To be more effective the DG invited 
less MS officials and experts to management and advisory groups than before; it used to be 
two from each MS now only one same for advisory groups. The NMS officials were stated to 
be still not well informed, because they were simply new to the sector.137 
In the Council NMS officials were said to often be silent and therefore not creating problems 
from an EU perspective.138 Often this was stated to be because the NMSs consider that there 
is no point and they cannot alter anything, or because national ministries think in terms of 
Brussels giving orders and so the flow of communication is one way and finally the NMS of-
1 
ficials on the Council often are not given instructions on how to vote. Another problem is 
that there are not enough lobbyists yet in the NMSs putting pressure on the ministries and 
NMS officials in the Council to vote a certain way. 14 The problem of a lack of expertise in 
the NMSs and NMS officials on the Council was also mentioned as an explanation along with 
disinterest by the national ministries as environment was stated to seem 'too exotic' to be in-
teresting.141 Poland was said to be the most active in the Council and to claim to speak for all 
the NMSs. This is likely to change though, as after the enlargement took place the Czechs 
gradually tripled the number of their officials in the Councils. 
With regard to national ministries, these were stated to have a problem of lack of experts and 
political appointees being placed too far down in the civil services despite laws being passed 
to prevent this.143 The ministries were stated to suffer from expertise gaps, with those with 
expertise belonging to the older generation and either leaving to take up better paid jobs in 
private industry or lacking English language skills.144 The ministries were stated to be badly 
organised and their officials badly paid. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
We have seen that DG ENV seemed to present an interesting example of an extremely dy-
namic DG, on the one hand showing all the skills and missionary approach that is to be ex-
pected of the Commission during an expansive phase. Staff were granted considerable discre-
tion to pursue the DG and the Commission's interests and to further legislation wherever pos-
sible. They did this with incredible skill and success as the large corpus of EU environmental 
legislation bears witness. Equally they were hard to control and formed very naturally into 
Policy Networks to do their work. Having said they were hard to control that presumes that 
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there was a need to control them, although until the 1990s the DG, the Commission, the offi-
cials and the Policy Networks were ail pulling in the same direction, 
Once the dynamic phase was over and the MSs 'arrested' the Commission and slowed it 
down, the DG was likely to be targeted by MSs which desired to take it over and to effec-
tively slow or stop its output. The UK in particular, but also Germany seem to have actively 
poured in officials to further the national perspective on the environment. The DG or elements 
of it gradually seemed to disintegrate into officials and units dominated by certain nationali-
ties with certain perspectives and agendas. Faced by the dangers of more MSs with green 
agendas presumably interested in strengthening the German position in the DG and the envi-
ronmentalists on the Council, the UK allegedly pressed to take control of the top management 
of the DG. Faced by ad hoc Policy Network methods to further the environmental agenda and 
to hold true to the previous DG culture, mission and ethos, combined with an environmentally 
friendly EP and Council, the senior management adopted seemingly ad hoc methods of man-
agement via the Policy Meeting and DG reorganizations to maximise their own discretion and 
slow the DG down. Although other factors were also no doubt in play the UK-dominated 
management were increasingly in line with Commission desires to be less environmental. The 
problem for the NMSs of the large amounts of environmental legislation to be absorbed was 
moderated by the disarming of much of the legislation via a softening of the infringement 
procedure and the move to less legislation. That said, the Commission and EU's desire to be 
more 'industry friendly' was considerably slower in coming than that of the DG and the same 
can be said for the weakening of the infringement procedure. The industry DGs were so weak 
that they were allegedly finally combined and staff numbers greatly reduced as will be seen in 
the DG ENT chapter. Those interviewed did not mention the above factors as causes of the 
changes but emphasised the role of the UK and the desire of the Commission to avoid any 
more conflict with the old MSs. Thus the basic model requirements seem to have been met in 
the DG. The Commissioners and Cabinets remained pretty environmentalist and Commission 
oriented and allegedly arguments and disagreements emerged between the management and 
the Commissioner which finally led to a new Director General. 
The real bureaucratization of the DG appeared to begin in earnest with the new Director Gen-
eral and resulted in a slow down but also less conflicts internally. Desk officers like Heads of 
Unit were allegedly being suppressed to an extent, and power going to the top ranks in a sys-
tematic manner. Finally the DG seemed to have been made mainstreamed and this element of 
the Commission fragmentation into sectors moderated. That said the DG was stated to have 
gradually become more dynamic again, very much as the model would expect. The desire to 
downplay infringement policy and its legal role and to appear more a normal bureaucracy was 
shown in the chapter and supports the notion of the Commission 'hiding' for a period, gather-
ing its forces for the next integrationary drive. 
One last point which the case study showed, was how policy and policy changes in the Com-
mission were made by reorganizations. Policies were so bound to individuals that it was only 
by removing the individual from their position that any change in policy direction was possi-
ble. This seems to be proof, if proof were needed, that Policy Networks were in action, par-
ticularly when combined with the fact that no change or reform in the approach to environ-
mental policy was possible until the DG was reorganized and finally also bureaucratized. So 
long as the individuals concerned were in a position of power in the DG and so in the Policy 
Network they would have the power to decide policies regardless of what management 
wanted. 
Table of management posts between 1998-2003 DG Environment 
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10.1998 06.1999 01.2000 02.2001 11.2001 11.2002 03.2003 
Unit number 24 23 (-2) 23 24(1-audit) 24 (Audit) 24(1) 26 (audit) 
Directorate number 5(1) 5(1) 5(1) 5(1) 5(1) 5(1) 6(1?) , 4 
new Direc-
torate titles 
Acting managers 3 1 1 2 1 7 
Unchanged managers 33 34 25 (similar 37 42 36 
job) 
Manager transfers 4 2 9 3 2 5 
Vacant posts 6 6 1 6 2 1 3 
New managers 6 7 8 5 5 2 
Promotions 1 1 1 
New titles for units 10 3 
New unit title but same 4 4 
contents/moved Director-
ate 
Staff figures and promotions real rate of promotion; 1998-2003 
Promotion to the grade 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
A4 16.65 18.94 17.05 14.68 14.39 
A5 24.52 25.69 24,32 23.34 24.88 
A6 28.88 28.15 29.69 27.56 27.13 
A7 65.36 60.33 79.45 37,25 53.44 
Overall staff figures 505 517 374 521 543 544 
External staff (END)figures as part 50 52 49 55 58 52 
of the above 
Temporary staff figures - 20 17 14 10 
Table of management posts between 1998-2003 DG Competition 
03.1998 01.1999 01.2000 03.2001 2002-3 
Unit number 29 28 28 28 30 
Directorate number 8 8 8 8 8 
Acting managers 
Unchanged managers 36 25 37 34 
Manager transfers 2 6 1 2 
Vacant posts 9 5 1 5 6 
New managers 2 11 4 4 
Promotions 1 2 1 
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5. THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
We have looked at the EU - Commission cycle from the perspective of OLAF and one of its 
DGs. The following case study offers us the perspective of an organisation not overly dissimi-
lar to that of OLAF. Whilst OLAF offers us organisational insights on the Commission as a 
whole and less on individual DGs the EEA provides us with the opportunity to assess a DG at 
work. Thus the case study to be presented will allow the reader to consider both the DG and 
the Commission as whole in a clearer light. Quite apart from the EEA's use as a tool to assess 
the DG it is also an interesting organisation in its own right. 
The agency resulted from a European Council request made in the Rhodes declaration asking 
for a European approach to environmental matters.1 The Commission responded with a pro-
posal for the creation of the European environment agency (EEA) in July 1989.2 Pressure was 
being applied on the Commission by the EP's Environmental Committee and by MS envi-
ronment ministers both of which wanted improved information to allow them to carry out 
their tasks effectively. A task force was set up within DG Environment3 in which 25 staff 
members were involved.4 The director was appointed in June 1994 and he immediately pus-
hed for the agency to be move as quickly as possible to its new location in Copenhagen. Of 
the 25 staff members only 3 were transferred to the new agency 5 as the director wanted a 
clear break with DG Environment and real independence for the agency as was required under 
the regulation.6 The regulation held seeds for future problems namely in the nature of the 
work7 and its relationship to the Commission.8As did the EEA mission statement based on the 
regulation in which the EEA stated it would aim to provide "timely and targeted" information 
to policy making agents and the public.9 The staff started off as 6 officials in 1994, by 1996 
there were 50 people working at the EEA and by 1997 there were 75 staff members and the 
budget was 16.9 ECU,10 2003 there are 100 staff members and a budget of 25 Million Eu-
ros, the staff numbers will soon reach 120,12 
The agency was designed to be at the centre of the European Environment Information and 
Observation network (EIONET). The network consists of European topic centres and 18 Na-
tional focal points, 124 National reference centres and 334 main component elements.13 All 
the present MSs of the EU are members of the EEA and represented on its management 
1 EEA, history in short EEA website, http://org.eea.eu.int/documents /arl997/ar97_history.html 
2 ibid 
3 ibid 
4 Interviews with EEA officials. 
5 ibid 
6 See note 1 EEA, history in short EEA Whereas the Agency should be granted legal autonomy while maintaining close links 
with the Community institutions and the MSs 
7 ibid Whereas the Agency should cooperate with existing structures at Community level to enable the Commission to ensure 
full application of Community legislation on the environment 
* ibid Article 17. The staff of the Agency shall be subject to the Regulations and Rules applicable to officials and other ser-
vants of the European Communities. The Agency shall exercise in respect of its staff the powers devolved to the Appointing 
Authority. The management board shall, in agreement with the Commission, adopt the appropriate implementing rules. 
9 ibid 
10 ibid 
11 EEA presentation can be viewed at http://org.eea.eu.int/organisation/presentation/slidel4 
12 Interviews with EEA officials 
13 ibid 
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board, as is the Commission, and the European Parliament (EP) has two specialists to repre-
sent it. Interestingly several non MSs are also members of the agency, including Norway, Ice-
land and Lichtenstein and the NMSs of the soon to be enlarged Community. The inclusion of 
the NMS is of particular importance to this article as it represents the first institutional enlar-
gement of the Community institutions and thus can offer both experiences and insights into 
the process of enlargement and how it affects Community institutions as well as how it affects 
the NMSs. 
The EEÀ has developed its own aims over time as is shown in their changing goals, at first it 
stated that its aim is 'to set up and manage a European information and observation network 
and ensure the dissemination of comparable information.'14 This modest aim was expanded 
and narrowed at the same time in their 1997 mission statement, 'The mission of the EEA is to 
deliver timely, targeted, relevant and reliable information to policy makers and the public, to 
support the development and implementation of environmental policies in the Community 
and the MSs.'15 By 1997 the EEA was looking to be involved in policy making by choosing 
which information to provide (having the power to choose which information is provided is a 
basic source of bureaucratic power) and it is likely that the EEA was sending a message to 
DG ENV which understood what was implied all too well. The DG had after all developed 
from being a loose group of officials simply providing information, much like the EEA, into 
the comparably speaking bureaucratic giant that it is today. 
The EEA has produced several seminal works which have now been accepted by the EU like 
the EEA's publication 'Europe's Environment: The Dobris Assessment' (1995). This was an 
important document which was perceived to be a success. That said the main customer of the 
EEA, namely the Commission and in particular the DG ENV was apparently often neither 
impressed by the quality of the reports nor their timing. 16The DG wanted accurate informa-
tion, presented on time and as requested and it was not satisfied with the results. 
During the first period of the EEA's existence it was said to have faced several difficulties 
some of which are typical to Community institutions and some which were due to the difficult 
relationship which the Commission has with some organisations with which it has to work. In 
1998 it faced a budget freeze, which led it to state that it would be unable to carry out some of 
the tasks requested of it. The EEA saw little prospect in 1997 of an improvement in its re-
sources but as indicated above, budgetary problems and scarce resources are common com-
plaints in the Community institutions. The EEA has apparently had special problems vis-à-vis 
the Commission in terms of its desire to evaluate policies and not just to provide information. 
According to the DG this is because the agency expected to have had more power than they in 
reality received]7and that they are therefore trying to expand their competencies into DG terri-
tory. The EEA considered that their task as laid out in the regulation required them to evaluate 
policies and to inform the public as well as the Community institutions accordingly. 
That said it is also noticeable that the EEA has proven to be resourceful in using its right to 
locate other financial sources to allow it to expand. In particular it turned the enlargement 
process to its advantage both financially and in terms of staff. 
14 Grant, W, Mathews, D, Newell, P, The effectiveness of Ell Environmental Policy (2000) Basingstoke, Macmillan Press p. 
32 
15 ibid 
16 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
17 The EP wanted the agency to be able to field environment inspectors. 
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5.2 THE EC TREATY, THE REGULATION AND THE EEA 
Examination of the EC Treaty shows the potential need for the EEA as a provider of informa-
tion. This, its main task, and its role within the Community institutional structure and policy 
making cycle are shown in the following passage, insur ing practical implementation is a 
much more difficult task since the Commission does not always have all the relevant informa-
tion and has no inspectorate able to collect it. The Commission is therefore dependent for its 
information on those reports required under directives and on other sources including com-
plaints made by the public. The EEA should be able to contribute as its tasks include provid-
ing "objective information necessary for framing and implementing sound and effective envi-
ronmental policies" and drawing up expert reports which the Commission can use "in its task 
of ensuring the implementation of Community legislation.'"18 
Article 95 § 3 states that , ' . . . environmental protection . . . will take as a base a high level of 
protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific facts'. 
One of the new directorates in the EEA was set up with just this task in mind, and as an or-
ganisation run by scientific specialists it is in a better position to keep up with scientific ad-
vances than the Commission, which has long had a reputation for having to import factual in-
formation from MS experts, industry and NGOs.19 The right of MSs in § 5 of the same article 
to use the latest scientific evidence to justify taking national measures to protect the environ-
ment, underlines the need of the Commission to have independent sources of information to 
allow it to make an objective Assessment. Article 174, § 2 states that the Community should 
aim at, 'a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various 
regions of the Community.' The network ElONET (European Environment Information and 
Observation Network, coordinated by the EEA) provides just such information, and it is hard 
to imagine how this article could be given any useful effect without an adequate source of in-
formation as is stressed in § 3 as well. It states that the Community shall, in preparing its poli-
cies, take account of, 'available scientific and technical data, environmental conditions in the 
various regions of the Community, the potential benefits and costs of action of lack of action.' 
The agency began life as Council Regulation 1210/90 of 7 March 19902Oamended by (EEC) 
regulation number 933/1990 and Council Regulation (EC) No 933/1999 of 29 April 
O 1 
1999. Whilst most of regulation has proven to be durable, in that the amended version still 
contains the majority of the original largely unchanged, the vagueness of some of the articles 
has led to considerable lack of clarity regarding competency, scope of tasks, priorities and re-
sources. In particular DG ENV and the agency have had difficulties as a result of the regula-
tion; this is to some extent reflected in that Articles 2, 3, 4 and 8 have been modified quite 
significantly. Article two is of particular interest as the different positions, conflicts and inter-
ests of and between the institutional players can be followed in the history of three §s from 
Article 2; the EP is an institutional supporter of the EEA. The original Article 2 §'s were as 
follows: 
Art 2 "ii) to provide the Community and the MSs with the objective information necessary for 
framing and implementing sound and effective environmental policies; to that end, in particu-
lar to provide the Commission with the information that it needs to be able to carry out suc-
18 House of Lords session 1997-98, Select Committee on the European Communities, Second Report. Community Environ-
mental Law: Making it work (1997) p72 
19 ibid 
20 Eur-lex http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc-
=31990R1210&model=guichett 
21 ibid 
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cessfully its tasks of identifying, preparing and evaluating measures and legislation in the 
field of the environment." 
Art 2 "(iii) to record, collate and assess data on the state of the environment, to draw up expert 
reports on the quality, sensitivity and pressures on the environment within the territory of the 
Community, to provide uniform assessment criteria for environmental data to be applied in all 
MSs. The Commission shall use this information in its task of ensuring the implementation of 
Community legislation on the environment. Article 2 vi) to ensure the broad dissemination of 
reliable environmental information. In addition, the Agency shall publish a report on the state 
00 
of the environment every three years" 
The Commission's preferred amended version of the regulation began by replacing the; 'nec-
essary'23 (put in italics) with; 'they require,'24 thereby emphasising the Commission's view 
that the EEA should be there to follow its requirements, a view which the EP rejected with its 
comments to the Commission's version rejecting the 'they require'25 in favour of the original 
'necessary'26; the amended regulation contained this wording.27 A paragraph was added and 
the Commission version stated, 'The Agency shall assist . . . as required by the Commis-
sion,"28 the tone is imperative and contains little regard for the agency's autonomy and man-
agement which produce a multi-annual work programme and set their own priorities. The EP 
comments on this were a clear rebuke to the Commission and the final version of the regula-
tion supported the EP, 'In accordance with its current multi-annual work Programmes . . . the 
OO 
agency shall a s s i s t . . . either on its own initiative, or as required by the Commission.' Over 
and above these corrections the EP underlined its disapproval with two extra paragraphs, 'The 
Commission shall in general seek to cooperate with the Agency in cases where appropriate 
information can be provided by the Agency to support Commission initiatives or implementa-
tion of acts,' and, 'Such requests should in normal circumstances be in line with the Agency's 
approved working programmes.'30 The EP effectively rebuked the Commission by placing an 
obligation on it in much the same manner as the Commission had attempted to do to the agen-
cy. The amended version of the regulation contained no mention of the Commission's re-
quirement. Instead elements of the EP's comments were included, with mention made of the 
need to coordinate all requests made by MSs with the multi-annual programme of the agency. 
Another duel of words apparently took place between the EP and the Commission over § 
three. The Commission continued following its desire of making the agency into a provider of 
environmental information as required and nothing else. The EP accepted the idea of the 
agency, 'establishing a repositoiy of information on the environment,'3 as contained in the 
Commission's version but then added that the information should be used by the Commission 
not only in the 'implementation of Community legislation' but also in its 'enforcement.'33The 
record of the Commission in the area of environmental legislation enforcement was less than 
optimal and the requirement that the 'repository of information' should be more directly in-
volved in enforcement would have been less than welcome to the Commission given its deli-
22 See note 20 Eur-lex 
23 ibid 
24 ibid 
25 ibid 
26 ibid 
27 ibid 
28 ibid 
29 ibid 
30 ibid 
31 ibid 
32 ibid 
" ibid 
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cate relations with the agency over policy evaluation. Furthermore the EP evidently desired n à 
for the repository to be freely available and not just restricted to the Commission and MSs. 
But the amended regulation contained no mention about either the repository or the enforce-
ment of legislation. The EP used again the same tactic of not rejecting the Commission's ver-
sion but by adding onerous comments and requirements to it, the final amended regulation 
reflected its views. 
The inclusion of the words, 'trends in and prospects for the environment', in Article 2 § 6, on 
the insistence of the EP , was a final solution to the agency's 'formal position' with regard to 
the evaluation of policies which has been a bone of contention between the agency and the 
DG since the former's inception. In the same paragraph the Commission wanted to require the 
agency to produce annual indicator reports, a point which the amended version of the regula-
tion left vaguer and more up to the agency to decide on by stating, 'supplemented by indicator 
reports focusing upon specific issues.' Indicator reports can be of use for the EP when it re-
quires to assess how effective Commission and MS policies are, the absence of any fixed time 
frame left the agency open to requests from institutions other than the Commission and it also 
ensured that there is potential administrative slack in this area which could allow the agency 
to exploit situations requiring a high profile report addressed directly at a specific issue: in 
essence the agency is given more leeway in its production of the reports. 
5.3 EEA ORGANISATION AND WEAKNESSES 
The agency consists of three main elements, setting aside the network, firstly there is the EEA 
management board, which is the main decision making body of the EEA and consists of 34 
members, 30 from MS countries, 2 from the Commission and 2 from the EP. Secondly the 
EEA scientific committee which is appointed by the management board and is there to advise 
the board on scientific matters, it consists of 20 members, and lastly the administrative or-
ganisation itself. 
This last consists of five directorates which are further subdivided into around 20 programme 
based sub units (excluding secretariats) which are broadly related to the activity they are in-
volved in and the EEA's 'organisational environment' matching sectors, e.g. the 'air and cli-
mate change' sub unit will be dealing with these issues and all organisations or parts of or-
ganisations that are specialised in these fields in the EIONET for example. In DG ENV there 
will be a unit(s) which will cover these issues. The administrative organisation is headed by 
the executive director's office which is closely supported by one of the directorates, namely 
that of strategic development and international cooperation. 
The issues dealt with by the agency are so complex and involve so many sectors that there 
was apparently a tendency within the agency for the specialised units to become absorbed 
only in their specialism. One of the major problems for the organisation has been allegedly 
the absence of a holistic approach to issues thus leading to inevitable compartmentalisation. 
Many of the present staff were recruited simply because they were scientific experts in a 
given field which was required by the EEA at that point in time, and there was a sense that 
they judged their performance on the basis of their sub units' activities and not the organisa-
tion as a whole. Recruits were often chosen due to specific sub unit requirements, which en-
sured that experts in the same specialism as that of the sub unit would be chosen and thus the 
34 See note 20 Eur-lex 
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officials' myopic perception of their work was self perpetuating. Individuals were chosen for 
their scientific expertise and not for their inter-personal skills let alone any managerial ones. 
This led to the fragmentation of the organisation and the centrifugal forces which are present 
in some organisations became cemented into the EEA's administrative fabric. Many managers 
and officials apparently felt no sense of responsibility to anything occurring outside their sub 
units, or directorates. In effect the agency was simply the sum of its parts which seemed to be 
almost coincidently working together. This point was commented on by both the evaluation 
reports on the EEA, which were made in 199935 and 2003.36 Attempts at drawing sub units 
together did not prove to be over successful. 
A second obviously linked problem was the style of management which prevailed in the or-
ganisation, two words were used by some to describe this: intransparent and unpredictable. To 
some extent the complexity of the issues and the organisational environment in which the 
EEA was active means that it was difficult for the management to retain control over the ac-
tivities of all the sub-units. This was compounded by the fact that the management were of-
ten drawn from a similarly specialised background to their staff and often apparently lacked 
10 
the global thinking that was necessary to provide coherent long term organisational decision 
making. All too often management appeared to have been reactive rather than strategic, react-
ing, often negatively, to proposals agreed upon and made by their officials who had consid-
ered themselves to be fully empowered to enter such arrangements rather, than defining their 
staffs' roles clearly enough in advance and then ensuring that the line of responsibility was 
maintained. Examples were given of one official who had been given a budget to spend and 
after she had spent it was informed by her manager that she should not have spent it and the 
funds were reclaimed, and in another example a report was requested which was later ig-
nored.40 
An alleged absence of management skills in terms of leadership, coordination and simply 
presence was commented on. Sometimes the desk officers concerned were placed in the situa-
tion of having to choose which project to follow and how they wanted to implement it. Man-
agement apparently failed to provide the direction setting touch that is usually considered to 
belong to the management of organisations.41 In part this was due to the similarity of aca-
demic and professional background42 and a collegial atmosphere was perhaps inevitable. In 
some cases this is desirable as organisational theory would appear to indicate in the innova-
tive type of company,43 but in the agency it appeared to have resulted in a general lack of di-
rection and an organisation drifting apart, if it was ever very much together. Further measures 
to encourage a more global approach to management within the organisation involved project 
management training, multi national team building training etc, but most of these training op-
portunities were of two day duration and it was unclear how successful they were.44A weekly 
newsletter with real information in was one attempt encouraged by the then executive director 
to reintegrate sub units into the organisation. 
The organisational culture of the EEA was obviously a difficulty which has not helped the 
organisation to integrate its parts into itself. As is typical of Community institutions as a who-
35 Evaluation report made by a management consultants firm in 1999 
36 EEA evaluation report August 2003 commented on by EEA officials 
37 ibid and Interview with visiting scientist to EEA, Fragmentation is still an issue in the 2003 report 
38 Interviews with EEA officials 
39 ibid 
40 Interview with visiting scientist to EEA. 
41 Interviews with EEA officials 
42 ibid 
43 ibid 
44 ibid 
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le, the individual is given great discretion and the desk officer level officials are often idealis-
tic both to their sector and a European ideal. Often the culture of the organisation appeared to 
be little more than a diffuse 'esprit de corps,' a collegial atmosphere charged with energy en-
gendered by a sense of adventure, shared background, idealism, and the inevitable elitism of 
belonging to a small band of selected individuals drawn from tough selection competition.45 
The initial culture of the organisation has been described as a 'pioneering' one in which a 
small band of officials who used 'guerrilla tactics' to achieve their goals in a 'work hard, play 
hard atmosphere' encouraged by the former executive director,46 This is not unlike the Com-
mission in its early stages when it too attracted similar descriptions and metaphors. The im-
portance of the individual in the Commission process and in particular here, the EEA, has 
been stressed by both managers and officials at the agency.47Talented, professional individu-
als often of an idealistic nature, effectively unleashed and armed with some Community insti-
tution rights, missionary sense and allowed maximum freedom of discretion produced the dy-
namism of the agency and finally also some of the difficulties. 
In the apparent absence of an effective culture to provide guidance, management resulted in 
an ad hoc affair with relaxed collegial solutions alternating with the abrupt, negative retrac-
tion of competencies and 'intransparent, unpredictable'48reactive management mentioned ear-
lier. There had allegedly been deliberate attempts to introduce a culture which was more for-
mal and more directed to being focused on the activities the staff performed and audiences to 
be targeted. Activity and productivity for its own sake had to be changed to match the needs 
of the organisation and its customers. Before, the agency had what can only be described as 
an island mentality or as one of the officials interviewed said, there was a lack of reality in 
some of the organisation's activities. This was also allegedly reflected in the new corporate 
goals which the new director introduced,49 the management were attempting to guide the de-
velopment of a new 'corporate' culture in which intended projects were assessed and evalu-
ated before being adopted and implemented.50 This was very much in tune with the current 
cautious Commission and Community approach to policy making and project implementa-
tion. 
The island mentality mentioned above resulted in and from the agency failing to communicate 
internally and externally. Information did not flow between the sub units and neither did it 
flow to the management. This had detrimental effects on the agency itself but it also had ef-
fects on the customers or audiences the EEA was supposed to be providing for. There was a 
very real sense that it was generating huge amounts of thick reports that were of little use to 
anybody and merely served to justify the agency's right to exist, an organisational cogito ergo 
sum, as if by producing large amounts of reports it gained influence. Again this is a common 
symptom in the Commission where productivity and quality in generated legislation is, or ra-
ther was, commonly perceived to be proof of worth. Many Community institutions were and 
are unaware of the EEA's existence and were therefore unable to gear its activities to their 
requirements. 
45 15,000 applicants for one position was not uncommon. 
46 Interviews with EEA Officials 
47 ibid 
48 See note 40 Interview with visiting scientist to EEA 
49 ibid 
50 ibid 
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mission was seemingly not capable enough of evaluating its own policies and required the 
EEA to assist it in this field and the EEA was in a position to provide the valid well re-
searched reports which were required,60 something the DG was not satisfied with until re-
cently. The EEA also benefited from the EU desire to improve information flow and be less 
policy generating which was always the prerogative of the DG.61 This point is discussed by 
Alan Butt Philip in his article on Environmental policy in the EU,62when he describes the de-
cline in the 'command and control' methods favoured by the DG and Commission as a 
whole.63 He notes that the number of legislation proposals as found in the Commission's work 
programme in 1996 was only two whereas in the 1980's it was 14 a year.64 Although certain 
hard line views remained present in certain parts of the DG and pushed for proscriptive legis-
lation as the only way forwards, the management had moved from this position and the legis-
lative production from the majority of the DG slowed even further with the units that were not 
toeing the line being reorganised.6566 The EEA had the advantage of already being geared up 
to a less proscriptive method of environmental policy-making and have gained from the move 
to evaluating legislation more and giving value for money. 
On the surface at least, the disputes between the two Community organisations appeared to 
have diminished. The rewording of the regulation was cited as another reason for the allaying 
of the dispute,67but as so often with changes in the law, did the change reflect changed reality 
or did it bring about the change itself? Leaving that to one side, the harmony seemed to be 
based on a clearer idea of task differentiation as the deputy head of the DG Environment ca-
binet said, when she described the EEA as providing an organisational memory68 which the 
DG seemingly lacked owing to the extreme staff/management turnover, problematic archiv-
ing, problematic strategy69 and organisational culture and frequent re-organisations,70whilst 
the generalists in the DG would concentrate on policy making. However the apparently com-
mendable acceptance of task specialisation and institutional co-operation was over shadowed 
by their recruitment strategies. If the Community memory, and source of specialists was to be 
the EEA then it would have made sense for the specialists to be found in it, but the DG appar-
ently actively aimed to increase its number of specialists as the 2002-2003 recruitment con-
curs showed. Specialist applicants were requested to apply for the posts,71 not the generalists 
that might be expected for policy making positions. Whilst this hopefully reflected the desire 
of the Commission to produce quality legislation, it did also look curiously as if it might be 
duplicating the specialisation of the EEA and attempting to provide scientific expertise from 
its own ranks. The EEA, on the other hand, which was made up of specialists and this was 
their strong point, was seemingly looking to encourage recruits who were more policy based 
and to 'change staff qualifications to be more generalist policy analysts,' staff will have to be 
re-trained in their area.72 Whilst this hopefully indicated that both sides maybe wanted to meet 
in the middle the result might result in more conflict and loss of specialist task skills. 
60 Discussions with EEA officials 
61 ibid. 
fi2 Philip Alan Butt, The European Union; Environmental policy and the prospects for sustainable development, in Hanf, K 
and Jansen* A-I (eds) Governance and Environment in Western Europe, 1999, Harlow, Longman p.265-264 
w ibid 
^ ibid 
63 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
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67 ibid 
68 ibid 
m Interviews with EEA officials 
70 See chapter on DG ENV 
71 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV and E1PA official 
72 Interviews with EEA officials 
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The DG had the powers of the budget at its disposal although recently it has been described as 
positive in its budget proposals for the EEA. However, the EP had increasingly more say over 
the budget and the Commission was said to be just the administrators of it.73The DG appeared 
to view the EEA in a more positive light. In accordance with the regulation it carried out two 
evaluation reports into the operations of the agency. The first report was moderately critical 
and on the basis of its recommendations a forced reorganisation took place two years later. 
Some sources described this reorganisation as done 'begrudgingly,' and stated that it was 
counter productive.74 A second evaluation report (secret) appeared to state according to offi-
cials, that the EEA still had certain problems which were in part due to the complexity of the 
tasks facing it and the multi sector nature of their work.75 Whether this would result in another 
reorganisation remained to be seen. 
Another element in the troubled relationship between the DG and the EEA appeared to bear 
certain similarities to that of another Commission department, the Secretariat-General and an-
other 'independent' agency, namely that of OLAF the anti-fraud agency of the Commission, 
We looked at OLAF earlier and its problems with the Commission. Like the EEA, OLAF 
started out as part of the Commission structure and would have remained so if it had not have 
been for the pressure applied by the EP and the debacle of the resignation of the Santer Com-
mission. Independence was assured on paper for the agency but in practice the Commission 
attempted to control their staff recruitment and there was and is concern about its independ-
ence, In the 2003 evaluation report produced by the Commission there were signs that they 
were trying to claw back some of the competencies that had been given formally to the 
agency. In the case of both the EEA and OLAF there was apparently the feeling that the Com-
mission had a low tolerance for independence in agencies linked to it and that competencies 
given on paper would be fought over in practice, regardless of the logic of the situation. 
The Commission seemingly tried to influence staff / management recruitment and also allo-
cate excessive tasks to the agencies.76 With OLAF, task allocation strategies seemed to indi-
cate that the Commission was trying to direct the organisation away from internal investiga-
tions in favour of external ones.77 With the EEA there was evidence that the Commission 
wanted to reduce them to information providers, little more than an external service provider. 
With both agencies there were some problems concerning their budgets, with the agencies 
requiring greater resources in order to function effectively and the Commission refusing this 
and even appearing to use the budget to encourage the agencies in the directions that they 
want them to go.78 80Both agencies saw considerable delays in the appointment of their direc-
tors at different times and, according to some sources, the recent confusion regarding the ap-
pointment of the executive director of the EEA was testimony to the Commission's attempt to 
use the recruitment process which it organised to place their choice in control.8182The first list 
of candidates only apparently included 37 individuals selected rather restrictedly by a mostly 
internal advertising campaign. Had the public advertisement been done as the EEA had 
wanted then thousands were expected to apply. The EEA rejected the Commission's two pro-
posed candidates» The argument was about the wording of the regulation which stated that the 
73 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
74 Interviews with EEA officials 
75 ibid 
76 See note 2 EEA, history in short EEA and the OLAF chapter. 
77 OLAF evaluation report 2003 
7R OLAF supervisory committee report sept 2001-June 2002 p. 8 and 12 
79 Preface by EEA's executive director, Domingo Jimenez-Beltran (1997) p. 2 http://org.eea.eu.int/documents/-
arl 997/ar97 preface.html 
Interview with EEA officials and interview with Commission Officials; DG ENV 
81 European Voice, Environment agency rejects candidates for senior post 21 -27 March 2002 p .6 
82 Discussions with EEA officials 
172 
EEA management board should appoint its director after receiving a proposal from the Com-o^ 
mission. The Commission appeared to have tried to influence OLAF's recruitment process at 
its founding which resulted in lengthy delays in it achieving its goal of recruiting sufficient 
experts to carry out its tasks effectively.84 
The reasons for the Commission's attitude towards new agencies can be explained by organ-
isational logic. Both agencies had begun their existence as parts of the Commission institu-
tional structure. Some officials reinforced this point that the Commission would have pre-
ferred both agencies to have remained firmly under their control in practice, whatever was 
written in the formal agreements.85 The differences between legal reality and operational fact 
were often wide and glaring to those involved.86 Both agencies represented defeats for the 
Commission. 
The EP is considered to have increased its powers during the 1990's whereas the Commission 
is not,8889The EP seemingly forced OLAF onto the Commission in the form it presently en-
joys owing to the fact that the Commission was 
weak.909IOLAF92and the EEA93 are both 
agencies which enable the EP to perform its task of parliamentary scrutiny more effectively. 
The EEA provides indicators of environmental progress over time and also evaluated the ef-
fectiveness of Commission and Community policies in producing the positive outcomes they 
claim will be achieved, in a sense it cuts through the Commission spin. The EP has often had 
a problem assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Commission due to the lack of 
verifiable indicators. The EEA helped to rectify this situation, not surprisingly the Commis-
sion apparently disliked the agency making negative evaluations of its policies,94 although its 
own officials had accepted that they were at times unable themselves to evaluate the policies 
they made and often there were problems with seeing them implemented.9596 
Personality problems were probably an explanation for the disputes between the DG and 
EEA, which led to the problematic communication with neither side really knowing what the 
other was doing. Allegedly the personalities of the ex-director general of the DG and the ex 
executive director of the EEA seemed to have been a major cause of the bad communication. 
Both men apparently wanted visibility for their organisations and considered that viability 
was inextricably interconnected with visibility.97 The present apparent harmony between the 
two organisations seemed to have a lot to do with the two new leaders of the organisations. 
Both the new director general and executive director of the agency were from English speak-
ing countries in the Community, both seemed to be organisationally minded with an interest 
in setting priorities and concentrating on detail rather than broad sweeping plans and strate-
gies.98 Both organisations were to be organised around the sixth environment action pro-
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gramme of the Community and this was likely to lead to some rationalisation of resources. 
Yet despite the desires of the leaders, several officials expressed the view that there was still a 
lack of clarity as to the competencies of the organisations and that the harmony was more an 
attempt at papering over the cracks because the present situation was, according to one offi-
cial, 'delicate5.99 
The relationship between the EEA and the EP has been described as one of 'affection' which 
ensured that the EEA was treated generously in budgetary terms and thus able to grow to its 
present size.100On one occasion the environment committee of the EP requested a report on 
green taxes, which involved some policy analysis, from the EEA. This report created difficul-
ties with the Commission which thought the EEA should not have accepted the task. Again 
the Commission was apparently unhappy about the agency having anything to do with a pro-
ject that even vaguely bordered on policy analysis, regardless of how useful it was to the 
Community at large. 101The EEA officials formally visit the EP two or three times a year to 
102 report. 
The unease with which the Commission viewed the agency was perhaps not just owing to its 
current strength and threat, but rather the DG Environment and the Commission as a whole 
are aware of the potential in the agency to become even more the tool of the EP. The follow-
ing passage illustrates this danger, 'There is scope for the EP to play a more active role in en-
couraging conformity with Community legislation and in supervising the Commission in the 
exercise of its responsibilities. We recommend that reports by the EEA should be submitted to 
the EP as well as to other Community institutions.' 03The Commission was quite aware of 
such sentiments and knew that one role of the agency was to provide information about their 
activities and to expose the reality behind their environmental promises, as one MEP said. It 
would be odd for them to actively support any extension of the agency's competencies into 
this area or any other which could threaten them. According to one source, the first executive 
director of the EEA wanted the agency to be a political organisation close to the EP and in the 
DG's view the EEA was much too close to the EP for their liking and this explained the criti-
cism which the EEA aimed at the DG in their first synthesis report. 104 
There would appear to have been a mutually reinforcing circle of scrutiny in existence in 
which the EP desired to improve the level and standard of the scrutiny with which it con-
trolled the Commission. It relied on the EEA to help it in this regard and to provide the indi-
cators which were essential for any meaningful monitoring of the Commission. The EP com-
mittee on the environment was frustrated at the bad record of environmental law implementa-
tion, and expressed its lack of certainty that the Commission was really serious about dealing 
with the problem.I05The EP representatives of the EEA management board expressed their 
desire to see the EEA be involved in the implementation process.106 The EEA was kept under 
scrutiny by the Commission, here the DG ENV, and the latter issued evaluation reports on the 
performance of the agency. The EEA knew that it could appeal to the EP and its budget was 
partly controlled by that institution, and Commission knew that the EEA could make such ap-
peals and that the EP could, had, and may well in future make use of the EEA, to challenge 
the Commission's claims. The various institutions occasionally made use of the existence of 
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this circle and as a result could hold their counterparts in check. The different responses of 
the cabinet level of the DG and the DG services to the budget question were interesting, the _ | ng 
former stressed that the EP was responsible for the budget now whereas the latter was cate-
gorical that the Commission could and would use the budget to direct the activities of the 
agency if necessary.l09There were allegedly cases where the cabinet of the DG have infor-
mally discussed issues with the EEA before approaching their own DG services (the adminis-
trative arm of the DG and sometimes at odds with their political leadership in the cabinet.) On 
at least one occasion the cabinet, many of whom including the Commissioner were Scandina-
vian, worked on a directive with the Denmark based EEA rather than with the DG services 
which were seen as slow and heavy in their methods.110 One of the major issues in which the 
DG services and cabinet were at odds was over the EEA entering the enlargement process 
ahead of the DG itself. On the desk officer level there were contacts between the organisa-
tions but as soon as decision making officials were involved the lines appeared to stiffen. 
5.5 RESTRUCTURING AND REORGANISING THE EEA 
Both the relationship between the DG and the EEA and the organisational weaknesses men-
tioned earlier, led to changes in both the way the agency perceived itself and in its mission 
and to changes in the its structure. Since its inception the agency had seen constant reorgani-
sation but there have been three major reorganisations which took place in 1998, 2001, 2003. 
The 1998 reorganisation was aimed at reordering the EEA to match resources with the 
changed reality that the agency now faced. The agency had over extended, owing in part to 
the lack of strategic management and the ad hoc basis on which tasks were allocated, and it 
had to withdraw and regroup and redefine tasks and roles. It was impossible for the agency, 
considering its size and resources, to cover all the sectors it was attempting to cover, the envi-
ronmental sector was vast and was potentially involved in every other sector of Community 
activity. The reorganisation began to modify the agency's organisation but it did not go far 
enough, given its by now entrenched compartmentalised nature any radical change would run 
up against vested interests. 
The evaluation report made in 1999 made it clear that the agency had further weaknesses that 
it needed to address, one of which at least was that it did not involve itself enough with the 
policy makers it was supposed to be serving. A summary of the report's contents was that the 
agency needed to consider balancing its resources better to match short and long term devel-
opments. It should aim 4 . . . at better balancing short, medium and long term developments; 
external relations EEA management and group management; innovation and routine activi-
ties; work on products and services; EEA development and staff development;.. . to improve 
communication tools.' There was also a tendency to generate information without any clear 
strategy, purpose or market. The report emphasised that they had to put more resources into 
strategy and planning with regular reporting becoming more focused. Pressure was applied to 
the EEA to reorganise itself and to provide the products that were required. Despite the nega-
tive comments expressed in the report the core activities of the EEA were not criticised.1!1 
Formally the resulting reorganisation was a 'response to the performance evaluation com-
pleted in 2000. The Agency revised its strategy in early 2001 to develop from being a report 
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producer to an information provider . . . . ' The enlargement also played a role 'In the light 
of the evaluation and in view of enlargement the Agency was reorganized'. It aimed to ad-
dress all the issues arising from these motivating forces by 'clustering people together in pro-
grammes and groups based on similar areas of expertise, separating longer-term planning and 
preparation of future work programmes from implementation of the agreed work programme, 
and ensuring clear and consistent distribution of responsibility for the various Agency clients 
and stakeholders'. 113 
Despite the impressive sense of critical mass for change having been reached the effect of the 
report was, initially at least, apparently to provoke resistance in the agency and the plans for 
an immediate reorganisation were postponed until 2001 and then they were only unwillingly 
implemented and some of the major changes were avoided. One of the weaknesses of the 
agency, namely that of over specialisation, was considered in the plans for the reorganisation 
as it was obviously partly to blame for the comments in the evaluation report. The apparent 
absence of a clear organisational strategy and goal was bound up with the fact that every sub 
unit was following its own goals and interests, all too often in apparent isolation from the rest 
of the organisation and the market they were serving. Put another way, the mission statement 
goals of, 'timely, targeted, relevant and reliable information' provision were seemingly not 
being met. Huge reports which were not particularly user friendly were being produced with-
out any audience in mind. The measure involved the introduction of cross cutting teams 
which would have served to bring together specialists from various sub units into teams deal-
ing with specific issues e.g. signals reports, etc. The final goal was to create a matrix organi-
sation in which specialisms supported and worked with each other in teams. Had the measure 
suggested been followed through then it might have improved the excessive specialisation in 
the agency. This idea was first floated in 2001 in the run up to the major re-organisation of 
that year. At the time the staff proved to be very much in favour of it but without explanation 
the idea was apparently dropped and not mentioned again and played no part in the re-
organisation. 
The reorganisation which occurred was seemingly largely reactive and as a result the urgent 
internal reasons for changing the organisation were ignored and the sense of acting under du-
ress remained. One positive development that did occur was the creation of the strategic de-
velopment and international cooperation directorate, directly under the executive director's 
office and is intended to encourage strategic thinking in the organisation and to pull the sub 
units together in a joint drive to working together more with policy makers. The signs were 
good that this attempt would prove to be successful. After the 2001 reorganisation there was 
still need for what are described as 'more efficient internal procedures . . . to ensure good 
management of the enlarged agency.'ll4Indeed a further re-organisation, possibly stimulated 
by the sense of unfinished business, the arrival of a new executive director and the imminence 
of another evaluation report, had to take place before the process that was sporadically begun 
in 1999 could reach fruition. 
The subsequent reorganisation in 2003 which took place with the arrival of the new executive 
director apparently led to the reintroduction of cross-cutting teams. This reorganisation appar-
ently followed on the growing realisation that the agency needed to prioritise its resources and 
to manage the information it produced rather than randomly generate it. This idea had begun 
to blossom after the 1999 evaluation report said the agency needed to use the information and 
structures it had more effectively rather than producing more. The agency was moving from 
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attempting to cover every aspect of the environment to the more realistic position of their staff 
needing to have a more general overview of the broad sector whilst purchasing in the detailed 
expertise as required. There were plenty of institutions able to provide the data and there was 
a risk of the agency duplicating their work and expertise and thus missing its own path. As is 
so often the case with effective reorganisations the formal changes merely sealed the growing 
move towards the focusing of the organisation's activities that had already been taking place. 
There was apparently a growing realisation in the EEA as reflected in its reorganisations that 
a corporate strategy had been lacking and was essential. Information had to be considered in a 
different manner to previously and its provision seen as a science. Information had to be de-
veloped which was that which policy makers really required, the means to achieving this was 
greater interaction with those who needed it, via work shops and more consulting. With the 
case of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) the EEA successfully followed its new strat-
egy, The problem of compartmentalised information was inevitable in large organisations but 
it needed to be countered. Their goal was to produce readily understandable and 'digestible' 
'information bytes' in reports which were produced for specific circumstances or crises, these 
would boost the EEA's profile and were more useful to their customers. There were seem-
ingly some misgivings in the EEA about the dangers of producing reports which were user 
friendly but possibly also less objective, but the days of the agency generating huge reports 
for no audience appeared to be numbered. An element of risk management was going to be 
involved in the strategy i.e. if there were greater uncertainties, then the sweep, for information 
had to be wider and more inclusive than if a formal task like 'building a bridge is involved', 
in the latter case the necessary information was likely to be needed by a restricted audience 
and would follow a well set pattern and involve a small number of actors, it is clear who has 
the knowledge and who needs it; the agency has to consult widely, keep involved with the lat-
est science and ensure excellent internal and external communications; both were criticised in 
the latest evaluation report and were specified as areas requiring improvement.115 
Both the 2001 and 2003 reorganisations seemingly corresponded to some extent with the 
move throughout the Community's environmental sector towards adopting a more joint strat-
egy on sustainable development, and in particular the sixth environmental action plan of the 
Community. The first Community organisation to reorganise itself around this programme 
was DG ENV and this move towards a clearer strategy with the making of priorities which 
that entailed was greeted by some as a positive step. Indeed the DG had allegedly been con-
sidered to be hard to work with owing to its lack of a clear strategy and corporate plan. The 
reorganisation took place in 2000 and led to some major upheavals in the DG, The EEA fi-
nally followed suit with its reorganisation of 2003 which was based around the Sixth Envi-
ronmental Action Programme (6EAP). The goal of the organisations was to bring coherence 
into the environmental sector and to use the 6EAP as the core around which to organise their 
activities. There was also discussion about a new DG being created which would be named 
DG sustainability and would certainly absorb the DG ENV and maybe the others too. 
The less discussed reasons for the reorganisations were not so obvious, what was clear is that 
the DG led the way and seemingly set a domino effect in action. The declared purpose of the 
DG ENV 2000 reorganisation was to translate the 6EAP into structural change. Whilst this 
goal was no doubt involved in the DG management's calculations, the changes were allegedly 
also a useful method of re asserting management control over lower management and desk 
officers, many of whom had developed efficient compartmentalised empires. Policy networks 
involving the desk officers, their heads of unit had seemingly made management more diffi-
cult. Throughout the 1990's there would appear to have been an attempt to change the organ-
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isational culture of the DG and in 1999 and 2000 the same appeared to have been the case in 
the EEA reorganisation. Both organisations had allowed their desk officers a great deal of 
discretion but the emphasis in both the DG and the agency was being placed on less but bet-
ter, and so the lower levels of management and desk officers saw their discretion diminished 
and the organisational decision making centre of gravity return to the higher management. It 
seems a remarkable coincidence that the Commission began its reforms in 2000 with the em-
phasis on better value for money, less legislation and better management control if possible, 
and the EEA and DG both reorganised within a year. It would appear that a reason for the re-
organisations was the desire by the management in both organisations to use the Commission 
crisis, and the sudden acceptance of radical reform as an antidote to the Community's prob-
lems, to break up private empires and take control over their organisations again, in particular 
in the face of a revitalised opponent, namely for the EEA, the DG. 
The Community institutions have often been defined as porous with networks forming be-
tween them often based more on level and purpose than anything else. Cabinets have rou-
tinely circumvented management to address desk officers, and management have seemingly 
fought back by trying to break off all such contacts. At a lower level the desk officers and 
some heads of unit had worked closely with in both EEA and DG, maybe too closely, and 
granted the nervousness with which the higher management seemingly perceived their organi-
sation's independence and competencies in the Community network of institutions, it is likely 
that when under pressure management react defensively. 16Crises can bring together or they 
can force further apart, the reorganisations probably reflect both. The organisations seemingly 
initially used the Commission crisis to re-entrench themselves with the management in both 
taking the opportunity to regain power in their own organisations. Since the 6EAP was used 
as the new means to structure the DG in the cause of sustainability the EEA had to effect 
some changes and to concentrate on quality and not quantity in its competition with the DG. 
Quality and sustainability were the goals of survivors in the tougher environmental sector of 
the late 90's and early 2000. The EEA had to respond to the more tightly managed DG or-
ganisation it now faced but it did not at this point decide to link its reorganisation to that of 
the DG and to base it around the 6EAP. The various interviews which were carried out in both 
organisations reinforced the notion that the real reasons for the reorganisations in both the 
EEA and the DG were the above. Thus the 6EAP was to an extent probably an excuse for 
tightening management control and organisational identity in the DG and the broad portfolio 
of enlargement, strategy, Commission reforms and evaluation report were given to justify the 
changes in the agency both performed in a top down manner, by dynamic top mangers who 
have been said to have been vying with each other. 
The fact that there was the subsequent need for reorganisations in 2003 in both organisations 
is a sign that the first reorganisations of 2000/2001 were not fully effective, at least in attain-
ing the goals they claimed to have set out to achieve, although they were quite successful in 
achieving management re-control over their organisations. But it is a curious coincidence that 
the reorganisations in both organisations again occurred so soon after each other. This time 
the EEA claimed that it was adopting the 6EAP as the basis for the reorganisation and this 
would remain the case in the future. The DG on the other hand reorganised again and this 
time the 6EAP was not the justification but rather a general movement of policies and person-
nel. It would appear that the two organisations respond to each other but not in a way that 
suggests policy coordination, since the reorganisation of the EEA in 2001 should have been 
like that of the DG and should have had the 6EAP as a basis. Instead it matches the move to 
the 6EAP as the DG changes again, which would appear to imply that whilst there are many 
other factors involved in the decisions to reorganise, a motivation of the management of both 
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organisations is apparently to increase control over their own organisations both internally 
and externally vis-à-vis each other. 
One last reason for the reorganisations that was given by one interviewee, was that environ-
117 
ment government organisations are 'high energy' organisations and that to maintain this 
momentum and energy levels, opportunism and constant changes have to be adopted, 'to f JO 
make progress you must reorganise,' however the general slow down in the EU environ-
mental field is the backdrop for these reorganisations. Progress is less likely than standstill or 
stagnation in the present environmental organisational climate, thus the reorganisations dis-
cussed above would appear to be more related to defensive regrouping and less to "high en-
ergy" levels. 
It was worrying that the environmental organisations were seemingly still not coordinating 
effectively after nine years of interaction. The EEA annual work plans for 2001, 2002 and 
2003 onwards all contained the key aim of improving the flow of information between the 
DG and itself. In 2001; 'the main activities and outcomes for 2001 can be summarised as fol-
lows . . . strengthening the MDIAR (monitoring, data, information, assessment, reporting) ca-
pacities through networking with the Commission . . . to support EU activities on integrated 
environmental assessment and especially environmental outlooks and scenarios.'U9In 2002; 
'The major directions for the EEA 2002 work programme are the following: to enhance deliv-
ery of environmental information serving three major policy priorities. . . integration of the 
environment into economic sectors and information needed for the Commission's sustainable 
l»i/i _ 
development strategy.' In 2003 'The EEA is faced with a number of major key challenges 
in 2003: developing and sharing information on environment and health . . . to support Com-
mission activities. . . *121 Evidently the aim was not being reached despite the reorganisations. 
In the annual report of 2002 a draft memorandum of understanding is stated as having been 
signed to 'establish guidelines for closer cooperation.'122 Given the problems, why this was 
not done in 1994 remains unclear, maybe it had something to do with the change in direction 
heralded by the departure of the energetic ex-executive director and his replacement by an 
acting director Gordon Mclnnes, who was stated as 'forging stronger links to the key clients 1 O T 
in the European institutions.' The seeming lack of a common approach between the two or-
ganisations was most clearly seen in the issue of the enlargement which will be discussed. 
The reforms of the Community with regard to staff hiring were also feeding into structural 
aspects of the EEA. The Commission staff regulations were gradually being modified and this 
applied to the EEA as well. This allowed the agency to employ 'agents' who had seven year 
contracts and who could be brought in to work alongside the officials with full contracts. Fle-
xibility was thus ensured as agents could be brought in when required as they were employed 
from a different budget, (title three) and not budget A, that used for permanent officials. The 
danger of this new approach was that morale would sink as staff, sitting next to each other 
doing similar tasks, discovered they were on different contracts. For the agency, in which ma-
ny of the officials were employed on supposedly temporary contacts which in practice never 
ceased, the problem was perhaps not as acute as in the Commission where this was apparently 
not the case. This method combined with the increasing use of expertise outsourcing, could 
also enable the management of the agency to increase their control by breaking down the en-
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trenched information compartments and ironically allow themselves to have alternative 
sources of information to that provided by their own staff. On top of this the EEA's staff were 
required to move into more generalist areas and also, since the emphasis of the agency was on 
producing less quantity and more quality there were likely to be more staff per task than be-
fore, supply and demand would appear to have improved the managers' situation considera-
bly. 
5.6 EEA AND THE ENLARGEMENT 
One of the coups which the agency managed to carry off successfully was its enlargement in 
January 2002 to include the soon to be MSs Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, Poland and Turkey we-
re also expected to join. The agency had been actively involved with these states for five years 
prior to the formal enlargement of the agency in the implementation of the PHARE project 
which involved the development of administrative capacity in the NMSs as they set up their 
elements in the EIONET. The EEA regulation required it to set up networks of experts in the 
MSs and the NMSs thus the EEA had been actively involved with the NMSs since 1996. A 
small office was set up in the agency during this period to deal with PHARE and it employed 
two people and spent 21 million Euros on 100 projects. The EEA paid for the office as the 
PHARE funds were spent on the NMSs. Many of the PHARE projects petered out into noth-
ing tangible but the EEA ensured that their PHARE project led towards the enlargement of 
the agency. PHARE provided multi-country support and the EEA wanted to keep this struc-
ture since it treated every state as equal. The DG on the contraiy apparently wanted to deal 
with NMSs on an individual bilateral manner. 
The extensive experience in the reality of the enlargement process which the agency gained in 
its dealing with the NMSs placed it ahead of the DG as the latter apparently acknowledged. 
The agency worked at enabling the NMSs to incorporate and implement the environmental 
chapter 22 in the regular progress reports of the acquis by creating administrative capacity in 
their institutions. The EEA helped them too by its goals of harmonising monitoring systems 
and encouraging effective data flow. This resulted in an improved flow of information for the 
Commission via reporting to the DG which was important for it in its policy making role and 
its task of assessing the readiness of the NMSs for accession. One of the major projects which 
the agency was working on was the streamlining of the complex reporting requirements 
which the NMSs as well as the MSs were required to perform. This was a crucial area of work 
as the NMSs were currently being overburdened by demands for networks to be set up in or-
der to supply reports for various DGs. These DGs, divided in a sectoral manner in the Com-
mission, placed onerous demands on the fragile and slowly expanding networks of experts in 
the NMSs, Apparently little attempt was made by the DGs to ascertain whether the NMSs had 
already been required to set up similar networks and provide similar information to other 
DGs. As a result seemingly a duplication of tasks took place, with several networks coexisting 
side by side, generating similar information but not aware of the other network's existence. 
The fragmentation of the DGs internally and between each other within the Commission was 
responsible apparently for this situation, as was the lack of resources within the Commission 
to provide the information themselves. It was easier to place the requirement of creating an-
other network and reporting process on the backs of the NMSs which were, after all, inter-
ested in keeping on good terms with their assessors, rather than to acquire the information 
from expensive private institutions or of course from the EEA, for example. In other words 
the absence of administrative capacity in the Commission and the ability and willingness to 
180 
rationalise internal procedures and to improve internal communication within DGs and be-
tween them was endangering the enlargement process.124 
The already over stretched resources of the NMSs and their supply of experts were being 
wasted on duplication. What was more, their academic and intellectual assets were being di-
verted from the needs of their economies and ministries for domestic uses in the direction of 
creating needless layers of bureaucracy. Hard-pressed ministers and their civil servants were 
not able to direct attention to where those closest to the ground considered it to be most nec-
essary, but were rather having to follow the requirements for accession as defined by disput-
ing Commission DGs. There was already expected to be a brain drain from the NMSs to the 
Community institutions and Western Europe as a result of the enlargement, the multiplication 
of networks was expected to exacerbate the problem further. As fast as the NMSs were creat-
ing the administrative capacities they were obliged to in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria 
relating to implementation of the acquis, so the capacity was being absorbed into superfluous 
networks. If the Commission had rationalised its own internal communication and manage-
10^ s ment procedures the process of enlargement could have been considerably helped. 
The method by which the agency enlarged prior to the rest of the Commission is indicative of 
the confusion in the Community institutions and the potential for inter institutional rivalry po-
tentially at the expense of the vital Community policies like enlargement. The agency recog-
nised that its regulation both in the preamble and in Article 19, allowed it to open up it-
self to new members including the NMSs and to receive funding to achieve this. It decided 
with the NMSs that it would be helpful to both if they enlarged in advance of the formal 
enlargement of the Community. The agency worked closely together with all ten of the NMSs 
in 1999 to write a letter to DG ENV requesting for the permission to enlarge the EEA. The 
DG 'services' allegedly did not want to allow the enlargement to take place, after ail it had 
not initially been planned and inevitably it meant more resources for the EEA. Thus the ser-
vices allegedly refused, but the DG cabinet accepted the letter and the enlargement. The EEA 
and the DG cabinet worked together without the initial support of the services, later this came, 
so that four months after the letter had been sent the acceptance was received. Commissioner 
Wallstroem of the DG said that nobody had expected the enlargement to take place; the ex-
ecutive director of the EEA stated that the enlargement had been a big achievement. Accord-
ing to one source the enlargement assisted the agency vis-à-vis the DG and ensured that the 
agency had the positive visibility it needed after the problems associated with the evaluation 
report and raised its profile considerably.128 After the set back of the evaluation the EEA had 
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outmanoeuvred the DG 'services' and gained more resources for itself. 
124 Interviews with EEA Officials 
125 ibid 
,26 Regulation (EEC) 2110/90 preamble to 'Whereas it is desirable to provide for the Agency to be open to other countries 
which share the concern of the Community and the MSs for the objectives of the Agency under agreements to be concluded 
between them and the Community' 
127ibid article 19 'The Agency is open to countries which are not members of the European Communities but which share the 
concern of the Communities and the MSs for the objectives of the Agency under agreements concluded between them and 
the Community following the procedure in Article 228 of the Treaty.' 
128 Interviews with EEA Officials 
129 Initially the NMSs had worked with the agency on a voluntary basis in the PHARE project, but this was less active than 
the decision to press for the enlargement which was a policy driving process in which the NMSs showed that they were inter-
ested in using the opportunities provided by the EU and could act both as a bloc and in a pro active manner, both important 
for their future success in the Community institutions. For the EEA increased membership meant increased influence as well 
as increased funding. For the first three years the fees which the NMSs had to pay to the agency were to be supported by 
PHARE; 75% in the first year then 50% and 25% for the subsequent years. The funds which they would be able to receive 
from structural funds would be 26 Billion Euros as opposed to the 3 billion they were then able to receive. Prior to the formal 
Community enlargement the NMSs had a special contract status with the agency but as soon as they became members of the 
Community this status was expected to lose its attraction and value and therefore probably change to that of the rest of the 
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The success of the EEA enlargement was reflected in the fact that Turkey and Malta wanted 
to copy it and discussions had begun with the Balkan countries. The problem was that the 
EEA had little to offer these states at that point in time, apart from environmental information. 
Obviously one of the reasons for the NMSs to want to join the agency was because it served 
as a stepping stone into the Commission and the Community as a whole. The practice they 
gained in dealing with the Community from within one of the institutions was also consider-
able and beneficial, but it was likely that their desire to join the agency was also for other rea-
sons. The EEA was important in the provision of information to the Commission about the 
readiness of the NMSs for accession in terms of administrative capacity and ability to imple-
ment environmental legislation, this was certain to have played a role in the NMSs decision to 
press for membership. If nothing else they showed the Community their interest in getting in-
volved in the Community as fast and as fully as possible. 
Some positive developments had occurred in terms of reducing duplication and enhancing 
performance because of the enlargement. Prior to the enlargement there had been two struc-
tures, the PHARE ones and the topic centres; now there were Etopic centres which are a com-
bination of the two previous networks. In tune with EEA thinking there were no differences 
between the new and the old members of the EEA. In the agency there was plenty of opti-
mism about the Community enlargement and its likely effects. And yet there was apparently 
evidence that environment ministries in the NMSs as well as the MSs were in danger of being 
governmentally integrated out of existence by stronger sectors like agriculture. The assistance 
of the EEA and finally that of the Commission might prove necessary to provide support to 
the ailing ministries. There was growing acceptance that the EEA could be considered to be a 
test run for the enlargement of the Community and was therefore of particular interest to DG 
ENV which was likely to have very similar problems and experiences. 
Several effects of the enlargement on the EEA were observed, some positive some less so. At 
first the EEA apparently experienced a positive sense of mission and direction and the organi-
sation was imbued with energy and optimism. Interest and motivation increased dramatically 
as resource flows matched the increases. At first allegedly 10% of officials' time was ab-
sorbed in dealing with the NMSs this rose to around 15 % which was still moderate when 
considering that membership had increased by over a 30%. The organisation had experienced 
a sense of vision and buoyancy which the DG could also expect. After this, though the state of 
readiness of the organisation to address the real issues was tested and in particular the prepa-
rations which had been carried out earlier. Once states were members and no longer on the 
outside they expected to see value for money. The NMSs were initially still being supported 
by PHARE but as this was incrementally reduced, and therefore as their own contributions 
increased so their attitudes changed. The agency had to face the problems related to Turkey 
which finally joined the agency. The environmental information reporting systems were prob-
lematic and Turkey expected the agency to help them to put such systems into place: Turkey 
was going to be disappointed. 130The expectations of many of the NMSs were going to be dis-
appointed as the studies necessary and the projects that would have followed on behind had 
not been carried out. The motivation of the NMSs to comply with the environmental acquis is 
very high, but after the formal enlargement of the Community and they experienced first hand 
the bad compliance records of the rest of the MSs, this was expected to possibly change.131 
MSs. Most of the NMSs had performed most of the HEA working programme and were therefore fully operational members 
of the agency. 
130 Interviews with EEA Officials 
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In terms of officials the agency had deliberately sought to employ staff from the NMSs since 
they had the local knowledge, cultural know how and the networks necessary to link the a-
gency effectively to the states in question. Also the states had the feeling that they were get-
ting something tangible back in terms of nationals employed in the agency. The new staff had 
to work with the EU presidency on policy and environment and were being fully integrated 
into decision making. They had been and were being forced to learn about the reality of the 
EU by being forced to focus on real EU problems; the process of building up a consensus in 
the complex, at times slow Community. The new staff and their states could not just criticise 
from the margins any more. For many the sheer scale of the ^traitjacket' of the EU system 
came as a shock. Many were apparently shocked and disillusioned at just how 'strait jacketed' 
they were in the Community institutions, the free atmosphere they had expected was simply 
not there, some of the restrictions which they had to operate under are as bad as those they 
experienced in their ex-communist countries of origin.132 The idealism with which many 
came to the Community had seemingly quickly evaporated. However, they also noticed how 
their weight as members of staff has changed as their countries became full members (two 
NMS members of staff had served in the agency before their countries became members), 
they could now affect teams and internal processes which was good for their careers and their 
understanding of the EU policy struggle. 
EEA staff had to see the NMSs as individual states with very different cultures and national 
traditions. Far from being like a bloc, the various states often bore closer resemblance to their 
geographical neighbours which were already MSs, than they did to each other. Poland and 
Polish officials and ministries were bureaucratically minded and quite Germanic in their way 
of thinking whereas as Bulgaria was more like Italy, and its nationals tended to have more 
Mediterranean attitudes. It was to be expected that the southern NMSs would naturally align 
themselves with countries from the same region sharing similar environmental problems and 
attitudes. The example of how differently the Greeks and the Germans viewed the war in Ko-
sovo showed how neighbouring countries were far more ambivalent about military action than 
northern ones. The agency was facing the problem of limited resources and of having to bal-
ance the needs of its new members with those of its old ones. How it resolves this dilemma 
I ^ ^ 
could be important for the Commission as well as scarcity of resources and many demands. 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
The case study of the EEA was the only one to be performed on an organisation less con-
trolled by the Commission than most. In this sense it also serves the function that discussions 
with NMS officials has, in providing external feedback on the Commission departments con-
cerned. We have seen that the EEA was an interesting case as it revealed some trends in the 
EU, and also showed once again the Commission's resistance to reform and any organisation 
that is in a position to inspect it and its performance. The Commission is stated to react rather 
allergically to European agencies regardless of their usefulness. On a more fundamental level 
the combination of a sector interest with MS actors as happened in the EEA could be the ne-
mesis of the Commission and it is likely it senses this. The EEA, in a similar manner to UC-
LAF/OLAF, was also created originally to plug a gap in the policy making arena, namely that 
of policy evaluation and feedback. 
132 Interviews with EEA Officials 
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In terms of the EU - Commission cycle of slowdown (stagnation) we can say that the EEA 
reflects what could appear to be a concerted attempt by the MSs to reassert control over the 
environmental field. We can also say that the EEA seems to also be a symptom of general 
fragmentation and sectoralisation of EU policy fields, as will be discussed later, much like the 
other agencies and so related networks. The danger is that these represent an acceleration in 
the centrifugal tendencies already apparent in the EU, with more power going to sectors. MS-
Commission rivalry is resulting in yet more actors with diluted compromise competences 
which are not effectively coordinated by any central authority. A more sensible approach 
might as usual be for the functions of the EEA to be incorporated into the Commission or ra-
ther a new governmental structure which will be outlined in the recommendations section. 
The problem is the ongoing unwillingness of the MSs to provide the necessary resources to 
the Commission to manage properly. 
There is also the basic organisational rivalry and resistance to reform of the Commission to be 
taken into consideration. As with OLAF the Commission seems to see the EEA as a rival and 
competitor, where they should be complementary. The EEA offers the Commission the neces-
sary policy evaluation required for improved future policy making and programming and this 
should be complementary. The Commission legislates and has real legal authority which the 
EEA simply does not have and yet it apparently resists the agency. The Commission controls 
EEA funding to some extent and seems to be willing to use this mechanism if needed. It has 
also applied the same method used with OLAF of wanting the EEA to concentrate on external 
data collection and the generation of general reports on the state of the environment and oth-
ers for the benefit of the DG, rather than concentrating on evaluation of DG policy. Granted 
that some environmental legislation could well have been improved on, according to some 
DG ENV officials themselves, the agency should be welcomed for this reason alone. Whilst 
the political motive cannot be denied these authors* views are also accurate. Which leaves the 
observer with the feeling that the Commission, here DG ENV is possibly jealous about its 
monopoly over all aspects of policy making and reluctant to accept any reform of the policy 
making process and so indirectly itself. 
With regards to the enlargement, there seems to have been a measure of rivalry here too. The 
DG seems to have wanted to curb the EEA from enlarging first and so beating the Commis-
sion to it. There seems to have been little policy reason for this but just another sign of the 
organisations unhealthy rivalry. The EEA was quite critical about the DG and its enlargement 
activities and stressed the habit of the Commission failing to coordinate itself internally and as 
a result requiring that the limited resources of the NMSs be used to construct networks which 
were duplicating each other. This was particularly bad where different sectors were involved 
and the DGs did not coordinate or check first, whether or not a network was already in exis-
tence before simply requiring another to be made. Duplication between the DG and EEA is 
also a danger if for no other reason than that the DG had seemed to lack a degree of coher-
ence. The competition between the two organisations, also plagues the whole of the EU, is 
counter productive and leads to confusion and duplication rather than positive synergies; 
thankfully there are signs that this is gradually moderating. 
A particularly interesting finding was the changing relationship of the EEA and DG ENV. 
Whilst the DG was more environmentally active and in a state of internal conflict the conflict 
with the EEA was at its worst. As the DG was apparently re-oriented via personnel reorgani-
sations at various levels, and economic interests allegedly came to be more influential in it so 
the conflicts with the EEA subsided. In fact the interviews even seemed to show a quite cor-
dial atmosphere existing between the senior management of both. There would appear to have 
been a take-over of the environmental field, to some extent, by MSs and these in part for eco-
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nomic reasons. In that sense a larger MS strategy seems to have been followed of which the 
EEA was just a single element, a useful means of applying influence whilst the DG was re-
oriented internally. 
The EEA as an organisation seems to be remarkably like the Commission itself, or rather an 
interesting mixture of the Commission during its earlier phases, dynamic and acting like parti-
sans almost, and also the more problematic Commission of the present day with resistance to 
reorganisation and lack of coordination. This young organisation was not surprisingly quite 
critical about the old fashioned, slow, bureaucratic DG and Commission. In this sense it see-
med at times to almost present an alternative sectoral approach to managing the policy field, 
far more modern and partnership-like than the more formal approach of the DG to the MSs. 
Whether the EEA's attitude merely reflects greater sectoral self confidence and willingness to 
go it alone and to drop the old rivalries of the EU or rather a desire to see the Commission re-
structured and rejuvenated remains to be seen. 
http://org.eea.eu.int/documents/ar2001/images/ar2001_14.jpg 
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Dates of Interviews Held with: 
EEA Officials: 
Official 1. 11.06.2003 
Official 2. 06. 08. 2003 and 29. 08. 2003 
Official 3. 03.06.2003 
Official 4. 03.06.2003 
DG ENV Official: 11.06.2003 
DG ENV Cabinet Member with knowledge of EEA/DG Relationship 
DG Cabinet Member: 11. 06.2003 
NMS EEA Official: 
NMS Official: 03.06.2003 
Visiting Scientist to the EEA: 15.9.2003 
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6. DG AGRICULTURE (DG VI) 
We have now looked at one DG and two agencies all of which are relative new comers to the 
EU institutional scene. All of them have shown the qualities of the Commission which we 
would expect to find on the basis of the theory. There is a bureaucratic shell which surrounds 
the Commission which can respond flexibly in a dynamic period to allow officials maximum 
leeway to promote the Commission and the integration project. Equally during times of threat 
when fragmentation sets in and the sense of mission wanes, then MS and sectoral influence 
increases and as in the case of DG ENV, reorganisations were apparently used to combat the 
policy network. The bureaucracy was strengthened and became more rigid. DG ENV was 
seemingly made less of a threat to the MSs and other sectors by having its staff and organisa-
tional culture altered. Less infringement proceedings were put into force and the idea was 
even put forward that the complaints procedure be partially nationalised. DG AGRI is a useful 
case study which shows us a long standing DG which has apparently had a history of being 
cyclically penetrated by MS influence and sectoral policy networks. More than in many DGs, 
bureaucracy has increased in the DG to suffocating levels and the policy is under pressure to 
be partially re-nationalised. The resistance of elements of the DG to any reform and weaken-
ing of their position let alone the CAP can be expected to be serious, and the moves made by 
the Commission political authorities to restore their control over all the elements of the DG 
can be expected to be equally earnest. 
One of the oldest and largest DGs in the Commission, DG AGRI deserves the title, 'Levia-
than' in memory of the great monster which at first delighted its observers but later froze 
them with fear. An institution and a policy (Common Agricultural Policy, CAP) which was 
the integrationalist's hope and ideal but finally became a monster which devoured half the 
budget and a fair portion of the Commission's resources. It could be argued to have stunted 
the future development of the Community when funds could have been better spent on sup-
porting the booming sectors of the European Economy. In the 1950s it was seen as the rescuer 
of the hungry Europeans and a bringer of stability to the states as a whole. Whilst undoubt-
edly also serving as the sweetener to the French for opening their markets up to German in-
dustrial products. In the 1990s, it could be said to be seen as a devastator of the countryside 
leaving in its wake a scarred, savaged environment, mal-treated animals, sickness in humans, 
unemployed farmers in Europe and starving ones in the third world. As a policy it appears to 
be intransparent with attempts recently launched to reverse this.1 What on earth went wrong 
with the ideal and the idealism, what happened to the CAP and the DG that encapsulated it? 
Reading some of the descriptions of the effects of European intensive farming one could be 
forgiven for seeing one of the apocalyptic riders underway with a swinging scythe. Yet in the 
Brussels headquarters a far calmer picture is laid out, the monster has been tamed, if it ever 
existed. 
What is clear is that the CAP is undergoing reform, however slowly and it is equally clear that 
the reforms have taken longer and are less dramatic than many would have wanted. The DG is 
at the heart of the reforms and however shy and reticent it likes to appear its powers have 
been considerable and remain pretty impressive even now. The CAP has often appeared re-
1 Kubosova, L. 'Member slates back EU funding disclosure from 2008' 20.10.2006 'EU member states have supported pro-
posed new rules to unveil individual recipients of all EU funds starting in 2008, with the EU25 asking the European Commis-
sion to run a central database for the information. The transparency principle is part of a revised EU financial regulation the 
bloc's ambassadors adopted on Thursday (19 October) and paves the way for a publication of beneficiaries of EU farm aid as 
well as of regional and cohesion funds1. 
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markably resilient to reforms, as has the Commission itself. One argument is that the MSs are 
the cause of the lack of CAP reform, they are unwilling to give up benefits. This is true up to 
a point, but the linkage between a DG and a Commission, which have repelled reform and 
their policies which have done likewise, cannot be ignored. Status quo and inertia favour tho-
se with power in the present, but not when that status quo provokes a reaction which gathers 
steam and threatens to reach a critical mass. 
A survey of the DG reveals a far from uniform organisation itself undergoing internal change. 
Reforms occurred but were apparently not matched by internal reorganisation and remained 
stunted reforms. Rationality was supposed to He behind the major reorganisation taking place 
in the DG in 2004 but the reality was seemingly rather different. The modest nature of the re-
forms up until 2003 seems less innocuous when the alleged missed chances are considered, 
the inefficiency, the blockages, negative protectionist policies and their effect on major policy 
issues like enlargement. A large proportion of the cause for the above seemingly lay in the 
DG itself and not in the MSs. It is described as 'shirking' the crucial issues of reform and not 
tackling seriously other fundamental issues of CAP reform. 2The reason for much of the DG's 
behaviour is to be found in a combination of Sectoral fragmentation; Commission fragmenta-
tion; dynamic Policy Networks; MS interference and finally Bureaucratisation. 
The findings relating to DG AGRI are now presented. The first point is that the growing po-
wer and willingness of the MSs to interfere in a DG seems to be most clearly shown in DG 
AGRI. There are several examples of MSs apparently pressing their nationals into positions as 
low as Head of Unit level and MS officials showing quite clear MS loyalty in their decisions. 
According to the literature there is a process of re-nationalisation going on in the policy and 
there are some who would like to see this continue. Unsurprisingly some within the DG have 
apparently resisted this tendency and the reforming of the policy and the DG. The French are 
stated to be one MS which is strongly present in the DG and resistant to any changes. 
The article will describe the recent trends and history of the CAP and the DG, before moving 
on to consider the other main actors in the policy making process and the growing willingness 
of MSs to use staffing policies to extend their influence. DG Agriculture's structure is then 
discussed and its growing bureaucracy; the various groups which compete with each other for 
the direction of DG policy. General organizational observations will be made about the DG 
and inefficiencies stated. The curious use that has been made of the Kinnock reforms is then 
considered and is followed by an analysis of the powers of Policy Networks and their ability 
to resist reform to the CAP, the DG and of course enlargement. 
6,1. CAP HISTORY 
6.1.1. CAP 
The primary task of the nascent CAP was to bring together the various instruments which the 
then Member States (MSs) had individually created to guarantee food for their citizens and 
support for their farmers. The hungry years of the Second World War and its aftermath for-
med the background for the creation of the CAP. In order to have a common policy the re-
moval of these individual instruments and their replacement by the CAP was necessary. The 
declared aims of the CAP were; 'to increase agricultural productivity, to ensure a fair standard 
of living from agriculture, to stabilise agricultural markets and to guarantee the availability of 
2 Tracy, M. Agricultural policy in the European Union, (1997). APS/AGRA. Brussels, FOCUS, p. 103 
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food supplies for consumers at reasonable prices.' The CAP was 'based on support for cere-
als market prices at levels designed to safeguard the profitability of the least efficient produc-
ers.'4The outcome was 'extensive subsidisation and intervention on the internal market, a sys-
tem of import levies which largely insulated the main commodity markets from world market 
influences, and subsidisation of exports to third countries.,5The main outlines of CAP were 
decided in Stressa in July 1958. The conference declared the design of the common system 
which stressed the need for structural change and higher productivity. The Commission drew 
up a range of proposals on the basis of article 40(2) of the treaty. At the end of the transitional 
period for the common market in 1962, the main package of measures based not surprisingly 
on a compromise involving cereal prices was agreed. In the same year the European Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund was set up which covered the main CAP expenditures. 
Although the fund was at first financed jointly by the MSs and the EC, after the struggles be-
tween de Gaulle and the Commission the fund was absorbed into the EC budget. The support 
prices were steadily increased with the justification that they were enabling farm families to 
have a just standard of living. 
6.1.2 CAP REFORM 
After the growth of agricultural surpluses, internal and external pressure for reform of the 
CAP finally began to bear fruition. From the early eighties support prices were not raised eve-
ry year, a new development and in 1984 the quota scheme for dairy products was introduced 
with the intention of reducing surpluses. The Delors Commission managed in 1988 to put 
controls on agricultural spending as part of the changes in the EC budget, the set aside scheme 
for arable crops was also concluded in the same year. The Delors II package 1992 led to a 
council decision to control agricultural expenditure in 1994. The MacSharry Reform was fi-
nally agreed in 1992 with the EC under pressure from the United States. This reform was con-
sidered to be the beginning of a new way forwards with agricultural prices being left alone 
and instead farmers being provided with direct payments as support. Again the aim was to 
ensure that production was decreased and also amounts exported. The reform envisaged more 
major price cuts than the council was willing to permit and a more moderate reform was the 
result. 
The agenda 2000 reform (1997) was the logical result of the weakened MacSharry Reform. 
Despite the reform there was an increase in productivity and increased competition in both 
internal and external agricultural markets, which combined with the Uruguay Round Agree-
ment for Agriculture, meant that there was a real danger of 'new market imbalances' if prices 
remained at their present levels.6 This along with the BSE crisis, and pressure for environ-
mentally friendly approaches to farming made improvements seemingly inevitable. The WTO 
round scheduled for 1999 added pressure for more changes. The Agenda 2000, as it was fi-
nally agreed, was much watered down and left several problems remaining, 'It delays the 
dairy reform until 2005/06. It reduces the cut in support price of cereals from 20% to 15%. It 
introduces again a costly set-aside rate of 10% for all the 7 years. It re-adjusts the beef reform 
to allow for the possibility of ad-hoc intervention buying. With the overall aim to "stabilise" 
the budget, the delays were preferred to other more effective options . . . Agricultural trade 
3 Minutes of Evidence, Agricultural Committee of the House of Commons, session 1997-8. Second report CAP Reform: 
AGENDA 2000, volume I. p,l. 
4 ibid 
5 See note 2 Tracy (1997) p.96 
6 Pezaros. P. The Agenda 2000 CAP reform agreement in the light of the future EU enlargement (1999) Maastricht, ElPA 
discussion paper p.3 
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and intervention schemes will continue to depend on the markets, both internally and exter-
nally.'7 
A somewhat jaded perspective on the reforms is shown as follows; 4 . • . moreover, in a fur-
ther tactic to delay reform at the Brussels summit in October 2002, the French president 
Jacques Chirac and the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroder brokered a deal to maintain a 
ceiling on agricultural spending until 2013. the deal in effect blocks the prospect of introduc-
ing any substantive change in the common agricultural policy until 2006, and delays any 
meaningful concessions until at least 2012 , . . The mid term review of the CAP offers at least 
an opportunity to set a new course. While there are signs of positive elements in the proposals 
put forward by the Commission, their approach to de-coupling (de-linking subsidies from 
production) raises serious problems. With de-coupled payments, the traditional export subsidy 
will disappear only to be recreated in another guise-the hidden export subsidy. De-coupling 
on the current model, as supported by the UK and Sweden, is a cosmetic exercise, designed to 
bring the EU into compliance with the letter of WTO law, while violating the spirit of free 
trade. In a cynical move the Commission is proposing to shift the bulk of domestic support for 
agricultural production into the so-called green box - a mechanism devised by the USA and 
EU during the Uruguay Round of trade talks. Free of tight disciplines, the green box allows 
farm income aids such as direct payments that rise with the size of farm and level of past pro-
duction, and compensation to producers for low prices. These payments may perpetuate sur-
plus production and export dumping - and so are clearly trade-distorting but they are currently 
exempt from any cuts agreed in the agriculture negotiations at the WTO. Bringing greater 
benefits to large corporate agriculture at the expense of small family farms, de-coupled direct 
payments would also reinforce the inequitable nature of CAP spending.'8 
The MSs were, it seems, responsible for some of the watering down of the Commission's ini-
tial proposal for Agenda 2000. The result was the so called Mid-Term Review reform 2002-
2003 which some have called the most radical of the reforms to date. The Mid -Term Review 
resulted in the following changes: 'single farm payment system which will no longer be lin-
ked to the volume of production; Member States can maintain a limited link between subsidy 
and production only under well defined conditions; these subsidies will be linked to the re-
spect of environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards; a strengthened rural devel-
opment policy with more EU money; the single farm payment system will enter into force in 
2005, but Member States can delay this to 2007; reduction in direct payments ("modulation") 
for bigger farms to finance the new rural development policy; several other modifications of 
the market policies of the CAP in the areas of milk, cereals, rice, durum wheat, nuts, starch 
potatoes and dried fodder.'9Pressure applied by Germany and France prevented the total break 
being made between farmers and their production level. 0 
The CAP has enjoyed plenty of political support from its beginning and still today several of 
the MSs of the Union and their main political parties remain strongly in favour of a generous 
CAP. In particular certain conservative parties have shown themselves strongly supportive of 
the farmers,11 this is particularly true of Germany where the CDU are aware of the Catholic 
backgrounds of its farmers who generally support the CDU. This appears odd considering that 
Germany is the major paymaster of the Community and is also very industrialised, but helps 
7 See note 6 Pezaros. P. (1999) p.22 
8 Leadbeater J, of Oxfam International. EU hypocrisy Unmasked: Why EU Trade policy hurts development in SME Union 
'the Entrepreneur' (European People's Party of the EP group of MEPs supporting SMEs) June 2003 No 7. p7-8 
9 EurActiv website (22. 7.2003) CAP Mid-Term review background. http://www.euractiv.com/de/gap/cap-mid-term-review-
not-updated/article-l 09964 background section 
10 ibid 
11 See note 2 Tracy (1997) p.89 
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to account for Germany's acquiescence to the costs of CAP. Under Chancellor Kohl, Ger-
many used for the first time its empty chair rights to veto a cut in cereal prices. The reunifica-
tion changed the situation and subsequently Germany became more favourable towards re-
form. 12France has always supported CAP and stood up for the principles of it and fought 
against any mention of reform. French presidents and governments are uneasy about opposing 
the farmers and in the face of strong farming disapproval have shown themselves likely to 
oppose the offending reform proposals rather than to confront the farmers. The British have 
always advocated reform of the CAP. The continuing importance of the CAP to MSs and the 
differing MS attitudes towards it was revealed in the Italian delegation's position in the 2002 
run up to the Mid-Term Review. The document stressed the support of the Italians for the 
CAP whilst also advocating greater national competences.13 Interestingly it states that there 
appeared to be three main groupings of MSs in the Council. The first group were in favour of 
the CAP and are against any major changes. This group was described as being the largest 
with 'many MSs'uwhich received a lot of revenue from the CAP as it was. A second group 
was described as having little sympathy for the CAP and wanting to speed the attainment of 
market conditions. The last group seemed to place environmental issues high on the agenda 
and the welfare of animals. It appeared likely that France, Spain and probably Germany were 
in the first group, the UK in the second and the Scandinavian countries in the third.15 Al-
though it was not clear from the text whether the membership of more than one group was 
possible, it would seem likely. Italy would appear to have been positioned between the first 
two groups, favouring positive change to the CAP but not scaling down.16 
Arguably the CAP has been slowly moving to be more under the influence of the MSs via a 
process known as re-nationalisation, ' . . . the new support regime, having separated support 
and market prices, has prepared the ground for more national influence on social and envi-
ronmental measures . . . small steps in the direction of more national influence have been ma-
de: increasing Member States' influence can in some policy areas be justified by the principle 
of subsidiarity.'17 The possibilities for so called 'envelope payments' (lump sums of money 
are provided to the MSs to distribute themselves which allows them greater leeway in its dis-
tribution and application,) to be made to MSs allows them greater room for manoeuvre in the 
implementation of the CAP. Indeed the optional top up payments which New Member States 
(NMSs) could pay to their farmers to bring them up to a level of income bordering on that of 
the MSs, appeared to allow and train the NMSs in extending and practicing national influence 
in agriculture. It is true that these amounts were to be reduced over time, but that they were to 
be present from the start of the NMSs membership, which seemed indicative enough of the 
trend to lower the cost to the EC budget in the short term, MSs can help their farmers sepa-
rately. This process was also mentioned by the Italian delegation under the notion of'subsidi-
arity,' as the following shows 'market policy needs to incorporate more flexible instruments 
enabling individual Member States - in a framework of increased subsidiarity - to boost mar-
ket support for farms that fulfill specific quality, environmental and employment require-
ments.' 8It seems hard to interpret this statement as being anything but a gradual move to-
wards some re-nationalisation. If this continues to be the case then it would be a return to the 
situation prior to the de Gaulle crisis. Since it has been said that there are common policies in 
12 See note 2 Tracy (1997) p.90 
13 Council of the European Union. (2002). 2615/02 Italian delegation. Agricultural policy: the run-up to the mid-term review 
of Agenda 2000 p.9 
14 See note 13 Council of the European Union. (2002) 2615/02 p.5 
15 ibid p.5 
16 ibid.pS 
l7Kjeldahl, R. Reforming the Reform?-The CAP at a watershed (1994) in Kjeldahl, R. and Tracy,M (eds) Renational isat ion of 
the Common Agricultural Policy? (1994) La Hutte, Institute of Agricultural economics/Agricultural Policy Studies p.5-22 p. 
21; 22 
See note 13 Council of the European Union. (2002). 2615/02 p.8 
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areas where the MSs simply do not trust each other at all,19 optimistically maybe the CAP is 
gradually losing this quality, and years of harmonising their systems have possibly removed 
many of the possibilities of cheating. Maybe the CAP can be allowed to be gradually less 
'common' as it gets less important. The general desire of the MSs and the Commission ap-
pears to be that agriculture should take a back stage role in the Community and free up staff 
and resources, political as well as budgetary for more relevant pressing and profitable integra-
tionalist sectors. Thus the CAP is no longer desired to be a core item of community activity 
by many of the political actors, it served its role in furthering integration and can be dealt with 
differently. 
6.2 DG AGRICULTURE 
The DG is said to be in charge of implementing one of the two 'policy bedrocks' of the Trea-
ty. Their establishment was required to be achieved within a twelve year period.20 Thus it is 
one of the oldest DGs in the Commission and has enjoyed a reputation as being both conser-
vative and traditional. The DG has vertical or rather sectoral responsibilities insofar as it is 
« * _ 
'focused' on the agricultural sector. It is also considered to be one of the DGs which is deal-
ing with a policy area where considerable power had been transferred to the Community from 
the MSs. The DG has more executive powers than most and has a role of being an 'overseer 
of administration undertaken by agencies in the MSs.'23 It is also one of the main paying DGs 
and much of its work is geared to implementing the CAP and making the necessary payments. 
Throughout its history most of its officials have been working on 'administering the complex 
CAP programmes.'24 
A snap shot of the DG in the 1960s was provided by Coombes. He describes how Commis-
sioner Mansholt enjoyed good relations with the Director General to such an extent that his 
cabinet were primarily involved in matters external to the DG. This state of affairs is remark-
able given the state of antagonism or at least unease that appeared to exist between the Cabi-
net and the DG recently, where it was said that once a month a circular was sent from the Di-
rector General forbidding the officials to have direct contact with either the cabinet or the 
Commissioner. 26The relationship which Mansholt enjoyed with the Director General was de-
scribed as being like that of the partisan, loyalist organisational spirit of the early days of the 
Commission.27 The DG was likely in its early days to have been run along the partisan lines 
with European enthusiasts predominating. Later the Cabinet probably separated the Commis-
sioner from the DG, much along the present lines.28Initially the officials were probably less 
specialist than they later became. There would appear to have been a development of the 
Commission including the DG into a 'porous1 organisation with seconded officials from the 
MSs joining. This seems to have heralded a more general increase in the MSs promoting their 
representation within the Commission.29 Arguably, in the short term, two of the main func-
tions of the Commission, the meditative and the initiative functions, were strengthened by the 
19 Interviews with DG Officials: DG REGIO 
20 Nugent, N. The European Commission, (2000) Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave p. 36 
21 ibid p. 145 
22 ibid 
23 ibid 
24 See note 2 Tracy (1997) p.84 
25 Coombes, D. Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Communities (1970) London, Allen and Un win p. 25 6 
26 Interview with Commission Official: DG AGRI 
27 See note 25 Coombes (1970) p.256 
28 ibid p. 25 7 
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addition of flexibility and inventiveness combined with the organisation being 'loose, open 
A 
ended system of organisation.' However values and loyalties multiplied as well leading fi-
nally to 'bureaucratic means of preserving equilibrium and consistency.'31The importance of 
agriculture and the DG in the early community explains the high level of political drama that 
it invoked between de Gaulle and Hallstein. 
Recently the DG has been said to have a 'broken backed policy' by which is meant that the 
CAP is ceasing to be the most important and certainly not the core of the Commission any-
more, The BSE crisis apparently led to a weakening of Commissioner Fischler in the Com-
mission and resulted in the transfer of food and consumer health to the Commissioner for 
Consumer Affairs. He was further weakened over the Rural Development issue after a dis-A i 
pute with the Commissioner for Regional Policy. Whilst the Agenda 2000 possibly helped 
restore his position he was unable to pursue his desired integration of agricultural and rural 
policy.35 During the 1990s the DG was perceived to be not adopting a coherent approach to <2 / _ 
policy making needs. The DG was seen as being wholly the wrong organisation to even be-
gin to create and nurture an integrated rural approach, despite the Commissioner's declara-
tions.37 The DG was declared to have 'a poor track record on managing markets', although 
the national civil servants on the management committees were seen to have supported this 
weakness.38It was described in 1997 as having 'clearly lost most 
of its battles'.39The Mid-
Term Review was perceived as a master coup by the Commissioner and to have boosted the 
DG's position in the Commission. 
6.2.1 THE CAP PROCESS ACTORS 
6.2.1.1 POLICY MAKING BACKGROUND AND THE MSs 
Fanners are considered to be a pretty unified and cohesive social group, particularly in com-
parison with the public as a whole. Taxpayers and consumers are not easy to mobilise and are 
less likely to mobilise themselves.40Farmers are directly affected by any agricultural decision 
as are the larger rural communities around them.41 They are likely to be extremely well in-
formed about any governmental moves to in anyway damage their interests, and they are or-
ganised at a political level 42so that politicians appear to prefer to placate this group of voters 
although it is probably at the cost of the electorate as a whole. Using pricing mechanisms 
seem to be less resisted in general by consumers than large payouts from the tax payer.43This 
changes when large surpluses attract negative media attention to the policy concerned, then 
more independent and controllable amounts paid by the tax payer may seem a better solu-
tion.44 More or less this is what happened in the Community, with hidden price mechanisms 
30 See note 25 Coombes (1970) p.258 
31 ibid p.259 
32 Interviews with Commission Officials; DG AGRI 
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34 ibid p.84 
35 ibid p.84 
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37 ibid p.l 18 
38 ibid p.224 
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40 Nedergaard. P (1994), The Political Economy of CAP Reform, in Kjeldahl, R, Reforming (he Reform, The CAP at a water-
shed in Kjeidahl, R. and Tracy,M (eds) Renationalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy} (1994) La Hutte, Institute of 
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being used until the surpluses forced a debate to start which led gradually to the de-coupling 
of payments from productivity levels of farmers, 6 All in all, it seems that the influence of the 
farmers on the political decision makers plays a more important role for the countries' attitude 
towards a restructuring of CAP than countries' net economic benefits.'45Politicians dislike the 
technicalities of the CAP and at the same time favour them. It is argued that transforming po-
litical decisions into bureaucratic technical ones makes the policy appear more objective. Of-
ficials confirmed that the more technical the document the less it is changed by the politi-
cians; this is the case with many of the so called comitology regulations. 
Since the inception of the CAP, unanimous voting in the Council of Ministers has prevailed, 
defying often the existence of majority voting procedures, ministers tend to negotiate until 
overall agreement is reached.46This can lead to an increase in package deals and compromise 
so that all MSs get something out of the proceedings and therefore vote positively. This is 
said to have led to a steady increase in support for farmers. The desire of ministers to get the 
best deal for their own farmers whatever the cost to the Community as a whole has ratcheted 
the costs of the CAP up.47 The insularity of the different sectors from one another and the ab-
sence of any real EU ministry of finance to check the activities of the ministers reinforced this 
tendency. The various groups in the sector, as in other sectors, can be expected to find more in 
common with those involved in their sector than with those without, even with their national 
ministries. Thus the DG and the agricultural ministers and all their officials can be expected to 
act in a fairly cooperative manner in supporting agricultural interests. This melting down of 
the institutional barriers between the Council and the DG is not complete but it is there and 
adds to the upward push on CAP support levels. This is discussed further under the Policy 
Network section. 
The MSs bureaucracies already have considerable power over implementation and this is like-
ly to increase with the reforms which will benefit their bureaucracies48, 'in other words, the 
arsenal available to individual MSs to take specific national measures or adopt alternative 
ways of implementation has increased. This will increase national influences on the CAP.'49 
Directives been favoured rather than regulations since 1993 and this will extend the already 
very real power over implementation which the MSs have, which allows for full scale 'redefi-
nition of policy.'50The process of re-nationalisation and the increasing use of high level politi-
cal decision making also appear to reflect the growing influence of the MSs. The MSs have 
always been involved in the CAP and there are signs as mentioned above that they desire to 
and are extending their influence. 
6.2.1.2 LOBBYISTS 
The farming lobby has proven to be of considerable influence to the DG over time and helped 
it to consolidate its position in the Commission.51The French government could almost be 
considered to be a major lobbying force for the DG as well, or rather as a "political 
ally".52The Commission is known to rely extensively on lobbyists to supply it with the infor-
mation it needs to generate effective policies and to supplement the information provided by 
the MSs it is supposed to be overseeing. Involvement of stakeholders is also important for the 
45 See note 40 Nedergaard. (1994) 
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Commission in its drive towards transparency. But there have been allegations that the DG is 
too close to the farming lobby and that the close and durable contacts that the DG has enjoyed 
with lobbyists needed to be changed. Implicitly the resistance to reform that the sector has c n 
shown would appear to have been linked to the DG's resistance. Thus the policies for the 
sector and the DG appear to have a strong relationship, with both being involved in the others 
fate. The market divisions of the Commission have been described as being protective to-
wards their sectors and the whole DG has been noted for being farmer oriented.5 
6.2.1.3 DG AS A BUREAUCRATIC ACTOR 
The Bureaucrats are considered to have a large influence on agriculture owing to the techno-
cratic input and the wealth of detail required for the majority of decision making.55 They are 
thought to in some ways compete not only with their fellow bureaucrats but also with the poli-
ticians involved for control over decision making. Far from the bureaucrats gaining relatively 
few benefits from extending their control the opposite appears to be the case. Major aims of 
the bureaucrats are said to be 'to increase their power-base, their responsibilities, staff and 
career prospects. These goals are best achieved the more complex and technical agricultural 
policy is, the more important agriculture is as an economic sector, the more agriculture is go-
verned politically rather than by market forces and the more technical-bureaucratic decisions 
are legitimised by the involvement of the agricultural interest organisations in the decision 
making process.' 6The power alleged to be wielded by the specialists within the DG of whom 
there were many was considerable, and their knowledge of the complex details of certain sup-
port regimes was often utterly unique, in one case only one individual within the DG and 
within the EC was said to fully understand one of the support regimes, which logically left 
both him and his unit in a position of considerable power.5 
The reforms of the agricultural sector can be expected to increase rather than diminish the 
power of the bureaucrats.58This somewhat paradoxical fact owes its origins to a more com-
plex list of calculations and bureaucratic tasks which will have to be performed as a result of 
the reform s.59The basic rule of thumb appears to be that the more tasks that there are to be 
performed the more bureaucratic units will be required, at the DG level and in the MSs. The 
CAP has been stated to have become more complicated despite the stated aims of simplifying 
it and this requires that more officials and not less be involved in it.60 Each CAP compromise 
appears to have generated matching complexities. The reforms have resulted in de-coupling, 
yes, but not to the point of removing the linkage to production. The headage payments on cat-
tle, sheep etc which are now paid still allocate funds according to the number of farm animals 
a farmer has, and remain a link to production. Milk is still quota oriented and arable crops re-
main subsidized in terms of price, albeit at a lower level and direct payments can be made to 
prevent farmers losing out.6 The fact that some price support remains alongside direct pay-
ments obviously requires more not less officials to implement. 
53 See note 51 Stevens, A and Stevens, H (2001) 
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The DG officials could be expected to oppose reform and change if it is in favour of more 
'market orientation',62 and also if they have developed over time loyalty to their regime which 
they are often specialists having worked in the same area for up to thirty odd years. They are 
also said to benefit from 'continuing and building up agricultural protectionism because they 
gain fewer benefits from taking general economic and political considerations into account,' 3 
than the politicians. But if at some point the pressure mounts from their bureaucratic col-
leagues, or from the political head of the DG, then they can be expected to protect themselves 
by allowing or even encouraging reforms. Too many conflicts with other DGs and the Com-
mission itself are said to have led the DG towards its apparent acceptance and endorsement of 
the reform ideal. These conflicts were said to be 'threatening to damage its influence, prestige 
etc.'^That said since the date of the previous quote the DG has entered into several conflicts 
with some DGs and found some interesting new partners in others.65Furthermore the methods 
used by DG Agricultural officials to protect their clients represent a surprisingly effective 
rearguard action. Some farmers are said to be better off as a result of the reforms than they 
were before.66Furthermore it is stated that the reforms have resulted in a higher bill being paid 
by consumers and taxpayers rather than a lower one, 'It was recently reported in Agra Europe 
that Commissioner Fischler has confirmed that switching to greater use of direct payments 
will increase the cost of CAP measures/67 
6.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE DG 
The DG the largest DG in the Commission, employs around one thousand members of staff. It 
is divided up into eleven different directorates which reflect its size and complexity, see be-
Iow.68The fact that there are three deputy Director Generals when some DGs have only one or 
none as is the case of DG ENV also emphasises this point. The DG is said to be split between 
the CMO (Common Market Organisation) units which monitor the markets and price levels, 
the horizontal units which administer the DG, the units now responsible for the payments and 
lastly the other units which include those involved in the new rural aspects of CAP. Accord-
ing to sources there is a little communication between the various parts of the DG which is 
maybe partly due to its size. Managerial task forces are set up to deal with new tasks like the 
Agenda 2000 reforms and those of Mr Kinnock. The co-existence of reformed policies along-
side the old ones for a period of several years as one system is replaced by another has argua-
bly generated a lot of friction within the DG, and overwork for the management who are 
called upon to perform several extra tasks without any significant extra resources. 
Some of the characteristics of the DG owe their origin to the sector itself, the range of direc-
torates reflects the various regimes and tasks the DG is called upon to implement: 
DG AGRI ORGANIZATION. 
Directorate A.I - International affairs I, in particular WTO negotiations 
Directorate A.II - International affairs II, in particular enlargement 
Directorate B - Relations with other institutions; communication and quality 
62 See note 40 Nedergaard. (1994) p.95 
63 ibid p.96 
64 ibid p.96 
65 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG AGRI, DG Environment has been quite positive about the measures taken by 
Commissioner Fischler towards sustainability, although it has to be said that there were some Officials who are less positive. 
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Directorate C -
Directorate D -
Directorate E -
Directorate F -
Directorate G -
Directorate H -
Directorate I -
Directorate J -
Markets in crop products 
Markets in livestock products; specialised crops and wine 
Rural development programmes 
Horizontal aspects of rural development; Sapard 
Economic analyses and evaluation 
Agricultural legislation 
Resource management 
Audit of agricultural expenditure 
The growing importance of auditing and financial control is shown in the directorate J which 
is a relatively new addition. The role of external issues in the workings of the CAP and the 
DG is shown by the first two directorates, directorate F can be added to this group as SA-
PARD (Special accession programme for agriculture and rural development) was primarily 
used in preparing the New Member States for accession to the Union. Thus six from eleven 
directorates are no longer directly involved in CAP implementation. The fact that directorates 
J, 1 and B are dealing with internal issues again emphasises the present preoccupations of the 
DG, fending off external problems and attempting to ensure that internally the DG is secure 
from any further fraud and that it is able to effectively compete with the other DGs and 
Community organisations. Personnel issues have also seen their importance reflected in the 
DG, although some of the officials considered working in personnel to be far from optimal, 
although in the Commission as a whole the two booming sectors are the financial control and 
personnel sectors 
6.3.1 MS INFLUENCE IN THE DG 
During Commission slow downs the MSs have extended their influence into the DG. After 
the Hallstein Commission the Commissioners became increasingly MS oriented.6970Recently, 
in relation to agriculture, the Commission has been stated to be another institution full of 
'veto points' primarily for the MSs and to be considered in this respect similar to the Council, 
'Although the Commission is a collective body, it divides along national lines.'71And ' . . . 
even within the Commission there are several veto points. ,72So the MSs have been described 
as having considerable power within the DG itself73Iet alone within the Commission as a 
whole where the Commissioners as well as cabinet members are suspected to be increasingly 
promoting their countries' requirements.74 
The fact that around 50% of Community funds are earmarked for agriculture has attracted 
commensurate political interest from the MSs. Their national interests are often explicitly 
promoted and defended in the DG at every level. One favoured approach which was appar-
ently present in DG AGRI, was to attempt to influence technocratic processes by placing na-
tionals or seconded officials in key positions in the DG. Thus even down to the level of the 
69 Daugberg C. Reforming the CAP: Policy Networks and Broader Institutional Structures. In Journal of Common Market 
Studies Vol.37. No 3 September 1999 p.422; 
'Although the Commission is a collective body, it divides along national lines. Until the mid-1960s, the Commission con-
sisted of Commissioners who had been there since the creation of the EC. They had idealistic attitudes towards European 
Integration. Thereafter, a new generation of Commissioners took over. These "Commissioners and their staffs (were) increas-
ingly conscious of their separate national identities and loyalties". Compared to the first generation, the Commissioners of the 
early 1990s were also more nationalistic...So, even within the Commission , there are several veto points.' 
70 Page, E. The People who run Europe. (1997) Oxford, Oxford University Press p,36 referring to the Spierenberg Report 
1979; 'Spierenberg emphasised the importance of the national dimension as a major cause of fragmentation above all in the 
College of Commissioners.' 
71 See note 69 Daugberg (1999) p.422 
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Desk Officers national political needs were met. The DG was described as being divided 
down the middle over certain agricultural fundamentals, into groups supporting importing 
countries like Italy and those supporting exporting countries like Ireland. A great deal of in-
ternal discussion allegedly occurred which often led to weak compromises which do not rep-
resent the European perspective. The 2002 import quotas were said to demonstrate that the 
two nationalities listed above, throughout the DG took their nationalities' side and actively 
promoted it. Due to the amounts of money involved some officials have described their 
work in the DG as highly political and involving the MSs constantly.77For a lot of the officials 
work, the MSs have to be taken into consideration, and the officials anticipate comments and 
7 g 
complaints in advance, too much so according to some. The French are said to want to have 
one of their nationality in the position of Director General whilst the Germans aimed to set as 
many of the nationals in positions of Heads of Unit. The Irish and Italians are supposed to 
have competed for the positions of deputy Director General.79 According to some of the offi-
cials little discretion is nowadays left to the DG as the MSs are scrutinising every aspect of 
legislation and every decision originating in the DG. The French have traditionally been the 
net beneficiaries of CAP and it is no surprise to find that from 1958-1999 the Director Gen-
eral was French. The importance of the DG for the Mediterranean countries is apparently re-
flected in their presence in the hierarchy. 
6.3.2 BUREAUCRATIC 
For most of its history the DG has been dominated by the French management style and there-
fore very hierarchical. With the change over from a French to a more Mediterranean style, 
there have been few noticeable changes. Examples of the recent rigid hierarchical approach 
were provided by officials who stressed that the management insist that, every piece of infor-
mation must pass up through the signatories and down again to reach another official or man-
ager.80 The fact that many officials allegedly used e mails to circumvent this requirement was 
frowned upon and unlike in other DGs where alternative methods of communication are used 
to 'formalise' the use of e mails, DG AGRI supposedly refused to use them.81Decision mak-
ing was apparently made at the highest possible level as were payment decisions. This was 
shown by the fact that the Director General met with the directors and deputy Director Gener-
als for discussions once a week but decision making was allegedly made by the Director Gen-
eral and his deputies alone. In some DGs the directors have a more direct input into decision 
making. Personnel issues were said to be dealt with in once a week meetings between the Di-
rector General and his deputies and the personnel department. 
On the positive side some stated that whilst the hierarchy was rigid and slow it was able to 
n ^  
react with surprising élan and efficiency when it wanted to. Some DGs were described as 
family run businesses in their style and attitudes, like DG FISH whilst DG AGRI was de-
scribed as a multinational. The prevalence of bureaucratic procedures was to be expected in 
an organisation involved in making large payments on a regular basis. It was also to be ex-
pected in an extremely large organisation required to implement intricate, often technocratic 
policies. Maybe it was also inevitable in an organisation that contained a wide variety of na-
tionalities and administrative cultures, in order to preserve some coherence. Recently, though, 
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the DG seemed to have collected so many check and balances that a form of gridlock had fi-
nally emerged. 
The DG seemed to have become even more bureaucratic, probably to try to deal with MS in-
fluence and rein in the Policy Networks, 'horrifically bureaucratic' was the description of the 
DG by one official, who appeared to shudder at the memory.83 Some of the officials inter-
viewed were clear that much of the bureaucracy in the DG was not just counter productive it 
was also often inefficient, unjustifiable.84As is the case in other DGs there was also allegedly 
tension between the hierarchy and its own immediate superiors, the Cabinet and the Commis-
sioner. The latter had allegedly found the DG problematic when he had pressed for re-
forms.85The Director General was said to have had problems communicating with the Com-
missioner Fischler and this had only added to the general tension. Extra bureaucracy was 
added to the mass already present via the requirement that officials are not to communicate 
directly with the Cabinet or the Commissioner, every document or comment had to pass via 
the hierarchical interface.86 This was not good for efficiency as most of the DGs stress that 
ease of access between cabinets and officials are essential for fast, accurate and effective deci-
sion making. In the long run the DG itself benefits when the Cabinet and the services work 
closely together. Bottlenecks and delays were laid at the door of the hierarchical structure. 
6.3.3 STAFFING 
The turnover in staff in one unit according to one source is somewhere in region of 50% over 
2.5 years, this was specific to his unit.88 This was similar to the level in DG ENV which had 
25% change annually. A situation of demoralisation existed in DG ENV and the same was 
said of DG AGRI, thus the figure supported the general statements of officials. The DG was 
no longer considered to be the place to be to make a career and the fact that its policy was 
considered to be broken backed was said to be a key reason why officials avoid working the-
re.89 Many officials are considered to enjoy a challenging work atmosphere where they can 
see that their work is having a positive effect, this was no longer said to be the case in DG 
AGRI. According to the personnel department the DG was understaffed and over worked. 
However the same source stressed that the so called 'negative priority' list which DGs were 
asked to draw up to indicate policies which could be dropped or toned down had failed to be 
completed.90 None of the DGs were willing to contemplate a reduction in their competences 
and the dossiers which they had, no doubt for reasons of status and influence in the Commis-
sion. Dropping a dossier is seemingly equivalent to dropping a key element of defence in the 
endless struggle between DGs. 
6.3.4 CHANGES IN DG STRUCTURE 
There have been surprisingly few changes to the structure of the DG although there have been 
calls for change. The Court of Auditors made a report in 
199091 which called for some fun-
damental changes in the DG's methods of organisation; these recommendations were sup-
ported by the European Parliament and ignored by the DG as the next report made in 2003 
repeated some of them. In the absence of reorganisation and in the presence of unresolved 
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conflicts prior to the reorganisation planned for 2004 the DG was said to be quite a tense 
place.92 Some of the following reasons were given for the tension: very different views on 
management styles which run broadly along nationality lines. Tension since too much power 
was considered to have been given to the financial control; conflict and general tension owing 
to the increased workload and problematic staffing policies. The management were stated as 
not being able to cope with the many tasks they were called on to perform: the enlargement; 
the CAP reforms; the Kinnock reforms and financial reforms in general; the DG reorganisa-
tion etc. There was said to be considerable friction existing between various groups in the 
DG, Whether the reorganisation would work or not was a moot point, some seemed to think 
that it was badly thought out, and over rushed and this threw doubt on the probable long term 
success of it.93 
6.4 GROUPS WITHIN THE DG 
One thing which seemed clear about the DG was that there were several groups which had 
different agendas and competed internally for control over the direction of the DG. The suc-
cess or failure of a particular group to press home their influence could result in negative con-
sequences for the various clients of the DG. There was allegedly tension between CMO units 
and the rest; between the traditional CAP officials and those who favoured rural development 
and what could be called a modern approach to agriculture and the countryside; between offi-
cials with what could only be described as various forms of idealism, that of the Commission 
and Community and those who were first and foremost staunchly loyal to their specific re-
gime (CMO). There was the split between the Mediterranean hierarchical approach and that 
of the modernizers who supported the Kinnock reforms. The Kinnock reforms aimed to 
strengthen the control of the college over the DG senior officials and to encourage a merit 
based hierarchy seemingly along northern European lines. There was apparently a split be-
tween those who supported the Commissioner and Cabinet and were career oriented and those 
who were DG oriented. 
6.4.1 CMO UNITS 
The most dominant and arguably the strongest groups within the DG were until recently those 
dealing with of the various market sectors. By this is meant the Beef CMO; the Milk CMO, 
the Sugar CMO. The CMO units were to some extent in control of the setting of prices and 
rates for their particular commodity. Some 50-70% of the officials in the DG were said to be 
loyal to the sector and idealists in terms of promoting agriculture.94 These officials served 
longest in the DG and often in the Commission as a whole and were considered, until the 
1990s, to be the 'kings9 of the DG.95 They were highly respected within their regime and on 
the best of terms with producers and governments. Many were said to be specialists, officials 
who knew their technocratic business perfectly.960ne major EU crisis was reputed to have 
been avoided because of the quick, decisive action of one Head of Unit.97Within the DG there 
was a tendency for staff to respect an old hand who knows his or her stuff rather than one of 
the new manager types who were better with people management but are not experts in their 
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sector. The specialists were said not to delegate and not to have a good method of handling 
their personnel.98 
Some of the managers serving in the CMO units had held office in them for thirty or more 
years, they allegedly became the guardians of their commodity and defended it, the producers 
and their bureaucratic territory from all comers.99Outside their area of expertise they were 
vulnerable, within it they alone knew the information and were thus irreplaceable. These spe-
cialists were unsurprisingly allegedly unwilling to either see a weakening of their sector or to 
allow any organisational changes to occur which would weaken their internal position within 
the DG and within the Commission as a whole. It is hard not to see these officials as idealists; 
they had after all devoted the whole of their working lives to their specific sector and set up 
effective, sometimes too effective regimes to provide security to the producers and productiv-
ity for the Community. Their ability could probably be seen in terms of the soaring increases 
in productivity that the DG was in control of; they seemingly managed to secure the place of 
agriculture within the Community and the Commission despite the evident need for change. 
Maybe this could be described as a form of fanaticism and certainly the CMO units have been 
described as refusing to see the writing on the wail in 1992.l00Many were no doubt European 
as well as agricultural idealists and could maybe be argued to have held true to the original 
ideology of the DG and the CAP, That said there was a sense that the sector loyalties had 
seemingly increasingly come to dominate. 
It is understandable that many officials who often held agricultural degrees, shared a similar 
French civil service background and years of promoting productive farming along the lines 
laid out in the treaties resented the moves towards rural development, sustainable agriculture 
which showed respect for the environment. This was stressed to be an explanation for the loy-
alty to a sector which can often exist in the Commission.101 Officials are said to follow a self 
selection procedure, the Commission chooses officials for the agricultural sector who have an 
agricultural degree of some description and a desire to work in a similar field. The officials 
could not therefore be seen to be normal civil servants who could move about relatively free-
ly, they are more limited in their career possibilities.102One official was recorded as getting 
agitated during one DG internal discussion about CAP reforms, he stated that the modernizers 
were from the cities and did not have a clue about farming reality.103 Their main policy oppo-
nents were said to be the policy people, by that is meant the cabinet and Commissioner and 
the policy planners within the DG, the task forces set up and maybe also the Director General 
and his deputies. 
6.4.2 'THE POLICY PEOPLE* 
That struggling occurs between the services and the Cabinets and Commissioners in several 
of the DGs is nothing new. Commissioners are aware about their standing vis-a-vis the other 
Commissioners and their cabinets. They are aware of the unacceptability of certain aspects of 
their sector and or DG as they are forced to face the criticism directed at them from other sec-
tors. If a vote is lost in the College, then the sector suffers. DG AGRI appears to have had a 
dearth of allies during the 1990s in the College, if for no other reason because the DG alleg-
edly appeared to be unwilling to face up to realities. The slow, piecemeal progress of CAP 
reform which kept the budget under pressure could not have been positively viewed by other 
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DGs and sectors which were crying out for more funds and staff. This seems to be confirmed 
by the general Commission perception of the DG as being 'spoilt and over staffed \104The 
Commissioner is said to have desired greater reforms and earlier, but been opposed by the DG 
itself, or rather groups within it. At first the term 'policy people' seems to have included the 
higher management of the DG but later it became a narrower group. 
According to some sources a clear move from inclusive decision making within the DG to-
wards exclusive small task force groups operating in a secretive, tactical manner, took place 
during the 1990s. The earlier CAP reforms were discussed openly within the DG and opposi-
tion taken note of. The later reform, Agenda 2000 was allegedly prepared by a small man-
agement task force. The latest Mid Term review was described as being carried out in a 
highly secretive manner with only a small team of experts close to the Commissioner being 
involved. Even the top DG management were said to have been excluded from the prepara-
tions. In particular the reforms of some of the CMOs and units were said to have been forced 
by the Commissioner, An atmosphere, increasingly lacking in trust, was said to have ruled 
between the Commissioner, Cabinet and the DG. Implicitly the DG and the CMO units were 
alleged to have successfully resisted necessary reforms which dragged the DG and the Com-
missioner into a bad light. The Cabinet apparently decided to push ahead and circumvent the 
hierarchy wherever possible, 'problem people' were allegedly ignored to get the policy 
through.105 The power of small groups with the right connections was stressed as being a very 
important means of achieving change and reform in the long established bureaucracy.106 Ad 
hoc decisions were favoured by the small groups and a form of strategic behaviour which in-
volved more or less outmanoeuvring external players as well as the DG itself by secret deci-
sion making and finally springing the result on all of them before any information could be 
leaked out. A really effective group or small alliance was said to be one which involves an 
official in DG BUDGET as well as some in the DG itself and the cabinet level.108Such tactics 
were necessary when dealing with Policy Networks as will be seen. 
6.4.3 THE GENERALIST REFORMERS 
There were said to be two main groups which were involved as reformers, those promoting 
modernisation of the CAP and pushing for greater rural and environmental elements and those 
who were in favour of market liberalisation in general and less CAP influence. Officials be-
longing to these groups were allegedly likely to either not share the exclusive agricultural 
background that many of the CAP traditionalists had and were also likely to be from a more 
generalist background. Certainly some officials who were in favour of or pushed for internal 
reform of the DG were from a generalist background.109 They were defined as coming from 
Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian backgrounds, although it seemed likely that other MS nationals 
also belonged to their ranks. There was said to be a French 'ruralist school,'110and the Nether-
lands were known to support liberalisation and environmental issues whilst both MSs contin-
ued to support CAP in general.111 The Greens in Germany were more than likely to also apply 
pressure for changes in the CAP. There was described as being a growing rural lobby in the 
UK, which was considered to be potential 'counter weight to the agricultural lobby' which 
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would; 'broaden the basis of agricultural decision making' they would represent the many ru-
ral interests not addressed by the CAP.112 
Recently the rural development directorate in the DG saw a strengthening of its resources, but 
for a long time it was considered to be understaffed and resourced in general and some main-
1 1  
tained that this was still the case. The rural development group and campaign were suppos-
edly opposed by both the farming organisations which were in favour of traditional fanning 
methods, and by various elements in the DG which identified heavily with the organisations 
involved. Curiously enough suggestions were made that rural development may be a useful 
backdoor method of financing farmers, once the normal CAP channels are closed off, 'the 
transformation of the CAP must not become merely a system of maintaining current levels of 
CAP spending by other means, nor should spending on rural policy goals allow any element 
of subsidy to be linked directly to agricultural production.'114 The US was known to be con-
tent to allow farmers to be quietly supported via this channel so long as the more overt market 
distortions are removed. 115Thus it would appear to have been in the interests of the agricul-
tural sector as a whole to move in the direction of rural development as some in the DG rec-
ognised. But there may well have been losers insofar as rural development could be targeted 
more at individual farmers, and thus the quantitative groups who benefited from over produc-
tion and protection may well have lost out. These were the groups which were traditionally 
protected by the CMO units within the DG. 
6.4.4 MEDITERRANEAN GROUP 
Not only were the Anglo-Saxons described as being at loggerheads with the CAP traditional-
ists, they were also said to be at odds with the hierarchical approach to administration which 
was supported by officials from Mediterranean countries. The more northern MSs were said 
to prefer less formal, modern, more efficient means of management rather than the hierarchi-
cal Mediterranean one. The differences were seen in the controversy over the Kinnock re-
forms which were perceived in some quarters of the Commission as alien and unwanted. The 
introduction of the Kinnock modern management methods were opposed by the DG hierarchy 
and their unpopularity was allegedly used by the management as a justification for retaining 
the previous management regime untouched.U6The Kinnock reforms were said to have been 
rushed, inefficient and badly managed, but at the same time the previous management struc-
ture was described as old fashioned and resistant to change. The Kinnock reforms served as 'a 
scapegoat for the management deficits and problems.'11 Arguably the reforming group within 
the DG were weakened as a result of the reforms. 
The Mediterranean model requires a fair amount of personal contacts to be made and used to 
function at all, which can be quite un-transparent. Arguably the DG hierarchy was based on a 
French model and only succeeded in functioning owing to the officials' ability, often from the 
French civil service tradition, who made it work. They shared similar backgrounds and abili-
ties and were able to ensure efficiency. Over time the CAP ceased to attract top quality candi-
dates from a common background as more exciting sectors opened up and so the DG was re-
vealed for the creaking leviathan it was.U8The possibilities for informal lubrication of the DG 
were gone and large numbers of officials and groups from other MSs were present in the 
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structure. The hierarchy allegedly became steadily more rigid over time. Young and old 
Mediterranean officials were said to adhere to the hierarchy model which was opposed by the 
modern managerial methods of the Anglo-Saxons in particular.l,9Linked to this group were 
the CMO technocrats, discussed earlier, the specialists who allegedly managed information 
not people and opposed the notion of managers who manage people but have little clear 
knowledge of the facts. 
6.4.5 EUROPEAN IDEALISTS 
To an extent this group often consisted of the younger officials who placed their idealism for 
the Community ideals above all, and desired to pursue a career in the Commission as a whole. 
Whilst older officials also belonged to this group the younger officials were the most outspo-
ken of their Europeanism. The size of the group within the Commission as a whole was set at 
30%.120According to one source, many officials arrive in the Commission as idealists, become 
disillusioned cynics and gradually moderate this position as European Realists.121 This would 
seem a fair comment, although it has to be stressed that the realists are still more idealistic 
than their counter parts outside the Commission, and this idealism is abstract and linked to the 
European ideal. There would appear to have been common ground between the realists and 
idealists, but little with those who were seen to be waiting out their time to retire. The ideal-
ists were sceptical of the sectoral loyalties of the DG and the 4old guard' who allegedly re-
sisted reform and change even if it was in the best interests of the European Project as a 
whole. They 
were likely to respect the skills of the specialists as a tool for controlling the 
MSs and securing Commission dominance over MS administrations. The mastery over tech-
nocratic detail was recognised by them as useful but at the same time they were unwilling to l ^^ tolerate the inefficiency which had all too often allegedly accompanied the specialists. 
Rigid hierarchies, stifling bureaucracy and the absence of task and responsibility delegation 
were the banes of this group. The idealists were concerned with the efficiency of the DG, and 
expressed their idealism in drives for reform. They stressed that whilst mastery of detail was 
admirable, some of the details were unnecessary to perform the task effectively. 124Two years 
was stated as being sufficient time to master a dossier and the extra years that some individu-
als spent in becoming the European experts in a certain dossier was inefficient. Implicitly 
this group would like to see an even more efficient DG and Commission using its resources 
more powerfully to further the integration model. As career officials they were less tied to DG 
loyalties and were likely to favour the mobility rules of the Kinnock reforms, whilst at the 
same time acknowledging that a possible decline in institutional memory could well result.126 
It is worth noting that one of the most complex agricultural regimes in the DG; that of the 
Sugar CMO, was also allegedly the most resistant towards any reform. It was said that only 
one individual in this sector really understood it completely. This raised the possibility that 
reform leading to greater simplicity and transparency are undesirable as they lead to a dilution 
of the power of certain officials.27 Thus the complexity is not only unnecessary it is also 
deleterious to the Commission as a whole. 
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6.4.6 THE AUDITORS AND KINNOCK REFORMERS 
One last group which needs to be briefly mentioned is that of the comparative newcomers, the 
Auditors and those in the personnel department who have added strength to the non CMO u-
nits. Whilst being on the surface neutral it was clear from comments made that this group, as 
newcomers, were not welcomed by the old-timers they have been sent to reform. The resent-
ment of the old-timers was expressed in the excessive priority that the new group are getting, 
and the new group were not particularly positive of the old fashioned hierarchy which resisted 
change. 
It is evident that the groups will overlap but they do have a position and a core of supporters 
willing to defend this position. The Commissioner and the Cabinet apparently can and do 
make use of the divisions within the DG but unless a dossier is political enough to make the 
Cabinet's attention unavoidable, the management hierarchy seemingly prevents the Desk Of-
ficers breaking free to make contact with the Cabinet. 
6.5 GENERAL DG ORGANISATION INEFFICIENCY 
Several forms of inefficiency appear to have existed within the DG, some of which were 
common to the Commission as a whole and could be labelled as general inefficiencies, others 
were more DG specific. Staffing policies were one area and the resistance of the CMO units 
to being reorganised or the CAP to being reformed was another. 
6.5.1 GENERAL INEFFICIENCY 
Consideration of the Commission departments reveals a surprising array of sources of ineffi-
ciencies, which somehow appeared to coincide with extraordinary effectiveness in terms of 
policy document generation. This was true for DG AGR1 as much as for the other DGs stud-
ied, which poses a paradox to the observer, the sheer number of inefficiencies should make 
the organisation a disaster but somehow did not. 
The services of the Commission do not seem to have an effective and integrated clerical ad-
ministrative level. This point was raised by several of the officials working in the DG and 
seemed odd if not inexplicable to them.128 Most civil services in most MSs if not all, have a 
policy making layer, usually relatively thin in which the top experts and highly trained offi-
cials work. Under them is a much larger pyramidal structure allowing for an ordered range of 
graded clerical officials. Here the paper work is attended to; the writing of routine letters; mi-
nutes of meetings; planning efficient meetings; ordered filing using uniform filing systems; 
preparing briefings for ministers etc. the real clerical work of the department concerned in o-
ther words. Such tasks require training, and of course repetition to achieve perfection, they do 
not require extensive academic excellence and policy making ability. Such positions are paid 
considerably lower than the top policy officials to reflect the difference in ability and task. It 
is true that officials can work their way up through the British civil service to the policy mak-
ing ranks, however, given the existence of fast streaming methods and academic qualifica-
tions often encouraged if not required for entry into the policy making ranks, the top officials 
are likely to be top graduates. Time is another factor which ensues that policy making offi-
cials are not the same as their clerical subordinates. It is possible to work your way up through 
the clerical grades but that takes years and the official's time as a policy making official will 
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be considerably shorter when compared to the graduate official who can immediately proceed 
with promotion through the policy making grades. 
The skills required by the policy making grades are those of analysis, sectoral expertise, spe-
cialised knowledge and the ability to use it. The Commission is said to be excellent at these 
10(1 
skills and MS officials turn to them for advice as towards 'the experts. These skills are 
radically different to those required by clerical graded staff. But the policy making staff in the 
DG were also apparently expected to perform a range of basic clerical tasks which appears to 
go contrary to the notion of work specialisation. They allegedly have to carry out their own 
filing system, write their own letters, organise their own meetings and similar tasks. At the 
same time they are paid vastly more than a clerical official would be. Evidently this is an inef-
ficient use of their highly paid expertise. Furthermore as they have not been trained in clerical 
tasks they are not going to be as proficient at them as a trained clerk performing them day in 
day out. This no doubt goes a long way towards explaining the apparently problematic state of 
the DG's filing and the Commission's as well; a seeming oddity for an institution which 
prides itself on its institutional memory and possession of expert knowledge. Meetings organ-
ised by the officials were alleged at times to be badly planned and coordinated as well as be-t in 
ing non informative. Meetings appeared to be little more than an around the table with each 
official stating their view on a matter, or each MS stating their prepared view on an issue. The 
discussions were not as useful as they could be if they are present at all. The end result was 
that more meetings have to be called to allow for the discussion that was missing from the 
first one.131 Again the policy making officials organising them were not experienced clerical 
officers. Without an effective clerical layer, and implicitly the present B grade clerical offi-
cials seemed to be insufficient to be that layer, the intended reforms of the Commission were 1 n  
expected to fail, or so it was stated. The Commission was said to be worse at basic civil ser-
vice tasks like organising and holding meetings, writing briefings and maintaining an archive 
system than its civil service colleagues, despite the high level of academic qualifications of 
officials.133 
The argument provided by some within the Commission for the continuation of the present 
n a 
system was that it takes too long to train clerical staff in their tasks. This appears a rather 
weak argument given that most other organisations have an effective clerical layer and would 
find it somewhat bizarre to even contemplate senior managers typing routine letters. There is 
maybe another argument for the present system in that the dossiers run by the officials are so 
individual and personalised that it is hard to force a uniform structure on them. The singular 
nature of Commission work and dossiers often strengthens the individualised methods of a-
chieving ends. There is often no model to follow, a new Commission law structure is just that, 
new, to some extent unique and uniformity is impossible. The staff come from quite different 
MSs with quite different clerical systems, and training a clerk in twenty odd different MS ad-
ministrative systems as well as languages is quite a challenge. A further reason for the ineffi-
cient use of expertise is probably that the Commission seems to be limited in the staff it can 
employ and it would prefer to employ more policy making officials rather than clerical ones, 
for status if nothing else. Desk Officers did not want to become more civil service like if they 
could help it.135 
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But this means that any bureaucratisation, particularly that including clerical tasks, of the 
Commission, directly affects the policy makers and slows them down. Maybe this is desirable 
for the bureaucratic cycle outlined in the theory chapter even though efficiency is lost; it is 
maybe a cost worth paying if it ensures Commission survival. Another point is that informa-
tion in the Commission is allegedly used as power and this is maybe another reason for the 
absence of effective filing systems or clerical staff. The institutional memory of the Commis-
sion resides in the heads of the policy making officials. If an official requires information 
about a previous dossier, he has to apparently locate the individual who ran it and discuss the 
points with him or her.136 It is allegedly a waste of time to contemplate using the filing sys-
tem, even if it is there at all. Thus an alternative filing system is used with officials having to 
network to locate the previous dossier 'owner' and then to discuss with them the points and to 
receive some sort of explanation of what filing there is. It is after all often bundled together 
following the personal desires and methods of the individual. 137This property based nature of 
information seemed to work well enough at times, and evidently guaranteed officials consid-
erable power over past and present dossiers. No doubt in internal and Policy networks this 
information is tradable. Any reforms will have an uphill struggle to deal with this in the ab-
sence of clerical grades and their alternative supply of information memory. 
The DG apparently had a curiously vague separation between Heads of Unit and Desk Offi-
cers however rigid things became further up the hierarchy. 138Th is was most clearly seen in the 
curious management patterns. It was quite possible for officials to be doing the same tasks as 
another official further up the grading system who was being paid considerably more and pro-
| ^ r t 
bably with more experience and expertise. This was a result of the non alignment of grades 
and functions which the Commission appeared to be following and also due to the strange 
promotion system which allowed for progress according to seniority and networking, but 
seemingly little due to merit. The non alignment system meant that it was possible for an A4 
to be working under an A5, who was lower than them in terms of grade and salary. But it also 
meant that A4s and A7s could and often were working on the same types of tasks. They were 
all policy making officials and Heads of Unit and Desk Officers could be expected to be do-
ing quite similar work, apart from the personnel tasks which the Heads of Unit were now re-
quired to do under the CDR element of the Kinnock reforms which related to career develop-
mental issues. This grade - work incongruence was reflected in the fact that there were appar-
ently no effective, clear job descriptions, expertise was there but who does what was at times 
a matter of choice.140 
Grades above Head of Unit were said to be occupied by political appointees.141Thus Directors 
and Director General are allegedly there owing to belonging to the right political party, MS or 
both. The promotion chances to this level are said to be fixed. The process is said to be 
'stitched up,'pre-decided, between the Cabinet, Chefs of Cabinet, permanent representatives 
of MSs and MSs.142Chefs of Cabinet were allegedly given extensive patronage possibilities as 
they appointed their Cabinets from within the DG or outside. Ability apparently did not have 
to play a role in their appointment. Some worked their way up through the ranks and then 
gained their position by serving in a Cabinet. It is quite possible that these individuals are 
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skilled at managing networks as well as their work, but it remains the case that many resented 
this method of achieving promotion.143 
The problem of networking and the use of personal contacts as opposed to objective criteria 
were alleged to be present in the DG.144 People were apparently given positions on the basis 
of who they knew and not what they knew. This apparent emphasis on personal contacts 
worked its way through the system. When an official was asked to organise a team to perform 
a task they might well end up disregarding the CVs provided and making a choice according 
to what their colleagues have to say about the officials concerned. Only if nothing was known 
was the CV likely to be considered. 145Even for quite basic tasks, decisions about who to allo-
cate a task to would apparently be made on the basis of personal contacts and what was 
known about the individual concerned and rarely on their qualifications. The enlargement was 
provided as an example of the DG informal management system at work. A Director and sev-
eral Heads of Unit were allegedly 'parachuted' into the DG to ensure that the NMSs had some 
management representation relatively quickly. I46This might be good for the representative 
nature of the DG but it seemed to have little to do with merit. The use of 'parachutage' which 
is to do with having friends in high places, or MSs, was supposed to be diminishing as part of 
the reforms to enable the Commission to function after the enlargement. The use of it to en-
able the enlargement was unfortunate, and rather seemed to throw doubt on the stated motives 
and sincerity of the reforms in the first place. 
The absence of effective management of personnel could be seen in some curious phenomena. 
Firstly the officials were said to have extraordinary freedom of choice as to what they did ow-
ing to the lack of management. Which then lead to another fact which could apparently read-
ily be observed in the Commission. Every year 'Start of year Commission work plans' were 
issued, with fairly detailed lists of what the Commission aimed to achieve in that year. How-
ever at the end of the year the report on the Commission's activities during the year was al-
leged to often bear no correlation to the aims stated at the beginning of the year. This was said 1A "J 
to be a standard joke within the Commission as a whole. At a DG level this is likely to 
originate in the 'failure' of management to manage the work that had to be done, that should 
be done. But above all this seemingly reflected the dynamic, flexible, extremely diverse Com-
mission, with officials with maximum discretion and not needing management owing to their 
motivation and loyalty to the Commission ideology and sense of mission. The Commission in 
such phases needed policy makers and not managers. When slowing down, then turning the 
senior policy making experts into personnel managers, was useful to slowing the DG down. 
During a dynamic phase Commission bureaucracy did not seem to bother the officials, rather 
the opposite. There was stated to be, at times, an apparent absence of anyone willing to take 
any responsibility for anything within the DG148 and the Commission.I49This occurred along-
side quite rigid methods of communication reflected in the system of collecting signatures be-
fore a letter could be released. Bureaucracy in the Commission during a dynamic phase 
seemed to add to the willingness to take risks and generate work, responsibility was appar-
ently passed upwards, and seemingly to no-one, leaving the policy making officials free to be 
143 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG AGRI 
144 ibid 
145 ibid 
146 ibid 
147 ibid 
148 ibid 
149 The Committee of Independent Experts First Report on Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepo-
tism in the European Commission 1999 
208 
entrepreneurial. The negative aspects of a rigid bureaucracy were simply not enforced and 
therefore affected officials far less than recently. 
Arguably it was the apparent existence of an atmosphere of opaque competition that existed 
inside the DG and the Commission, with unofficial networks operating secretly, fostered a 
lack of trust. No-one allegedly knew who belonged to which network, so maybe your col-
league was not all they appeared to be and therefore why should the official support them.i50It 
was not even clear if the networks shared the same goals and missions, probably they did not, 
Clear management structures and lines of accountability and responsibility would have helped 
alleviate this particular phenomenon. However good management was allegedly not necessar-
ily a priority in the DG or the Commission. Opaque, secretive management structures ap-
peared remarkably similar to diplomatic, intergovernmental methods of doing business. This 
was probably no accident, the MSs seemingly directly affected the higher management and 
via their networks could affect management appointments, however, they were unlikely to 
want it to be too well known. After all such networks and appointments keep their power by 
being unofficial and would undermine their effectiveness if the Commission were too well 
known to have possibly at times lost its independence. Thus to expect the German State to 
stop trying to place their nationals in Head of Unit positions-as they allegedly did or other na-
tionalities to place their officials as Directors, Director General or Desk Officers is wishful 
thinking and it is equally wishful to imagine that these networks will ever be fully transparent. 
They are too effective at soothing the nerves of the MSs that they are being heard in the right 
places. Inefficiency is a relative commodity; there are more important effectiveness issues at 
stake. 
6.5.2 STAFFING INEFFICIENCIES 
Discussions with officials at a unit level revealed that some of the units in the DG appeared to 
be overstaffed and not the opposite. Some tasks were allegedly more or less created by staff to 
justify their continued presence in a unit and the Heads of Unit tacitly encouraged this. Some 
stressed that the DG was chronically over staffed, but then add the proviso that it was under-i r i 
staffed with able and motivated officials. Thus there would appear to have been some staff 
that worked extremely hard and more or less carried the free riders with them. Some stated 
that thirty percent of the staff did little, thirty percent were demoralised and therefore worked 
less hard than they could whilst thirty percent were highly motivated and work extremely 
hard.I52Staff transfer from under worked to over worked units appeared to be negligible and 
there was no real management plan to implement such transfers. Some Heads of Unit seemed 1  
to deliberately keep their staff even though there was not enough work for them to do. The 
reasons given for this were status and maintaining slack for future needs, although the unit 
concerned was being gradually run down which made any future bottleneck unlikely. But it 
was fair to say that the acquisition of staff in the Commission was renowned for being diffi-
cult, but equally MSs always stressed that the capacity was already there if the Commission 
were more able to move its staff around and they seem somewhat justified in their view. The 
alleged unwillingness of managers to allow their staff to be transferred was no doubt contin-
ued within the directorates and the DGs. It was stated as well that officials had been consid-
ered to have 'feudal' rights over their position,]54and this made it extremely difficult to forci-
bly move them at all, outside an all out reorganisation. The end result was rather similar to 
that of a muddled chest of drawers, which it is easier to ignore and buy another one rather 
150 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG AGRI 
151 ibid 
152 ibid 
153 ibid 
154 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG REGIO 
209 
than sort out the old one. Some Heads of Unit were alleged to claim the need for more offi-
cials when this was not necessarily required155 and the personnel department possibly did the 
same. 
One apparent mystery described by some of the officials was that the structure of the DG had 
remained curiously unchanged despite the major changes in CAP which should have brought 
about matching changes in the organisation.1 6Staffing levels appeared to be utterly resilient 
to changes in work load and regime make up. The decline of the DG and the CAP should 
have led to a gradual decline in staff numbers but this was not the case, rather staff numbers 
were increasing. Part of the explanation was laid out earlier, the need to implement new and 
old policies at the same time and the growing complexity wrought by the reforms, but some 
of the officials were sceptical that there would ever be a decline in staff numbers. 157The DG 
had proven itself able to defy the trend in the reforms that should have left them with less staff 
and a simpler policy to implement. The DG seemed to blame the MSs and their pressure for 
the growing complexity of the policy and the reforms, but this was only half the story. It see-
med to be relatively clear that the DG and its units were quite able to defend their interests 
and it would seem logical that it would be equally able to influence the reforms to defend 
their clientele and to defend their units and officials, In the Commission, policy change could 
seemingly only come by moving people around and not simply by requiring it from above. 
Once officials are inside the Commission they enjoy considerable protection and room for 
movement within the structure. They are allegedly able to affect their promotion prospects to 
a certain degree by their willingness to join various networks and to use the hierarchy to their 
advantage. An incident was given by one official of the ability of some officials to get around 
impending reforms and changes in the Commission. An official allegedly knew that the April 
26, 2004 Staff Regulation change would result in his being downgraded and not up graded. 
Quite informally he was able be promoted to a higher grade before the changes came into ef-
fect which effectively protected him from the reform of the grading system.158 This is of 
course not supposed to happen. It was stated that by knocking on the right doors rules could 
be circumvented.159 It was problematic for those outside the system and the networks. The 
NMS officials joining did not of course not benefit from the ability to circumvent the reforms. 
As under the new reforms all officials are to be paid less, regardless of whether or not NMS 
officials applied to the old grades and salary levels. Therefore NMS officials were going to be 
treated, in effect, as lower officials. Those already in the services were able to get promoted 
before, or some at least; those outside the networks would join with less money than they had 
expected and than their equivalents at the time of their application. It was expected that there 
would be cases going before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) with regard to this, in prac-
tice seemingly cunning form of discrimination.160 
6.6 REFORMS RE-INTERPRETED 
The promotion scheme was allegedly turned on its head. It was intended that the CDR and 
promotion structures would allow the Heads of Unit more room to be managers of their staff. 
To achieve this goal a points system was introduced which allowed the Heads of Unit to allo-
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cate points which would be used to grant disserving officials promotion; these points would 
be allocated according to merit. However a parallel system apparently existed which allowed 
the Director General to allocate so called priority points for promotion. This unfortunately 
coincided with a desired Commission average of fourteen from twenty points which was set 
for the DG to achieve, setting an average in merit points regardless of whether the merit was 
there, which was odd, and a claw back system allowed points to taken from the DG for the 
future. The Director General had the final say in who got the priority points which meant 
these points were the crucial ones where promotion was concerned. The outcome was obvi-
ous, the Heads of Unit generated their points which were not crucial, it was allegedly the top 
management which mattered. 
The attempt at reforming the administration of the Commission and the DG also seemingly 
floundered, in part, due to the apparently deliberate attempts by the more directly affected hi-
erarchy to seemingly sabotage them!6land also in part due to the probable inexperience of the 
management executing the reforms. The hierarchy were alleged to have resisted the Kinnock 
reforms and their change in management and administrative culture that they implied.I62Un-
der the previous system they had enjoyed considerable power over their personnel and the 
DG, they perceived the reforms as threatening this. No doubt there was also the sense in 
which the old style hierarchy was familiar and different in tone from the more Anglo-Saxon 
approach of the Kinnock reforms. Either way, the hierarchy was said to have either resisted or 
subverted the reforms to try and ensure their power. The point system with the promotions 
was probably one of the reforms that was altered away from its original goal. Since the Kin-
nock reforms were supposedly aimed at improving efficiency, such activities could only be 
construed as opposing efficiency as defined by the Commissioner level. That said the method 
of introducing the reforms and the reforms themselves was alleged to have been clumsy, re-
vealing it would seem an ironic lack of management skill by the highest management.163 An 
example of the problems related to the reforms in general was the ABM, activity based man-
agement, was alleged to have been done badly and late, with complicated task sheets which 
were impossible to fill out, there was a desire to use neat categories like letters written and a 
lack of interest in the real work of the officials. 164Many of the typical tasks of the policy-
making officials were simply not on the lists. The Commissioner level management appeared 
to have failed to consider the true nature of the Commission and its services in drawing up the 
reforms. Such a lack of knowledge of the managed officials' work appeared to show a failure 
of management. This was confirmed by officials alleging that the reforming management 
failed to apply their own rules to themselves, albeit in relation to parachutage.16 
One of the key reforms was that of mobility. Staff were encouraged, sometimes obliged to 
move to a new position every five to seven years. However a closer scrutiny of what actually 
occurred showed the apparent failure of the reform. Although staff were moved to new units, 
some seemed to have continued to follow the same dossier although in a different unit.166 
Which leads to another point that units were alleged not to have been given clear tasks and 
there was no way of knowing which unit was doing what.167 In some DGs, the allocation of 
tasks to units seemed to bear little relation to the formal title of the Unit.168Thus a horizontal 
unit could find itself being allocated a quite different sort of task. With regard to the mobility 
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rule this could not have been the intention of the reform. It was to be expected that the posi-
tions handling financial payments would see a stricter form of mobility, but for many others 
the reform was allegedly more form than reality. Continuity in dossier management was as-
sured, but mobility is not. 
Officials were alleged to have had far more freedom to do what they wanted rather than what 
they should, formally, have been doing. Compared with the officials in national administra-
tions the DG officials were said to have been loosely supervised and much was left up to the 
motivation of the individual concerned. Basic management tools for controlling staff were 
said to have been like water on the back of a duck.16 With the ABM, activity based manage-
ment reform the management apparently asked the staff to inform them about what they were 
actually doing, in order for the ABM to be put into place. According to some this showed the 
absence of management control which was allegedly present in the DG and the Commission 
as a whole. I70The management in this situation seemingly did not know what their staff were 
doing. The forms which the staff were then required to fill out were said to be over long and 
complex and time consuming to fill out. The DG then dropped the ABM returning to the 
situation to that which had existed before. Certain officials expressed their amazement at this 
turn of events, stating that in MS administrations ABM was a basic management tool, un-
popular at first but accepted and used later. The Commission allegedly quietly let it drop, sup-
posedly the DG introduced a watered down version, but the officials said that they had never 
heard of it.171 
The Kinnock reforms and bureaucratization were received with plenty of scepticism if not 
hostility as was stated earlier. According to one source the reforms did too much too soon and 
had to fail. The reformers were stated to have 'wanted to rush' and that they did no t ' . . . care 
about them or want the reforms to succeed.' The reforms ' . . . were only there for their face 
value and purely cynical only for the audience, political reasons. . . '172The point was stated 
by another official who said the reforms had all been only paying lip service to the real notion 
and that in the DG they were only finally put into force.1 3 
6.6.1 FRAUD AND LACK OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
Having discussed what happened inside the DG and how officials were managed it is interest-
ing to note how external actors perceived it. The Court of Auditors produced two reports on 
the work of the DG, particularly the setting of financial rates with regard to Community sup-
port. Inadequate documentation of the facts behind the rate setting (for various agricultural 
products) pursued by the Commission was criticized, as this could well lead to fraud, with se-
rious results for 'independent control by third parties and for management.'174 There was said 
to still be only a weak connection between setting of the refund rate and the information avai-
lable.175There was said to be 'no coherent' link between the market prices and the rates set by 
the Commission.176 In conclusion the 2003 report stated that nothing very much had changed 
since its last report in 1990. Interestingly enough the Commission accepted this and promised 
to act on the report, this time round.1 This suggests that some of the allegations were proba-
169 interviews with Commission Officials: DG AGRI 
170 ibid 
171 ibid 
m ib id 
173 ibid 
174 See note 91 Court of Auditors. Special report No 9/2003. 2003/C211/01 
§9 
f75 ibid § 20 
176 ibid § 27 
177 ibid conclusion 
212 
bly accurate and requiring remedy. The list of recommendations which the Commission 
agreed to act upon was long and included; making more transparency available via clear do-
cumentation; checking some of the CMOs such as that of Sugar, to see if they needed chan-
ges; ensuring that rates were justified and supported by paperwork, proving that management 
checks had been carried out. 78The Court of Auditor's recommendations were said to be one 
of the reasons for the major re-organization in 2004, but some officials seemed to consider 
that it was the scandal of 2003 which involved the cereals CMO unit and misbehavior by a 
1 "TO member of staff which forced the DG into a position where it was willing to compromise. 
There was a major re-organization planned for October 2004, the main features of which were 
apparently that the units paying for the CAP were to be separated from those monitoring the 
market and setting the rates and placed in different directorates. The need to fully implement 
the Kinnock reforms and in particular the reforms associated with accountancy methods to 
protect against fraud led to the creation of a new directorate solely charged with this task. A 
rural development directorate with three new Heads of Unit and a new Director was to be cre-
ated. Most new staff were to be allocated to rural development and the audit directorate. Be-
fore, in the DG, units had had financial control members of staff attached, but with their in-
creasing importance the directorate was created, and the increase in numbers justified. Ac-
cording to some the audit directorate was the one with the most clout, too much power since it 
was not a front line, sectoral, directorate. The auditors were said to have 'an arm lock' on the 
rest of the directorates, slowing the administration and payments down.180NMS staff were to 
be 'parachuted' into the new management positions and into any others which the policy of 
early retirement opened up. 
The reasons given for the re-organization were varied and no doubt all had elements of truth 
in them. One reason stressed that the re-organization was to rationalize the DG and to inte-
1H1 
grate the NMSs fully into the organization. Some officials stressed that the re-organization 
was intended to incorporate the changes required after the Mid-Term Review and the reforms | na 
of the CAP, i.e. a purely logical step. However, granted that the DG had a track record of 
stubborn resistance to internal changes in line with policy changes this seemed curious. They 
added after a while, that the Court of Auditor's report recommended the changes be * A-i 
made. This was true but as was stated earlier the same recommendations were made in 1990 
and ignored. More staff stressed that the allegations of fraud and corruption in one of the 
CMO units in 2003 forced the DG to change.1 4 This was exactly what the Court of Auditors 
had warned could happen in 1990 and been ignored. The DG had allegedly chosen to ignore 
the requirement for staff to be mobile, only highly sensitive posts had been made mobile, the 
rest remained unchanged, despite pressure from officials.185A further change which the reor-
ganization put into place is the long overdue separation of market monitoring from payments. 
A system 'integrated payments system' which achieved just this separation had been drawn 
up by a unit in the DG long before the 2003 scandal broke, but far from the DG accepting the 
logic of the system and allowing the unit to put it into practice, it was sidelined until the scan-
dal broke and the unit disbanded. 186In 2004 it was apparently to be recreated again.187 
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6.7 SECTORISATION AND POLICY NETWORKS 
The CAP is stated to be well known for its complexity, 'the "Byzantine complexity" of the 
CAP is legendary.',88Which is a situation which has given large amounts of discretion to the 
specialists, this also reinforces the general notion that complexity, leads to opacity which 
1 so 
keeps all but the experts on the outside. There are said to be 'Intimate, even incestuous, rela-
tionships between national agricultural ministers and farmers' groups . . . \ which, ' . . . have 
manifested themselves in quite insular and integrated national policy networks.'l90Even the 
reforms that have been agreed upon seem to have made the CAP even less understandable to 
all but the experts. The complexity is said to have assisted in the formation of; 'tightly inte-
grated farm policy communities' and making sure that they 'keep a grip on decision mak-
ing.' ,9lThe 'highly fragmented decision-making mechanisms at the sub systematic level' are 
stated to be a major hindrance to reform and 'sweeping policy changes.' ,92The literature and 
the reactions of CAP officials mentioned in the literature seem to confirm the presence of 
'policy networks' and it seems pretty likely that the Commission is the 'ring leader' of CAP 
networks, and its officials remain that too.193 It is interesting to note that 'the CAP's complex-
ity is almost impossible to overstate, and in many respects is an anathema to coherence or 
centralisation.' This is not so dissimilar to the situation in the rest of the EU. CAP status quo 
and complexity has seemingly kept officials enjoying considerable power, reform and reor-
ganisation at bay, and farmers reasonably safe and content, agricultural ministers content and 
the sector both inefficient and absorbing too many funds. EU complexity has likewise 
probably been extremely useful to a similar range of actors as well. 
The DG was excellent ground for Policy networks and not surprisingly there were indications 
that this was the case. As was mentioned earlier, on a purely organizational level, staff stated 
the problem of networking and the use of personal contacts, when discussing project and task 
distribution. People were allegedly given positions on the basis of who they know and not 
what they knew. It seemed to be possible to affect officials' promotion prospects to a certain 
degree if they were willing to join various networks and to use the hierarchy to their advan-
tage. An incident was mentioned of the ability of an official to get around impending person-
nel reforms and changes in the Commission by using their personal networks of contacts. 
Some 50-70% of the officials in the DG were alleged to be loyal to their sector and idealists in 
terms of promoting agriculture.195 The most powerful lobbying groups in the EU are stated to 
be those of 'farmers and recipients of regional aid' and that 'the prospect of major cuts to pay 
for increased transfers to the East would provoke opposition . . . ' , 9 Certain MSs are impor-
tant members of influential Policy Networks: 
'Thus the agriculture DG used the farm lobby to consolidate its position in the 1960s and 
1970s. As the political pressure for reform grew and it found itself under challenge from other 
coalitions, it remained strong, partially because it could draw on other resources such as lon-
gevity, but also because it could call upon a powerful ally, the government of France. Both 
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political expediency and nationality (the Agriculture DG from 1958 to 1999 always had a 
French director general and despite the appointment of a Spanish head in 1999, remains a ve-
ry 'French' DG) have created a strong and valuable link.'1 
'There had been expectations that the Commission would propose a bolder move to an inte-
grated rural policy . . . but adverse reactions from farmers lobbies and some MSs and power 
struggles within the Commission, appear to have caused a retreat from earlier intentions . . . 
The efforts of various Commissioners and their departments to hold on to fiefdoms have im-
peded rationalization.'198 
The quotations are but one hint at a deeper problem which afflicted the DG until very re-
cently, and it could be argued until October 2004, namely, that of weak CAP reforms and 
general DG AGRI policies owing to the existence of powerful groups within the DG assisted 
presumably by strong links to lobbyists and MSs outside the Commission i.e. Policy Net-
works. 
A cursory glance over the history of CAP reform reveals that the reforms have often failed to 
live up to the expectations of many of those outside the directly involved agricultural indus-
try. It is often argued that this is due to the MSs and their ministers on the Agricultural coun-
cil being unwilling to allow changes. This no doubt to some extent true, Commission propos-
als seem to have been more reforming than those that the MSs finally agreed to. But it has 
also been stated that apparently some MSs supported by some elements within the Commis-
sion formed the cause of the problem which finally had to be dealt with by the Commissioner 
himself. 199It is the apparent collusion between certain groups in the DG and MSs and of 
course lobbyists which makes it necessary to consider more fully what apparently far reaching 
Commission reform proposals actually represent. 
Major proposals agreed by the Commission, mean just that, these are documents maybe 
drawn up by a small group within the DG concerned often under the direct influence of the 
Commissioner and often discussed and amended by other DGs and the College before becom-
ing 'Commission' proposals. As was stated earlier, the alleged use of small groups for draw-
ing up the Agenda 2000 show that the DG and some elements of its hierarchy and units were 
not necessarily involved in the adoption of the proposal. The subsequent watering down of the 
proposal appeared to have not been desired by the Commissioner and the group which pio-
neered the original reform proposal. But allegedly the members of the CMO units, the so 
called guardians of their sectors, were known to have opposed the reform of their regime.200 
Granted the close relationship between many of the MS nationals in the hierarchy and their 
decisions to favour their MSs at times, then the apparent MS opposition to reform is more 
than likely to be matched and represented in the DG. In fact the thirty odd years that some 
members of the CMO units seem to have enjoyed in their positions, with a monopoly of in-
formation and terms in office exceeding their MS counterparts allegedly combined with long 
standing networks,201 reveals an interesting point. In times of crisis the expertise of the spe-
cialists was stated to have been able to marshal the MSs, so why not in the face of reforms 
which certainly meant crisis for many of those involved. Officials were seen to be at the cen-
tre of their policy networks and for details and policy know-how the MS officials looked to 
them for leadership and answers. Quite apart from the Agricultural Council there were a range 
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of Committees which the Commission officials would often participate in if not lead which 
involved MS officials and experts. These committees were so closely related to the DG that 
an example was given of MS officials knowing about Commission lower level future promo-
tions long before the official concerned.203 In such an environment the separation of MS from 
Commission in terms of the reform seems somewhat artificial and needing closer definition. It 
appears quite possible that old timers from the CMO units could use their networks to oppose 
the proposals made by the Commissioner and make it seem as if the MSs decided it so. This 
might also help explain the seeming impossibility of matching the DG organization with the 
required radical reforms, and such reform would seem to require as a starting point the reor-
ganization of the DG. Policy Network activities seems to help account for the seemingly 
clear perspective of the spokesman for the Commissioner who expressed a desire for radical 
reform,205and the greening of the CAP, whilst in fact the details achieved considerably less.206 
It could be expected therefore that the CAP reforms would be watered down in favour of the 
CMO units' clients, in this case ensuring that some price protection remained and also that 
some productivity payments relationship would be in place. This would ensure that the CMO 
units which dealt with using market prices to encourage productivity, would be able to retain 
some of their work and influence whilst also protecting their productivity payment dependent 
clients. Even at the proposal stage before the Agricultural Council dilution seemingly took 
place, the CMO units could be seen to have begun to water down the 'vision' of the Commis-
sion. The results support the above, as the discussions surrounding the Agenda 2000 show: 
' . . . we are profoundly disappointed by the timidity of the proposals for reform of the sheep 
meat and sugar regimes. Only if direct compensatory payments to producers decline over time 
will it be possible to respond to the external challenges to the CAP posed by the WTO and 
enlargement of the EU . . . Though the Commission does have a vision for transforming the 
CAP into a more integrated rural policy, they appear to have judged that the Agricultural 
Council would not share or accept that vision at this stage of the reform process. A more posi-
tive lead from the Commission would have forced the Agricultural Council to confront these 
issues directly, and it is regrettable that the Commission has not felt able or willing to provide 
such a lead in Agenda 2000.'207 
In fact despite the Beef support price being reduced, there were signs that beef stocks were on 
the up again. The use of a term 'headage' to signify productivity payments made per head of 
cattle and sheep was found replacing the direct support price. Unsurprisingly this new way of 
paying for productivity, showed plenty of signs of increasing production and generating the 
surpluses20 at excess costs that the reforms were supposed to have stopped, 'the growth in 
production was again outstripping growth in consumption from 1994 onwards . . . and the po-
tential for the re-emergence of a long -term structural surplus in this sector remained even 
after the 1992 reforms,'209 and ' . . . the EU Commission could have underestimated the po-
tential build-up of intervention beef stocks in their analysis even before the Agenda 2000 pro-
2W Interviews with Commission Officials: DG AGRI 
21,4 Mr Wynne, Director of Conservation RSPB, Minutes of Evidence, See note 3 Agricultural Committee of the House of 
Commons, session 1997-8 p.l 18. '1 think the point is that if the kind of radical reforms we all want to see go through, DG VI 
would not be DG VI in any case/ 
See note 3 Agricultural Committee of the House of Commons, session 1997-8 Memorandum submitted by the soil asso-
ciation. Minutes of Evidence, p.290 
206 Memorandum submitted by Scottish National Heritage. Minutes of Evidence, See note 3 Agricultural Committee of the 
House of Commons, session 1997-8 p.246. 'It is not convincing for the Commission to argue for the integration of environ-
mental issues into the CAP, but to reject the clear opportunity to end headage payments.' 
207 See note 3 Agricultural Committee of the House of Commons, session 1997-8 p.31-32 
208 ibid Memorandum submitted by the farm and Food society. Minutes of Evidence, p.237 
209 ibid Memorandum submitted by Micheal Winter, Professor of Rural Economy. Minutes of Evidence, See note 2 p, 168 
216 
posals are introduced. We believe they may reach 1.4 million by 2000 rather than the 39,000 
tonnes forecast by the Commission/210 And 'far from reducing CAP budgetary expenditure, it 
is clear that the Commission, in Agenda 2000, is resigned to increasing it. This is totally un-
Til acceptable. It could have been avoided by reducing direct payments overtime.' 
The Australian government commented on the reforms and seeming removal of market sup-
port required to comply with international agreements and agreed upon in principle by the 
EU, as follows, 'Australia is disappointed that they do not go far enough, with levels of mar-
ket support remaining excessively high and the reforms themselves limited to a narrow group 
of commodities,'212 and again 'The proposals are only a further step in the direction towards 
real reform. They do not de-link support from production.'213 They go on to state that the EU 
is not preparing itself for the WTO agreements nor really reforming as needed. The Commis-
sioner's goal was to be ready for the WTO and to effect real reforms.214The use of: headage 
payments; little or no changes in the Dairy CMO; and the Sugar CMO seemed to show that 
the units and related hierarchy concerned with these CMOs, which had been supported di-
rectly by intervention price support before, had successfully protected their own positions and 
their clients from the intended effect of the reform. Whatever the Commissioner seemed to 
want to promote failed to be executed properly in practice. 
Allegedly there was resistance in the CMO units to the reforms which would affect their sec-
tors and of course their units.2,5The nature of this resistance appears from the above to have 
involved utilizing networks, MS pressure, and the use of information in the DG. Probably the 
failure of the DG to reorganize itself in the light of the Commissioner's reforms weakened the 
reforms themselves. Even the Kinnock reforms which were intended to promote mobility 
within the Commission were apparently successfully evaded by the CMO units when they 
were first suggested.216Curiously enough, allegedly the argument used was that the units' 
closeness to their clients and industry was a major asset which would be put at risk. Years of 
patiently building up networks would be endangered; the hierarchy apparently obligingly 
dropped the mobility issue for them.2,7It was just this apparent level of closeness to clients, 
industry and MSs that the mobility policy aimed to remove. The appearance of fraud in 2003 
in one of the CMO units proved this danger to be real. It would appear that the units also ar-
gued along the lines of the difficulty of reforming or reorganizing them without endangering 
the complex knowledge banks in officials' heads which were the key to the complex re-
gimes21 In reality allegedly a determined, total reorganization of the units was possible, al-
though only one of the units chose to follow this example and only due to external influ-
ences. 
One of the most unreformed CMO units was seemingly that of sugar which seemed to have 
successfully evaded reorganization to itself and any reform to its regime. The reform and re-
organization seem to go hand in hand, as this case shows. The Sugar unit and its personnel 
were cited as an example of longevity in post and policy being neatly correlated to reform re-
sistance 220When asked to consider the reform of their policy the officials allegedly refused to 
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give it their support and ensured that the study that was performed to assess the need 
failed.22,Finally there was allegedly no other way forwards and the Commissioner intervened 
to force the reform, he appeared to have lost trust in the CMO units. The unit was seemingly 
considered to be far too close to the industry and that this was a likely cause for their unwill-
ingness to reform. 
Certainly the documentary evidence supports the notion that sugar was oddly exempted from 
all the reform procedures,6 . . . we consider it wholly unacceptable for the sugar regime to be 
left unaltered until 2006, and would welcome an early declaration of intent from the Commis-
sion that the reform of the regime will be addressed as soon as possible.'' The Commission's 
own documents mentioned the odd situation of the sugar regime: 
'In essence, the sugar CMO was left out of the CAP reform process which started in 1992 and 
has continued since then, and was only slightly affected by the Uruguay round of trade nego-
tiations. Its relative longevity bears witness to a certain degree of success, although at a high 
cost with regard to the achievement of the initial objectives assigned to it. Today it is experi-
encing pressure which is profoundly changing the prospects for the sector and is also being 
subjected to criticism, sometimes years-old, from numerous and varied sources. . . However, 
this exclusion from reform encouraged support in the sector to develop in a way that created 
competitive distortions among farmers . . . Without reform the sugar sector would remain si-
delined from the movement towards sustainable agriculture guided by the market.'224 
The same document mentioned the frequent impulses for reform which came from several 
sources, 'While being subject to great external pressure, the CMO is also under pressure from 
within. Since 1975 the Court of Justice has been pronouncing strong reservations on the CMO 
and its impact on competition. In 2000 independent experts carried out an overall evaluation 
of its operation. In the same year the European Court of Auditors made it the subject of a spe-
cial report'. Later it stressed that: the Commission itself; the national authorities; the OECD; 
the Court of Auditors; the sugar using industries and the consumer bodies all complained 
about the CMO which was so beneficial to the sugar producers.226 It is almost unbelievable 
that the Sugar unit and its networks were able to withstand such pressure, but seemingly they 
did. This reinforces the point made earlier that the 'Commission' as a whole may well want 
reform but this 'Commission' in all likelihood does not involve the actual units concerned and 
the hierarchy which seemingly supports them. It is allegedly well within the power of the unit 
concerned and the Policy Network in which it is both embedded, and at the heart of, to stand 
up to and oppose the Commission and Commissioner as a whole, unless great pressure is 
brought to bear. 
The Report made by the Court of Auditors on the Sugar Regime in 2000 revealed some inter-
esting points. Some elements including a small group task force, from the economic analysis 
section of the DG, within the DG considered many of the options available in 1992 and con-
cluded that in the possession of a 'thorough assessment' they could propose some major price 
cuts of up to 30%.227228But finally the Commission only proposed that the CMO remain un-
changed. In 1994 despite the DG being in possession of a range of important facts these were 
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seemingly not passed on to the decision makers, the Council and Parliament. These institu-
tions were effectively kept in the dark by the DG, it would appear possible that the unit con-
cerned, used its information monopoly to manipulate the decision makers and to so win a con-
tinuation of the regime, almost unchanged, T h e preparatory work by the Commission ser-
vices . . . was again not presented to the decision makers. There was no information given on 
the desirability of reform in the light of the CAP reforms and the single market.' And again 
one paragraph Iater229'It is clear from the above that the Commission did not present all the 
appropriate information to justify the continuation of the quota arrangements for 1995 to 2001 
. . . At the same time it was noted that extensive, although, not complete information was 
available to the Commission services. Furthermore, the Commission did not present the likely 
impact of their proposals compared with other options . . . ' The report concluded by casting 
doubt on the Commission's management, 'the soundness of the Commission's management 
and in particular the quality of its proposals, decisions and actions has had an impact on the 
0 T 1 
outcomes and for this the Commission is responsible and accountable.' But the CMO ap-
parently persisted for some time in keeping the same level of quotas and prices despite evi-
dent contradictions between the Agenda 2000, the Sugar CMO and the resultant overproduce 232 tion. 
The report seemingly confirms the supposition that the Commission, here the unit, as ex-
plained before, was able to ignore pressure to reform from internal sources and from the 
Commission as a whole and it is likely the Commissioner and the other institutions were 
equally powerless. It seems to have achieved this by using information controls, omitting to 
mention certain aspects and withholding important facts. The CMO units were seemingly able 
to monitor and control the success or failure of the Commission economic evaluation teams 
and the Sugar regime did this. The hierarchy appeared to have supported the unit or at least 
neglected to control it and to manage the DG more thoroughly. Whatever problems emerged 
at the lower levels of the DG, the hierarchy were alleged to have neglected their task of con-
trol and management, either accidentally or deliberately 234Thus the unit and CMO were able 
to determine their own future and that of their sector. Something similar if not so spectacular 
probably happened in the other CMO units. The cost to the consumer, the credibility of the 
Community and the reforms was large, yes, the Council and thus the MSs agreed to the re-
gime and could have been blamed for the situation but it is clear how the Council and thus 
MSs were also controlled. One solution to the Sugar regime was listed as the liberalization of 
the market. Indeed this would appear to have had the winning hand with the list of benefits to 
^^ c 
be gained by adopting, it more impressive than the other three options discussed. The down-
side was that many of the then beneficiaries of the regime were seemingly unhappy about it. It 
is likely that the Unit knew that the price could be reduced and the regime simplified, by more 
liberalization as early as 1992 if not before and opposed it, to prevent any loss of power. 
In the 1992 reform the CMO units had participated in the CAP reforms, in the Mid Term Re-
view they were allegedly not consulted, maybe this is why the Mid Term Review was referred 
to by some as the most radical of the reforms 236The Commissioner was stated as having used 
his think tank alone to ensure that this time the reforms took place. He was alleged to have 
deliberately 'bypassed' the CMO units, MSs and the hierarchy 237A problem and reason for 
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the CMO units and their regimes remaining unchanged and not 'seeing the writing on the 
wall' was that the organization of the DG had failed to change to match the new policy re-
forms. Thus an old style, pre reform organization structure will impede if not contradict the 
reforms themselves. To force such a reorganization requires considerable political will, par-
ticularly in a DG the size and age of DG AGRI, but the cost of not doing it is worse. Of 
course the CMO units would have probably opposed the change, but in the end the change 
had to happen anyway. 
The literature supports the findings above of Policy Networks resisting reforms to the CAP. 
Indeed the DG is criticized about the power of the networks, T h e history of moderate reforms 
as responses to fundamental and serious policy problems suggests that we should examine the 
reasons why there have been no fundamental changes in the CAP, even though there would be 
welfare economic gains from doing so.,239The article reaches the conclusion that powerful 
Policy Networks were able to keep the CAP from being reformed, even though it should have 
been as the next quotation suggests. 'The existence of a cohesive policy network in the sector 
in which reform is put on the agenda limits the opportunities for fundamental reform. Mem-
bers of such a network can form a strong coalition resisting change. Political systems in which 
the structure disperses political power to several decision making centres provide many veto 
points which can be used, often successfully, to mobilize opposition to reform.'240 The last 
point is important as the current fragmented state of the EU is seen to be an important reason 
for a lack of reform. The DG or units in it, seemingly headed and organized the resistance and 
seemingly encouraged the fragmentation and not the opposite. The DG was considered to be 
full of veto points and very influenced by the MSs. The author stressed, 'This study has 
shown that even though heavy pressure was put on EU agricultural policy makers to reform 
the CAP fundamentally in 1991 and 1992, organizational structures led them towards moder-
1 
ate reform.' Essentially the article is in agreement with the chapter only the chapter provides 
the DG internal explanation for the reform resistance that occurred and emphasizes that the 
DG or elements of it were of central importance in the Policy Networks. It was seemingly 
only once the Commissioner out-manoeuvred these that the Mid Term Review was possible. 
6.8 ENLARGEMENT 
'Eastern enlargement puts the CAP, as we know it, under threat as never before . . . '242 
The close relationship at times between the enlargement process and the CAP was made clear 
in the above, the rest of the quotation follows; 'Eastern enlargement puts the CAP, as we 
know it, under threat as never before. Fischler insisted that his 1998 reform package provided 
a "much needed example to Eastern candidates for EU membership. The European model of 
agriculture no longer justifies artificially high prices."'243Whatever happened the CAP would 
end up being examined and reformed as a result of the enlargement and this was seemingly 
enough to make some officials in the DG react in a far from positive manner. 
When addressing the enlargement phase, pre-accession aid is interesting. SAPARD was the 
EU instrument intended to help prepare the NMSs for the enlargement by their setting up ma-
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nagement and control systems. The DG was responsible for handling many of the aspects of 
SAPARD. The Court of Auditors annual report of 2001 reviews the SAPARD programme 
and made a range of criticisms. Some of these seem somewhat similar to the courts views a-
bout the CMOs; 'The Commission's analysis of the management and control systems is of 
crucial importance, because it aims to ensure that EU funds will be used properly . . . The 
main shortcomings noted were a lack of documentation on the nature, timing and extent of the 
audit procedures performed, some conclusions on the systems that were not supported by suf-
ficient and reliable evidence and no systematic file review by the responsible hierarchy. The 
Court's audit concluded that, in these areas, generally accepted auditing standards were not 
applied satisfactorily . . . '244 The amount of money finally paid out was incredibly small, 
'Two years after the start of the programme, payments to final beneficiaries were made in on-
ly two countries to 0,1% of the total available funds.'245 The Commission failed to carry out 
sufficient checks and this was said to be due to the 'numerous changes in Commission 
O/l f 
staff.' One of the NMS officials interviewed commented on SAPARD, 'Mission impossible 
*)A H 
to get SAPARD going.' This comment was linked to his comments on Commission bu-
reaucratization and reforms. All in all the SAPARD scheme was not a particularly auspicious 
start to the enlargement process. 
It was to be expected that a major policy issue like enlargement would have some profound 
effects on the organization directly implementing and affected by it. In order to survive in the 
new environment some form of evolution was expected to occur. Granted the Commission's 
constant statement of its being overworked and understaffed, then such a major new burden 
would have been expected to have placed it under almost unbearable stress. It would affect 
the DG's structures and reveal the fundamental soundness of them or at least their core com-
ponents. Harsh decisions had to be made as resources were scarce. DG policies would have to 
be reformed and the units involved in them would see changes in their status, power, and re-
sources. Some of the units concerned were all too aware and well informed about the likely 
trends and were in a position to act on their well informed expectations. CAP reforms had a 
direct link to the need to prepare for enlargement somewhat like the Kinnock reforms. The 
powerful groups within the Commission who had maybe been able to remain unreformed and 
quietly in control over the years, were forced to take actions which drew them into the open. 
Reforms would not surprisingly be resisted; political leadership would find itself steadily be-
ing forced to take more decisive steps to address administrative reluctance and resistance. The 
CMO units seemingly tried to resist the change and reforms with minimal adaptations rather 
than evolution, however they were finally modified after the Mid-Term Review. The hierar-
chy of the DG, or elements of it, appeared to have resisted the Kinnock reforms and seem-
ingly assisted in resisting the CAP and enlargement required reforms. It seems hard to accept 
that the CMO units could have acted as they did without some assistance from the hierarchy 
or elements of it. Reorganizations can be ordered by Director Generals and these could have 
forced changes into effect in these units, but no reorganizations occurred and none were seem-
ingly attempted. On the contrary the Commissioner appeared to have found himself ever more 
isolated with regard to the services which were ostentatiously there to serve him. The earlier 
balance of power, in favour of the services and certain units of it in particular was finally ap-
parently visible. Once visible it could be addressed, despite the many allies internal and exter-
nal that the units allegedly enjoyed. 
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Time was one key factor, and the other is pressure. The Commissioner needed time to come 
to grips with the DG and this he seems finally to have done. The later years of his term in of-
fice saw the CAP reforms sharpening. No doubt he also built up his own networks internally 
and externally in the sector during this period. The arrival of the NMSs would have been of 
assistance as they were not content with the status quo and were also not yet part of the long 
established networks. Thus it seems likely that the Commissioner and the NMSs were in a 
sense allies. Interestingly enough the NMSs were seemingly interested in CAP reforms, much 
like the Commissioner, probably to prevent it becoming too much of an issue and blocking 
integration and because the CAP was tailor made to fit the old MSs and as newcomers they 
would like to alter the system to accommodate them better. 
The attitude of the DG or elements of it towards the NMSs and the enlargement is interesting. 
At the early stage of enlargement the so called EA agreements were used (Europe Agree-
ments) to guide the CEECs towards the Union and the negotiations for them began in 1990; 
there were problems at this stage between those who favoured long term political objectives 
or those 'under pressure from short-term problems'. Basically DG enlargement was opposed 
by DG AGRI and DG Industry, the latter under pressure from their respective sectors, much 
the same happened in MSs in their governmental departments. The result was that: 
' . . . the ability of the sectoral logic to constrain a more politically motivated agreement was 
greatly facilitated by the fragmentation of the policy process and the lack of close oversight 
by the macro-policy-makers in the member governments. Defensive sectoral interests were 
able to insulate specific aspects of the EAs from political pressures for a more generous ap-
proach to the CEECs and to set the baseline of what would be on offer. As some of those in-
volved on the CEEC side were able to observe, as fast as they identified issues on which they 
wanted to press for more open market access, they found that an EU-based lobby had beaten 
them to the EU negotiators.'248 
The inefficiencies listed, and in particular that of the reform resistance of the CMO units, had 
a direct effect on the enlargement process. It was often said that the CAP reforms were vital to 
allow the Uruguay round to be successfully implemented and the future WTO round likewise, 
at the same time it was noted that the enlargement was to a large extent dependent on the suc-
cessful outcome of the CAP reforms. In the September 2001 meeting of the European Prime 
Ministers, the enlargement was alleged to have been in danger of failing or being postponed 
on the basis of agriculture alone.249The argument was about the structure of the CAP and the 
payments connected to it, i.e, connected neatly to the CAP reforms. The role of the CMO u-
nits in resisting reform and keeping the cost of the CAP high was therefore a real threat to the 
enlargement process. 
Allegedly, the CMO Units and some in the DG were seemingly hostile to the enlarge-
ment.250The NMSs were apparently seen to be a disrupting factor that was forcing changes 
onto the CMOs in question. The units and their supporters seemingly set out to resist the 
enlargement as well. They appear to done this by ensuring that the acquis was hard for the 
NMSs to accept and absorb, it was , ' . . . aimed against the NMSs in the period leading up to 
the Agenda 2000 . . . '251The Commission drew up the acquis which the NMSs had to accept 
and implement, and that meant in practice that the CMO Units would have been able to have 
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influenced their acquis. Some of the CMOs were alleged to be an ongoing problem. One 
official put the current and old NMS problem succinctly enough; basically if you are not rep-
resented in a DG by your nationals then you will lose out directly in policy terms.253 One last 
point on the DG and the NMSs, it will, according to one source, take 15 years for the NMSs 
to have the same representation in DG as the MSs, this is "normal,"254The NMSs are likely to 
have further problems down the line, parachutage or not. 
Some NMS officials expressed their problems at dealing with the CMOs and this is backed 
up in the progress reports made by the Commission on them. The enlargement seemed to have 
been in some danger of failing or being postponed on the basis of agriculture alone. The 
summaries of the positions of the Czech Republic and Poland in their progress to accession 
with regards to agriculture, show some confirmation of the suspicion that the CMO units 
could affect enlargement in 2002. The NMS CMO organisations were stated to be an ongoing 
problem for the two states in question, mentioned first in 2000 directly for Poland and in 1999 
in the Czech Republic, and still a problem at the end of the summary presumably in 
2002.256257After 2003 the DG was quite different, 
apparently after mobility was accepted by 
CMO units and there was a planned reorganisation. The successful passing of the Mid-Term 
Review was of considerable importance. Thus the enlargement went ahead despite the Com-
mission's negative 2002 judgement of the Czech Republic, The decision to allow the 
enlargement to take place probably reflected the weakening of the CMO units. 
Where the period leading up to the Agenda 2000 proposals was concerned, there would ap-
pear to be evidence of some form of discrimination being practiced by the Commission vis-à-
vis the then candidate countries. The proposals are apparently clear about the refusal to allow 
the new states to fully use the productivity support mechanism, or direct payments for beef on 
a headage basis, on their accession; 'The Commission's proposals in Agenda 2000 will lead 
to serious problems as the process of accession . . . takes place. The prospect of the establish-
ment of a two tier CAP for the foreseeable future is fraught with political and moral problems. 
Equally the prospect of superimposing the bureaucratic and inefficient paraphernalia of the 
CAP on eastern European countries together with significantly higher food prices for less 
prosperous peoples is completely unacceptable.'258This was the situation that the Agenda 
2000 envisaged and which arguably some of the CMO units had a hand in affecting. The final 
result in 2004 with the reduced power of the CMO units, was that the NMSs could receive 
some portion of direct payments from their accession onwards which they could then top up 
with national measures - which looks rather like a form of re-nationalisation for a period. The 
demands of the candidate states for direct payments and the involvement of the Prime minis-
ters and no doubt the Commissioner, under pressure to prevent the enlargement coming un-
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stuck was required to get the agreement. Throughout the period the Commissioner had been 
allegedly becoming more active, using smaller more exclusive groups to decide policy, as 
stated earlier, and apparently losing trust in the DG services, which no doubt also helps ex-
plain the difference in the final decision. Food prices will go up in NMSs. In MSs 10-15% of 
public budget goes on food, in NMSs it is 30% which is considerably higher,259Since the CAP 
came into force in the NMSs, prices started going up in the states concerned and this was dif-
__ ^/ a 
ficult for populations already coping with the problems of transition. However, the Com-
mission seems confident that the situation will improve and benefit all concerned. That said a 
sharp altercation in 2003261 between the NMSs and the MSs at Luxembourg about changes to 
the accession treaties, resulted in the MSs ignoring NMSs concerns. Interestingly enough 
much of the problem appeared to involve the dairy regime, which is one of the CMOs which 
was not over modified in the reform process. Finally the statement by the Polish minister ap-
peared to contain a covert threat that after gaining full membership the NMSs will not only 
want more reforms, but will ensure that they are fully considered this time.263 
In general, interviews with NMS officials revealed a range on opinions about the DG. On the 
whole the DG performed averaeely or needed improvement. The DG was described as 'a 
mammoth' 265or a 'dinosaur'.26 Inter DG communication and coordination seemed to have 
been considered to be below average or very bad. The levels of bureaucracy seemed to be a 
problem for the NMSs in their dealing with the DG; 'Procedures were a problem for Europe 
and for the enlargement.1 There was a general sense that the DG was not communicative ^ J'« 
enough and that it was a problem getting answers from it. The CMO units were stated to 
have been a problem, 'CMO units lived their own lives;'270a point shared by an official from 
another NMS who added that they 'resisted reforms and that their NMS was lucky not to have 
too many contacts with the CMO units.'27lAnd 'CMO unit officials did not like the NMSs 
interfering in their affairs, CMO cereals was a problem, but the Commissioner was keen about 
the enlargement;'272'CMO units showed little concern for the NMSs which experienced diffi-
culties and there was a lack of openness on the part of CMO units to new situations. Their Ann 
main concern was to keep the old MSs' preferences in place.' 'CMO units were very nega-
tive to reform.'274About the DG was stated, and CMO units in particular; 'a lone MS is ig-
nored by the Commission; you need a group and an old MS to apply pressure.'275After the 
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reorganization the NMS officials were ail pretty well united in stressing that the DG was 
"more concrete since the reorganization and aiming to strengthen communication with 
MSs;'276 'reorganization of DG AGRI made it much more efficient and effective, manage-
ment groups more effective and organisation of work better now. ,277One official stressed that 
the quality of the proposals had improved since the re-organization as they were better dis-
cussed now and what was more they were delivered more quickly. The same official said that 
the Council needed more concrete proposals from the DG owing to the enlargement and to so 
make better decisions and added that the enlargement had proven useful for the DG since the 
old MSs were now 'more diluted.' The DG was encouraging the NMSs to approach it and so 
using the enlargement; having said that though, 'The old MSs have big influence in the 
D G / Half those interviewed considered the DG was prepared for the enlargement. He 
stated that a recentralization of the Commission was taking place and that it had to happen, 
combined with some bureaucratisation, in order to improve decision quality 279According to 
one official the DG was not prepared for the enlargement but required that the NMSs be fully 
prepared; there were not enough experts in time in the DG and in fact in any of the DGs. The 
example was given that the recruitment exam for the Commission which aimed to get the ap-
propriate experts for grade A8 was performed in 2003 and it took a year to actually recruit 
them, and this was not yet over. The translation department problems in the Commission, 
were stressed to be endangering legislation quality owing to their lack of capacity. The DG 
was criticised for spending more time on the internal staff regulation than they did on the 
enlargement process. Half of those interviewed shared the view that the DG was not pre-
pared for the enlargement.282There was only minimal change in the grades given for the DG's 
performance before and after the enlargement actually took place. There will be four Heads of 
Unit in the DG from the NMSs; 2 Directors and 50-100 Desk Officers, their numbers being 
gradually increased.283 The overall size of the DG is 1000 staff. 
With regard to the situation in their national ministries the officials interviewed had this to 
say. The Czech Agricultural Ministry was not structured to deal with DG AGRI which created 
problems. The Czechs had to learn to persuade the Desk Officers and the Cabinet together 
which was not so easy. The ministry officials were stated to see the EU work as being an ex-
tra on top of their usual agenda and so they left it for ten people to carry out in an EU depart-
ment which needs more staff. Most basic CAP structures were stated to be implemented but nrj a 
the various reporting requirements were a problem. 
The Hungarian Agricultural Ministry was said to consist of a top layer who were political ap-
pointees, which seemed to extend down to the top four ranks; family and political connections 
were alleged to be important to reach these positions. There was said to be a lack of experts in 
the ministry and a lack of a middle-aged middle management, combining language skills with 
expertise. There were stated to be only either older experts with Hungarian language skills or 
young officials with no expertise or not enough. There were said to be 1000 staff, many of 
whom were young, 30% or more with no experience. This had created problems and negative 
results for Hungary in its dealings with the Commission delays etc. It was impossible to deal 
with all the required procedures, so direct payments had been delayed. In management com-
mittees there was the problem that there were no translation services and the older experts at-
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tending could not speak French or English, and the Poles also had this problem. The Hungari-
ans in the Management committees were stated to not say very much. Where implementation 
was concerned, Hungary was prepared with the only problem the lack of EU experts. Salaries 
for ministry employees was said to be not a problem. There was said to have been a problem-
atic brain drain to the EU of appropriate staff.285 
The Estonian situation seems to have been rather different to that of Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. The ministry was said to be small and flexible and there was no mention of exper-
tise problems or political appointees. The Estonian's apparently had been willing to accept the 
huge amounts of imported acquis easily at first owing to the changing legal atmosphere when 
it began, but this is getting more and more problematic and the fact that only 1-2% of the ac-
quis is really discussed before becoming law. Estonia had been more market oriented before 
with only 4% of GDP going on agriculture. With the CAP, prices went up 5-10%, sugar went 
up the most, by two and a half times. A certain amount of duplication occurred in networks 
maybe to create jobs, but this was less a problem for agriculture.286 
Unfortunately, the Polish official was not very forthcoming about the situation in Poland apart 
from saying that there were problems with implementation, but the staff in the ministry, y-
oung and old, were experienced and there were good lines of communication.287 
The question inevitably arises whether it might have been better to have left the reforms to 
one side until the enlargement had taken place. The following points mention Structural 
Funds but similar criteria also apply to agriculture. One source stated that the structural funds 
'create a clear political obstacle to the enlargement process: all current beneficiaries of the 
regional transfers are trying to avoid losing them, while the current contributors are trying to 
avoid paying for a much larger b i l l . . . the arrival of the CEEC countries is likely to create a 
whole set of new objectives, special clauses, exemptions and "temporary" compensatory 
Q^Q  
transfers.' The situation was not positive leading to the statement that the reforms should be 
left until after the enlargement, 'As things stand, the first new members are unlikely to get in 
before 2005 . . . Once in, they could help make the rules, rather than having to accept a fait 
accompli rigged against them. A messy fight might ensure but that might be better than delay-
ing enlargement indefinitely.'289This sentiment is repeated, with suggestions that linking the 
reform to enlargement could prove to be a 'trap' and 'risks playing into the hands of those 
who would like to delay the EU's expansion indefinitely, ideally keeping the CAP as little 
changed as possible.'290That said, the enlargement happened and so did some reform of the 
CAP so maybe the linking of the two was not so detrimental, although the NMSs suffered to 
help the Commission and DG reform. 
The more recent history of the enlargement and the effect of the CAP on the NMSs has not 
been particularly positive. There seem to be signs that the experience of the NMSs continues 
to be negative and that the old MS influence and bias in the DG remains in place. The follow-
ing quotation illustrates this well ' . . . small farmers are unable to withstand the unfair com-
petition of the much better-supported farmers of the original 15 member countries. Over-
subsidized, cheap and poor quality food, often hazardous for health, pours into the Hungarian 
market, trampling domestic producers who are under-financed and under-supported. Accord-
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ing to the latest report by the Swiss-based Institute for Management, Hungary between 2002 
and 2006 slipped 11 places down a list of nations surveyed for competitiveness.'291 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
So we have seen that DG AGRI seemingly shows many of the weaknesses of the Commission 
which can be seen from different perspectives to be positive and beneficial for a Policy net-
work. The absence of rigidly observed management structures is not a problem if there is 
enough of a sense of motivation and mission provided for by European ideology. However, as 
observed by officials, the loss of the motivated idealists and the motivation of having a policy 
that drove integration on, exposed the DG to be a large, unresponsive, old fashioned organiza-
tion. The idealism which drove the CAP to success at the beginning finally became conserva-
tive, resisting change rather than making it. Elements in the DG showed the power of 'ideal-
ism' or rather sector loyalty as it became, in the absence of Commission integrational dyna-
mism, and small groups to achieve their goals and to resist new comers. In a DG without a 
positive policy and a Commission that has lost some of its idealistic drive, sector loyalty can 
dominate. The motivation of the officials involved was not dissimilar to that which forged the 
Community in the first place. There was a dogmatic quality to their idealism that accepts no 
argument and saw criticism and calls for reform as opposition to be opposed. The mission of 
the group was above all else, they are after all protecting their clients and their status. 
The apparent success of some CMO units and the other small groups within the Commission 
to follow their own agenda is explained in part by their motivation, but also by the structure of 
the DG. Had the Commission been more of a civil service then such resistance would have 
been harder. But the combination of seemingly loose management structures and competing 
networks reduced the efficacy of the control of the Commissioner. The fact that some MSs 
would quite possibly have been happy with quietly opposing the reforms, whilst avoiding be-
ing seen to do so on the Agriculture Council, is likely to have meant that members of the hier-
archy were less willing to oppose the units involved. After all, the reforms meant even less 
power and discretion for the DG and of course the hierarchy. 
Therefore there is a sense in which several parties in the policy making process would have 
been quite content with the status quo and so opposed the reforms. The same goes for the en-
largement, several MSs were unhappy about it. The DG was seen from this perspective cor-
rectly reflecting the European Agricultural sector as a whole. Some elements wanting re-
forms, some resisting them, some MSs in favour some against But above all, the CMO units 
concerned and some of the hierarchy seemingly represented the interests of farmers and the 
CAP policy as first envisaged. They were willing to hold to this outdated policy with the ide-
alism that they first attached to it years before. Idealism is seemingly difficult to re-steer after 
initial launch, or at least this is true where it meets sector experts and officials. Guardians of 
the treaty are left behind by the greater drive and goal, and become guardians of the sector. 
The influence of the MSs in the DG after the Delors period was considerable and this was 
shown. The growing bureaucratization was also outlined, serving as it did the multi-purposes 
of changing the image of the DG and Commission from dynamic political actor to slow, safe 
bureaucracy and reducing the power of Policy networks and MSs. Also the case chapter dem-
onstrated that the outsiders, the NMSs lost out as a result. The complex bureaucratic require-
ments resulting in minimal payments to them in the period stated, and excessive requirements 
291 Csath, Magdolna. 'The mora] deadlock in Hungary and the EU's answer.' EU Observer 23,10.2006 
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made of them perhaps to make up for DG weakness. The NMSs also suffered from the CMO 
Policy networks which were seemingly wagging the DG dog at times, and the members of the 
sector which ensured that the NMSs got a somewhat raw deal in the EAs. Had more political 
leadership been available in the EU and had the Commission and DG not been quite so defen-
sive, bureaucratized, fragmented, MS and Policy network oriented the enlargement could 
have been less painful for the NMSs. The existence of the dynamic-defensive cycle of the 
Commission made matters rather worse for the NMSs than it needed to have been. 
Dates of Interviews Held with DG AGRI Officials 
Interviews carried out with ten officials between 18. 06. 2004 and 09.03. 2005 
Dates of Interviews Held with NMS Officials 
Polish Official: 22. 02. 2005 
Estonian Official: 01.02.2005 
Czech Republic Official: 25. 02. 2005 
Hungarian Official: 
Hungarian Official: 
15.02. 2005 
24.02.2005 
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7. DG ENTERPRISE AND INDUSTRY (DG ENT) 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
We saw in DG AGRI the amount of power that sectoral policy networks have and can wield. 
They were able to resist alterations to their CMO which would have meant a weakening of 
their own position in the DG and their policy network. And we saw the problems that any po-
litical authority in the Commission faces when attempting to deal with both policy networks 
and a strong MS presence which can combine with the policy networks to make any reform 
difficult. In DG ENV there was a sense that a MS used its influence to stop a policy network. 
In DG AGRI this was less defined with MSs more evenly balanced in their influence. The en-
largement process suffered as a result of the lack of reform and the fact that the NMSs were 
outsiders often dictated to by the DG and not able to influence its inner workings. OLAF and 
the EEA both showed the dislike of the Commission and its DGs to reform and anything 
which was perceived as a threat to it. The dynamic Commission considers itself to need a free 
hand and to have a mission to protect. Bureaucratisation can serve a useful purpose and in 
particular OLAF was integrated into this drive almost to the point of having so many tasks 
and procedures to fulfil that it would not be able to carry out its core function. DG ENT pre-
sents us with a relatively new DG which had carried out some major reorganisations already. 
Like DG ENV, DG ENT is primarily a policy making DG, with relatively few funds to dis-
tribute but plenty of influence over the setting of technical standards and the passing of policy 
which can have expensive consequences. DG ENT will show us a DG with increased MS in-
fluence and policy networks but owing to the major reorganisation this will probably be more 
muted. Bureaucratisation will be an issue as it is in all DGs the question will be as to how se-
rious this has needed to be. 
The Community Industrial Policy was achieved to an extent by Commission stealth and no 
doubt its organisational logic and desire to extend its competences. Strong vested interests 
seem to have been willing to participate in formidable alliances sometimes of a Policy Net-
work nature with Commission and at times MS direct involvement. The Enterprise Policy of 
the Commission seems to have followed a similar logic, at least on the Commission side. The 
diversity of companies involved in the Commission's Enterprise Policy did not make them 
useful vested interests. So whilst the extension of formal Commission competences into the 
field in a formal sense was desirable from the Commission perspective, there would be a dan-
ger that that would also be where its interests ceased. The small companies involved in the 
policy served a Commission purpose rather than vice versa. After all, enterprise policy had 
been an MS sphere before. Not just that, but also the newcomers would face a Commission 
dominated by vested interests and entrenched Policy Networks bent on controlling the re-
sources available. 
The NMSs also found themselves in this situation as newcomers to the EU and Commission. 
They could be expected to have been faced by similar problems to those facing the small 
companies. On the one hand owing to having become involved in the EU and the Commission 
they were more liable to have to accept its products and of course legislation, whilst on the 
other their actual influence was minimal. Given the situation of the Commission during the 
period covered by this thesis the newcomers could be expected to have suffered considerably 
from Commission structural weaknesses and in fact have seen their interests seemingly suffer 
more than they benefited. 
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The chapter addresses first the Community Industrial and Enterprise Policies and considers 
their histories. Before moving on to the creation of the DG itself, its organisation, manage-
ment and the major reorganization of the DGs which had previously organised the industry 
and enterprise fields and their combination in the new DG. Policy Networks and their influ-
ence are then considered with the ability of MSs and industries to capture the field, and over-
influence the DG discussed. The growing bureaucratization of the DG is examined and Com-
mission sectoral fragmentation finally the DG's relationship to the enlargement is addressed 
and the NMS reactions to the DG outlined. 
12 COMMUNITY INDUSTRIAL AND ENTERPRISE POLICIES: 
A BRIEF HISTORY 
Initially the EEC had little real industrial policy content, after all the Treaty of Rome did not 
directly specify a common industrial policy. The ECSC and EURATOM had clearer interven-
tionist policies which aimed at creating a common policy and tactic for dealing with the Coal 
and Steel industries or assisting atomic research in the community. Europe in the 1950s and 
60s consisted of several very different national industrial policies in which subsidies, direct 
and indirect were often present but very diverse. Whilst it was becoming clearer to the Com-
munity institutions and the MSs that industrial development and modernisation required 
common policies in particular in the field of research, little was done of a practical nature. Af-
ter 1967 when the three Communities were merged the DG for Industrial affairs, (DG Indus-
try or from now on DG III) was set up which a wide portfolio including industrial policy, 
competition, transport and energy and the internal market. The sheer diversity of the portfolio 
could be said to have been a recipe for vagueness and inaction. 
The reality on the ground in the Community was of MSs with widely differing economic ap-
proaches and equally differing industrial policies. It is not surprising that there was little 
agreement as to what the common policy should be. In March 1970 the Commission issued a 
memorandum in which it stressed that a structural policy was needed which aimed at integrat-
ing the industrial sector to solve the problems of inefficiency and competitiveness, it also sta-
ted that , . . the process of permanent change which is a feature of modern economies can-
not be left to market forces alone.'"'The 1972 Paris Summit set out a programme for action 
for creating a Community industrial sector. The Commission, evidently under the influence of 
the West German authorities, placed emphasis on liberal economics and worker and employer 
agreements, drew up a programme aiming to harmonise industrial regulations to reach the 
goal laid out for it and the 4 . . . removal of barriers to trade, progressive and effective opening 
up of public and semi public contracts, promoting inter-company competition at European 
level and sectors facing special problems; the Commission concluded that; " . . . some indus-
trial sectors deserve special attention either because they are under a crisis or because restruc-
turation at a European level is high priority for them.'" The programme was, however impor-
tant for goal setting but not goal achieving as little momentum was noted. The oil crises of the 
1970s ensured that even less was done to follow the common policy and to achieve the goals 
set. Rather there was a period of the states fending for themselves to try and survive as best 
they could. Sectoral approaches were used to ease the problems for industry. Subsidies were 
often used and protection extended to 'strategic industries' usually of nationally important 
1 Kuyper, L. A Policy for the Competitiveness of European Industry in Darmer, M and Kuyper, L (eds) Industry and the 
European Union, Cheltenham, Edward Edgar Publishing Ltd, (2000) p.26 quoting from Bulletin 5-1970 
2 ibid quoting from Communication of 7 May 1973, Bulletin 5-1973 
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companies. During this period the European Industrial Policy such as existed has been 
termed 'defensive' and aimed primarily at 'softening the blow' for sectors in trouble from in-
ternational competition.4 The MSs held the view for most of this period that industrial policy 
belonged firmly in their sphere. The apparent failure of this approach resulted in a growing 
consensus that the internal market had to be completed and that a common industrial policy 
was an integral element of this. That said, there were some important break-throughs during 
this period, the principle of Mutual Recognition was expounded by the European Court of 
Justice in the Cassis de Dijon case 120/78 of 20 Feb 1970; one MS was not allowed to use its 
standards to block goods acceptable in another MS according to its standards, unless serious 
health or safety reasons existed. Other principles like that of free movement had existed in the 
Treaty but not been enforced until the Single European Act (SEA). 
Under the guidance of Industry Commissioner Davignon, European Industrial ministers began 
holding informal meetings in 1980 which led to the formal meetings of the Industry Council 
beginning in 1984. The European Parliament (EP) was important in the founding of an Indus-
try Policy which it called for in its Resolution of 198L5The Commission issued a communica-
tion, ' . . . a community strategy to develop Europe's industry'6 in 1981 which paved the way 
for a research and development programme which became the ESPRIT programme. It also 
expressed the view that companies within the Community should be treated differently, be 
given preference, to those outside. This policy was not accepted by the Council as it would 
discriminate against third countries. The Commission tried frequently to reintroduce this 
idea.7 
The SEA introduced more measures that followed up on the achievements made previously. 
The CE mark was introduced to reduce the problems raised by the slow harmonising approach 
of national technical measures; goods carrying this mark must be circulated freely through the 
Community as they have been attested to have gone through the necessary assessments. The 
move from unanimous voting for New Approach Directives was crucial for their success.8The 
SEA set out to encourage research and technological development to improve the Commu-
nity's international competitive position. An action plan for Small and Medium sized Enter-
prises (SMEs) was created with the aim of simplifying ' . . . administrative, financial and legal 
constraints and to encourage cooperation and partnership between firms from different re-
gions of the Community.'9The new consensus in Europe was that governments were best at 
encouraging the right business environment but not at making choices for specific companies; 
this was reflected in the new industrial policy as finally emerged under Treaty on European 
Union (TEU).10 
The Industry Council Meeting in 1990 concluded the industrial policy which had concentrated 
on sectors and a more general competitiveness goal, and the strengthening of this was en-
dorsed. But certain sectors were still allowed to slip through the net like steel and textiles. 
Sectors which the Commission considers veiy important for competitiveness and industrial 
3 See note I Kuyper (2000) p.27-8 
4 ibid p.29 
5 ibid p. 28 
6 ibid p.28 
7 ibid p,29 
8 Kuyper, L. The Infernal Market- Economic Heart of (he Union in Darmer, M and Kuyper, L (eds) Industry and the Euro-
pean Union, Cheltenham, Edward Edgar Publishing Ltd, (2000) p.55 
9 Hitiris, T. European Union Economics, Fifth Edition Harlow, UK Pearson Education Limited (Prentice Hall Europe), 
(2003) p.296 
10 See note 1 Kuyper (2000) p.31 
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integration are still monitored actively by the Commission. lIThe TEU introduced a title XIII 
on industry (Article 130) and in Article 3 a general obligation to improve competitiveness was 
included. This was the first time that the Community or rather Union, had had a specific in-
dustrial policy. The MSs are called upon to coordinate their actions and the Commission is 
instructed to ' . . . take useful initiatives to promote such coordination'. The stated aims are to 
4 . . . speed up the adjustment of industry to structural change, to encourage an environment 
favourable to initiative and to the development of undertakings throughout the Community, 
particularly small and medium sized undertakings, to encourage an environment favourable to 
cooperation between undertakings, to foster better exploitation of the industrial potential of 
policies of innovation, research and technological development." l2The EP is only allocated a 
consultative role. Unlike national industrial policies the EU cannot use tax incentives. Several 
other sections and titles in the treaty refer to and are closely related if not part of any indus-
trial policy; although not explicitly included under the industry title, examples are: 'Title VI 
on common rule on competition, taxation and approximation of laws; title XI Social policy; 
title XVII Economic and Social Cohesion; Title XVIII Research and technological develop-
ment.',3The industry article states that the speeding up of adjustment of industry to structural 
change is a goal. Companies are directly assisted then via the European Regional Develop-
ment fund and the European Social Fund, these require EP Co-decision.14 
The period since the TEU saw several changes. Industry Commissioner Bangemann's high 
level group called for progress in the information and communication technologies sector; 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector was an essential element of this. A Commis-
sion Action Plan resulted which addressed the need to apply liberalisation to the telecommu-
nication sector.15The Commission in 1995 delivered its Action Programme for strengthening 
the competitiveness of European industry to: 4 . . . reinforce the internal market and improve 
its functioning; coordinate R and D policy with the needs of industry; information society; 
and promote industrial cooperation.'16After the European Council of Essen in 1994 a Com-
petitiveness Advisory Group was set up, made up of top experts. Industry has a strong influ-
ence via groups like these.1 The benchmarking of governments according to their public ser-
vices' quality and performance which relate to competitiveness was formally started in 1999 
after a three year trial period. 
The Lisbon objective and related criteria was decided on at the European Council in March 
2000 with the goal to ' . . . make Europe "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world" by 2010.'1 The ambitious goals were intended to kick start the 
European economy which despite the 1992 impulse had not generated the hoped for and an-
ticipated economic growth. The link between the enlargement and the Lisbon summit is 
shown by their being placed in the same paragraph, 'A successful enlargement has been the 
overarching objective of the Commission, and remains very important. The setting of a new 
economic and social agenda designed to increase competitiveness and create jobs has been 
central to the work of the Enterprise DG. The Lisbon Summit in 2000 marked a major turning 
11 Lawton, T. Uniting European Industrial Policy in Nugent, N (ed) At the heart of the Union, second edition, (2000) Basing-
stoke, Macmillan Press p. 138 
12 Title XVI: Industry, Article 157 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
n Darmer, M. A definition of EU Industrial Policy in Darmer, M and Kuyper, L (eds) Industry and the European Union, 
Cheltenham, Edward Edgar Publishing Ltd, (2000)p.l5 
14 ibid p. 15 
15 See note 1 Kuyper (2000) p.34 
16 ibid p.36 
17 ibid p.37 
18 ERT (European Round Table of Industrialists)4 The European Challenge' message to the spring European Council March 
(2003) p. 1 
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point in this endeavour.' 19However the Lisbon goals were not being achieved as the Wim Kok 
report stated, other European leaders have been equally clear on this point, 'Prodi said in the 
financial times that the Lisbon process "is a big failure"; and Wim Kok said "If we don't fo-
cus strongly on growth, productivity and employment, we will not provide the means to keep 
the social model.'"20Lisbon is a typical piece of Commission and European compromise 
rhetoric it is 'about everything and nothing' and the Kok Mid-Term analysis stressed it had 
too many targets it hoped to achieve. Whilst the enlargement process is said to have made 
reaching the Lisbon objectives harder it also offers better hopes for growth too.21 By 2004 
only '58% of the European directives linked to the Lisbon process have been imple-
mented.'22Some state that Lisbon goals are mostly within the nation states remit4 . , . these 
reforms cannot be remedied by legislation or executive action at EU level because these pow-
ers remain mostly with the member states.'23But others take a different view that the Lisbon 
criteria and their subsequent shortcomings are very much also due to the Commission, ' . . . 
the shortcomings of the Lisbon agenda reflect the weaknesses of the Commission's internal 
organisation and working practices. It is no longer as capable as it needs to be of focusing the 
Union on a few objectives and ensuring it has the right instruments for achieving them.'24ln 
general, 6 . . . established interests' at various levels are responsible more than inertia for the 
failure of Lisbon, "That the 'old' single market is not yet delivering growth and jobs at its full 
potential can in large part be put down to the successful defence of established interests to the 
detriment of society at large."'250ther reasons are excessive and slow 'bureaucratic decision-
making processes' and a climate which does not allow enough creativity and 'pioneer 
spirit. Another useful statement which indicates a partial if not complete reason for the eco-
nomic problems is 'Too many key reforms for Lisbon are still waiting to be approved and im-
plemented. Firms cannot be successful in business if the system is against them.'27The EU 
and the Commission are fully involved in this system which is highly regulatory and not 
friendly to business. 
The Commission is said to have established the Community Industrial Policy 'by stealth,' 
much along the lines that are expected according to some scholars. The MSs are said to have 
wanted a minimalist role for the Community in the industrial sphere forcing the Commission 
to covertly use other tactics, in particular during the 1980s. It is said to have ' . . . incremen-
tally evolved its authority through developing and converging its influence in research and 
development activities, trade policy, competition rule . . . the suppor t . . . of national govern-
ments was achieved through the development of a Commission-led advocacy coalition, cen-
tred on a partnership between the Commission and big business, aimed at market liberalisa-
tion and competitive enhancement. . . . governments were persuaded that it was the best inter-
est of national economies to support Commission activism in many areas of business related 
policy. The Single European Market initiative was the most visible and ambitious outcome of 
this Commission policy activism , . . '28The manner in which the Commission achieved this is 
19 The Enterprise Directorate Genera! Activities and goals, results andfuture directions 20.04.2004 p,7 
20 European Voice 10-17 November (2004) Winneker, C. No surprise as Lisbon process coincides with tunnel vision 
21 European Voice 28 Oct-3 November (2004) Spinant, D. Breathing new life into Lisbon. and see note 18 ERT (European 
Round Table of Industrialists) 'The European Challenge' message (2003) p,5 
22 UEAPME Press release 18.03.2004 Member States should not use current economic upturn as a pretext to ease up on im-
plementation of Lisbon reforms, UEAPME warns, UEAPME represents employer's interests at the EU level for SMEs, Crafts 
and Trades www.ueapme.com 
23European voice 25-31 March (2004) O'brien, Senior Europe editor at the Economist Intelligence Unit, Why Lisbon reform 
process hinders, not helps, the EU 
24 European Voice Vol.9 No.33. 15.10,2003. Wyles, J. in Do less to deliver more-a challenge for the next European Commis-
sion. 
25 European Voice 17-23 March 2005. Commission President Barroso 
26 See note 18 ERT (European Round Table of Industrialists) 'The European Challenge' message (2003) p.2 
27 ibid p. 15 
28 See note 11 Lawton, (2000) p. 132 
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said to be evidence of the neo-functionalist theory. The planned and active tactic of the Com-
mission 4 . . . is seeking to establish certain policy areas as legitimate goals for EU level ac-
tion, achieving this and then incorporating these policy areas into the treaties.'29This is much 
as happened in the environment sector as well. The Commission can be said to have acted as 
'a policy entrepreneur' or 'purposeful opportunist.'30 
The Community Industrial Policy reflects to a certain degree the views of the MSs who make 
up the Community at any given time. Thus one group of states: the Netherlands, UK and 
Denmark are said to prefer a liberal market based industrial policies; whereas France, Spain 
and Italy are said to prefer greater intervention by the government with massive support being 
provided for certain companies and sectors.31The Community Industrial Policy is said to con-
tain ' . . . an ever increasing competition policy in line with British liberal economic principle; 
an emphasis on training and employment, corresponding with the social capitalism predomi-
nant in Germany and some of its neighbours; and a supportive R and D framework conform-
ing to France's Colbertist nature.' The Single Market Programme is said to 4 . . . illustrate 
vividly the ideological cleavages which persist within the Union, broadly speaking along 
dirigiste-liberal market lines. The relative weightings of these two tracks at an EU level re-
veals the tensions within the Union between those who favour a minimalist approach . . . and 
those who prefer a maximalist approach advocating an active, interventionist industrial pol-
icy.'33The split continues right through the Commission and amongst the officials. 
With regards to the relationship between enlargement and industrial policy; there seems to be 
an amount of catching up necessary, to go by the wording of the 2004 statement of the DG's 
plans. The wording in the document is of 'must ' and 'will' 'Our industry will also soon evol-
ve in an enlarged Europe, EU industrial policy must reflect this. The Enterprise DG has there-
fore developed a new Industrial Policy (adopted by the Commission in December 2002) 
which will focus on the improvement of the framework-conditions for developing entrepre-
neurial activities,'34and ' . . . enlargement is a source of unique opportunities for both future 
and existing MSs. Enlargement will also entail a number of well identified challenges. Indus-
trial policy must fully take into account the specific needs of the applicant and accession 
countries.'35The use of tense indicates that industrial policy and the new Commission policy 
will in the future come into effect, or at least it should. This is unfortunate considering that the 
report was issued on the eve of the enlargement. Many of the officials at the DG have proba-
bly been, as is hinted in the document, involved in the new and pressing priorities of dealing 
with the other aspects of enlargement and the worsening economic condition in the EU.36But 
it does not seem to be a sign of readiness by the DG and an indication that its capacity was 
sufficient for the task. 
But to sum up, the well meaning, vast amounts of EU attention ' , . . could result in stifling, 
rather than unfettering European enterprise . . . the overbearing manager of the 1980s has be-
come the over eager promoter of the 1990s. The plethora of European industrial competitive-
ness committees and expert groups advance a wide array of tools for influencing the business 
environment and shaping enterprise culture. They might be better advised to simply allow the 
29 See note 11 Lawton, (2000) p. 133 
30 ibid p.134 referring to Cram (1993) p. 134 
31 See note 13 Darmer (2000) p, 10 
32 Lawton, T. Introduction in Lawton, T (ed) European Industrial Policy and Competitiveness, Houndmills, Macmillan Press 
Ltd, (1999) p. 16 
33 Lawton, T. Fostering Invention and Innovation: Europe's Collaborative RAD Initiatives in Lawton, T. (ed) European In-
dustrial Policy and Competitiveness, Houndmills, Macmillan Press Ltd, (1999) p.44 
34 See note 19 The Enterprise Directorate General Activities and goals, results and future directions 20.04.2004 p, 9 
35 ibid p.9 
36 ibid p.7 
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single marke t . . . take effect. A complex array of policy initiatives and artificial stimulants are 
unnecessary and even unhelpful in shaping these foundations of European competitiveness.'37 
The revival of the national champion's argument is particularly disturbing. The "National 
champions discussion is on again.3 Maybe it is significant that the DG in its activity and spe-
cific objectives in 2004, stated under competitiveness and sustainable development title under 
subtitle Industrial policy, ' . . . specific sectoral initiatives will be launched in business related 
services, textiles, fashion and design, automotive, pharmaceutical, mechanical engineering 
and non-ferrous metals industries.' One wonders how this compares with the horizontal goal 
of competitiveness which the Commission had been highlighting, and this is explicitly stated 
under the under the industrial policy title, as ' . . . the objective is to carry out Industrial Pol-
icy through proper analysis as a basis for action mobilizing all relevant policies and respond-
ing to the needs of industry at both horizontal and sectoral level.'40 Responding to the needs 
of industry at a sectoral level, might entail more old fashioned industrial policy again rather 
than the holistic competitiveness approach. 
In conclusion, regarding the Commission and its general industrial policy * . . . the patchiness 
and inconsistency of EC action are still ev iden t . . . The Commission still operates more like a 
confederation of functional divisions engaged in piecemeal intervention rather than an inte-
grated entity with more than a rhetorical common purpose.'4 *It is also interesting to note that 
the majority view of the top officials throughout the Commission, around 80%,42was that A1 
'capitalism should be regulated' and the Commission should protect ' . . . a conviction that 
European capitalist societies both were and ought to be different.'4420% held the view that in 
the 1990s 'public interventionism, protectionism and overregulation'45should be stopped, the 
majority of this group were in the competition and internal market areas. Hooghe's work, re-
ferred to above, was published 1999 and by this point the internal market DG had been sepa-
rate from DG III for some time. Thus whilst DG III is said to have had a proportion of liberals 
by the late 1990s they may well have become less in number as the more convinced liberals 
split off into the internal market DG. What is alarming is that neither the Council nor the 
Commission appear to have learnt that the days of achieving better economic performance by 
focusing on industry (or specific industries) are past, as the following quotation illustrates. 
'The fact that the Commission is requested to draft a paper containing proposals on how to 
increase the competitiveness of European industry is a dangerous sign: most of the improve-
ment in the productivity performance of the US economy in recent years has come from ser-
vices, not from industry . . . Any attempts to strengthen European industry could only come at 
the expense of the rest of the economy, i.e. services. Taxing the future to preserve the past has 
been done before, as with the common agricultural policy but it is hardly a recipe for faster 
growth,'4<sSMEs are particularly strong in services. 
"Lawton, T. Conclusion in Lawton. T (ed) European Industrial Policy and Competitiveness, Houndmills, MacmilJan Press 
Ltd, (1999) p.238 
38 The Economist Special report Europe's Future, May 27 2006 p. 22 
39 See note 19 The Enterprise Directorate General Activities and goals, results and future directions 20,04.2004 p,37 
40 ibid p.36 
41 Menon, A and Hay ward, J. States, Industrial Policies and the European Union in (eds) Menon, A and Kassim, H. The 
European Union and National Industrial Policy, London» Routledge (1996) p. 273 
42 Stevens, A and Stevens, H. Brussels Bureaucrats? (2001) Basingstoke, Palgrave p,200 referring to Hooghe 1999b p.365 
43 ibid 
44 ibid 
45 ibid 
46 European Voice 1-14 April 2004 Gros, D. Only lip-service being paid to Lisbon plans 
235 
7.3 ENTERPRISE AND SMEs 
Enterprise Policy is directly linked (seemingly in competition at times) to Industrial Policy in 
the Commission and both are found in the same DG. Industrial Policy has been discussed 
which was primarily the work of DG III one of the three elements involved in the merger that 
resulted in DG ENT, now the policy of DG enterprise policy, distributive trades, tourism and 
cooperatives, also known as DG SME, (from now on DG XXIII) will be considered. SMEs 
were the main thrust of the new policy approach and showed that the Community and the 
Commission appeared to be aware of the need for a policy concentrating more on SMEs. The-
se companies are said to be 99.8% of all the companies in the Community, 15.8 million in to-
tal with 66.52% of the population employed in them. They are said to account for two thirds 
of the Community's turnover and are the major job creators. These are impressive statistics 
and obviously competitiveness and unemployment cannot be addressed without considering 
them. But SMEs are a divergent group covering companies which can be classified as micro 
with below 10 employees to those with 250 and from a minimum turnover to those with 40 
million ECU.47The sheer number of the companies in existence shows the problem of treating 
them as a single group. Regardless, the Community decided that an enterprise policy was nec-
essary and in 1983 the 'European year of small and medium sized enterprises and craft indus-
try' was held. In 1986 a task force was set up for SMEs which in 1989 became DGXXIII. The 
intended tasks of the DG were to represent the SMEs in particular in the Commission and to 
monitor and ensure that all DGs kept in mind the effects of legislation on SMEs. A lot of leg-
zlft 
islation carries costs and burdens as well as 'administrative procedures or requirements.' The 
DG stated that the main problems for SMEs were financial, dealing with changes of owner-
ship and dealing with 'administrative complexity.'49 
Throughout the 1980s very few resources were provided for helping SMEs, despite the en-
couragement, the Community remained attached to the idea that Competitiveness was best 
secured by backing national champions, this was true until the early 1990s. A change began 
with Article 130 of TEU which specified the scope for the new enterprise policy ' . . . encour-
aging an environment favourable to initiative and to the development of undertakings 
throughout the Community, particularly small and medium sized undertakings.' The Council 
agreed 110 million ECUs for the policy from 1990-1993, for the first multi annual pro-
gramme. For the period 1993-96 112.2 million ECUs were provided. For the period 1997-
2000 180 million ECUs were allocated. These figures should be compared to the amounts 
made available to Research and Development to which the Community allocated 2.4 Billion 
ECUs in 1992 and 4.2 ECUs in 1997.50Whilst there was an intention to see that SMEs51 get a 
proportion of this, the vast majority of SMEs were hardly likely to be affected by it. The first 
integrated programme for SMEs was announced in 1994 it aimed ' . . . to assemble the vari-
ous initiatives into a global framework, with a view to ensuring their coherence and giving 
them a high profile.'52 
The Madrid European Council of 1995 set a list of priorities to be reached by the pro-
grammes: they were to: ' . . , simplify and improve the administration and regulatory business 
47 Hodges, M and T.Lawton. Promoting Competitiveness: Inward Investment Incentives and Enterprise Policy; in Lawton, T. 
(ed) European Industrial Policy and Competitiveness, Houndmills, Macmillan Press Ltd, (1999) 
p.214 
48 ibid p.217 
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50 See note 33 Lawton, (1999) p.39 
51 Darmer, M Small and Medium Sized Enterprises Create Growth and Jobs in Darmer, M and Kuyper, L (eds) Industry and 
the European Union, Cheltenham, Edward Edgar Publishing Ltd, (2000) p.296 
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environment; improve the financial and fiscal environment for SMEs; help SMEs to Europe-
anise and internationalise their strategies, in particular through better information and coop-
eration services; enhance SME competitiveness and improve their access to research, innova-
tion, infonnation technologies and training; Promote entrepreneurship and support special 
target group.' Three measures to implement the above were agreed upon: 'A. Concerted ac-
tions; to increase the efficiency of member states' actions by exchange of best practices be-
tween member states . . . B. Actions under other Community policies - the Commission is to 
ensure better coordination of the various contributions that the Community makes in favour of 
SMEs through its different policies and programmes . . . state aid policy . . , regional policy . . 
. research and development.. . C. The multi annual programme for SMEs . . . Euro Info Cen-
tre . . . Europartenariat.. . to promote direct contact between SMEs by organising two contact 
events a year where SMEs can m e e t . . . JEV , . . the Joint European Venture initiative . . . to 
support and encourage the development of transnational joint ventures between SMEs in the 
Community . . . ' 53 
Some important SME initiatives taken have been those related to improving the business en-
vironment for SMEs by dealing with the late payment problem by larger companies to SMEs, 
a directive was agreed in 2000 which addressed this issue. The European Investment Fund 
EIF was created which grants loan guarantees to trans-European project networks.54 Direc-
tives have been passed which aim a t 6 . . . the simplification of conditions of access to insur-
ance markets, subsidised loans for job creating SMEs.'550ther funds are disbursed from the 
URBAN, REGIS and RETEX Community programmes. The EIB and European regional de-
velopment fund and the European social fund also provide more financial opportunities to 
SMEs.56The BEST task force of entrepreneurs, civil servants and academics was set up in 
1997with the remit o f ' . . . improving the quality of legislation and for removing unnecessary 
burdens.' The task force produced a report with recommendations which the Commission £ M 
then set up an action plan to achieve; the Council watered these down in 1999. 
The last few years have shown the differences between the SMEs and their needs and big in-
dustry's. REACH, the EU chemical's directive, showed the different requirements of SMEs 
and large industrial giants and also showed the tensions between them. Basically REACH re-
quires the registration and evaluation of chemicals, carried out by expensive testing per-
formed by a new European chemicals agency. By grouping companies together who use a 
chemical, costs can be shared and multiple registrations avoided and the additional testing that 
would be involved. OSOR would archive the information and only requires companies to sha-
re non core data.58 Logically enough SMEs would benefit greatly from this approach and if it 
is not adopted they would pay considerably as 'downstream users.'59The problem was the 
definition of core data, 'too wide a definition and industry will complain, too narrow and 
SMEs will be left with the costs.'60The large companies and Cefic the European chemical 
federation demanded an opt-out from OSOR.61Interestingly enough the large companies with 
the support of the European consumers' group were pushing for a different approach to 
chemical registration based on risk rather than quantity,2 which would appear to then favour 
the producers of large quantities, the large companies, DG III had previously worked with the 
53 See note 51 Darmer (2000) p.299-304 
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group on the issue of pharmaceuticals the results of which industry finally accepted too (this 
is suggestive of the existence of a European network). The SMEs were the big losers and 
were seen as being too burdened by the costs of REACH, according to the Dutch presidency; 
the Commission had predicted it would cost 2.3 Billion Euro, the Dutch calculated 4 Bil-
lion;63the SMEs were also said to be those least able to deal with the complicated REACH 
procedures owing to a lack of technical staff, and the costs of taking on such individuals could 
be ruinous.64 
In the field of IT research funding the familiar picture emerges of SMEs being under repre-
sented and increasingly so. It would seem logical to point to the disappearance of DG XXIII 
in the new DG ENT as adding to the decline of SMEs and their representation, ' . . . the in-
terim finding of a panel of experts conducting a five year assessment of the impact of EU re-
search in information technology (IT). It finds that the public funding of IT has let down 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and the ten new member s ta tes . . . participation 
of SMEs and Europe's new member states in IT research has, so far, been drastically lower in 
the current Framework 6 programmes than in its predecessor Framework 5, and the panel 
blames the introduction of large new integrated projects . . . The panel calls on the Commis-
sion to rethink its strategy on the use of integrated projects and to look at developing mecha-
nisms to integrate SMEs and new member states more effectively in EU Research.' 5It.is in-
teresting to note that SMEs and the NMSs both suffered under Framework Six's structure and 
the increase in project size criteria and 'have been let down' by it.66It would appear to have 
been fairly obvious that large integrated projects would benefit the larger players and compa-
nies rather than the SMEs with their more limited resources. 
The assessment of SME initiatives is far from positive 'SMEs have accrued little tangible be-
nefit to date . . . those programmes which have been developed by both the EU and its mem-
ber states to assist SMEs have been inadequately focused and integrated.'67AU in all, despite 
the attempts to make changes throughout the 1990s by the last couple of years of the decade 
the picture seemed very unchanged, Community level initiatives were not coherently 'com-
plimented' at member state level, 'The potential pitfall centres on the extent to which the EU 
is merely paying lip service to the prevailing policy fashion or, in fact, genuinely means busi-
ness. The evidence from R and D programmes, human capital schemes, and other industrial 
policy realms, reveals that EU policy is still primarily benefiting large companies. This pro-
portional balance is shifting but remains far from the Commission's stated intention of being 
the promoter of SMEs rather than the subsidiser of large companies.'68The late 1990s still saw 
the SMEs in a rather weak state in terms of their representation in the Commission, with the 
European small businesses association the UEAPME excluded from crucial discussions being 
held regarding the rights of part time workers. The Commission had the trade unionists pre-
sent and UNICE which represents European industry employers and also stated that it spoke 
for SMEs too, however the specialised association for SMEs is the UEAPME and it was ex-
cluded from the talks.69 
A basic economic problem with Commission and EU policies has to be stated here as well; 
recent studies into SMEs and their alleged important role to the European economy ' . . . cast 
serious doubts on the European Commission's single minded belief that small and medium 
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sized enterprises provide the key to cutting into Europe's disastrous unemployment figures.' 
The Commission's approach was too simplistic to effect any real benefit to the SMEs con-
cerned, let alone job wise. In fact the final conclusion of the studies was that the 4 . . . studies 
offer no basis for the specific promotion of the SME sector by direct or indirect means.' The 
reaction of the Commission to the studies was expected to be negative ' . . . it will come as a 
blow to the Commission, which continues to insist that renewed efforts must be made to sup-
port the small business sector.' Not surprisingly the Commission and the then DG XXIII de-
*7 n 
fended the SME policy; this was in January 1997 and no change took place at all until 2000 
with the reorganisation and subsequent merging of DG XXIII with DG III. In fact the Com-
mission still professes and builds much of its arguments on the need to help the SMEs. An-
other study stresses that support for SMEs should be 'de-emphasised', since 'it is our view 
that such national policies are by far more effective (when properly implemented) and rele-
vant, than some general subsidies coming from Bruxelles, linked to complicated business 
plans the elaboration of which is often too demanding for truly small companies.' Whilst the 
academics writing this report are most interested in structural funds the basic idea can be ex-
pected to hold true for SMEs and the policy related to them in general.71 The suspicion has to 
be that the Commission had and has its own interests for at least paying lip service to the no-
tion of SME promotion which benefited it competences, but little real desire to more, what-
ever groups of officials and in particular those involved in DG XXIII attempted to do. 
Part of the problem was that there is a lack of consensus that SMEs should be supported at the 
EU level, ' . . . policies for SMEs are principally the business of national or regional authori-
ties . . . There is little evidence to suggest that this role is changing or that Member states and 
HH 
regional authorities are willing to cede their role in SME development to Brussels.' The vast 
majority of the MSs have their own SME policies which cover most of the necessaiy ac-
tions73to support and promote SMEs 'The activities of almost all member states leave little 
room for the Community to conduct an SME policy at Community level which is different 
from, and adds value to, what members states already do.'74Furthermore the majority of 
SMEs are said to be narrowly focussed on their locality or region and hard for national gov-
ernments let alone the Community to help.75There was a feeling that whilst some elements of 
the Commission and Community favoured SMEs and maybe desired to appear to be favour-
ing them, others were less convinced for an array of possible reasons which will be discussed 
later. Regardless of economics and economic arguments and studies made, rhetorically the 
SMEs stood and stand high in the Commission's esteem but, in practice, where some assis-
tance would have been helpful in terms of not burdening them with legislation this has not 
occurred. 
From January 2000 with the creation of the new DG a programme was set for 2000-2005 
which aimed to make Europe the ' . . . most competitive and dynamic knowledge based econ-
omy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion.' Multi annual programmes for enterprises were set up, targeting 
SMEs. An action plan for innovation was founded which aimed to: promote an innovation 
culture, to set up a good business environment with legal, regulatory and financial provisions 
to encourage innovation and finally to establish real links between research, innovation and 
70 European Voice Vol.3 No.2. 16.01.1997. Mann, M. Study queries crucial role ofEU's small businesses. 
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business. Industrial competitiveness was to be enhanced and the environment was to be incor-
porated into industrial policy.76 
Unfortunately the recent history of the SME policy has not been inspiring; the last Commis-
sion did not produce the hoped for benefits for SMEs that had been expected. It remained the 
case that big businesses appeared to benefit from legislation which took their needs into con-
sideration but not those of SMEs, ' . . . our main criticism is that legislation at European level 
is done for a minority of businesses,' some of the laws agreed by the main institutions 5 . . . 
missed chances to back SMEs and even worse, took decisions against their interests.'77There 
has been awareness that SMEs have not had an easy time of it in the new DG as the statement 
of the senior official in 2001 reveals;4 . . . a lighter regulatory environment has to rely on self 
"JQ 
regulation, not only for an exclusive industry club, but also for SMEs.' From the statement it 
is possible to conclude that within the DG there was a need in 2001 to tiy to counter balance 
the weight and influence of 'an exclusive industry club' which had evidently been able to use 
the DG to secure more 'self regulation.' After the creation of the DG ENT, the SMEs saw re-
ductions in funding which affected their participation in discussions ' . . . on technical stan-
dards for businesses' and led some to ask questions,' . . . the group questions whether the EU 
still has an enterprise policy, given proposed reductions.' The reduction in size of the enter-
prise department was also questioned the, ' . . . slimmed down enterprise department' within 
the new DG was seen to be a cause for concern, and did seem incongruous with the stated im-
portance of SMEs.79The UEAPME also expressed its concern over the reduction in the role of 
the European Investment Fund (EIF), which had worked closely with the disbanded DG 
XXIII, and thus probably funding available for SMEs. After the creation of the new DG many 
of the EIF's activities were taken over by the EIB.80 Whilst 'political rhetoric' stressing the 
importance of SMEs was everywhere, the practice showed little progress with really useful 
items like an ' . . . overhaul and update of European Company law' not occurring along with 
other 'measures . . . to support and facilitate the expansion of SMEs in the EU.'8 This is par-
ticularly odd given that the Lisbon process aims to create millions of new jobs and SMEs are 
seen to be the key for the generation of these jobs. The following quotation stresses the im-
portance of the SMEs and queries the lack of support they have received, 'The European Par-
liament has published the questions that it intends to put to the newly nominated Commis-
sioners . . . and Glinter Verheugen, whose proposed portfolio encompasses enterprise and in-
dustry, will field questions on the Lisbon Agenda . . . SMEs are the backbone of the economy, 
responsible for creating millions of new jobs and therefore vital to attaining the Lisbon objec-
tives, MEPs will tell Mr Verheugen. They therefore want to know why little progress has 
been made with regard to SMEs in terms of financial support and the encouragement of en-
trepreneurship . . . ' The lack of practical interest in SMEs was stressed 'Despite a general 
acceptance of the importance of SMEs to the EU economy, the vast majority of small firms 
are ignored under Commission programmes and in crucial policy statements, most recently 
the conclusions of the Lisbon spring summit.'83Particularly odd from this perspective was the 
decision to in essence disband DG XXIII as it was merged to form DG ENT; this seemed a 
strange method of boosting SMEs. The new DG was, after all, set up in part at least to align 
the DGs involved in the Lisbon objectives with them. 
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Evidently the general fear was there amongst the SME supporters that the new DG would not 
support the SMEs as much as DG XXIII had done, ' . . . the first actions of the Prodi Com-
mission, which forced us to adapt to the fact that there is no longer a Directorate General for 
SMEs, and that all entrepreneurial issues, no matter if the enterprise is big of small are now 
treated by just one Directorate General. We tried and will go on trying to assure that DG En-
terprise . . . defends the interests of enterprises . . . and of small enterprises in particular, 
within this Commission. ,84The report of 2001 states that from the Commission came 4 . . . a 
general feeling of insecurity,' and this was especially so for the new D G ; 4 . . . we had the im-
pression that the Directorate General was still searching for its position. Lately, we have seen 
a new departure of the DG towards a coherent SME policy.'85 These show the negative effect 
that reorganisation can have on a DG which can last years, and also that official Council-
approved policy, like the Lisbon Agenda, was not necessarily taken seriously in the DG. 
SMEs have not been as well served as big industry by the Commission as the next quote illus-
trates, 4 . . . the Commission should take SMEs more into account in its strategy. SMEs must 
be put in a position from which they can compete on a level playing field with big industry 
within a global economy. Policymakers at European level have to take into account the spe-
cific characteristics and needs of S M E s . . . '8<s 
There seemed to be a real danger that the new DG was concentrating too much on the needs 
of big industry with well established lobbies rather than on SMEs, 4 . . . the EU Commission 
should change their mind and their old fashioned and technocratic mentality, which takes just 
big companies and strong lobbies in account. For example, during decades, they just ignore 
the responsibilities of SMEs in social dialogue and excluded their organisations as social 
partners. The SMEs are not well recognised, not enough consulted and simply forgotten. It's 
the reason I think, that now it's time to nominate a new SMEs Commissioner coming from 
the new member states. She or he should act as a SME ombudsman and promote SME friend-
ly policies.' Once again the link up between the SMEs and the NMSs was made. 
Some of the projects for SMEs which the Commission launched both before but particularly 
after the merging of the DGs showed problems, 'The European Charter for small enterprises 
which was adopted in spring 2000 in Lisbon and whose content meets exactly our needs, has 
only reluctantly been integrated into the official policy for small and medium sized enter-
Qn 
prises.' With regard to the c h a r t e r 4 . . . although broadly welcomed by the SME community . 
. . the Charter has subsequently proved ineffectual in its overarching objective of improving 
the environment for small businesses. We are now gravely concerned that the February 2004 
Action Plan seeks merely to build on the charter for small enterprises, setting out a list of lim-
ited objectives that will fail to tackle the more fundamental challenges that policy makers 
must meet if they are to contribute significantly to increased entrepreneurial activity in 
Europe.'89This would reinforce the notion that the EU and Commission allow real reforms to 
be ducked from by cariying out a cosmetic exercise like the Charter; in and of itself it might 
have been useful if the DG and the Commission had taken it more seriously but this does not 
seem to have been the case; the very broad 4 . . . scope of the small enterprises Charter' would 
be broadened still further and that added the danger that it4 . . . will further dilute the Charter 
and make it even less capable of achieving its aim . , . '90 
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In the area of including the SMEs and their representatives into the lead up to the making of 
legislation, the Commission seems to have been rather unfair by wanting 'broad open consul-
tations' which seem to be attempting to sidestep representative organisations since 4 . . . small 
business owners do not have the time to answer complex executive questionnaires . . . '91This 
was particularly true since the Commission then also only allowed 6 weeks for the consulta-
tions as compared to the UK government which itself allowed 12 weeks. Documents are 
stated not to have been ready in time for meetings and these appear not to have been an-
nounced well enough in advance, 'UEAPME would like to stress that some recent "consulta-
tions" launched during the last week of July by some DGs, in full holiday period, are an abso-
lute mockery of the consultation principles.' Thus SMEs do not appear to have been taken 
veiy seriously in the pre legislative phase of stakeholder involvement. 
The SME initiatives that the Commission has supported like: the Observatory of European 
SMEs; the Multi-annual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship and the SME envoy 
who was created in DG ENT, have all had a mixed record and do not appear to have helped 
the SMEs much. The creation of the envoy seems to rather prove the lack of effect of the rest 
of the DG-Commission's SME policies. The envoy was to try and protect their needs in DG 
ENT. The subsequent creation of the DG inter-service 'SME Network' to perform similar 
tasks to the envoy seemed to prove the underlying inability of the DG and the Commission to 
do more to affect the problem than create more actors. Good for the officials maybe, DG ENT 
was argued by some to be over staffed,93 and the Observatory was well met by officials, but 
no-one else seemingly benefited, the ' . . . foreseen impact of the activity of the Observatory 
is not evident.'94 
Legislation and red tape are an area where the DG has shown itself to be somewhat weak as 
both are seemingly constantly increasing and creating problems for entrepreneurs, and better 
understanding of SMEs at European as well as national level would be an important step in 
remedying this. The fact that this does not occur enough shows the need for the DG and the 
Commission to involve themselves in the affairs of the SMEs that they desire to promote mo-
re, or to involve themselves less, via less legislation; one or the other has to be chosen.95Some 
red tape is inevitable and is the ' . . , result of the legitimate requests for public intervention 
made by society in a variety of areas . . . '; but the DG accepted that the problems for SMEs 
are sometimes ' . . . the result of poorly conceived regulation.'96 It further stated that; ' . . . the 
weight and complexity of regulations affects smaller businesses disproportionately, yet they 
are often conceived with larger companies in mind.' The general problem was/is that the 
Commission does not take into account SME problems when making legislation and so more 
comprehensive impact assessments are badly needed.98Big industry on the other hand is better 
organised and has greater resources as well as years of tradition to build on, 'EU legislation is 
closely monitored and strongly influenced by multinational corporations. SMEs on the other 
hand lack often the necessary financial and personal means to get their voices effectively 
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heard on the European, in particular on the EU level.'"That said red tape and problems with it 
are hardly a Commission speciality, reducing bureaucracy or promises to do so always sound 
good and in Germany for example promises have been made to reduce bureaucracy regularly 
by every government since that of Willi Brandt, however they have come to nothing and more 
has built up instead.100 
The problem is that when promises and expectations are made, then measurements are like-
wise created against which the new Commission can be measured. It has proven to be as un-
able or possibly unwilling to change the regulatory climate as the previous Commission was, 
T h e Commission promised to create a more favourable jurisdiction for enterprises. New leg-
islation is supposed to be in line with an ex-ante impact assessment, in particular with regard 
to SMEs. The Commission also assured that existing legislation should be streamlined ac-
cordingly. After a hundred days in office, however, the Commission's performance is any-
thing but impressive. Be it improvements of the chemical's legislation (REACH) or the fi-
nancing of SMEs, the Commission hardly does more than pay lip service. A real cross sector 
focus on SMEs can neither be found in the Commission's strategic guidelines nor in its work 
programme. The Commission apparently concentrates more on the large scale industry. A re-
cent example is the composition of the automobile high level group.'10 
There needed to be a 4 . . . real simplification of EU legislation with a drastic reduction of the 
number of EU directives . . . ' l02and the SLIM project aimed at simplifying legislation was 
launched inl995,103Promises were made to cut 100 directives and the Commission wanted to 
trim 35,000 pages of obsolete rules etc from acquis,104However the awaited simplification 
was evidently still not present in 2005, 'The subsequent exercise by the Dutch Presidency, to 
identify priority areas of EU legislation for simplification, reflects a view long held by the 
SME community: that policy objectives may be attained more efficiently through the simpli-
fication of existing legislation: measures must now be taken by the Commission to fast-track 
the implementation of the Council's simplification recommendations . . . ' l05The new Com-
missioner for Competitiveness stated in 2005 that the Commission aims to indicate sectors 
where legislation should be simplified and the programme to do this by autumn.106 
The goals of simplification and reductions in the quantity of legislation did not occur. The po-
litical level of the Commission, here European Commission vice-president Guenter Ver-
heugen blamed the top members of the DG hierarchies for the problems, 'He suggests that his 
own project to simplify 54 EU laws has fallen foul of stubborn commission bureaucrats. Be-
fore the summer he "strongly criticised internally some general directorates who evidently did 
not want to take the head of the commission's aim to reduce bureaucracy seriously, because it 
did not fit in with their own ideas,'"107 
Linked to the need for simplification, is the need for the legislation which is made to be of 
high quality and to be coherent, 'Particular consideration needs to be given to the dispropor-
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tionately high impact that poorly drafted legislation can have on smaller businesses.' How-
ever this does not appear to be the case in many instances, 'In recent years legislative initia-
tives proposed by the Commission often lacked coherence to the point that some beneficial 
measures for SMEs were promptly choked-up by proposals from other Commission services 
that added burdens for small enterprises. Therefore, the association calls for the new Commis-
sioners to live up to their promise by increasing the capacity of DG ENT and by better co-
ordinating the work of all General Directorates.',09The problem of coherence was evidently 
still there a year or so later in 2005 'Commissioner Verheugen and DG Enterprise should take 
a lead role in overseeing the Commission's work programme and guaranteeing consistent and 
coherent policies are followed.'110 
In part the problem lay with the sectoral fragmentation of the Commission during the Presi-
dencies of Santer and Prodi. The issue of Commission fragmentation is discussed in greater 
depth under the section 'Commission fragmentation.' DG gains were then seemingly formal-
ized in the decentralisation of the Commission; this saw DGs apparently acquiring new ad-
ministrative competences and independence seemingly owing to a College desire to delegate 
responsibility as well as the power which had already gone to the DGs. The idea was good in 
an organization worried about accepting any responsibility, but led to even less coordination 
and communication between DGs and a decrease in their willingness to work together. Vari-
ous DGs can generate legislation which will directly affect SMEs and these have to be in-
volved in any attempt to improve the quality and SME fairness of legislation, for example 
those DGs dealing with environment, social matters and those of foodstuffs. The involvement 
of several DGs with very different sectoral clientele all of whose objectives are mentioned in 
the Lisbon objectives and conclusions: ' . . . the Lisbon conclusions recognised the impor-
tance of a cohesive approach to meeting environmental, social and economic objectives. This 
must be reflected in the work of the EU institutions in a small number of key policy areas dur-
ing the coming months . , . , ' and 'prioritization in policy-making is as important as efficiency 
in legislating and we would advise officials and politicians to focus on achieving significant 
progress in a few key areas. The 25 EU member states must each take responsibility and ac-
tion to contribute to the Lisbon process. . . ' m T h e Commission needs to be able select from 
the vast array of policy possibilities in front of it some projects that will advance the Lisbon 
objectives significantly, and not to try and do everything all at once which an organisation 
with limited resources like itself cannot afford to attempt, but this is evidently difficult for the 
Commission owing to the lack of coordination between the DGs. 
One solution to the problems of the decentralisation of the Commission was to introduce the 
Legislative Impact Assessment (IA) procedure which would involve all the DGs in the gen-
eration of legislation at a much earlier time than had previously been the case. Under Delors 
there was said to have been ' . . . inter service coordination . . . now it is gone . , . which is 
1 to 
why IA is needed . . . if people at the base could agree then the top would do too.' The Sapir 
report made in 2003 urged the greater use of Impact Assessments regulations1 n a s have others. 
The IA procedure essentially means that before a legislative proposal of one DG can take 
root, it has to be considered by the other DGs which assess the impact that it will have on 
their sector. Greater involvement and dialogue should improve the quality of the subsequent 
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legislation and lower the damage that it can cause. One difficulty with the idea is that it seem-
ingly should have been more comprehensive. As it stands the assessment does not assess 
whether there is any need for the legislation at all, or whether a different approach might be 
more effective,114rather it simply assesses what impact the legislation in its current form will 
have or might have on certain sectors and so ensures that the DG dealing with these sectors 
can add an economic component to it. A further point is that the attitude towards Impact As-
sessments is like that towards legislation in general in the Commission, 4 . . . if there is non 
implementation, then rather than solving this problem they simply introduce new legisla-
tion.'n5There is a forced quality about Impact Assessments which some see as a problem, that 
they are not the right way to ensure cooperation, 'But trying to force more coordination with-
out inter service cooperation will fail, you cannot dictate it as Prodi has with IA, ,u6There 
seems to be a danger that the legislation produced will finally be a patchwork product satisfy-
ing everyone and no one. But even before this stage can be reached it has to be said that 
Commission Impact Assessments are not always accepted by the EP and Council, which 
themselves had seemingly not, at the point of writing, committed themselves to making as-
sessments there is a 4 . . . lack of systematic business impact assessments on decisions made 
by the European Parliament,'II7By 2005 the Commissioner responsible for competitiveness 
was still calling for better regulation based on 4 , . . thorough impact assessments.'I!8lmpact 
Assessments have been raised as the solution to the legislative burden on SMEs, 4EU institu-
tions should concentrate on effective Impact Assessments to reduce the burden of regulation 
on businesses,' a senior official in the DG stated.U9The assessments need to be implemented 
fully for them to have their intended effect and this is not happening as it should b e , 4 . . . whi-
le Impact Assessments on new legislation are now part of the political rhetoric, there needs to 
i in 
be greater commitment to their implementation . , . ' On the positive side there are signs that 
legislation is being changed with it becoming more goal based now rather than full of detailed 
requirements and this suits the NMSs a lot. In practice the MSs (and NMSs) are told that a 
door must have certain qualities, how this is achieved they can then choose , 4 . . . to design the 
door is their affair.'121 
Vision appears to replace practical implementation and what is implemented creates prob-
lems; reforms and hard steps are seemingly avoided by grand strategies, 'Europe's SMEs cur-
rently have the impression, that up until now, the European Institutions are much more suc-
cessful in the elaboration of strategies and the formulation of objectives than in their imple-
mentation. The Lisbon strategy and the Charter were necessary steps towards a comprehen-
sive and coherent economic and social policy. Nevertheless, most of the elements of these 
newly formulated policies were well known before and the member states, together with the 
European Commission and the European parliament, stopped short of making concrete deci-
sions for their implementation . . . Europe's economy does not need new visions or new proc-
esses, it needs concrete actions for changing the business environment, the main areas for 
change the document cites are that the internal market needs to be completed, red tape re-
moved, public services made cheaper for SMEs, labour markets relaxed access to finance im-
proved.'122 All the SMEs ask for is to be allowed to 4 . . . drive Europe's growth and employ-
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merit,' by being given 4 . . . a legislative framework that encourages enterprise and innova-
tion' and not the opposite.123 
SMEs are stated to be and that they will continue to be ' . . . a dominant component of the e-
conomic fabric of member states and they are of crucial importance for the processes of con-
vergence of the new member and candidate states,' and the Commission as well as the na-
tional governments and other authorities in the MSs 4 . . . will continue to have a significant i ^ J 
responsibility in determining public policies in this field.' Given their crucial role and the 
intended role of the Commission in assisting them, it is unfortunate that the Commission has 
not helped SMEs more, at least in terms of making the policy field easier for them and not 
legislating problems for this vital sector. 
7.4 DG ENTERPRISE AND INDUSTRY MAIN COMPONENTS 
Many DGs of the Commission have grown out of task forces set up for a specific purpose, 
DG ENT is rather different. At the time when President Prodi restructured the Commission 
there were three separate DGs in existence: DG III, DGXXII1, and DGXIII - DG Innovation 
Policy. Commissioner Liikanen who took over the new DG ENT was also in charge of DG 
Information Society. One Directorate from DG XIII was involved in the merger. DG ENT 1 . . 
. was forged largely out of three DGs which were seen to be too duplicative and not suffi-
ciently focused in their responsibilities: Industry; Telecommunications, Information Market, 
and exploitation of research; and enterprise Policy, Distributive Trades, tourism and Coopera-
tives.'125The aim of the new DG was to promote innovation which was considered a key to 
modernising the EU economy.126 
DG ENT is a policy making DG more than just a regulating or paying one, although it is ma-
de up of elements which did pay out money, DG XXIII, for example. It is said to enjoy close 
ties with manufacturers, which led it to take quite different perspectives to DG Environment 
(from now on DG XI), for example, over car emissions where DG ENT was not surprisingly 
in favour of a more relaxed approach.127As with DGs in general it was "the main repository of 
accumulated wisdom and specialised knowledge about EU policy activities,'128and thus, logi-
cally enough, it can be said to be 'the hub of Policy Networks involving key EU actors, and 
therefore inevitably influence heavily the direction of political choices.' 
The DG and its activities are founded on Treaty Articles: 95 (Internal Market), 152 (Public 
Health), 157 (Competitiveness) and Title XVIII (Innovation and Research). l29The DG at 
30.06.2004 was managing 282 directives, of this total there were 171 framework directives. 
The DG was managing 125 decisions and 198 regulations. Thus it was responsible for 805 
policy elements. In addition it managed 121 Communications, 20 Recommendations and 29 
Resolutions. It was responsible f o r ' . . . about 30% of all "internal Market" directives, as well 
as almost half of all the directives concerned with the free movement of industrial 
i in * goods.' From 1980 up until 1994 the total of policy elements being managed by the com-
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bined DGs which now make up DG ENT was 609 thus an increase of 196 policy elements 
for the period from 1994 to 2004, which would appear fairly modest. In the new DG one part 
of it dealt with the issues surrounding enterprise and another part with the management of leg-
islation, one final part deals with free movement of goods. Most of the legislation generated 
was to do with product safety.132The DG was completely responsible for three of the chapters 
in the NMS negotiations: I, 15, 16, i.e. free movement of goods, industry, SMEs; the ' . . . 
negotiations for their free movement were very detailed and specialised/13 
The amount of national legislation originating in Brussels has been put at 43% in Holland and 
costing businesses 7 billion euros annually; UK 57% of major bills over last five years im-
plemented EU directives at total cost of 37.8 billion Euros to UK businesses, annually 7.5 bil-
lion.134 Some disagree with these figures but governments were reacting to the high amounts 
and calling for reductions. 
At times as under Vice President Davignon 1984, various DGs with industrial-economic 
competences have been gathered under the coordination of one Commissioner as happened 
with DG III and DG Research and Development. Only if this did not generate the synergies 
required, were mergers then followed through. It should be pointed out that often a single pol-
icy field/issue like Biotechnology or even more obviously industrial ones will have several 
DGs involved and often with problems of coordination if not openly contradicting philoso-
phies; DG Competition (from now on DG IV) and DG III could be found supporting rather 
different positions on some industrial issues, A breakdown of the elements of the new DG is 
helpful to understand the accusations made that it is a DG in search of a policy, with confu-
sion about its tasks and that the policy it promotes is vague, nebulous. 
DG III, the main party in the merger, was founded in 1967. In fact it absorbed DG Internal 
Market for the crucial SEA and 1992 project period. As DG Internal Market was involved in 
planning the harmonising of legislation which was central to the success of the project so the 
combined DG Internal Market and DG III could be said to have been one of the most impor-
tant if not the most important DG in the Commission during the 1980s. However in the 
1990s the Internal Market DG was recreated and combined with Financial Services. DG III is 
stated to tend towards being ultra liberal and pro market but less so than DGIV. Its staff are 
said to have been a 'battalion of economists and legal experts' working in a horizontal 
DG.137At least once in its life the DG is said to have been captured by an industrial group. It 
had in 1975 an over close relationship with the advertising lobby which resulted in an EC Pol-
icy on advertising standards which reflected the interests of the industry, It continued to have 
a close relationship with the newly named European Advertising Tripartite and this resulted in 
a problematic Green Paper 'Television without Frontiers'.13 German officials as well as 
Commissioners appear to have been dominant in the DG.139 It had 430 employees in 6 Direc-
torates, 30 units and 14 staff per unit in 1993-5.140 The DG has been flagged or run by Lux-
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embourg Director Generals most of its early history until an Italian took over in 1995.14iOf its 
1/11 
top officials 13 were German, 8 French, 9 Italian in 1993. 
DG XXIII started out in 1989 as a task force that became a DG and had 90 establishment staff 
and 300 supporting staff by 1995.143 It had had 56 staff members in 1993 in 2 Directorates 
and 7 units with 8 staff per unit. It came under considerable criticism during the Santer Com-
mission's demise, allegations of corruption and inadequate control by the hierarchy, were no 
doubt important in its subsequent removal. There was only one Directorate represented the 
SMEs in the DG ENT. DG XXIII had a history rather akin to that of an ugly duckling that no-
body really supported or finally wanted; which is odd given the stated importance of SMEs to 
the Commission and the Union. The scandal related to the European Year of tourism with the 
allegations of fraud did not help the DG but it suffered from a bad image for a long time and 
at one point the Commission failed to find a new head for it in 1997 after the previous one left 
leading to protests, 'Something is wrong in Europe if no one is prepared to take up this posi-
tion. This is the department which is supposed to be drawing up EU legislation on small and 
medium enterprises and who is in charge - nobody.'144The Commission also decided to ' . . . 
shake up its handling of SME issues so that DG XXIII can better coordinate its activities with 
other departments.' That was evidently still not working as the DG was effectively dis-
banded two years later. The DG had wanted funding for SMEs to help create jobs and was 
supported by the UEAPME but DG III opposed it, quite evidently the difference in opinion 
between the two was not unusual and served to 4 . . . highlight again the gaps in thinking . . . 
1146 
7.5 THE CREATION OF DG ENTERPRISE BY REORGANISATION 
OF DG III and DG XXIII 
The major reorganisation of the Commission which saw two and a half DGs combined into 
one DG in 2000 saw staff reduced from 1000 to 800 and a large reduction in the number of 
Heads of Unit and Directors. DG ENT consisted of three main sections: Competitiveness and 
Industrial policy; Competitiveness and entrepreneurship; Competitiveness, internal market for 
goods and sectoral policies. There were ten Directorates labelled A-l and R for administrative 
support and 51 units. There were three units which appeared to deal directly with the needs of 
SMEs from the 51, the majority were either directly related to industrial sectors like tourism, 
chemicals and aerospace or to broader more horizontal measures like standardisation, innova-
tion policy and regulatory policy. 
Several reasons were given for the reorganization it was 4 . . . considered that in the present 
Commission climate that there were an unacceptable number of middle managers . . . ' so 10-
12 middle managers had to go;147fïnaIly staff were said to have fallen by 30%.148 Many pro-
jects which had been run successfully were dropped and or handed over to other Union or-
ganisations like the EIB149 even though these projects ' . . . were useful, if small, and should 
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have been continued; they were being done efficiently . . . '150The reorganisation project was 
led by DG III,151 and it resulted in the DG XXIII being much reduced, and SME policies being 
seemingly seriously affected, 'the merging of 2000 lost lots of projects and the DG was still 
f 
confused, multinationals and SMEs all in one DG, SMEs were downgraded hard.' In the 
current DG 'Multi nationals are very powerful and got an annex included into chemical's di-
rective.,153The reorganisation took place before the policy changed and according to some it 
would have made more sense for the policy to have been changed and the reorganisation to 
have matched this, since the result was " . . . lots of mini changes afterwards,'154however 
granted the difficulties of changing a policy in the Commission if the structures supporting it 
remain intact this was maybe inevitable. 
The 2000 reorganisation of the DG was alleged to have been s . . . an over reaction and exces-
sive,'155and seriously affected the DG and its staff and generated several difficulties which 
were only gradually being resolved. The most obvious physical difficulty was that4 . . , the 
new DG which was still sited in four different buildings and with different DG cultures as 
well.5 It was said tha t ' . , . there was a long period of cultural adjustment and administrative 
1 ^ 
procedures which all slowed things down a bit,' and not surprisingly this led to the search 4 . 
. . to find a new culture and they were introspective for a while. A new official was asked 
about the administrative culture of the DG and said quite simply 4 . . . there is no DG cul-
ture,' 158The atmosphere surrounding the removal of the middle management was difficult and 
in the aftermath there was a * . . . high loss of staff that then left the DG.'159Projects were 
stopped and for some there was 'bad disruption.'160 
The case of fraud in the tourism part of DG XXIII remained a stain on the SME policy area 
and this was apparently one reason for the restructuring, although it appears pretty be-
lated. 16,This element of alleged 'fear management' by the Prodi Commission was seen as a 
reason for the reorganisation; the new Commission was determined not to suffer the same fate 
as its predecessor. The MSs and EP were not to be given any excuse to weaken the Commis-
sion any further. Another scandal would provide them with just the excuse they were looking 
for. The MSs in particular allegedly seemed to have been looking for any opportunity to haul 
in the Commission, 'the MSs had hoped that Santer would slow things down after Delors had 
gone too far and fast. They wanted things back to the pre Delors period where the Commis-
sion was concerned. But Santer was too weak, Community oriented and European, and failed 
to rein in some of his Commissioners, he failed the MSs. So the MSs were looking and wait-
ing for an opportunity to drag his Commission down, waiting for a scandal and looking for it.' 
The MSs probably knew that the more nervous the Commission was, so the more defensive, 
and that meant more bureaucratic and slower. In order to survive the Commission had to 
have, at first, a low profile and to keep to it, 'the Prodi commission from 2000 on was ob-
1 /O 
sessed with survival'. The willingness with which economic concerns and competitiveness 
were accepted which the MSs wanted showed this, also the SME policy being allowed to be 
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dropped, whatever the rhetoric (re-nationalisation), was another sign of the Commission being 
less dynamic and allowing MSs and big industry control over a policy. The Commission was 
seemingly behaving more like a bureaucracy for the MSs. It also looked more like a bureauc-
racy internally. It could not afford to give its opponents any more excuses and justifications 
for re-nationalization of policies or any further weakening of it, T h e EP and Council want 
more documentation and are looking more into it, there is more political control.,163DG ENT 
changes and the other Commission reforms allowed it to be seen to be doing something about 
its image and to thus reclaim some credibility and to fend off demands for more changes, 
more fundamental ones that could affect its freedom. 
There was also seemingly consensus that Prodi's Commission wanted to return to 'core' 
Commission tasks i.e. that of making policy and to drop the running and managing of pro-
jects, 'Prodi wanted to stop managing projects and to do policy work and to free up the staff 
to do this.'I64Staff were, to an extent, to be subsequently 'freed up , ,65for other projects which 
was an important goal for the new Commission. The days of Delors were and are to some ex-
tent seen as a golden period where lots of policy was made and the Commission was on the 
up, whereas the Santer period was one of managing lots of projects left over from Delors, an-
other president's projects, and managing cost resources; which could not then be used on 
glamorous new projects and legislation. Managing the projects of another individual is not 
apparently considered in certain Commission circles as prestigious as generating something 
new, you are successful depending on the qualityl66and quantity of legislation you generate 
and new projects launched. Some officials emphasis the quality others the quantity as the im-
portant f a c t o r ; ' . . . as quality shows the quality of the staff and DG,'I67Nowadays the genera-
tion of legislation is said to be harder but the quality has gone up168according to one official, 
to another it has remained unchanged. 169Interestingly enough this view pervades the Commis-
sion right down to the level of archiving; once a document is written and adopted it is not 
considered of any value anymore. Mot surprisingly the officials accept this logic and appar-
ently no one traditionally cared much about filing or archiving as the Commission valued the 
new and the innovative and not the old, which is what MSs ministries are said to do, 'The DG 
is good at being the worst at archiving and filing. . . . within the Commission there is a view 
that an old document is a dead one . . . my first Head of Unit had stressed t h i s . . . it is seen as 
a waste of time looking back. In the "evolving of documents" the Commission must and does 
push on, constantly looking forwards. There are not enough staff anyway to waste on looking 
back. In national archives there is less evolution and therefore more archiving and it is more 
important.'170 
Several other reasons for the reorganisation have been given some were more what one might 
expect than others. The more usual explanation was that the new Commission required new 
DGs to match its new priorities; thus for the new Commission the Lisbon objectives and a-
voiding another case of Commission fraud were top of the agenda, the DG was said to have 
been reorganised for both these reasons. Another was tha t ' . . . the policy debate had moved 
beyond that covered by the previous DGs so the structures had to change to fit the new reali-
ties; the old industry title was not useful and this was the same for the MSs (inter-
nally).' m This explanation i.e. that of the new Commission's new priorities, reflected the 
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Prodi's Commission's difficult inheritance of an 'anti-fraud climate' which encouraged them 
to 4 . . . drop fraud risks like directly run projects,' although ' . . . these projects were being 
done well,' and for some of them ' . . . no one else took them over, so a direct loss took 
place.'172 
Less positive explanations range, from new Director Generals are alleged to change the DG to 
make it match the priority points he or she has set or they change it just to; ' . . . make his 
hallmark on the DG,' this was said to have been the main reason for the 2000 reorganisation 
177 | ** j 
by some. Reorganisations also aimed at personnel moving and so to change policy, a 
point emphasised by another o f f i c i a l " . . . personnel issues are sorted out via formal reorgani-
sations. The attempt is to use every restructuring to achieve as many personnel goals as possi-
ble . . . restructuring is used to remove people and so to change policy . . . (it) has been hard to 
remove Director Generals and Directors who have political backing. Heads of Unit are moved 
too much. Feudal rights to positions were a problem and Heads of Unit could not be moved in 
the old days as the College had to agree on Heads of Units appointments, now this is decided 
by Director Generals.'175 This last point shows the extent to which sectoral power increased in 
the Commission with DG hierarchy apparently deciding on appointments to middle manage-
ment rather than the College with possibly a more holistic approach. Power play was also 
mentioned ' . . . the restructure also reflected power play and not just policy rationale.'176Cre-
ating competences (extra Directors or Heads of Unit) was another reason given.177 
The end result of the reorganisation was a DG in which large industry and SMEs were forced 
I HQ  
to be together and this has been stated by some officials as not desirable. This was stated not 
to be the case in many MSs and that it was odd to have it in the DG, Other anomalies which 
were not dealt with was that the financial services sector was left with DG Internal Market 
whereas it should have been in DG ENT, according to modern methods of organisation, b u t ' . 
. . the Commission is too old fashioned to get above the old attitude to industry and therefore 
there is no consistency and rationale.'1790ther difficulties seemed to be with the DG covering 
such a wide field and leading to it being 4 . , . too general and not specific.'180Confusion in the 
DG was seen as a result of the mixing of the SMEs and DG III.181In the DG there was a hori-
zontal approach, 'competitiveness' but sectors were not comparable so this was not useful and 
putting all the very different sectors into one DG made consistency in policy very hard.182 
One official from another DG described it as follows, 'the Commission is unclear about DG 
ENT; it is not a spending DG; it is not a legislation making DG, what is it? What is it focused 
on? Clear tasks mean less reorganisations, the aim of an information society is a vague idea . . 
. is it thematic or sectoral or what? It must be a more adaptable organisation.'1830ther officials 
from other DGs were even more radical in their views about DG ENT, 'DG ENT is expand-
ing to get more staff but why do they exist? What directives are they responsible for? Why 
not just have DG Internal Market? DG ENT tries to expand into areas just to justify excessive 
staff. DG ENT has excess staff therefore the creation of the competitiveness strategy took 
place'.184 
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The frequency of staff moving around the DG and through it, was criticised by officials, 'DG 
ENT changes too often . . . changing contact people constantly . . . Staff are only in DG ENT 
for 2 years and are unsure about what they are meant to be delivering,'185and ' . . . the DG has 
been reorganised too often. Public administration needs stability and continuity. Mobility and 
restructuring result in lost memory of dossiers etc . . . There is more staff turnover than there 
used to be and the abuse of the mobility ruling is bad, too many changes too quickly.'186High 
turnover of staff is true of both DG XI and DG ENT, ironically major policy opponents, both 
of whom have been undergoing major internal changes and lack of coherence of legislation 
for enterprises, is in part owing to the DGs competition with each other and also their con-
flicting policy fields. One reason why the first two years of the last Commission were said to 
have been difficult was due to the Commission being 'green' although this then changed.187 
The reorganisation of 2000 evidently was not the success that had been hoped for in some 
quarters, and another was carried out as there was in Dec 2004 another restructuring, with the 
aim to 4 . . . fit the DG to Lisbon strategy and Commissioner Verheugen's competitiveness 
aims and new organisation. The DG now has three pillars and competitiveness is one of these. 
Now the DG has a very special role in that it is to coordinate the whole Commission in the 
1 ft ft > field of competitiveness now. The DG was intended to be reorganised to line up with the 
Lisbon strategy in 2000 but in 2004 the same was being repeated albeit with a heavier empha-
sis on the competitiveness aspect, presumably because the previous structures had not been 
successful enough at delivering it. 
7.6 DG ORGANISATION 
Within the DG itself, financial responsibility was apparently passed down the ladder to the 
lower officials and now Heads of Unit ' . . . can sign off accounts.' 189By some this is seen as 
positive and an element in decentralising the DG. It keeps staff involved more than in DG 
AGRI for example. 190Directors also allegedly gained more power in the decentralisation of 
the DG and saw their competences increase. The end of the Santer College led allegedly to 
fear management and excessive procedures. The general idea of the reforms was not ques-
tioned by most of the officials but rather the manner in which they were carried out, 'the prin-
ciple of the reforms was alright but a very bureaucratic method was chosen. Delegation in the 
reforms meant passing the burden of proof downwards; it is a 'monster system' that no one is 
happy with,'l92Ironically the enlargement is leading to a recentralisation ' . . . more delegation 
is needed . . . but (now) there is a recentralising of the Commission taking place to face the 25 
MSs and their Commissioners.,93One official described the DG a s ' . . . more centrifugal, and 
yet more centralising and hierarchical than ever and t h a t . . . there is more and more focus on 
procedures.'194Another stated; 'The Commission is a political administration and the bigger it 
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gets the more political it gets and the harder to manage.' 195By political officials usually mean 
MS influenced.196 
Another effect of decentralisation on the DG's internal structure has been in the dramatic in-
crease in the number of staff involved in the horizontal units, those coordinating the DG in-
ternally and with the rest of the Commission rather than drawing up legislation. Before the 
| Q^  
personnel budget was done by 10 people now there is a Directorate of 120. It is hard for the 
sectoral units to see lots of resources going to the coordinating horizontal units which are per-
ceived by some to create problems rather than solving them. The conflict between the hori-
zontal and the vertical (sectoral units) is in every DG to a greater or lesser extent. The offi-
cials in the horizontal units tend to see the problem as not so serious whereas those directly 
affected by the tasks generated by the horizontal units tend to be less satisfied. The horizontal 
units are seen as there to serve the vertical ones and even some of the senior management not 
directly in a sectoral unit stated, 'the problem is one of too many chiefs in horizontal units. 
These are constantly increasing. There is a big split between horizontals and verticals which is 
getting worse over time . . . Inter-service consultations and coordinating departments are ever 
increasing and this got much worse as a result of decentralisation but for operative units there 
has been no increase.' The perception from one sectoral unit was that ' . . . the rest are con-
stantly trying to "reintegrate" us into DG ENT and so reintegrate the DG,' this official seem-
ingly held the view that the horizontal units waste time and are overstaffed and irrelevant, and 10ft 
invent tasks for themselves to do. The horizontal units would be expected to be promoting 
coordination in the DG but this does not seem to always be the case, 'The people in these (the 
horizontal units) are anti coordinating and fighting for turf and so you keep cards close to 
chest . . . There is and was, not enough communication between sector units and horizon-
tals.'199When asked about the support that her horizontal unit connected to the enlargement 
had received from the sectors, another official answered with ' . . . no comment' and 'they 
were very busy,' also with aspects of the enlargement.200The ratio of sector to horizontal units 
has changed, there used to be more sector units, there are now more horizontal ones. Now 
sectorals are said to be getting stronger.20 *The shift of emphasis and staff increments from 
sector units to horizontal ones seems to show to an extent the DG and the general Commis-
sion aim of reintegrating themselves and improving coordination and reducing fragmentation 
and appearing to be more bureaucratic. The gradual sectoral strengthening again seems to 
support the notion of the Commission swinging back to being dynamic again. More sector 
unit staff and sectoral contact means more external contact and chances for integrationary ac-
tivity whereas horizontal units means more internal activity. 
Whatever else both vertical and horizontals have a problematic relationship, and this is re-
flected in the extremely problematic state of coordination and communication within the DG 
despite increases in horizontals, 'DG coordination and communication got worse after 2000 
and this is a big problem,'202another official said 'parts of the DG do not know what the other 
A^Q _ 
parts are doing, I certainly did not.' In DG ENT the unit to unit communication has got 
worse. Often the bigger the DG the worse the communication, currently the DG is housed in 2 
buildings and not the previous three or four. The problem was also between the higher man-
agement and the lower and the staff, 'There is no communication lower down in the DG and 
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between the political level and the A4s and above.204One official expressed the hope that the 
new competitiveness policy might bring the DG 'closer in his view.'205What appears a rather 
negative situation was seen by over worked officials in some sectoral units rather differently, 
'Lack of internal coordination and communication was good for a reduction in interference 
on A 
but isolated the unit. Other units could have been more helpful with staff transfers. 
When there are major issues to be dealt with then none of the normal units are used but rather 
smaller groups are created, which can mean that things happen more quickly as the numbers 
of officials are kept small but it also means that the DG as a whole can remain remarkably 
indifferent to the major issues. This is true unless one unit advertises the issue to the r e s t ' . . . 
big policy issues end up in working groups but have little effect on DG lower ranks, so there 
has been little effect of competitiveness on the DG.'207In other DGs the use of smaller groups 
to achieve major reforms where internal resistance occurred, in DG ENT this does not seem to 
be the case, or at least none of the interviewees mentioned i t 
7. 6.1 STAFF AND MANAGEMENT 
Each DG has an individual management style but there are common factors, the Director Ge-
nerals who head the DGs usually have two characteristics, they are good at policy making and 
they have political credentials; the Director General of DG III was often of German national-
ity. Unfortunately, traditionally neither they nor the rest of the management were usually 
chosen for their ability to manage.209They alleged to be powerful, sometimes more powerful ^ 1 A 
than the Commissioners, the following quotation illustrates this well: 
'In an interview with German daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung, the German commissioner in 
charge of the important industry portfolio said "the whole development in the last ten years 
has brought the civil servants such power that in the meantime the most important political 
task of the 25 commissioners is controlling this apparatus . . . There is a permanent power 
struggle between commissioners and high ranking bureaucrats. Some of them think: the 
commissioner is gone after five years and so is just a house keeper, but I'm sticking around, 
he continued . . . Illustrating how power struggles happen, the commissioner said it all occurs 
"under the surface." The commissioners have to take extreme care that important questions 
are decided in their weekly meeting, and not decided by the civil servants among them-
selves.'211 
This somehow combines with their political connections and is explained by their having to 
'lead'212and also their being closer to power. In general this group has gained from the decen-
tralisation which allows them greater independence but gradually also more responsibility. In 
DG ENT the relationship between the Commissioner and the Director General seems to have 
been easier than in some DGs and staff stated that they were not tempted to circumvent the 
hierarchy by going to the Cabinet or the Commissioner.213The nationality of the Director 
General and their desire for a career are important factors in whether they want to 'do big in-
dustry' i.e. work closely and promote the interests of companies, in these cases then they ex-
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pect to be closely informed of everything that occurs with the companies whilst seemingly not 
themselves doing the same for the staff who might also be involved with the dossier. 4The 
Directors were alleged to also be 'political animals ,215and that Delors increased the political 
influence of the Commission over them and their appointment, but since the end of the Delors 
Commission MSs began to re- extend their influence over Directors.216 
Heads of Unit are the work horses of the Commission and DG ENT has been no exception, 
They have allegedly seen a dramatic increase in their tasks owing to the reforms as well as the 
enlargement, 'The reforms have made things harder for enlargement, particularly for the 
Heads of Unit who have to manage their staff in this way as an extra to their previous 
tasks,'217and 'in the past people structured units to make themselves look good, giving presen-
tations etc and were not concerned about management. Now they have to cover their policy 
area and the planning, assessment reforms and lots of extra tasks. ,2l8Heads of Unit are ex-
pected to ' . , . marry the political requirements of the hierarchy to the technical contents of 
the dossiers.,219They are the experts and possess the institutional memory the DG needs to 
function, they are also good at strategy and are able usually to find ways around problematic 
hierarchy blockages by hiding files from them or by creating 'momentum outside the DG for 
their projects.'220As is so often the case in the Commission when staff avoid the hierarchy or 
excessive bureaucratic procedures, it is done not for personal gain but to get a policy done 
properly or to rescue what should be rescued221 In practice the DG makes management plans 
but these are often dictated to from below, from the policies which the staff have been en-
couraged to develop normally on behalf of MSs or stakeholders. The Heads of Unit then w. 
. . make the work plan (of the DG) fit around what they . . . want to do.'223 Major issues are 
dealt with at the top ranks or by working groups; ' . . . but for the r e s t . . . ' Heads of Unit in 
the DG as in the other DGs perceive of themselves as the experts with the right instincts and 
they follow them 224The top hierarchy are then said to 'take the axe' to the policies which they 
do not want although some do get through.225The DG plans are alleged to be to 'force mobil-
ity' on the Heads of Unit which will weaken the Commission vis-a-vis Council and MSs."6 
This use of mobility resulted in a situation where 'there were lots of management changes in 
the DG every 1 and a half to 2 years they changed. ,227The reforms and in particular how thev 
affected the Heads of Unit allegedly added to the weakness of the DG at the beginning of the 
Prodi Commission ' . . . which led to loss of continuity; therefore at the beginning of reforms 
the DG had problems finding its way.'228 
Desk Officers are apparently the main policy makers of the DG and, as was stated above^ 
management plans which seem to show policy dictated from above are, in fact, not very accu-
rate as policy is developed 'bottom up and management plans are made to fit what originates 
from below.'229The relationship between Heads of Unit and officials is stated to not be a prol> 
214 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENT 
215 ibid 
2 , 6 ibid 
2 , 7 ibid 
218 ibid 
219 ibid 
220 ibid 
221 ibid 
222 ibid 
223 ibid 
224 ibid 
225 ibid 
226 ibid 
227 ibid 
228 ibid 
2W ibid 
lem, but allegedly between officials and the Directors there is 'little contact' and 'this could 
be improved.' The officials are allegedly regularly scrutinised by the Cabinets and Commis-
sioners which carry out, 'talent spotting.'231The apparently relationship on REACH between 
the Desk Officers and the Commissioner was quite close and certainly informal and this cre-
ated problems with some in the top hierarchy, 'the Commissioner was very open and phoned 
up Desk Officers. Some in the DG found this threatening. The hierarchy like to have their po-
sitions confirmed by being asked first.'232Desk Officers are useful for Commissioners to have 
on their side as they are in the 'services' system and can further the Commissioner's goals 
with their knowledge and skills. 
Archiving is as problematic in the DG as in the rest of the Commission ' . . . the archives are 
not wonderful in DG ENT, with ad hoc filing. Often files are filled with every odd bit of info 
and it is impossible to find relevant information. There is a process of sending files to central 
archives that may have a better system.'233 The dislike of filing as a result of it not being an 
innovative task was mentioned earlier. Public pressure appears to be changing attitudes at le-
ast, which may lead to changes in the archives themselves, ' . . . as a result of the reform al-
lowing the public the right of access to information with "policy available on request ru-
les'" and ' . , . there has been a reform forced on the DG in terms of its archives; they are 
forced to have new rational archives.' From an outsider's point of view it seems that useful 
internal reforms were forced on Commission from the external world, like the creation of the 
anti fraud agency OLAF, greater use of impact assessments, the Kinnock reforms and better 
archiving. The Commission, in its desire to race ahead of itself and its supply lines is always 
in danger of overreach and the absence of any backup. However there is resistance in the DG 
and Commission to reforms which are perceived by some as controls on their Treaty given 
rights. 
7.6.2 UNIT LEVEL 
Most units in the DG are normally 15-20 strong; this figure being a basic as there is ' . . . little 
sense in small ones,' as each unit must have a secretary.236Units are very enterprising in the 
DG much along the lines of most of the Commission with highly trained and able staff excel-
ling themselves in innovation. A good example of this was the enlargement unit. It was given 
the task to prepare the DG for the enlargement. The unit saw the creation of the charter for 
small enterprises a s ' . . . a political opportunity for the unit, they managed to get this charter 
extended to NMSs, it did not involve legislation and was voluntary and action programme, 
NMSs agreed to sign, a coup for DG.'237A common declaration was signed in Slovenia which 
the NMSs had been persuaded by the unit to decide on as they were told ' . . . it was good for 
them and would help them to work with the DG.,238Resources were not made immediately 
available which meant that the unit6 . . . had to fight for them,' and ' . . . use arguments to 
make enlargement an issue. In 2000 enlargement seemed far away.' The Director General 
allegedly had to be gradually brought around to supporting the enlargement which he was not 
at the beginning, finally the unit had enough resources.240The Director General was present at 
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the signing and as a result became personally involved in the enlargement; this was vital for 
the unit and also for the enlargement as it served as an advertisement for the process and the 
work of the unit, 4 . . . the unit had persuaded other units to follow them and in the manage-
ment plan enlargement was clearly on all units' agendas.'241The next Director General was 
apparently more ready than the previous one for the enlargement and supported the unit in its 
next strategic move. A network within the DG was created with the purpose of keeping the 
other units ' . . . fully involved . . . fully informed . , . ' Individuals from each unit were 
given the task of concentrating on enlargement and enabled 'awareness of enlargement is-
sues,' to be extended.243Finally 4 . . . too many people were involved in the network for it to 
be effective so information notes were used instead.'244The unit4 . . . went beyond what the 
Commission was doing; the unit's policy was to perceive the NMSs as MSs and this "built ^ jM r 
awareness.'" In common with the enlargement units throughout the Commission 'open pro-
grammes' were run to show the NMSs ' . . . how to behave in the Commission; an endoge-
nous approach and not an exogenous one.'246 
The unit as a legislation generating organ has changed as well, although some say that ' . . . 
0 17 
there is a similar amount of time spent on legislation generation as in the past.' In sectorals 
the real legislation was done by the specialists which in DG ENT means engineers who deal 
with the details and specifications which make up the bulk of the finally document, however' 
. . . over time there are less technical elements in legislation than there used to be; no minister ^ jn 
understands what is in the legislation as it is so technical.' The move is therefore allegedly 
in the direction of out sourcing the 'technical content' and details to be completed by 'exter-
nal institutes' the legislation drawn up by the DG has got less technical as a result and 'the 
quality of the legislation has improved.'249To an extent this is a move away from the techno-
cratic expertise of the Commission which was able to outmanoeuvre MSs owing to its mas-
tery of technical details. Now the MSs will have equal access possibilities to external institu-
tions and could control the details more as a result. 
The tasks of the DGs units are changing and whilst it has to be said that different units have 
quite different institutional partners and tasks, so it is hard to generalise, it is possible to say 
that units are involved with more partners than before, that their work involves more bureau-
cratic procedures than before and that policy making pure, is becoming somewhat less and 
also more difficult, to perform. Contact with other European institutions is seemingly increas-
ing steadily, for one unit which is neither totally horizontal or vertical it has recently seen a 
^ ? a 
'10-20% increase,' in time spent working with the Council. This is partly to do with sub-
sidiarity which means the officials; ' . . . must analyse national legislation more and check i 
compliance.' The arrival of the NMSs saw the same increase in work since they became full 
a r ^ _ 
members. The way that the Council relates to the unit has evolved as well, 'QMV makes it 
easier to work with them (the Council) but with 25 members now it is much more compli-
cated and harder to keep all the MSs following on one thread. It is hard to keep legislation on 
track and national delegations are more important than before. There has been a real slow 
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down as a result and comments have been made. Yet the legislation is still being produced 
even though the Council appears to be slowing down to an extent; this is owing to the Com-
mission's alleged skill in using alternative methods of organising the proceedings to ensure 
agreements can be made, 'The Commission tries to use "backseat chairing" techniques; chair-i 
ing skills are more important than ever.' 
But it is with the EP that the unit mentioned above has seen its biggest increase in work, 40-
50% more contact with it owing to the increase in the Co-decision making procedure and 
concerns about the democratic deficit.255The DG as a whole has seen an increase of 20-25% 
more interaction with the EP and MEPs questions. Some officials state that they now have ' 
. . . to take the parliament seriously,' unlike before, 'under unanimity the unit put its effort 
into the Council, under Co-decision they have to take the EP seriously. Before only 5 MEPs 
were involved and the unit helped the rapporteur write their report. Now they must work with 
maybe up to 100 MEPs in a committee. They must work more with MEPs . . . interaction with 
the EP . . . has intensified and the MEPs comments have to be taken seriously.'257His unit has 
drawn up a plan for the next five years aimed at getting more staff to deal with the EP. 
7.7 DG ENT ADVOCACY COALITIONS - POLICY NETWORKS 
Within the broader field of the internal market there are stated to be ' . . . Policy Networks 
galore, and many of these relate to the narrower industrial policy sector. Some like the 
pharmaceutical one are very influential and powerful; the so called ERT, or European Round 
Table, in which top industrialists sit to advise the Commission is likewise powerful in a broa-
der manner. Others, like that for the aviation industry are weaker and more 'issue networks.' 
The DG itself states that it needs ' . . . close dialogue with the social partners in the various 
sectors (for example, textile and clothing, footwear, chemicals, steel, business related services 
and tourism),' and that the dialogue ' . . . is therefore essential in securing support and under-
standing for Community problems. Such specialist knowledge can be of particular value when 
dealing with specific problems. . . . ' It is also vital in gaining the DG ' . . . expert knowledge 
of the economic reality of the most important sectors (industry and services);' and of their 
'evolution, needs and concerns.' To assist the sectors in these the Commission; ' . . . must 
keep abreas t . , . ' There is a fine line between a close dialogue and more problematic rela-
tionships. 
Many internal market decisions taken after 1987 were made by a ' . . . closed circle of minis-
ters, officials and Policy Networks;'261 the subsequent 1992 project was so vast and fast that 
many national Policy Networks were unable to protect themselves and their interests262and 
were forced to struggle and race to establish themselves in Brussels, several of whom 
feared that a "Policy Network detrimental to their interests was hardening."'263Not being pre-
sent in Brussels at the formulation stage of policy ' . . . carried higher potential costs after the 
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mid-1980s/ the frequent use of Qualified Majority voting also forced MSs to lobby widely to 
^ ^ f A 
stop proposals. It is also likely that the MSs preferred to stop a proposal within the Commis-
sion rather than when it arrived in the Council, opposition at the later stage carries more po-
litical costs. The 1992 project also saw a large increase in experts being used by all parties 
including the Commission to allow them to continue to function despite the vast increase in 
legislative activity. This resulted in 6 . . . overlapping groups of consultants,' who 4 . . . wor-
ked for the Commission, member governments and firms . . . the conventional delineation be-
tween public policy makers and private influences became blurred.'265The haste combined 
with all the above resulted in 'important decisions' being taken by Policy Networks.26GIn the 
later 1990s the Policy Networks 'stabilised' although with the extension of the Co-Decision 
procedure the EP has become more involved and as the procedure is far from speedy informal 
decision making has increased and so the importance of the Policy Networks as ' . . . arenas 
for informal bargaining,' and 'backroom bargaining.'267The Policy Networks are vital also for 
the implementation of the Union's decisions268and will also be able to use this expertise to 
influence decisions taken centrally. 
In the field of research and development and information technology, the Commission is sta-
ted as having taken 'an active interventionist view' during the 1980s particularly amongst the 
top levels of the Community. The Commission used an advocacy coalition with big business 
to push national governments to back up its new approach. An advocacy network existed in 
the Commission's drive for competitiveness with a Commission big-business relationship at 
its heart, or 'partnership' as it has been called. The kind of network described here is said to 
be that of Sabatier, who described a network consisting of the following ' . . . people from va-
rious governmental and private organisations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs 
and who often act in concert. At any particular point in time, each coalition adopts a strategy 
envisaging one or more institutional innovation that members feel will further policy objec-
tives. A closer definition arrives at the following that coalitions have '" . . . shared norma-
tive beliefs" generally consist of policy goals; the advocacy coalition's intention is to manipu-
late legislation, public expenditure, personnel concentration and so forth, so as to attain mu-
tual policy objectives over a period of time; this strategy encapsulates the purposeful oppor-
tunism of the Commission in the realm of industrial policy . . . '270The existence of this advo-
cacy coalition is attested to by various authors, one of whom, Ross, states that the major elec-
tronics firms pressurised the Commission to produce the Community policies for electronics 
that in fact later emerged, stating that business leaders would lose faith in the Community if 
they were not helped during a period of intense competition from outside the Community.2 1 
The Commission for its part, is said to have seen European high tech companies as allies in 
creating a federal Europe. It should be stressed here, that the Commission values the big com-
panies for their expertise and economic and thus political clout, which give it more power in 
the face of MS reluctance to support greater Commission presence in the Industrial Policy a-
rea. But some MSs are said to be part of this coalition along with the EP and some smal le r ' . . 
. like minded private interest groupings.' In particular in the telecommunications sector the 
Commission is said to have been remarkably successful and ' . . . it succeeded in "mobilising 
a network of supporters not only at the European but also at the domestic levels" whilst "neu-
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tralising" the stiff opposition of several member states . . . ' The goals of these networks and 
the Commission seem positive 5 . . . it has acted with foresight and considerable boldness in 
^ ^ « 
pushing liberalisation on unwilling Member States.' The Commission's efforts resulted in 4 
. . . an EU telecom's Policy Network,' which was vital and compensated for the lack o f 4 . . . 
hierarchical decision making . . . in a sector marked by widely-dispersed power.'275In particu-
lar in this sector and that of technology in general it can be said that: 
1 . . . some tasks however while equally highly technical and demanding a sound mastery of 
procedures and policy instruments, arise from the more technocratic mode of policy forma-
tion. The officials have no monopoly of agenda setting in such circumstances, but they have 
an important influence upon it and there is markedly more scope for them to define the prob-
lem and undertake the choice of the solution; examples of such policy making include the de-
velopment of policy for industrial support and information technology, and indeed technology 
policy in general. Political control in such areas is difficult. In technology policy, for example, 
assessing and directing policy requires the political leadership to make judgements on com-
plex and rapidly changing technical issues. In some circumstances control is exercised, but 
frequently "Policy Networks of like minded actors, often organised and led by the Commis-
sion, have considerable scope to set the agenda and influence outcomes." In general as Laura 
Cram has demonstrated, the Commission and its staff have 'proven to be remarkably adapt-
able.'276 
And yet despite the Commission's success in the creation of the European technology policy, 
this has not had the overall positive effect that might have been expected; rather the European 
technology as is linked to R and D policy has been described as ' . . . producer rather than u-
ser driven.'277It is stated to have 4 . . . had little or no positive effect on European firms' mar-
ket position, because it failed to address the real cause of Europe's competitive difficulties.' 
These were not to do with a much discussed 'technology gap' but rather a problem in ' . . . the 
marketing, commercialisation, and adaptation of technology,' Thus, 4 . . . whatever its po-
nnrt 
litical benefits European collaborative R and D Policy has not been an industrial success.' It 
was only in the 1990s that the EU began to focus on user needs, rather than 'improving tech-
nology,1 which it should have done before, T h e EU should support areas in which there is 
obvious market demand, rather than those in which the Commission perceives the need for a 
supply.'28IIn 1996 the EU in the Commission's 1996 action plan first showed a ' . . . tangible 
attempt . . . to refocus its technology policy and address these problems.' There is a real 
danger according to some that the EU might continue to support o r ' . .favour the largest Euro-
pean Companies or any protectionist trade tools which are aimed at fostering infant firms or 
reducing the impact of international competition on European firms, should be abandoned, ^ Q l 
rapidly and completely.' Although with regards to the EC technology policy the Community 
is said to be leaving the more dirigiste 1980s and moving into the more liberal 1990s with a 
move from backing ' . . . uncompetitive multinational companies to promoting enterprising 
J 
SMEs.' Whilst this could be argued to be an improvement depending on the economic per-
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spective chosen, the Commission is still choosing and supporting companies, a method which 
was supposed to belong to a bygone era and secondly, it reveals a greater danger that the 
powerful multinational companies with the ear of many in the Commission285and members of 
strong Advocacy coalitions will be opposed to SMEs, which have little to directly offer the 
Commission as actors with economic and political clout.286 
In the field of biotechnology there has been the gradual creation of Policy Networks in the 
mid-1990s. The industry seems to be more represented in Brussels than in MSs owing to its 
development alongside the internal market, and yet despite this two industry organisations 
developed which have been 'hostile' to each other for years and mutually refuse to attend 
meetings in which the other is present. One organisation the SAGB represents the major large 
players and was close to DG III, the other the ESNBA was close to DG XI and focused on 
smaller players and in particular those with greener methods of production. Something simi-
lar happened with the revival of the debate surrounding the 1973 chocolate directive. Com-
missioner Bangemann, for DG III, seemingly favouring large companies which wanted to be 
able to use differing proportions of vegetable fat and thus produce a less pure chocolate prod-
uct. The smaller companies, in particular those specialising in pure chocolate fought back 
stressing that Europe and those in the institutions responsible, were favouring multination-
a!s.288These splits between large and small players and the difficulties of dealing with both 
with their seemingly different needs and agendas runs through the recent history of DG ENT. 
The Pharmaceutical industry enjoys and enjoyed a close relationship with the Commission 
and in particular 'close ties' 89 with DG III, and together form ' . . . a policy community with 
muscle.'290The EIPIA (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Associations) is ' . . . 
one of the most powerful, well-resourced and single-minded industrial lobbyists in Brussels. 
Formed in 1978, it defused the threat of transnational regulation . . . by the EU.'291Several 
times it has, owing to its organisational skills, succeeded in ' . . . talking the Commission out 
of proposing new regulations.'292Whilst the industry does not always win, a lot of the time it 
does, and maybe its greatest success was when it managed to gain the Commission's approval 
on a ' . . . self regulatory code of practice on medicine selling.' Furthermore it managed to 
talk the Commission around into not introducing a pricing directive when i t ' . . . persuaded 
the Commission that it should be more concerned about the overall health of the industry than 
with its prices.' Thus the industry and the EIPIA are 4 . . . at the centre of a tightly-
integrated policy community which keeps a tight grip on the policy agenda.'294 
7.8 MS AND INDUSTRY CAPTURE OF THE DG 
The Commission as a whole has been alleged to be at risk of 'capture' for several reasons. 
As a relatively small organisation it needs external expertise in order to function effectively, 
in particular, producer groups can provide this and they are also crucial to ensure that the laws 
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generated will be effective and meaningful to the producers as well as the Union, Naturally 
producers have an interest in ensuing that their needs are taken into consideration and where 
possible directing the regulations along paths beneficial to themselves. The founding treaties, 
which were drafted during a period when elements of 'corporatism' were still popular, con-
ceived of producers as being in an important and special position in the integration process 
and also being, in a sense, partners with the Commission in furthering integration, ' . . . the 
OO/x — 
integration process was predicated upon technocracy and elitism.' This approach was in-
tended to provide space for 1 . . . a combination of benevolent technocrats and interest-
propelled economic groups to build transnational coalitions in support of European poli-
cies.'297The need for the Commission to convince key economic elites that their self-interests 
lay in supporting integration, gave business interests a privileged position and contributed to ' 
. . . a lack of balance between public interest and private interests. *298The Commission is sta-
ted as lacking accountability.29 Whilst the authors of the above stress that the final regulatory 
product does not appear to reflect producer capture of the Commission,300this has not always 
been the case and it does not exclude individual DG capture. The saving grace of the Com-
mission has at times, been its decentralised structure which can be or seem at the very least to 
be anarchic, but it means that it is unlikely that any one group can totally capture over time a 
range of DGs which are intermeshed in veiy different sectors and have very different interests 
that they defend. In particular the environmental perspective and the power of DG XI and the 
environmental lobby301 within the Commission as a whole, reduced the possibility of industry 
dominating the Commission completely. The automobile industry and DG III are declared to 
have seen their influence in the emission's policy decline at the same time as DG XI's influ-
ence grew, indicating a linkage between the two. 02 
The stated pharmaceutical directive which DG III drafted, owed an initially consumer-
friendly face to the fact that the official drafting it had been brought in from the European 
Consumer's organisation to draft it, during a period when the consumers' consultative council 
was particularly influential303Subsequent protests from the industry and MSs led to a modera-
tion of the proposals by the DG. The DG acted belatedly once it realised the detrimental ef-
fects the proposed directives would have to industry, after industry and MSs reacted nega-
tively. Elements of the DG were quite possibly unaware of the full implications of what the 
drafted-in-official had written and only acted after the event. The existence of networks often 
with Commission officials close to their centre are known to exist in other sectors304 and a 
network or advocacy alliance(s) existed in the pharmaceutical field.305 It seems likely that of-
ficials in part of DG realised what had happened with the new official and activated opposi-
tion to the proposal in the Commission, other MSs and the industry; indeed the speed with 
which the Commission as a whole backed off is indicative of internal divisions.306 
MS capture of a policy is to the detriment of other businesses and interest groups as well as 
MSs. There would appear to be an inherent danger for DGs and in particular industry ones of 
getting too close to their main sources of information and support big business and key MSs, 
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The most infamous example of known capture of the policy by big business is that of DG III 
officials, who were said to have been so close to the advertising industry in 1975 that the EC 
policy on advertising standards is said to have ' . . . ended up reflecting the interests of the 
advertising industry .'307Far from learning from their error the DG seemed to have learnt the 
opposite message and when they began to work on a television policy, the advertising lobby 
was again involved. For the Commission with its neo-functionist policy in this area308 the ad-
vertising industry is said to have seemed to be an ideal partner.309The green paper entitled 
'Television without frontiers' of 1984 created some loud protests. Many interest groups saw it 
as being too pro market ' . . . others frankly observed that the Commission had been captured 
by the advertising lobby.'3l0Under pressure from another lobby, that of the public broadcast-
^ 1 ! 
ers, the paper was revised and became more protectionist in 1986. The example of high den-
sity television HDTV is an example of the EC being used if not captured by national interests, 
in this case France, 'The difficulties of separating EC regulation from national decisions and O 1 ^ _ 
the attempts to use the EC . . . ' DG XIII was the Commission institution most involved in 
the HDTV case. The French government and France Telecom shared a common strategy and 
France ' . . , appeared to be able to continue "grands projects," albeit at the European 
level.'313The German government was placed under pressure to ignore the market and its own 
national interests by the French and reluctantly agreed in 1990. The Commission as a whole 
and DG XIII in particular are stated to have ' . . . showed an alarming disdain for the interests 
of the consumer.'3l4Finally though, the MAC norm which was involved in the HDTV case 
was dropped in the 1990s despite French intensive lobbying and vast expenditure by the 
Commission.315AlI in all the HDTV project was a classic example o f ' . . . a range of national 
and EU protagonists' who ' . . . refused to shut off the spigots of effort and money even after 
it was clear that the project would fail.'316Granted that similar behaviour is seen in a range of 
EU policies and the presence of a collection of determined actors, it is fair to call this a case 
of Policy Network resistance to either the change or modification of a policy-project, whether 
or not the EU as whole would suffer as a result. Part of the solution was the reorganisation 
and taking apart of the problematic elements of the Commission end of the Policy Network. 
In the resultant fall out, DG III ' . . . dismantled parts of DG XIII,' and took them over and 
Bangemann, the Commissioner for Industry for the majority of the 1990s (who preferred to ; ' 
. . . promote structural adjustment' and ' . . . horizontal measures' rather than supporting ' . . . 
industry specific ones,')3 . . . played down' any future 'grand projects\318The Steel industry 
is said to provide an example of capture, this time by more than one MS. The French and 
Germans are said to have used their power and presence in Commission DGs to handicap the 
Italian steel industry by rejecting Italian plans for restructuring and demanding ones very T 1 0 much in the favour of the German steel industry. 
National Splits within the Commission are also important particularly as the Commission is 
intended to operate free of national political positions. Where decisions are of high national 
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importance then the Commissioners are said to 4 . . . rarely, if ever, vote against the position 
of their nation state.'320An example of this was the textile company Boussac which had severe 
problems; both Delors and Claude Cheysson abstained from the voting with regard to the 
company repaying aid received. A further example included the Greek Commissioner Chris-
tos Papoutsis, blocking the Commission taking Greece to court4 . . . for an illegal ban on toy 
advertisements.'321 
The growing problems with the economy in Europe led to an increasing importance for indus-
try and so the DG, 4The need of the Commission to listen to industry has strengthened DG 
ENT.'322Discussions with officials revealed some indications of networks: 4In the 1980s there 
were French groups in DG there are less now, but there are groups in specialised areas. . . 
,323Various reforms of the Commission are alleged to be also aimed at reducing the dangers of 
some relationships 'Mobility is an attempt to remove feudal control over positions. In one unit 
in the DG there are people who have been there for ages and have clear loyalties (industiy 
implied).'324 It is the MSs though, which are increasingly coming under pressure domestically 
to improve the economic climate, which seem to be apparently at the forefront of wanting to 
direct the DG and they have several methods of doing so some of which have been mentioned 
like the using of seconded officials. Seconded officials from national ministries are apparently 
'parachuted in' to the DG to get a certain policy put into place or to block one that has already 
started. Since personnel are the deciding matter in the Commission as to how a policy will 
turn out, changing personnel from outside makes sense as a means of directing policy inside 
the DG. Once a seconded official is inside a DG then they enjoy the freedom that officials 
have within the Commission to generate policy often with little limitations from the hierarchy 
unless the policy is over political. The MSs are said to h a v e ; ' . . . placed seconded officials in 
DG XI to make it environmentally active.'325Within DG ENT a Dutch seconded official was 
alleged to have been manoeuvred into position since ' , . . industry and banking knew the 
Commission was preparing a directive on mortgages.'326The official wanted to ' . . . stop the 
directive and the see the articles reduced from 75 to 14.' However when he was given a free 
hand to make the directive so long as it worked, he finally wanted 125 articles to get the job 
done.'327 In general 'MS Governments have (are included in) external and internal networks 
to influence Commissioners; lobbies are also states and cities like Frankfurt which lobby at all 
levels and have very different needs from small cities,,328and 'The German government wan-
ted to head the DG from Brussels . . . There is (now) a DG ENT committee which MSs are on 
which is required to give assent before money can be spent, the MSs are powerful.'329 
The MSs are alleged to have been increasingly interfering in the DG since the end of the 
Delors era, the Directors are apparently; 'political animals'330and that since the end of the 
Delors Commission MSs began to ' . . . lean on their Directors.'331 So although ' . . . formally 
there is no new political influence, in terms of quality more pressure is being ap-
^ ^ ^ 
plied.' When the MSs want to stop a piece of legislation in the DG, they have been alleged 
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to have got their staff placed in it to achieve just that. One strategy is allegedly to have gen-
eral A4 grades (Heads of Unit) and experts as well as Desk Officers put in position if a MS 
wants this to happen. The Director General of the DG was stated to have often been Ger-
man, reflecting German concerns about industry. 
7.9 DG BlIREAUCRATISATION 
The DG was not perceived to be as bureaucratic as some in the Commission, in particular DG 
AGRI was singled out as an example of 'horrific'335bureaucracy. Bureaucracy in the DG al-
legedly related directly to the political importance of the dossier in question; the more politi-
cal it was perceived to be by the hierarchy then the more bureaucratic controls would be 
•in/ 
used. This 
was stated by a senior official as well, 'It is a very hierarchical organisation like 
the UN only if dossiers involving political elements and method are used, for the rest you are 
free and there are no checks or controls.'337If it has a high profile then all the hierarchy want 
to be involved, the chemical's dossier REACH was an example of this.3380ddly enough the 
more bureaucratic a dossier the better it can allegedly be for the official's promotion chances. 
They will be noticed by the hierarchy. Thus some officials like it for this reason whilst others 
avoid it for the sake of a quiet life.33 The bureaucracy in the DG it was stressed, can be a pro-
tection for the official, if he is able to pass responsibility upwards via bureaucratic controls to 
his superiors this is safer for the official than making the decision himself.340 
The interaction of a recently formed unit with the bureaucratic system in the DG and Com-
mission was shown nicely by the experiences of the REACH unit. Allegedly the official's 
trick was to try to avoid 'traditional hierarchies' by having a 4 . . . small team at the bottom 
take the decisions. . . tried to sort things out at desk level and then pass things up the hierar-^ i | _ 
chy.' The unit worked closely with the comparable unit in DG XI. The unit was fortunate 
that it had the active involvement by the Commissioner and Cabinet ' . . . for REACH, the 
Cabinet and Commissioner realised its importance and were all on board.' All in all the 
more members of the DG management hierarchy involved allegedly the lower the efficiency 
of the unit, assistance of the political level can be crucial in remedying this 'There were only a 
small number of officials of the hierarchy involved on REACH which made it effective; If 
your policy is important and Commissioner and DG interests want it and promote it, the hier-
archy is removed, there are ways around it. Once a policy is out of the political limelight then 
it will suffer, briefings are ignored it is no longer priority. ,3430ne official alleged that 'tradi-
tionally it has been Cabinet versus the services. . . . There are problems if the Cabinet feels 
closer to the Commissioner than to the services; they are supposed to be a bridge between 
them.'344 Normally though apparently in the DG 'the Cabinet are too busy.'345The informal 
structure of the REACH unit and its special position in the DG allowed it several privileges;' 
. . . the REACH unit is seen as an exception as it has a team atmosphere . . . (it) had a hotline 
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and was priority; there were deadlines and so hierarchy was bypassed; ... worked with who-
ever was there at the time we "trusted each other."'346 However usually apparently "the higher 
the decision goes the more formalistic it becomes.'347 That said 'REACH could have been 
drawn up by Desk Officers alone if there had been less controversy and political require-^ Jo 
ments.' The rest of the DG seemed to see the status of the unit as something special which 
they would have liked too 4 . . . other units complained as they were not properly involved 
with REACH . . . The horizontal units which are supposed to pull the DG together are not ef-
fective and are constantly wanting REACH unit to report more but then complain that it is too 
slow. These units are constantly working on ways of "improving" communication.'349 
One of the Kinnock reforms which affected both Desk Officers and Heads of Unit considera-
bly was that of CDR, the creation of a career development plan for staff. In principle it see-
med to have been well received, but the way it was carried out led to protests 'Linking staff 
objectives to the management plan of DG is a good idea; the staff like it and like to discuss 
evaluation and personal progression. The point element in the CDR damaged the proc-
ess.' Under the scheme merit points from 1-20 could be given in reality only 13-14 are 
given making the exercise 'pointless.'351Furthermore the goal was to allow Heads of Unit, 
those closest to the officials the greatest evaluative power, but a parallel point system was in-
troduced which left the Director General of the DG in control of the 'priority points' which 
actually counted towards promotion.352In essence the 'problem of CDR is you set targets 
which staff then achieve but only a certain number can be promoted.'353The system also 
seemed to ignore another fact in the Commission, which was that officials of the same grade 
could serve under each other, thus two A4s might work in the same unit and one be the Unit 
Head. Under CDR this is no longer possible 'this is a return to the grade and function having 
to be the same which had existed before and is not logical.' Directors were alleged to have, in 
practice, the ' . . . final say over last point allocation.'354 Not surprisingly the Court of Justice 
had cases before it with regard to the CDR scheme.355All in all the promotion system had not 
got much less complicated and still was a 'very complex promotion scheme.'356CDR was said 
to be 'killing synergies and experience and giving too much power to Directors and responsi-
bilities to Heads of Unit,'357and was unhelpful for the entrepreneurial spirit of the officials.358 
Due to the nervous climate in the Prodi Commission setting reforms and requirements to re-
take control of the Commission and the interest that the MSs had in applying influence to Di-
rectors of their nationality, the latter are alleged to have taken to ' . . . micro management. Di-
rectors were more fearful and wanted to control things more.'359This apparently led to their 
reluctance to delegate despite the need for even more delegation of a positive nature being 
present 'Communication, delegation are not there . . . It is hard to bypass Directors and that 
means delays.' This sort of micro management was also apparently increasingly noticeable 
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in DG XI as a result of bureaucratization. DG REGIO will be shown to have also seen Desk 
Officer's freedom reduced with procedures increased. 
There was allegedly another side to the bureaucratization 4 . . . bureaucracy is everywhere and 
duplication, new DG procedures which are much more complicated have led to this. Before, 
we could manage four studies a year, now, owing to the above only two,'361The figures for 
the increase or decrease in the time spent on both policy work and/or bureaucratic tasks 
makes for alarming reading 4 we spend 40% less time on policy and Heads of Unit and Desk 
Officers are easily doing 5 times more procedures, taking double the time. Between 60-70% 
more time is spent on the b u d g e t . . . , for which there were said to be 4 . . . 50% more pro-
cedures.'363The effects were clear 'the budget was not committed due to the number of proce-
dures, 2-3 times as much time is taken for the calls to tender procedure.'364This was empha-
sised by another official4 . . . everything was slowed down. Impact Assessments intended to 
improve legislation slowed down . . . The legislative process has changed and slowed, work-
ing out the details of Lisbon has slowed and project financing has slowed; 15% in some units 
80% in others more time is taken on unnecessary procedures.,365Project financing in general 
has ' . . . slowed right down,' which has had an effect on the enlargement process. 66The MSs 
will have seen some of the proposals that they may have wanted also slowed right down, 
maybe this was also an indirect benefit of the bureaucratization. 
It is in the area of finances that the burden of procedures has really apparently come to bear 
and delegation of financial responsibility further down the hierarchy led to 4 . . . staff getting 
rid of budgets to cut down problems of doing projects, due to the personal accountability and 
personal liability of those signing.'367Despite the delegation, the procedures have allegedly 
not become simpler as would have been expected 4 . . . there are now very complicated proce-
dures, 10-12 (people) must sign for payments to be made; it was bad before but now impossi-
ble; it seems to be good for financial units to block Heads of Units.i368The work of units used 
to be above all to verify the quality of the project to be undertaken, to see if the projects made 
sense by carrying out studies and evaluations. Now however staff do not have the time avail-
able to worry about quality, 'it used to be 50-50% (of time spent) for financial control and 
management of projects, then 60-40% now 5-95%. We avoid making studies for projects. No 
one in the units wants to do the financial side and one person must. They are frightened to do 
this . . . financial responsibility is good but this is a total over reaction.' 69The staff and lower 
management were frustrated and this was true of all the DGs. They wanted to do a good job 
and to deliver the Europe that people wanted but could not, 'there is lots of training in finan-
cial management; there are lots of bad data bases for financial management It is very frustrat-
ing as projects are rejected and time wasted by financial staff and units.'370One official re-
flected There are 5 times more procedures than before. In old Commission they took short 
cuts but not illegal ones and now are paying for this attempt at efficiency.'371 
Other effects of this increase in bureaucracy were that 'since 2000 efficiency and effective-
ness in the DG has gone right down,' the fact that the budget 'which is approved from the EP 
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is not and has not been committed since it cannot be, there are so many procedures,' was 
stressed. The organisational effect of the increases in bureaucracy have allegedly been that 
'The planning, reporting system and human resources and budget have become more complex 
in every area, (with) very cumbersome procedures needing experts to do it: financial units, 
Human Resource units, audit people etc.'373For some of the officials the reasons for the 
changes were clear 'this was another example of fear management, endless controls and pro-
cedures and so a paralysed Commission.'3 4Prior to the changes one of the managers stated 
that he had only had one audit controller checking him, then he had five groups of controllers 
auditing him.3 5Attempts to introduce management by objective received a mixed response, 
one thought it helped to get resources attached to sensible objectives,376but most considered 
that it measured the wrong items like letters sent within certain time periods which are hardly 
the key indicators for the varied jobs of Commission officials.377 
7.10 COMMISSION LAUNCH OF NEW DYNAMIC PHASE? 
The sad irony is that allegedly all the staff which the Prodi Commission hoped to finally 'free 
up' to make policy and politics and launch a Commission dynamic phase rather than manag-
ing projects, have been absorbed by the new horizontal units and the need to perform all the 
procedures to ensure that the service's staff and management are kept from erring, 'before DG 
ADMIN had done the management and was professional; the management tasks devolved to 
DGs. All the 'freed up' staff resulting from the reduced DG ADMIN were then used up on 
management and not on policy as intended. The big goal of Prodi had been to get Commis-
sion back to making policy and not managing tasks, and so the reduction in DG ADMIN; in 
reality even less policy resulted as management tasks ate up the 'slack' that resulted. There is 
now one budgetary officer per unit, every unit even if one unit makes only one payment and 
another a thousand.'378 
7.11 COMMISSION FRAGMENTATION: INTER DG 
RELATIONSHIPS 
The role of centralisation versus decentralisation in the Commission was also stated to be a 
reason for the 2000 reorganisation and creation of the new DG; there is apparently a natural 
'swing' in the Commission between centralising and decentralising.379The Commissioners 
allegedly wanted to devolve a lot of responsibility to the various DGs so that the College itself 
could no longer be held responsible for certain financial matters 'in the pre Prodi period the 
budget was collectively approved in the College. President Prodi said no to collective respon-
sibility and instead made the Director Generals personally responsible for their budgets. Now 
the Commissioners are responsible for nothing. This was to protect the Commissioners.'380 
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The current state of inter DG communication and coordination was described so 'Interservice 
cooperation is "bad" there is no communication at all between DGs.'381A glaring example of 
the result of the lack of DG communication and coordination was the creation o f 4 . . . a mir-
ror unit in the DG which checked up on DG XI and which went from 2 to 20 staff members. 
This did help to increase DG ENT power. The REACH file showed this increase in ENT po-
wer over the last five years. It was harder for DG XI to enforce things against DG ENT, al-
though climate change file still showed DG ENT weaknesses. . . . , 3 8 The alleged creation of 
units to essentially follow and 'mark,' using football terminology, other DGs which you do 
not trust but have to deal with reveals the depth of the problem of fragmentation. The decline 
in DGXI's perceived antagonistic stance towards industry resulted in the mirroring units al-
legedly declining in size again.383The increase in fragmentation and the formal decentralisa-
tion which encapsulated it had several unexpected consequences, there 4 . . . was a loss in the 
shared and sharing of a legal culture, this certainly was lost in DG ENT and it is only slowly 
returning. The training in writing legislation has improved. The legal service puts tools to-
gether and says what can and must go into legislation. The problem is that not enough people 
take them up on this. Training started ten years ago, since many jobs were not getting done 
properly.' However the quality of legislation has not drastically improved, yet.384The apparent 
views of industry and SMEs and their representatives about the lack of quality of legislation 
coming from the Commission and its decline in coherence, probably owed its origins to the 
fragmentation/decentralisation process as a whole. 
That there are problems in the communication and coordination of DGs should be clear, why 
these occur and details about some of them are discussed now. Up to seven DGs were often 
involved in deciding an Industrial policy element: DG XIII telecommunications information 
and exploitation of research; DG III industry; DGXII science and research and development; 
DG IV; DGI external relations; DG XI; DGXXIII.385Struggles between them could be sharp. 
Industrial policy was seen as the result of negotiations and bargaining between officials and 
Commissioners of different ideological and national origins. These have often had quite dif-
ferent 4 . . . political and economic cultures.,386There were the southern European officials 
who often favoured more protectionist policies and wanted 4 . . . active interventionist indus-
trial policy,' and the Northern European officials who favoured a 'minimalist' ap-
proach,'388These two groupings fought almost constantly over core technology industries like 
electronics. During the 1980s when interventionist policies were most popular in the Com-
mission, then DG XIII was at its most influential. Even at the beginning of the nineties 
* 1QO 
DGXIII was able to generate a report that was very 'interventionist in tone' and this was 
adopted by the Commission before being toned down in a revision demanded by the more lib-
eral DGs III and IV. With more liberal views predominating in the 1990's other DGs have 
taken a greater role.390 
Food policy was an area where DG III was frequently involved in 'bitterly contested' argu-^ A | 
ments between it and DG AGRI. The formation of an energy policy to deal with climate 
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change saw a contest between 1 . . . as many as ten separate DGs'392of which the industry ones 
can be sure to have been a part. DG XIII, much of which was later absorbed into DG III was 
in fact stated to be almost at war within itself4 . . . relations are not always harmonious with 
each Directorate seeking a high profile for its work.' DG III and DG IV have often had a 
difficult relationship in part owing to the nature of their respective tasks; the latter tend to 
concentrate on an industry's needs and the former are more concerned that consumers are be-
70/< 
ing properly protected and not exploited. An example of the disputes was in relation to the 
motor industry. DG IV wanted to see the motor industry restructured in the face of Japanese 
competition by letting market forces and competition guide. DG III wanted to create a strong 
motor industry which would then be able to compete internationally. In principle it wanted the 
industry granted the necessary time to restructure which was at odds with DG IV's 
view. Another notable clash between the two DGs came over the De Havilland dossier. In 
essence in 1991 ATR Avions des Transports Regional told the Commission that it intended to 
buy control of the De Havilland division of Boeing of Canada. The Commission blocked the 
take over due to concerns about its anti competitive results. French politicians were outraged 
and considered the action to be 4 . . . contrary to the interests of Europe.'396The French are 
stated to have held the belief that a 4 . . . dirigiste approach to industrial policy,' was correct. 
The Commission subsequently back-pedalled and the competition policy element was reduced 
and in future DG IV had to coordinate with DG III and form a common position to bring be-
fore the Commission. It was hoped that this would reduce the 4 . . . source of intra Commis-
sion tension, pitting DG I I I . . . against the Competition Directorate.'398The German Industrial 
Affairs Commissioner referred to DG IV harshly, 4 . . , castigating the "competition ayatol-
lahs" for their failure to think in global terms rather than European markets.'3 9Other clashes 
resulted in very different outcomes also of a less than desirable nature as in the Mannesmann 
steel tubes merger.400 
Clashes occurred in 1989 between DG III and DG X responsible for cultural matters over the 
EC broadcasting policy. Compared to DG X, DG III is described as being 4ultra-liberal and 
pro-market'401 whereas DG X is more culturally oriented and deals with actors, broadcasters 
a 
as a sector. The tensions between the two were 'ideological' as4 . . . each DG has its own 
ideological orientation and interest group constituency,'403and were staffed by very different 
types of official with DG III being mostly made up of lawyers and economists and DG X of 
general ists.404These differences and frictions resulted in a fragmented directive with 4a lack of 
coherence of the directive itself.,405DG X weakness probably resulted on its having a minor 
role.406 
In the area of Biotechnology DG III came into conflict with DG XI which is often at logger-
heads with the Industrial DGs. At first in 1984 DG XI was not present at the Biotechnology 
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steering committee as there was 4 . . . no legal basis for environmental regulation.'407As DG 
XI grew in power and legitimacy with the increasing environmental awareness of the Euro-
pean public, so between 1985-1990 DG III and DG XI shared chairmanship of the newer and 
more active Biotechnology Regulations Inter service committee.408DG XI in practice drew up 
the Directive on GMOs as DG III, whilst being a co chef de file for one of them, was over-
stretched in dealing with the SEA. DGI1I tried to force a special clause into one of the direc-
tives (90/220) which would have allowed for certain exclusions and exemptions for indus-
tries.4 9It succeeded in winning in the Commission but DG XI worked closely together with 
the European Parliament Committee and the Council and regained much of the lost 
ground.41 Thus a form of strategic institutional manoeuvring resulted in DG XI outwitting DG 
III. However DG III was able to demand a reform of the directives and the biotechnology de-
bate.4,1There were hostile clashes between the two DGs and their respective Commissioners j i M 
in 1994-5, Bangemann for DG III and Ritt Bjerregaard for DG XI. Amended directives 
were the result and the European Parliament forced even more compromise on DG III and the 
industrialist lobby in 1998 during the passage of the directive for the protection of biological 
inventions.413 
REACH is another more recent example of the struggle between DG XI and DG ENT. It is a 
controversial directive which some claim to be unnecessary, regulation where the public 
should have been educated instead.414 Following this line of argument then, REACH seems to 
be an attempt by the EU to extend its regulatory reach where it should not have ventured, us-
ing a faulty understanding of the problem it aimed to solve.415The REACH directive on 
chemicals has been seen as a testing ground for the strength of the two DGs and the struggle 
continued through the last five or so years. Both had units involved in drawing up the direc-
tive and discussion was hard between them.416Bearing in mind the alleged ability of officials 
to leak information to industry and to activate opposition to policy, the burst of industry and 
member state outrage against the policy could well have been part of the strategy, albeit be-
lated, of the DG ENT officials, maybe even only accidentally, by keeping industry informed. 
Paradoxically there are those who state that DG ENT has been the clear winner, usually those 
from the environmental side, and then the opposite, the industrialists and many in DG ENT 
who think that the strength of DG XI was shown in the REACH directive. Maybe a solution is 
that purists on both sides are unlikely to be fully satisfied and the same applies to those in the 
DGs who failed to see their proposals adopted. However, there is room to see that DG XI was 
weakened as the result of its constant reorganisations and that this led to a more industry 
friendly REACH directive. This is the view expressed by some Greens who perceive the in-
troduction of impact assessments to assess the effect of legislation as being weighted in fa-
vour of economic impacts, 4 . . . impact assessments are making it more and more difficult for 
the regulator to take action.'417A forum was set up between DG ENT and DG XI coordinating 
the 4 . . . further work on impact assessment', two out of three of the studies carried out were 
paid for by industry, leading environmental NGOs to withdraw their support. 
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Whatever else, the new competitiveness, vice president Verheugen has stated he will aim to 
amend the legislation to make it more industry friendly.418A tacit acceptance it would seem 
that DG XI had been more successful than some would have liked, but he would appear with 
the Commission's blessing to be setting out to restore the fortunes of industry and DG ENT 
since he will be based in it. Possibly a return to a form of industrial policy may occur, appar-
ently the Le Monde thinks this will happen; however Verhaugen has stated that he would not 
welcome a 1970s style industrial policy.4l9That would still leave open the possibility of a 
more moderate version. REACH also showed that DG ENT appears to have similar problems 
to those of DG III, which is a major part of it, in communicating new legislation proposals to 
industry. Once again the new legislation allegedly appeared to surprise industry, 'REACH 
a on 
seemed to come all of a sudden, despite a white paper two years before.' REACH appar-
ently showed DG ENT as being as weak as its main predecessor presumably for similar rea-
sons, understaffed and maybe not properly integrated internally. This was certainly mentioned 
in interviews, the weakness of internal coordination and communication, with units remaining A*) I 
quite insular. But the ability to force a willingness to accept changes to the directive at a 
later stage, shows network strength and the presence of powerful actors in it. Thus the DG 
performs better at network reactive rather than proactive management 'the present proposal . . 
. has been seriously weakened during its drafting in the European Commission. A comparison 
of the Commission's initial white paper with its eventual proposal shows that it backed down 
in the face of strong lobbying from industry and weakened its position . . . '422 It has to be said 
that the increase in economic worries has led to a decrease in the clout of environmental 
groups and the DG XI in the Commission as a whole, which will have also enabled industry 
and its representative DG ENT to strike back at REACH now that a better legislative political 
climate has returned.4230nly moderately better, as the fact that REACH will remain on the 
cards shows. It is interesting that the mirroring unit of DG ENT was reduced considerably 
during this period as if there was no longer any need to worry about DG XI. 
The lack of trust between the various DGs and their often opposed sectors they serve was 
shown in the utter unwillingness of DGs to disclose information to other DGs. Attempts by 
the Commission to improve coordination and thus coherence of policy within the Commission 
have failed to a large degree, mostly due to the DGs mutual suspicion and lack of trust. Im-
pact Assessments and inter service consultation processes were undermined because DGs saw 
them as invitations for other DGs to spy on them. These points are discussed in the findings 
chapter. 
7.12 ENLARGEMENT AND THE DG 
At the early stage of enlargement the so called EA agreements were used (Europe Agree-
ments) to guide the NMSs towards the Union and the negotiations for the EAs began in 1990. 
There were problems at this stage between those who favoured long term political objectives 
or those who were ' . . . under pressure from short-term problems.'424Basically DG enlarge-
ment was opposed by DG AGRI and DG III, the latter under pressure from their respective 
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sectors, much the same happened in MSs in their governmental departments. The result 
was that4 . . . the ability of the sectoral logic to constrain a more politically motivated agree-
ment was greatly facilitated by the fragmentation of the policy process and the lack of close 
oversight by the macro-policy-makers in the member governments. Defensive sectoral inter-
ests were able to insulate specific aspects of the EAs from political pressures for a more gen-
erous approach to the CEECs and to set the baseline of what would be on offer. As some of 
those involved on the CEEC side were able to observe, as fast as they identified issues on 
which they wanted to press for more open market access, they found that an EU-based lobby 
had beaten them to the EU negotiators.' 
The White paper issued by the Commission in 1995 'Preparation of the Associated Countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal market of the Union* was quite 
clear in its judgement which 5 . . . made it evident that there were a substantial number of ac-
tors within the EU that had a stake in pressing the CEECs (NMSs) to take on as much of the 
EU acquis communautaire as possible before accession. The extension of SEM regulatory 
arrangements to the CEECs would ease the path for western companies doing business and 
had the potential to raise the costs of production of CEEC competitors. Some EU industry as-
sociations had started to lobby both the CEEC governments and the Commission in an at-
tempt to make the approximation process as favourable to them as possible.,427DGIII even 
went so far as to ask the European pharmaceutical industry association to ' . . . identify regu-
latory problems in the CEECs and to propose solutions . , . '428 Thus it can be seen that in the 
industrial sector many of the actors were pressing for their views to be heard and included in-
to the white paper and so forced upon the NMSs, as in fact happened. The strength of various 
'potentially . . . threatened,'429 economic interests and their demands were assessed to be suf-
ficient to make the accession ' . . . much more 
difficult'430 than that of the EFTA states in 
combination with the EU's unwillingness to accept lower standards.431 
In the field of competition the NMSs were expected to meet standards which were higher and 
tougher than those required of the old MSs. Forcing economies undergoing transition and 
restructuring to meet these, and also anti trust regulations was dubious, and whether their eco-
nomic welfare was behind the reasoning is doubtful.433In the whole of the SEM, (Single Eu-
ropean Market) there was a rather surprising ' . . . hardening of the definition of the 
SEM,'434combined with 
a ' . . . softening of the parameters about how the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP) should develop.'435This was in line with the growing understanding that 
SEM was at the heart of the integration project436and in contrast to previous enlargements 
where the emphasis was on the CAP rather than the SEM, The following quote sums up the 
enlargement process. ' . . . Thus in the case of eastern enlargement we can observe the oppo-
site phenomenon to the one that we observed in the EFTA case. The EU side is appearing 
rigid in defence of the acquis, preoccupied about not even minimum standards being achiev-
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able in the short-to-medium term, and disinclined to suppose that the CEEC candidates might 
a Q^ 
have any legitimate distinctive regulatory preferences and tastes of their own.' 
It seems clear that the NMSs suffered as the result of being outsiders in the Brussel's forum. 
Like the SMEs they simply did not have a representative institutional body or group of offi-
cials with sufficient authority to defend them. Not having your people in place to fight your 
corner in Brussels will result in problems for the outsider, as in the EU policy, is very de-
pendent on who is present and who has the ear of the officials. Having Policy Networks and 
MS networks already in place and ready to defend their own interests resulted in SME weak-
ness and NMS problems. The linkage between the two is captured nicely in the following 
quotation which indicates the cost to Europe as a whole of the failure of the Commission to be 
fully independent. 'Hungary is now in the second year of EU membership and it has little to 
show for it. The economy is in poor shape and the unemployment rate is continuously rising, 
especially among the youth with every fifth young person unable to find a job . . . SMEs are 
going out of business by the thousand . . . In striking contrast to all the original laws and val-
ues of the EU, free movement of people and services only works in one direction. Anybody 
can come and work or start any kind of business in Hungary, but this is not the case for Hun-
garians. The majority of the original EU member countries seriously constrain the free 
A 
movement of workers and services from the East.' 
7.12.1 A DG PERSPECTIVE ON THE ENLARGEMENT 
A general view of the DG on the NMSs and the enlargement process that it had followed with 
them, was the NMSs had most of the institutions in place although they were of an unknown 
quality as they had not been tested yet, like their 'standardisation institutions.' Parts of the DG 
as well as the NMSs had been prepared for the enlargement by being exposed to working with 
each other prior to the formal date of enlargement. As a result some of the units were familiar 
with dealing with the NMSs already. The NMSs were involved in working groups and other 
committees for well over a couple of years before the formal enlargement. 14-15 programmes 
were opened up for NMS participation.440 
The situation in the NMSs was said to be positive and heading in the right direction if still un-
derdeveloped. NMS implementation reports showed that they were catching up fast. But ac-
cess to finance for small businesses was still small relatively speaking. Innovation strategies 
which are very important for modern economies were too low but going in the right direction. 
Bankruptcy laws were stated to be rather recent and judicial experience low, with the result 
that they will have to learn by doing. On a macro level of economics and finance there was no 
problem. The Commission had the problem though on a micro level, that there were 10 dif-
ferent systems to be incorporated. Capacity building in institutions was still weak and under 
developed, but they had shaken off the old guard and often very young people were in high 
positions, well educated but not well experienced. The private sector was said to have picked 
off the best candidates.441 
7.12.2 NMS PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENLARGEMENT 
Unsurprisingly the manner in which the NMSs were handled early on in the enlargement pro-
cess, along with other DG problems, led to some negative comments about the DG and 
Commission in the questionnaires which officials from Poland, Hungary, Estonia and the 
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Czech Republic completed via interviews. On the whole though, the DG scored marginally 
better than some of the other DGs.443Regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the DG 
before and after the enlargement, with the exception of Poland,444 the officials considered that 
the DG had performed 'well*- '4 ' on a scale of 1-5 with '5 ' meaning 'excellent' and '1' mean-
ing 'needed a lot of improvement'. The two Polish officials rated the performance of the DG 
as mostly 'needing some improvement' -'2'.445Poland and the Poles were said by the DG of-
ficials to be more confident than most of the NMSs and to behave more like Spain and Span-
ish officials, so the willingness to criticise was maybe higher. Another point is that Poland 
may well have had more problems with the DG than other NMSs owing to its size and major 
industrial restructuring requirements.446In particular, projects were stated to have been de-
layed or postponed with some units being very slow and some in the DG failing to respond to 
'the present needs' of NMSs.447 
Regarding projects and procedures in general, the Poles once again were most critical al-
though to the question 'was the DG well prepared for enlargement,' one official answered 
with '4' i.e. 'good or well' and the other with '2' .4 4 80ne official knew more about the DG be-
fore and after the enlargement and elaborated on the subject ' . . . no it wasn't prepared, it 
needed more experts to deal with the NMSs, in programmes they are unaware of the NMS 
situation. They need more Poles and quickly.'449This official said that nothing had changed 
before and after the enlargement with project planning received a '2 ' , the same for DG flexi-j £ n 
bility and authorisation procedures. When asked about the number of bureaucratic tasks and 
procedures that the Commission had required of the NMSs, the Polish officials considered 
that it had doubled and or trebled these before and after and therefore gave it a '2.'45lThe Es-
tonian officials agreed with this and added that the DG was not prepared for the enlargement 
and was ' . . . too late to deal with the enlargement and that there were managerial problems 
and problems due to reorganisations combined with an 'old fashioned policy.' 52 The Hungar-
ian and Czech officials rated the DG as 'adequate' a '3'.453When asked about the attitude of 
the DG to the enlargement half the NMSs rated it highly at '4 ' or '5'454. But the Poles and the 
Estonians stating that the hierarchy and political layer were not really supportive there was a ' 
. . . lack of knowledge, not enough staff training and management.'455The DG managed the 
policy cycle on average adequately or well, involving stakeholders and managing the dossiers 
well 456It was only on the issue of policy evaluation that one of the Polish officials rated the 
DG as needing some improvement.57 
The question relating to the internal management, coordination and communication of the DG 
was more controversial although in overall terms all the officials rated the ' . . . quality, effec-
tiveness and efficiency of internal DG coordination and Communication before and after en-
largement as 'adequate' or 'good'.458 The Czech and Hungarian officials both rated the DG as 
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'adequate' to 'good' on all issues, but the Polish officials and the Estonians were less posi-
^fa 
tive. It was interesting that Estonia was probably the most liberal and economically ad-
vanced of the NMSs and Poland probably had the most problems. Particularly badly graded 
were Commission inter-service coordination and communication before the enlargement, 
which was graded by the Polish officials with '2' and an Estonian official said that this had 
been a ' . . . problem with odd decisions made,' and that the DGs had had ' . . . too much dis-
cretion.' PHARE projects were stated to have been accepted right through the Commission 
and all the procedures fulfilled only to finally be stopped by just one DG. 60This official con-
sidered that since the enlargement this situation had got 'better' and that there were ' . . . lots 
of informal meetings and tripartite meetings and inter-service better law making proce-
dures,'461 but the Polish officials gave the situation a '1' 462DG management and Desk Officer 
relations before the enlargement needed improvement; there were 'troubles' and there were 
also problems between the Cabinet and the Directors according to the Estonian official463 
General comments made by one of the Estonian officials were that the DG needed to modern-
ise more but it was heading in the right direction and the 'Lisbon communication was very 
good'; another said that the DG had a ' . . . centrifugal dynamic at a higher level,' which 
caused 'some confusion' and that different parts of the DG 'contradicted each other' and deci-
A AA 
sions took a long time to make. The Polish officials said that the expert groups in the Com-
mission 'needed better cooperation' and that there was ' . . . duplication in the working groups 
by the Council and the Commission,' which 'wasn't good enough,'465 
Regarding Commission governance and the stated goals of the 2001 white paper on the sub-
ject of the issues of Commission: openness, accountability, effectiveness and coherence with 
one exception all the NMSs rated before and after the enlargement the DG as being 'adequate' 
or 'good.'466The exception was one of the Polish officials who rated Commission effective-
ness after the enlargement as 'needing some improvement'.467The Hungarian official rated the 
DG's openness as '5' 'excellent'.468 
The reforms performed by the Commission internally, those linked to the Kinnock reforms 
and those linked to anti fraud, were seen by one Polish official as a problem as they made for 
'very late payments'. The other Polish official said that these had doubled problems but that 
they ' . . . needed to be done,' and therefore 5 . . . were not problematic.' One Polish official 
thought the Commission to be ' . . . too centralising and powerful,' but the other said that 
whilst this was true and that ' . . . enough networks are too Brussels based,' added the 'Com-
mission needs more power,' and 4 . . . should be more powerful.'469These last comments were j fy _ * "j * 
agreed upon by the Estonian officials. The Czech official thought it was 'just right'. 
When asked if Commission expertise had changed one Estonian official said that it had ' . . . 
learnt about NMSs,' and that it had ' , . . learnt to buy in special knowledge and to review me-
thodology.'472 All the officials apart from the Hungarian reported that they had experienced 
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problems 4 . . . as a result of staff turnover and reorganisations.,473One of the Polish officials 
stated that after the 2004 reorganisation the DG was now ' . . . better structured and that DG 
A*JA 
ENT was very mixed up before, and problems oddly mixed, now it is more logical. The 
Estonian officials stated that the administrative culture of the DG had changed, before ' . . . 
they suffered from the French bureaucratic system (which is) very time consuming,' now ' . . . 
enlargement changed its culture, there are two Directors under forty. And the Commission is 
trying to cut down on bad bureaucracy.'475 When asked if the Commission could 4 . . , have i 
done more to help the NMSs,' one Polish official said 'yes', all the other officials said 'no' 
or ' . . . the DG tried to help'.4770ne Polish official said that the 'Poles were discriminated 
against' by the Commission, as the ' . . . competition to A1-2 positions in the Commission 
showed, political decisions were taken. Too few Poles are in top positions despite Poland's 
size.'478 
Some NMSs considered that the enlargement process had been unnecessarily complex, con-
torted and bureaucratic, because the Commission had declined to consider already improved 
and modernised institutional processes and structures present in the NMSs, and literally de-
manded that restructuring begin according to its standards, without assessing the efficacy of 
the recently modernised local structures available. This led to confusion and delay as whole 
groups of well trained experts were excluded from adding their experience and expertise to 
the process.479 
7.13 CONCLUSION 
We have now seen that the DG went through a similar process to the other DGs with the ex-
ception being that it was merged to be formed and reorganization carried out at the same time 
rather than as with the other DGs which were reorganized and then underwent major bureauc-
ratization. The downgrading of DG XXIII and the removal of many of its Policy Networks 
certainly weakened the SME officials in the DG considerably. Whilst there seemed to have 
been a whiff of fraud or corruption related to this DG in the past, maybe a Policy Network 
had got out of hand, the majority of its work seemed to be both necessary and subsequently 
missed. The submerging of SME concerns in the big-industry-dominated-DG ENT seems to 
have affected negatively the SMEs within the Commission. Maybe SMEs lost out doubly, the 
dirigists wanted support to go to big industry as had traditionally happened, whilst the liberals 
in the DG wanted no support for any industries at all; thus the SMEs were caught between 
two stools. The resilience of reform resisting big industry networks and backward looking 
well established interest groups was damaging SMEs and their weaker voice, even if there 
was not an active anti SME policy. 
MSs and Policy Networks seem to have been active in the DG as in other DGs and like the 
Policy Networks this had to be stopped, or reduced if possible. Seemingly the link between 
MSs 'leaning' on the Directors more and the same Directors then having to micro manage 
seems to make clear the link between MS pressure and the Commission using bureaucratiza-
tion to combat it. 'Fear management' was the expression used to describe the motive of the 
College behind the bureaucratization. The College was allegedly frightened of any further 
weakening of the Commission in the face of increasingly hostile political actors like the MSs 
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and seemingly also the EP. To some extent reforms and bureaucratization would improve the 
management of finances. More bureaucratic controls and being more like a slow bureaucracy 
seemed to satisfy the MSs even though these are ineffective to stop corruption. Indeed the re-
forms and bureaucratisation seem to have been viewed by plenty of officials as being exces-
sive and unnecessary and in the end seemingly unsuccessful at achieving their stated goals, 
and the DG had to be reorganized again in 2004 to realign itself once more with the Lisbon 
agenda. The reaction of the Commission to its 'fear' was in part to hide and be seen to be hid-
ing, by becoming more bureaucratic. Policy Networks, Sectoral fragmentation, wayward 
Commissioners and MS influence could be reduced by bureaucratisation. It would be hard for 
the MSs to object over loudly to losing their influence in the interests of a corruption free and 
more efficient Commission. Policy Networks and policy management could, so the Prodi 
Commission seemingly hoped, finally be removed and as a bonus staff would be available for 
the Commission to launch the dynamic phase that always follows from a retreat. 
Of considerable interest to us, is the fact that the state of the DG and weakness of the SMEs 
and NMSs within it resulted in both suffering. Although a policy making DG, significant 
costs resulted for the under represented, owing to their lack of status in the DG. The picture 
remains of a DG which was extremely geared to being technocratic and close to big industry 
and powerful lobbies. Whatever lip service was paid to the SMEs the facts did not appear to 
support the rhetoric. Whilst the DG did not show too many obvious indications of Policy 
Networks, these are stated by several observers to be in existence and powerfully so, At times 
in its history, or rather the histoiy of DG 01, its main element, there have been indications that 
the DG had been captured by various industrial groups who had almost dictated legislation. It 
had also been taken over by MSs at various times. The sectors have shown themselves able to 
create problems for the NMSs and the SMEs as the DG was not able to move itself mentally 
or organizationally from its dependence and commitment to big industry. 
The alleged slow speed of decision making owing to the Co-decision process, encouraged 
Policy Networks and backroom deals to occur even more: 
'The application of the Co-decision procedure has enhanced the importance of Policy Net-
works as arenas for informal bargaining on most internal market questions. The procedure is 
complex and potentially time consuming . . . Co-decision has made the EU a more pluralistic 
system of government, but also increased its reliance on informal deals and backroom bar-
• • *480 gaining. 
It is worth noting that the amount of time that officials were spending interacting (presuma-
bly) in networks in particular with the EP and the Council. For the DG as a whole the time 
spent dealing with the Council went up by 10-20% and dealing with the EP from 20-25%, for 
some units up as much as 50%. Whilst this was in part no doubt due to the move to the Co-
decision procedure, the increase in Council communication seems to suggest that more back-
room deals and bargaining were occurring. Thus the time available for DG or Commission 
work alone, like in drawing up legislation had presumably decreased accordingly. 
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Interview Dates 
DG Enterprise Officiais 
Interviews with ten officials between. 31.03.04 and 09.08.05 
NMS Officials 
Poland 
Official 1. 
Official 2. 18.03.05 
Estonian 
Official 1.04.03.05 
Official 2. 30.03.05 
Hungary 
Official 11.04.05 
Czech Republic 
Official 27.04.05 
8. DG REGIONAL POLICY 
MS INFLUENCE AND POLICY NETWORKS VERSUS ENLARGEMENT? 
Having considered our second policy making DG we return now to a paying DG. Having al-
ready looked at DG AGRI, our first paying DG, we can make certain assumptions about DG 
REGIO. If the DG policy are following the Commission trend then there should have been 
signs of greater MS presence in the DG, attempts at re-nationalization of the policy and or a 
reduction is its size. Again if the DG is in line with the general trend then it could be expected 
to be undergoing bureaucratization and in part rejecting and resisting major reforms. It would 
also be expected to be becoming increasingly dynamic or 'bullish.' The contact that the DG 
could be expected to have with every layer of MS governance, owing to the DG's focus on 
involving local and regional governance in the funds it administers, should lead to high levels 
of MS involvement in the DG. Where large sums are disbursed there are likely to be loyal 
constituencies or here Policy Networks willing to struggle to maintain their share of the funds 
available. As these constituencies contain numbers of MS officials and politicians of all levels 
of governance their strength and influence could be considerable. As with DG AGRI and DG 
ENT the outsiders in the enlargement process, the NMSs or CEECs as they were sometimes 
referred to, will probably have suffered as a result of their status. 
The Cohesion Policy has been the subject of much academic debate recently. The criticisms 
of it have come from economists and also from a high level group of experts. The so called 
Sapir Report which was sponsored by President Prodi caused a major stir in the Commission 
and lent support to the detractors from the policy. The DG put up energetic resistance to the 
policy and its implications. The report and the DG response offer a useful perspective on the 
policy and also the willingness of the Commission to reform policies let alone its administra-
tion. Both are examined in the chapter. 
The theoretical chapter considered the main theories relating to the European Union and their 
interpretational force; the same theories are, of course, applicable to the area of the Cohesion 
Policy (CP) and its Structural Funds (SF). There is considerable discussion amongst academ-
ics of the European Union about the appropriate theoretical perspective with which to analyse 
the Cohesion policy of the Union. Liberal Intergovernmental ism stresses the role of the Mem-
ber States (MSs) and Multi Level Governance emphasises the complex nature of the policy 
and the power of the Commission in it. The truth seems, according to some leading academ-
ics, in particular the Sapir report, to lie in the middle. 
The chapter first considers the CP itself, its history, criticisms of it and its actual operation. 
Then it moves on to examine the DG organisation in a similar manner to that used with the 
other DGs; the influence of the MSs is assessed as is the presence of bureaucratization. The 
issue of Policy Networks is addressed and the identification of those linked to the DG is pur-
sued. The Enlargement process and the affects of the DG on it, is finally brought to the fore 
and the perceptions of the main actors; the DG and the NMSs are used to lead to the chapter's 
conclusion 
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8.1 THE EU STRUCTURAL FUNDS POLICY: THEORY, HISTORY 
AND PRACTICE 
8.1.1 THEORY 
Two major theories about the EU, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) and Multi Level Gov-
ernance (MLG) have explanations for the development of the CP and the reforms to it which 
reflect their approach to EU policies in general. Hooghe argues for MLG that the Commission 
followed a distinct strategy aimed at maximising its preferences and thereby reducing the 
MSs,' and stresses that the Commission drafted the reforms internally and deliberately avoi-
ded MS involvement in the process.'Thus whilst an LI approach can provide an explanation 
of the results with MSs maximising their position and acting very much in their own individ-
ual interests, the actual drafting process carried out in a MS vacuum must imply the Commis-
sion acting 4 . . . as the pivotal actor in designing the regulations,'2which fitted well in the ob-
served move of the Commission's strategy from 4 . . . maximising financial and legal control 
towards an emphasis on the policy process.' Sub-national actor involvement was a key ele-
ment of this new 4 . . , structural policy-making.'4One factor though has to be mentioned as 
Hooghe does, and that is that the circumstances surrounding the reforms were remarkable and 
probably a one off with the presence of Delors and the re-launch of the internal market and 
the SEA combined with a relatively positive economic outlook.5 Even at this high point in the 
history of the CP the problem of effective implementation remained whatever the gains in the 
content of the regulations.6 
However, rigid theoretical differentiations are inappropriate for the current EU situation and 
in particular for CP: 
'It is quite misleading to suggest that the choice for the EU lies between "the" Community 
method and forms of "intergovernmental" cooperation. Already we can observe a great vari-
ety of community methods and a great variety of forms of cross-country cooperation, with the 
former shading into the latter and vice-versa, and with a range of different roles and responsi-
bilities for European and national institutions within, as well as between, areas of economic 
policy.' And further, 'effective implementation of EU policy thus frequently depends not only 
on the explicit cooperation of various national and sub-national government bodies in the im-
plementation of common policies, but also on their willingness to set up their own priorities 
and develop their own agenda in accordance with EU priorities, or to shape their local policies 
in the light of wider European reference points.'8 
1 Hooghe. L. Building a Europe with the Regions; The changing role of the European Commission„ in Hooghe, L. (ed) (1996) 
p. 89-128, discussed in Bache, I. The Politics of European Union Regional Policy», Multi-Level Governance or Flexible Gate-
keeping? Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press (1998) p.80-81 
2 ibid 
3 ibid 
4 ibid 
5 ibid 
6 Bache, I. The Politics of European Union Regional Policy, Multi-Level Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping? Sheffield, 
Sheffield Academic Press (1998) p.80-81 
7 An Agenda For A Growing Europe: Making the EU Economic System Deliver the so called Sapir Report; Report for the 
President of the European Commission, (July, 2003), chairman Sapir, A. Group members; Aghion, P, Bertola, G, Hellwig, M} 
Pisani-Ferry, J, Rosati, D, Vinals, J, Wallace, H. Sapir report 
8 Sapir Report (2003) p. 125-126 
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8.1.2 HISTORY 
The main funds which make up the SF available to countries and regions within the EU are 
the following: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the guidance section of the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) set up 1962 to provide ' . . . 
investment aid for a variety of measures to assist less favoured agricultural areas. ,9The Euro-
pean Social Fund (ESF), set up in 1958 initially to help train and retrain workers who had 
been affected by restructuring of industry and to so improve their mobility;10 the Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) and rather separately from the main SF, the Cohe-
sion Fund (CF). When the ERDF began in 1975 it involved only 5% of the budget, now the 
SF and the CF are expected to take the largest proportion of the budget, even larger than that 
of agriculture which has traditionally absorbed the majority. At the beginning of the EEC the-
re was little in the Rome Treaty about cohesion and it appears to have been accepted that it 
was a matter for the MSs to address,11 however in the years in between, major changes oc-
curred and the Maastricht Treaty made plain that4 . . . strengthening economic and social co-
hesion has formally become one of the objectives of the European Union, alongside the estab-
lishment of the internal market and economic and monetary union.'12Economic and Social 
cohesion have steadily increased in importance since the beginning of the European project, 
but have also grown in difficulty to achieve as MSs with very different economic and social 
realities joined the EU.13 
The UK was the main instigator in pushing for 4 . . . the establishment of a European Fund 
aimed at regional development purposes.' 4The reasoning behind this demand was that the 
UK had to pay in considerable amounts into the budget and received little back from the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). To be fair to the UK, creating funds to sweeten in-
creased economic and industrial competition had a venerable history in the EEC. The CAP 
has been considered to have been part of the bargain that allowed the EEC to come into exis-
tence in the first place, a grand compromise which saw West Germany subsidise French 
farmers in return for gaining access for German industrial products to French markets. Indi-
rectly of course the money paid to the farmers flowed into the French economy as a whole 
and no doubt assisted in its growth. Since the UK was not going to benefit from the CAP, 
rather the contrary, it required some immediate sweetener to outweigh the short term difficul-
ties its economy would face; so in 1975 the ERDF was founded. The Commission had a 
strong ally in Germany, the main contributor in the 1970s, when seeking precise rules for the 
implementation of Regional Policy, an insisting on additionality and so the supranational 
element.15 
Despite the tough economic situation for the main contributors, the recipient MSs like Italy 
and Ireland were prepared to 4 . . . sabotage the Paris Summit,' in 197416 unless the ERDF 
was set up and finally Chancellor Schmidt of Germany and others were not as willing to fight, 
and backed down at the prospect of any threat to the internal market and members possibly 
leaving, as seemed might happen with the UK in 1974 and the referendum.17The tough situa-
tion of the oil crisis did lead though to greater MS power over the fund and so the Commis-
9 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p.34 
10 ibid p.32 
" Bollen, F; Hartwig, I; Nicolaides, P. EU Structural Funds beyond Agenda 2000: Reform and Implications for Current and 
Future Member States Maastricht, EIPA Publications (2000) p. 14 
12 ibid p. 13. 
13 ibid 
14 ibid p. 14 
15 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p.43 
16 ibid p.4l 
17 ibid p.4] 
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sion dealing with it, leading to an 4 , . . intergovernmental "carve up" rather than one based on 
1ft 
objective Community indicators.' Something similar to the above occurred with the Iberian 
enlargement with an interesting addition, the old MSs, France, Italy and Greece were worried 
about seeing their share in the EAGGF diminish so a new fund was set up, the Integrated Me-
diterranean Programmes which enabled them to agree to the changes.19In fact Greece threat-on — 
ened to veto the enlargement in 1984 unless it received compensation. Thus there was a 
sweetener for the new members and also the old. Each enlargement has seen funds being 
made available or new ones being created to allow all the members old and new to receive 
something. The presence of these sweeteners has been important in enabling enlargements to 
take place without old MSs blocking the admission of new ones, and new ones maybe creat-
ing problems when they join, the veto is still very much a reality in plenty of areas of EU leg-
islative proceedings and where the veto is not present, often tacit agreements make it usually 
unlikely that one MS will be totally overruled. Not over surprisingly the Agenda 2000 nego-
tiations in Berlin saw struggles over sweeteners, 4 . . . decisions on the structural fund alloca-
tions are caught in intense competition between governments to assist their domestic clients 
and to resist threats to their entrenched advantages from further enlargement.'21 The Commis-
sion stated logic has generally been that, there are poorer regions which need assistance in 
order for the goals of economic and monetary union to be met.22The beneficiary MSs particu-
larly favour this interpretation, as the Irish and Italian governments did in the 1970s, whereas 
Denmark considered that EMU would itself solve the regional problem.23 The recipient MSs 
have consistently favoured a larger fund and the paying ones like West Germany with other 
MSs supporting a smaller one.24 
The growing number of relatively poor MSs meant that there was an expanding coalition 
which could and did press for more SFs to be made available. They made very explicit link-
ages between increased economic competition and poorer regions losing out unless they were 
0 ^   
given compensation which would then help them to compete on an equal footing. The Com-
mission was not over surprisingly in accord with the position of the poorer MSs, after all a 
larger European Fund, which it would be in charge of, would be in its organisational interest. 
Other MSs were less happy but finally agreed on a chapter "Economic and Social Cohesion" 
being included in the 1987 SEA.26The link between the extension of the market and SFs was 
again underlined in the 1988 reforms to the SF, which included a call for the Funds to be dou-
bled between 1987 and 1993; T h e timing of this doubling gives an indication of the intimate 
political link between the Structural Funds and the progressive establishment of the internal 
market.'27 
There were reforms carried out in 1979, 1984 and 1988, which, as is the case with the policy, 
were highly politicized 1 . . . particularly in relation to the size and distribution of funds.>28The 
1979 reforms were dominated by the MSs via the Council, but the European Parliament (EP) 
supported the Commission and strengthened its hand somewhat, at least where the amounts 
18 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p.52 
See note } 1 Bollen; Hartwig; Nicolaides (2000) p.15 
20 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p.68 
21 Allen, (D. Cohesion ami the Structural Funds in (eds) Wallace, H and Wallace, W. Policy Making in the European Union 
fourth edition (2000) Oxford, Oxford University Press p.244 
22 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p,37, 38. The Communication of the 1972 Paris Summit stressed this connection as did the Re-
port on the Regional Problems in the Enlarged Community of 1973 and the Padoa-Scioppa Report of 1987 used extensively 
in the Delors 1 package 
23 ibid p.39 
24 ibid p.39 
25 See note 11 Bollen; Hartwig; Nicolaides (2000) p. 16 
26 ibid p. 16 
27 ibid p. 17 
28 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p.57 
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were concerned. The Commission succeeded in introducing 'non-quota' programmes which 
4 . . . were designed primarily to develop new alternative economic activity in regions across 
^ A ^ _ 
the Member States affected by the decline of a dominant industry.' The Commission intro-
duced the idea of a 'programme contract' which was a bundle of initiatives aimed at dealing 
with concise regional problems; the Commission had greater control over the funds thus dis-
bursed than it did over the rest which was handed out via rigidly controlled national quo-
tas.3 ^ 'The programme contracts and the integration of the various funds ERDF, ESF, EAGGF 
were important steps for the future of the SF.32The 1984 reforms saw the Commission achieve 
less than it had hoped, with extensions of the non-quota regime and funds being paid directly 
to regional authorities and effectively sidestepping national authorities.33But the Commis-
sion's desire to extend the programme method, where all programmes ' . . . would be required jk 
to set out clearly both objectives and anticipated results . . . w a s agreed on only to a small 
degree. Whereas the Commission had wanted to make all ERDF funding liable to program-
ming, with a split between Community programmes which the Commission would dominate 
and would ' . , . directly serve Community objectives . . . ,' and national programmes domi-
nated by and drafted by national governments with regional actors involvement, also geared 
to the 'Community Interest.'35ln fact only 20% of the ERDF were covered by the programmes 
and these were drawn up by the MSs with the involvement of the Commission. 6In part the 
problem was caused by MSs which were receiving more funds from the pre non-quota regime 
opposing any reduction in their net receipts despite agreement ' . . . in principle with the 
Commission's proposal for greater concentration of funding on the regions most in need, all 
but Germany argued they should have eligible regions.'37The 1984 reform meant a minor in-
crease in Commission's powers much in line with the trend up until the reform, with the ^ Q 
Commission's gains owed mainly to its ' . . . agenda setting powers . . . with the Council 
moderating or rejecting many of its proposals but accepting some as they were based on the 
Commission's ' . . . expertise and information . . . ,' which enabled it to gain the backing it 
needed in the Council.3 Yet it can be said that until 1988 at least the ERDF was really ' . . . a 
system of r e imbur semen t . . . and not really geared to regional policy as such.40 
The 1988 reforms had the goals of implementing four main principles: concentration of the 
funds where they were most needed; programming to ease administration and achieve coher-
ence; partnership to involve sub-national authorities and additionality to keep the funds as an 
extra benefit to the areas concerned and not simply replacing national funds. The reforms saw 
the three funds ERDF, ESF and EAGGF put together under the general framework of SFs ha-
ve been said to have resulted in ' . . . institutional arrangements . . . ,' which ' . . . made sig-
nificant advances in the direction of Multi Level Governance but that subsequent develop-
ments can be characterised as a reassertion of MS control.'41MuIti Level Governance empha-
sises a decrease in 'monolithic' MS state power and an increase in that of the Commission. 
The reforms saw six priority objectives being singled out for the Funds. Objective 1 regions 
were those deemed to be most ' . . . lagging behind,'42and consisted of 21.7% of the EU popu-
25 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p.57 
30 ibid p.56 
31 ibid 
32 ibid 
33 ibid p.59 
34 ibid p.61 
35 ibid p.60-61 
36 ibid p.62 
37 ibid p. 60 
38 ibid p.65 
3y ibid p.66 
40 ibid p.66 
41 See note 21 Allen, (2000) p.246 
42 See note 11 Bollen; Hartwig; Nicolaides (2000) p. 17 
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lation and received 69.6% of the budget in the period 1989-1993 43 The Commission had the 
discretion to decide which regions belonged under which objective, which improved its posi-
tion.44Furthermore it gained control over 10 percent of the SF budget which would only be 
spent on truly EU measures.45So called multi-annual-integrated-programmes were introduced 
to replace the plethora of individual projects that had existed before and had led to ineffi-
ciency. The MSs submitted development plans to the Commission which then drew up a 
Community Support Framework (CSF)4 . . . this framework set out the development strategy 
and priorities for action of the structural funds, their specific objectives and the financial con-
tribution of the structural funds. The CSF was subsequently implemented through a series of 
operational programmes.,46Regional authorities were encouraged to become actively involved 
in the policy process in a partnership role, affecting both the ' . . . design and implementation . 
. . ,'47 of the programmes; this was a major change. MSs were also required to co-finance the 
programmes and projects. Various Community initiatives (CIs) were introduced, which aimed 
to 1 . . . cover specific cross-national regional problems which slipped through the cracks of 
projects covered under other structural programming.' The Commission has almost total con-
trol over these funds and used them closely with regional authorities to 'gamer' their support 
and alliance to ' . . . help fend off criticisms from central governments,' and to get useful in-
formation.48 
The 1988 reforms saw several trends emerge which the reforms aimed at addressing, in prin-
ciple, the attitudes of the MSs had changed to the funds. A basic of Community activities is 
said to be t h a t " . . . where there is greatest mistrust between the MSs then there you will see 
the most "common" policies,' this amounts to the MSs allowing the Commission maximum 
control over funds where they are least able to trust each other.49On the one hand the 1988 
reforms saw the funds doubled and the Iberian enlargement increased the lobby for an exten-
sion of the funds, on the other it saw France join the UK and Germany as a ' . . , net contribu-
t o r . . . ,'50for all three of the largest MSs efficiency and keeping a control over the level of 
Community spending was becoming a major issue.5 These MSs were as a result more willing 
to allow the Commission more 'intrusion'52possibilities which before would have been un-
thinkable. 
The 1993 reforms were largely a consolidation of the past achievements and took place a-
gainst a different political and economic backdrop to those of 1 9 8 8 , 4 . . . growing unemploy-
ment and other economic difficulties within some northern Member States heightened con-
cerns about the costs and the cost effectiveness of Community policies. . . ,'53and 1 . . . subse-
quent problems involved in ratifying the treaty prompted concern over the progress and time-
table for economic and monetary union.>54Basically the partnership principle was used to in-
clude economic and social partners and environmental issues were taken into consideration. 
The Maastricht Treaty granted the environment a full treaty base in line with the growing 
concern for and awareness of environmental issues in Europe; the new status of the environ-
ment and thus sustainable development therefore affected also SFs as it would increasingly do 
43 See note 11 Bollen; Hartwig; Nicolaides (2000) p. 17 
44 Peterson, J and Bomberg, E. (1999), Decision making in the European Union, New York, St, Martin's Press 
p.151 
45 ibid 
46See note 11 Bollen; Hartwig; Nicolaides (2000) p. 18 
47 See note 44 Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p.151 
48 ibid p, 160-161 
49 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG REGIO 
50 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p.76-77 
51 ibid 
52 ibid 
53 ibid p.82 quoting Wishade (1996) p.48 
54 ibid 
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also in the area of the CAP. Furthermore adjustments were made to the administrative ar-
rangements of the funds 4 . . . the prior appraisal, monitoring and ex post-evaluation of the 
structural funds were strengthened, by requiring quantitative analysis of the measures under-
taken . . . Member States have to maintain their public structural expenditure at least at the 
same level as in the previous programming period.,55The CF was created to assist the poorer 
MSs to achieve the EMU convergence criteria with a 3% of GDP public borrowing require-
ment; the Spanish government more or less forced the Council to agree to its creation with the 
threat of otherwise vetoing the Maastricht Treaty.56 Spain ' . . . effectively doubled . . . its £ T 
receipts of EU funds from 1993-9. It gained the support of the other major poorer MSs with 
the argument that more resources were necessary to deal with regional economic weaknesses 
than were currently available under the SFs.38 
Despite the reforms as whole being considered as a consolidation of the past, the Commission 
lost the momentum that it had previously generated which positively emphasised its role as 
policy initiator in the EU. As a whole 4 . . . the 1993 reform represented a reassertion of na-
tional government control in key areas;'59the partnership principle was now subject to a 
clause which allowed the MSs' discretion as to the selection of partners.60The CF was largely 
outside the SF policy framework and MSs allowed the Commission little discretion in its op-
f\ 1 
eration. A management committee was also set up to monitor CIs which allowed the MSs a 
greater role than they had previously enjoyed.62 'Access p o i n t s . . . , ' for the Commission and 
the sub-national authorities to meet were reduced via 4 . . . streamlined programming options,' 
but at the same time the reform saw the power of the Commission as an 'arbiter' increase, as 
the Commission could choose between larger numbers of possible regions to fund.63 
During the period subsequent to the 1993 reforms a number of deficiencies in the SF policy 
became apparent, which combined with the expected difficulties of the major enlargement 
east to create a pressure for more reforms. The funds were too widely spread and therefore not 
concentrated on the areas most needing them and failing to address this point left the policy 
vulnerable to allegations of its lack of effectiveness. Implementation of the SF was perceived 
to be over complicated and the solution was to clarify and improve the definition of the ' . . . 
roles and responsibilities . . . ,'64 of all those working as actors in this area.65The funds were 
furthermore being put to use at an astonishingly low level mostly as a result of implementa-
tion delays; MSs had difficulties with the co-financing requirements and the lengthy negotia-
tions involved in getting the necessary funding elements in place.66In addition, the main con-
tributing MSs as well as the poorer ones were affected by constraints set by the EMU conver-
gence criteria which affected their budgetary decision-making scope considerably 67Finally, 
the contributing countries strengthened by the new Scandinavian MSs, increasingly demanded 
that inefficient usages of Community funding should stop, and Germany and the Netherlands 
amongst others were reluctant to accept the level of payments that they were expected to 
make.68 
55 See note 11 Bollen; Hartwig; Nicolaides (2000) p.21 
56 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p.88-89 
57 See note 44 Peterson; Bömberg (1999) p. 153 
58 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p,88-89 
ibid p.90 
60 ibid p. 91 
61 ibid 
62 ibid 
63 See note 44 Peterson; Bömberg (1999) p. 161-162 
M See note 11 Bollen; Hartwig; Nicolaides (2000) p,24 
65 ibid 
66 ibid 
67 ibid p.26 
68 ibid p.26 
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The decentralisation of the policy began and allocated to the MSs the main role in implemen-
tation whilst ensuring that they were accountable for it to the Commission, 4 . . . the role of 
the Commission will be limited to strategic programming, ensuring the respect for Commu-
nity priorities and verifying the results through monitoring, evaluation and financial control.. 
. the Commission will also be involved in the decision on the allocation of the appropriations 
that have been put in the performance reserve.'75Attempts at securing the involvement of a 
range of sub-national and economic and social actors throughout the complete policy cycle, 
floundered on the rock of MS opposition as did the proposal of the Commission to strengthen 
the part played by the monitoring committees, finally it was only allowed an advisory part in 
these. 
Contrary to goals of concentrating the ever tighter funds more carefully to 'objectively identi-
fied problems' and consistently applying 'the eligibility criteria' the Council decided on a ru-
bric of providing financing for 'particular situations' which appears to allow great discretion 
to the actors involved at the expense of the goals of simplification and rationalisation to raise 
effectiveness which the Agenda 2000 aimed at achieving; this development was described as 
'worrying.'76All in all the Agenda showed the problems of adjusting the SFs, even in the face 
of a major challenge to them in the form of the enlargement. Powerful MS actors were more 
than able to defend themselves against the Commission and to ensure that their views were 
able to dominate. The CI budget was reduced from 9% to 5% of the structural fund budget, 
the number of Cls was reduced and ' . . . the role of monitoring committees increased.' 
8.1.3 PRACTICE 
At first when the policy was developed the MSs had a strong hand; the Commission could 
approve projects submitted by national governmental departments which were then submitted 
to the fund management committee made up of MS representatives and chaired by the Com-
mission. A Regional Policy committee was created with two representatives from each MS 
and one from Commission and its task was to coordinate national regional policies and set 
framework for regional policy in community. 50% of funds had to be supplied by MSs any-
way, so a lot of cooperation with Commission was necessary. There was therefore a mixed 
picture, and partnerships with MSs were inevitable even encouraged and the Commission of-
ten chaired these, like in a network. Since the main contributing MSs did not win out, in terms 
of limiting the growth of the policy, one must assume that the recipient ones had more influ-
ence in this area and no doubt this is still the case. 
As the history of the policy shows, the Commission performed a catch up role with the policy 
and under Delors took the lead, but always the MSs have been able to modify and direct the 
funds in their favour. The positions taken by certain MSs and or groups of them often in close 
alliance with the Commission are indicative of the resulting policy. The minimal role of the 
European Parliament and the presence of the unanimity voting procedure have left the Com-
mission very dependent on two main factors, the personality of the president and the ability to 
offer something to everyone as only one vote against is enough to put a stop to any proposal. 
Whilst the Commission has the power of policy initiation and drafting the initial proposal, 
from then on the Council is decisive. That means that at the crucial period when the new five 
to seven year budget and thus the multi annual perspective plan's main principles and details 
75 See note 11 Bollen; Hartwig; Nicolaides (2000) p.41 
7fi ibid p.45 
77 See note 44 Peterson; Bomberg ( 1999) p. 161 
78 See note 6 Bache, (1998) p.42 
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The result was the Agenda 2000 process which began with the Commission document of the 
same name which addressed both the enlargement and EU finances for the period 2000-2006. 
Thus, as before, another enlargement was entwined with SF negotiations and struggles be-
tween the MSs themselves and between the MSs and the Commission. In general the Com-
mission's proposals 1 . . . seemed intentionally to suggest a status quo, thereby downplaying 
the anticipated costs of the next enlargement in order to ensure continuing support of the MSs 
for the enlargement process.'69The Berlin agreement of 1999 looked rather different. Whereas 
the Commission requested 286 billion Euros for the structural area it received 220-260; MSs 
gained 195 from SFs and 18 from the CF.70The NMSs were allocated I billion per year via 
the ISPA fund, 'Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession,' with these states finally 
receiving funding from the SFs themselves to the tune of 12 billion by 2006.71No MS would 
be allowed to exceed funds in excess of 4% of their GDP and 4 . . . the resources that will go 
to the New Member States will remain considerably below this 4% ceiling . . . In theory, the 
NMSs with the highest income levels would receive more financial assistance than those with 
the lowest income level, which would obviously contradict the fundamental aims of the cohe-
sion policy. This point was stressed as well by other influential organisations,' . . . the total 
receipts of new members after accession are capped at 4% of their GDP. This ensures that 
they can absorb transfers and keeps costs in check, but it has the perverse outcome of giving 
more money to richer countries (which have a larger GDP), and giving them more money as 
they grow.'73The sums stated here are: NMSs by 2006 would receive 225 Euros per head, 
Portugal and Greece 400 Euros per head. This goes against the 'principle of fair treatment' 
but the European Round Table of Industrialists report expects,4 . . . the applicants have little 
bargaining power and so may not gain full access to EU funds for some time.'74 
The Commission further proposed various measures aimed at simplifying and rationalising 
the system; these included reducing the seven objectives under which funding was allocated 
to just three; reducing Community Initiatives from 13 to 3 and finally concentrating the funds 
on 35-40% of the Union's population rather than the 51% which it was presently serving. The 
first two points were largely agreed upon with the minor modification of an additional CI to 
the three the Commission wanted. However, with the 'simplification' of the objectives, it ap-
peared to have been a somewhat empty exercise as it amounted to little more than a rear-
rangement of the objectives with no real changes in their 4 . . . actual scope . . . , ' and resulted 
in the creation o f ' . . . a rather heterogeneous mixture of issues covered by the various objec-
tives.' The last point however, saw MSs flexing their political muscle and once more de-
fended their share of the funding; only in 2006 will there actually be a reduction in the per-
centage of the population receiving the funds. Germany, Spain and Italy remain ' . . . in abso-
lute t e r m s . . . , ' the main beneficiaries of SFs and received together more that 50%. However 
in 'per capita terms' the former four cohesion countries received the most. The Commission 
had also favoured the creation of an implementation incentive for the MSs in the form of a 
'performance reserve.' Had the idea been fully accepted, 10% of the available funds would 
only have been granted half way through the programming period if the Member State con-
cerned have adequately implemented the fund programme. The Commission would have 
wielded some discretionary powers in this scheme, however the MSs had this amount reduced 
to 4% and this was broadly at the discretion of the MS concerned. 
69 See note 11 Bollen; Hartwig; Nicolaides (2000) p.29 
70 ibid p.30 
71 ibid p.30 
72 ibid p.31 
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are being worked out there is a lot of political tension. Generally speaking, the device of the 
plan is clever insofar as during the period of the plan, apart from the beginning, there is a rela-
tive lack of discord.80 Prime Ministers are very aware that they will be expected to defend 
their countries' interests and of 6 . . . vigilant domestic media, interest groups and opposition 
parties watching his eve™ step.' The pressure is present to ensure that each of the MSs comes Q 1 
out with some reward and victory. 
As mentioned earlier, the policy has consistently been used as a flexible support for other po-
licies and as a general lubricant in decision making in the Union, 'in the evolution of the Eu-
ropean Union, there have been many occasions on which speedy action in new priority areas 
has been possible only through the flexible recourse to these funds.' Liberalizing markets 
and opening them to competitive pressures often from more dynamic economies is tough in 
the short term for poorer MSs, whatever gains they see in the long term. SFs have served the 
worthwhile task of enabling greater economic integration by side-payments,83as the following 
quotation emphasizes, 'From its very outset, this policy area has been a haven for side pay-
Q A 
ments related to other aspects of European integration.' One senior Commission official 
stated quite candidly 'Let's be clear, the cohesion fund was the price for EMU, just as Struc-
tural Funds were the price for the single market.'85The cohesion fund was the price for EMU, 
and a ' . . . prize given to poorer Member States in return for their endorsement of further 
enlargement.'86The same has occurred with the CAP, with there being a 'strong link' between 
the two policies with the CP serving as a flexible alternative to the more 
rigid CAP.87The ear-
lier enlargements of the Community also required rigid efficiency centered CAP, which was 
inappropriate for the UK, Spain and Portugal, to be complemented by SFs.88The case of Po-
land illustrates this, during the enlargement negotiations Poland stated that it disagreed with 
its allocated milk quotas, the old MSs were unwilling to offer more CAP assistance but in-
stead offered assistance * . . . within the Polish envelope available from the structural 
funds.'89The Monetary Union and the concerns of poorer states led to doubling of the struc-
tural policy resources and the Edinburgh Summit led to the cohesion funds being created 
largely for the same reasons.90 MSs have had a crucial role to play in the CP since its incep-
tion, 'The cohesion fund was also the result of a familiar two stage bargaining process . . . 
This two stage bargaining process illustrates a wider tendency in EU decision making; a basic 
deal is agreed, but "sequentially implemented for reasons of decision making efficiency.'"91 
The positions of the MSs are to a degree decided by or heavily influenced by their sub na-
tional authorities; this is particularly true of federal states like Germany, Belgium and Austria 
where the Länder have considerable rights and often quite different views to the federal gov-
ernment. Within Germany different blocs of Länder take different positions with regard to the 
CP, the eastern and western Länder benefit from the policy whilst the southern do not. The 
79 Tarschys, D. Reinventing Cohesion: The future of European Structural Policy Report 17, Swedish Institute for European 
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87See note 79 Tarschys, (2003) p.30 'Second» there is a strong link between Structural Policy and the CAP. Where the CAP is 
difficult to adjust because of all the intricate trade-offs that have gone into constructing it, Structural Policy is all the more 
adjustable and can therefore readily be used as a counterweight balancing skewed measures of compensation in the agricul-
tural field.5 
88 ibid p.23 
89 ibid p. 19 
90 ibid p.26-27 
91 See note 44 Peterson; Bomberg (1999) .p. 153 
289 
federal government has to take into consideration such differing positions in its own position-
ing in the Council and also in general negotiations.920wing to some degree of devolution 
other states like the UK, Spain and Italy, likewise have to take into consideration the views of 
their regions and local authorities which are receiving support from the funds, MSs are also 
influenced by developments in other sectors which can be affected by the CP in the broadest 
sense, for example on state aids, and this will affect their stance in CP negotiations.94It is like-
ly that sub national and economic and social actors affected by such developments will give 
input to their governments. 
There are strong vocal 'constituencies' and support for the CP,95which the Commission is ca-
pable of 'mobilising,' as the following quotation illustrates, 'While strong interests are now 
being mobilised for the continuation of Structural Policy in its present form,'96as part of its ' . 
. . defending and protecting . . . , ' its turf.97 DG REGIO like its counterpart DG AGRI reacted 
very strongly to the Sapir Report, discussed later, and the recommendations to reform the 
budget, that it seemed clear they were supporting their turf and no doubt also fighting for their 
institutional survival: 
'Within days of the publication of the report, the Commissioners of Agriculture and of Cohe-
sion condemned the recommendations, in particular on the budget. Clearly, their disagreement 
is a pure case of protection of turf and/or power, rather than the outcome of a reflection on 
what would be best for EU growth in the longer run. Since the Union's public interest is cap-
tured in the latter, a reform of the budget should be embraced rather than shot down, even if 
this requires an overhaul of today's powers or assignments. At the same time it demonstrates 
how hard progress will be on this dossier.'98 
From this perspective, the subsequent mobilization of interests supporting the DG and the 
funds, as opposed to the good of the EU as a whole and the Commission, has to be viewed 
with suspicion. The Commission can maybe be stated to be mobilizing its networks to resist 
reform, the subsequent success that they appeared to be having, so far, is reflective of the 
strength of the network at the DG's disposal. One particular constituency of importance is that 
of the various groups of MSs which are ' . . . supportive of the particular programmes aimed 
in their own direction.'99 France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are said 
to support the SFs for their ' . . . tangible expression of solidarity . . . , ' and Austria, Belgium, 
France, Greece, Portugal and Spain value the policy's ' . . . positive impact on regional devel-
opment.'I00In particular Spain has championed the cause of continuing SFs and predicated its 
willingness to discuss and agree on other issues with agreement by the other MSs that the ba-
sics of the funds remain unchanged. 101Germany and Spain are frequently direct dialogue part-
ners in discussions about the funds, traditionally the former has been the Community pay 
master and the largest economy geared to exports and the latter has received considerable fi-
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nancial support. The EP is strongly supportive of the CP as are the Committee of the Re-
gions and the European Economic and Social Committee.103 
There is a surprisingly low level of demand for the CP, and in particular the SFs. This is ow-
ing to their complex bureaucratic requirements, as shown by the mid term reviews. Monitor-
ing is said to be the most serious element of this. Sometimes the measures on offer seem un-
favorable compared to similar national ones on offer l04let alone the CAP, 4 In contrast with 
expenditure of the CAP, where payments from the fund are largely determined by formula, 
there is a substantial discretionary element in the spending of the structural funds. Taking full 
advantage of the structural funds is a labor-intensive exercise for Member States, both for the 
technocratic standards projects are expected to match, and because of the extensive co-
ordination required to satisfy the partnership principle.'l05The Commission's position as ex-
pressed in the Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion is that even more monitoring is 
going to be required combined with 4 . . . more results-oriented evaluation and potentially new 
reporting requirements to enable assessment of progress under the new national and EU stra-
1 flA 
tegies. . . . ' Furthermore the so called n+2 rule which requires funding to be disbursed 
within two years or it is de-committed and returned to the budgets of the contributor states107 
is to be retained. This despite the fact that the measure whilst encouraging the recipients to 
spend their funds rapidly also is said to 1 . . . compromise the quality of spending.'108 
8.2 COHESION POLICY CRITICISED 
THE SAPIR REPORT AND OTHER CRITICAL VOICES 
Criticisms have been addressed at the CP for a long time, as early as 1996 a MS official was 
voicing his and others' doubts about the efficacy of the policy and that it might be retarding 
'economic dynamism.'I09In 1998 the EP reporting on the financial period 1994-1999 was cri-
tical of the funds 4 . . . is far too complex and must be simplified, MEPs declared . . . poorly 
targeted and seriously underspent. MEPs were especially critical of the Commission's inabil-
ity to keep track of the money once it had been sent to the member states.'H0Other voices 
were raised about the policy itself in 2003, with a Portuguese economist worrying 4 . . . that 
structural aid may have a corrupting effect. . . , '1 U and a 6 . . . senior Greek official in Brus-
sels . . ."The best thing the EU could do for Greece is to cut off the structural funds immedi-
ately", he says. "They're turning Greece into Europe's Mezzogiorno. Anybody who works 
hard at a regular business is regarded as an idiot. . ."'112And others have also been critical of 
the economic effect of the funds. The problem is also a Brussel's political one, according to 
the Economist 4No academic study, though, is likely to have much effect on the structural 
funds industry. Those in Brussels who strive to promote the Union know that EU-financed 
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programmes are among their most effective propaganda instruments. And what national poli-
tician can resist the temptation to trumpet a big new spending programme, particularly if it is 
other countries' taxpayers who are footing the bill,'114 
The debate about the future of the CP is said to have really got underway in 2001 with the 
Commission's adoption of the Second Report on Social and Economic Cohesion. 115lt was fol-
lowed up by a large Commission forum on Cohesion and then the 'General Affairs' Council 
met in June 2001. Spain, in particular, expressed concern about the effects of enlargement on 
'economic and social cohesion'. It should be stated here that Spain and Portugal will lose 
most from changes in the allocation of the SFs and CFs as a result of the enlargement east and 
also, owing to their geography, see less gains made as a result of increased trade. 116A flurry of 
activity and reports followed with the EP passing several resolutions117as well as the Commit-
tee of the Regions118 and the European Economic and Social Committee. n9Against the back-
drop of economic recession and tighter budgets the so called group of six submitted a letter to 
the Commission which stressed the point of view of the main contributors and their desire to 
see Commission spending reformed and reoriented. The basic views of the contributors were 
captured quite neatly in the words of Ambassador Petersson of Sweden. His view and that of 
Sweden was that a new approach was necessary in the allocation of SFs. According to him, 
current SFs within the European Commission budget were unfairly going to certain 'older' 
countries and should be phased out more quickly. Among the then 15 MSs, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece should only receive funds for regions that were below the threshold of 75% of to-
tal national income.120 
But more crucially the Commission President established an Independent High Level Study 
Group to report on making, 'An Agenda for a Growing Europe'; this was the so called Sapir 
Report. The group contained individual leading experts in the European Policy analysis field 
like Helen Wallace. Before going into the report in greater depth it can be said that the then 
current CP set up and justification of it were seen to be inappropriate and inadequate for the 
goals and needs of the EU. The 2003 report appears to have come out of the blue to the offi-
cials in DG REGIO and to have been perceived by them to be a major threat to their very ex-
istence.121 The effect of the report was to create a sense of crisis in the DG with hasty meet-
ings held to draft an effective response to the Sapir report. 122Some officials spoke about the 
2007-2013 negotiating period for the CP as if were a mere possibility and Commission offi-
1 TJ 
cials outside the DG emphasised that this was the case. It was certainly a major reason for 
the tone and response found in the 2004 Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. 
Some of the officials involved in drafting the response considered that they had adequately 
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defended their policy and thus DG. Not overly surprising the report sparked off several 
other reports and articles on the CP of a critical nature. 
The Sapir Report primarily addresses the economic situation in Europe and the need for chan-
ge at every level to restore growth to the continent and so secure the system of social security 
which the continent has enjoyed to date. It was the spectre of continued lack of growth which 
seemed to dominate the report, and economic growth was the measure of all the policies and 
their effectiveness. Interestingly, the report authors stated that they were asked to use the Pa-
doa-Scioppa Report of 1987 as an inspiration. This report was used by Delors as he set out to 
organise the 1988 reform of the SFs. It stressed the; 4 . . . serious risks of aggravated regional 
imbalances in the course of mark liberalization/125and effectively justified the need for the 
strengthening of the funds to balance out and allow for the greater integration of the single 
market. The Sapir Report authors stated that Euro-Sclerosis led to the Single Market Pro-
gramme and the Padoa-Scioppa Report and that the present Lisbon process led to their present 
I ' j / 
report. With regards to CP the report stresses the growing size of its proportion of the bud-
get; in 1988 Agriculture took 60% of the budget and SF 17%; in 1992 it was 52% and 27%; in 
1999 45% to 35% and according to DG REGIO officials soon the SF will exceed Agricul-
ture.127^ 1988 1.15% of Community GDP was taken by the budget; in 1992 it was 1.20%; in 
1999 it was 1,27%.128 90% of the EU budget is financed from national payments from treasur-
ies rather than from VAT and taxes 4 . . . levied on EU wide fiscal basis.'129This is quite dif-
ferent to the situation which had existed earlier in the history of the CP where VAT receipts 
had been considerably higher. 
In particular the resources of the Commission are criticised, 4 . . . the Commission should ha-
ve its resources extended to provide high-quality and well-focused advice and processing of 
grants.' ,30This is repeated later in the report with,4 . . . the staffing of the Commission needs 
to be reinforced to provide absolutely first class expertise in all core policy areas that we have 
discussed in this Report, as well as a deep understanding of the situations in each of the 
Member States, especially in the light of enlargement. This implies enabling the Commission 
to hire experienced professionals instead of assessing abilities and skills on the basis of a uni-
form recruitment procedure.' l31The call is for a 'leaner Commission' ready to tackle the stra-
tegic tasks which are considered to be its 'primary purpose.'132This is reminiscent of the stra-
tegic policy group style Commission that Monnet envisaged when he laid his plans in the 
1950s. It is also similar to his Commissariat du Plan mentioned in chapter 1. And; 'a radical 
change in budgetary procedure towards: more ex post evaluation of expenditures based on 
meeting criteria specified ex-ante; devolution of responsibility for budget execution to rele-
vant local, national or EU actors; qualified majority voting for the adoption of the multi-
annual budgetary guidelines.'133Several of the recommendations like this which were made in 
the report are found in the Commission proposal for the new regulation. 
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8.2.1 CRITICISM OF THE 'CONVERGENCE' OBJECTIVE; AND FURTHER 
'ECONOMIC CRITICISM' 
The objective of convergence of the DG is stated as follows, 'the "convergence" objective 
concerns the less developed MSs and regions which in accordance with the Treaty are the top 
priority for CP. The Treaty calls for a reduction in disparities between ' . . . the levels of de-
velopment of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions or is-
lands, including rural areas (article 158) . . . This objective concerns, first and foremost, those 
regions, whose per capita GDP is less that 75% of the Community average. The key objective 
of cohesion policy in this context would be to promote growth-enhancing conditions and fac-
tors leading to real convergence. Strategies should plan for the development of long-term 
competitiveness and employment.'134The Sapir Report is most critical about the ' . . . pre-
dominantly regional focus of cohesion policy . . . ,' which 4 . . . generates two results . . . a. 
All Member States, except Luxembourg and Denmark (and Belgium and Netherlands from 
2007) have at least one region receiving financial aid under objective 1.' The second result 
is that whilst economic convergence has occurred between MSs, the regions which have been 
primarily targeted by the policy to date have suffered the opposite fate, 'Inequality within 
each country accounted for roughly half of total EU regional inequality in the early 1980s, but 
this rose to about two thirds by the mid 1990, while inequality between countries fell by about 
a third during that period,' i.e. there has been 'country convergence' and 'regional diver-
gence.'136Furthermore the GDP data simply is not sufficient to conclusively prove that the CP 
necessarily affected the areas concerned and whether or not the areas might have seen similar 
changes in the GDP resulting from other factors.I370ther authors have added that the dispari-
ties had been 'over-stated, as a result of'double-counting,' and that how the disparities de-
creased remained to some extent a mystery owing to the inevitable complexity surrounding 
such economic developments, but the role of the EU CP was likely to be minimal. The very 
notion of there being a useful connection between convergence and cohesion was also ques-
tionable. 139i40Studies that have been made seem rather inconclusive where ' . . . relatively 
simple models with only a few variables tend to hint at a stronger influence than more com-
plex models integrating different types of secondary effect.' And the objectivity of the studies 
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and which are chosen as such depends on the position taken, 'Not surprisingly, the European 
Commission appears more prepared to trust studies indicating a greater impact.'141 
Economic theoiy can also throw some light on the CP. Those in favour of the policy tend to 
support 'agglomeration theories' and '" . . . new growth" or "new trade" theories. . . . 
'142These latter theories state that more ' . . . trade openness combined with increasing returns 
and a variety of external effects will produce agglomeration phenomena, poverty traps, eco-
nomic divergence and increased inequality. Hence, when differently endowed countries start 
trading with each other, the richer or more advanced one "wins" while the other loses.'143Ag-
glomeration theories4 . . . predict that capital and labor move toward where their complemen-
tary factor of production is more abundant, thereby leading to a concentration of economic 
activity in a few privileged areas and leaving the rest far behind. Hence the need for active 
public intervention to prevent factors (especially labor) from moving around too much and for 
subsidizing economic activity in poorer areas where it would not, otherwise, take 
place.'144Obviously those working in the area of regional support as DG REGIO does will 
take this theory as being justification for their work, 'Unfortunately, when looking at conver-
gence data there is a strong tendency to see what out personal prejudices would like them to 
show. It is for this reason, we believe, that in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, the "ag-
glomeration" hypothesis seems to be more popular than ever. Research produced at or around 
the European Commission, especially the Directorate for Regional Policies, is an excellent 
example of this phenomenon.'145However the following is stated to be the case, '"new 
growth" or "new trade" theoiy models are comfortably rejected by the data . . . , ' and 'We are 
not aware of any historical experience of trade integration showing support for this kind of 
predictions. In fact, all recorded episodes of increased trade openness, at the national or inter-
national level, have generated the opposite outcome; poorer areas have either strictly gained . . 
. on the leader or have kept distances roughly constant.'146 
It appears that an array of assumptions are involved in linking convergence to cohesion which 
should have to been separated to arrive at a more coherent route to cohesion. Cohesion is 
seemingly used by DG REGIO in a rather vague manner and can cover a wide range of things 
and the policy should change to match it147Arguably the current definition is too broad and 
this does not help the DG target its scarce resources optimally. The Sapir Report recommends 
that a convergence policy remain but that it should ' . . . focus on countries, rather than re-
gions.'I48Another solution proffered is to abandon the overt convergence objective altogether, 
'A third option, to be outlined in the following section, would be to undertake radical internal 
reforms within Structural Policy by downgrading or even abandoning convergence as a policy 
objective, and making cohesion the principal purpose of policy interventions. This would im-
ply a discontinuation of certain elements in the present policy package but a continuation and 
development of others. Above all, it would imply the suppression of subsidies aimed at satis-
fying exclusively local needs in favour of projects and programmes having a clear trans-
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national or European dimension.'I49Despite the fact that the Commission supported projects 
are clearly labelled as such, there is a sense that the Commission is missing out on really 
choosing and planning projects which are very much Union oriented rather than local subsi-
dies for local concerns which lack this dimension and so 4 . . . boost to the sense of commu-
nity and shared fate.'150 
At least one pair of authors have used 4 . . . a simple econometric exercise . . . , ' l 5 land 4 . . . 
economic theory and empirical evidence . . . , ' to press home the argument that the CP needs 
to be considered differently and spent4 . . . more eff icient ly. . . . ' If it can not, it should " . . . 
be terminated as they amount to nothing more than pork barrel spending to favour one lobby 
after the n e x t . . , . ' The reason for their continuation is various 4 . . . political games . . . 51 2 
which amount to little more than pay offs to allow other policies to be carried 
through.153Whilst allowing for the improvement of infrastructure and not being wasted as 
such, the funds do not appear to achieve their goals 4 . . . they do not alter the long run growth 
rate of the recipient regions in any significant way,' 154whereas 4 . . . national policies do 
make a huge difference; national policies that reduce distorting taxes and unproductive public 
spending, liberalize labor markets and foster job search and retraining, attract FDI (foreign 
direct investment) and minimize income support transfers seem to lead to sustained period of 
above average growth.'155SF payments seem to lead to 4 . . . stagnating growth performance, 
little downward pressure on wages, rent-seeking activities by non-participants and unem-
ployed and strong incentives to maintain the status quo, a picture which duplicates to a large 
extent the experience of the southern part of Italy and of a number of other provinces of 
southern Spain.' 156It also reduces money available for other more productive activities as SFs j cn 
have to be taken from productive economic actors via taxation. 
8.2.2 COHESION POLICY: VAGUENESS AND COMPLEXITY AND MS POWER 
The objectives laid out in the SF are notoriously broad even the latest version, with aims such 
as 'convergence' which can cover a large range of projects leading to what can be described 
as 4 . . . goal congestion.' I58The inclusion of competitiveness in one of the objectives is an-
other example; the following quotations illustrate the broad nature of the SF, 'The very omni-
presence of Structural Policy makes it difficult to pin down and evaluate . . . ,'159and 4 . . . the 
cornucopia of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund serving to supplement the meagre 
direct appropriations to the various sectors in the EU budget.' 160This vagueness of the objec-
tives of the CP is sympathetically criticised as the inevitable outcome from the complex ' . . . 
horse-trading . . . ,' that has over time resulted in the web of commitments and payments to 
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MSs. This vagueness is what allows so many variant commitments to be covered and 4 . . . 
fragile agreements . . . , ' kept complete. 161The Sapir report states that the: 
4 . . . link between Community fund disbursement and genuine regional development needs is 
weakened by a politically unavoidable tendency to balance transfers across Member States. 
This is reinforced by the fact that the unanimity rule in decision making, which regulated the 
planning of cohesion policy funds, gives every country a considerable amount of leverage. 
Secondly, Member States have a tendency to trade cohesion policy funds against other finan-
cial flows, such as those under the common agricultural policy and other internal spending 
¥ Jj ^ 
programmes which have fewer strings attached.' 
The negotiations to set the financial perspectives are said to constantly follow the 4 . , . line of 
least resistance, which consists of modifying, at the margin only, the financial allocations of 
the previous period. As a result, the current budget is more the expression of different deals 
and attempts by governments to claw back in receipts as much of their contribution as possi-
ble (juste retour again!) than a coherent set of measures aimed at pursuing EU objec-
tives.'163The necessity of some if not total '^nationalisation' is stressed by the author who 
1 /IJ 
adds that the majority of regional policies are carried out by MSs in any case, 
MSs can thus be seen to be very much in control of essential elements of the CP and whilst 
some might prefer there to be less of it, or that the CP be directed towards different goals or 
want to retain their receipts from it, broadly most seem to wish to retain it. The report implies 
that the status quo proves that the EU and its assorted institutions and parts are n o t 4 . . . seri-
ous and determined to achieve growth and solidarity;' which require the budget to be 4 . . . 
radically restructured.'165MSs are responding to their 4 . . , national political constraints . . . 
166and more concerned about claiming a national success than 4 . . , about being sure that 
money is spent on worthwhile projects, let alone those fostering convergence in the EU as a 
whole.'167 
8.2.3 COHESION POLICY SHOULD BE RE-FOCUSED 
1 AS 
The 4 . . . design and implementation . . . ,' of the policy are considered not to be focused 
enough, in particular the regional targeting of i t Any future CP should 4 . . . focus on coun-
tries. . . . 9 I t can be said to be in urgent need of reform and re organisation in order to fulfil 
the task it set out to achieve. The policy should aim to 4 . . . help low-income countries to have 
good and stable administrative capacity; and . . . should be sustaining high investment rates in 
human and physical capital.' 170In both the above the MSs should be allowed to allocate the 
,f i l See note 79 Tarschys, (2003) p.89-90 'In such a wide and complex political space as the European Union, it should not 
surprise us that some horse-trading takes place, that combimzioni are a natural part of the system of governance and that 
imprecise objectives are often employed as the glue required to keep fragile agreements together. When a whole army of 
evaluators is then dispatched into the quagmire of implementation to find out whether these objectives have actually been 
attained and return with rather vague tidings about impact and outcomes, they also deserve our sympathy and understanding'. 
162 See note 7 Sapir Report (2003) p.58 
163 ibid p. 162 
1MSee note 79 Tarschys, (2003) p.89-90 'The spectre of "renationalisation"is often conjured up as a horrendous step back-
wards in the integration process, but as we have seen above(3.3), this term is a bit of a misnomer. Most regional policies and 
other policies with a regional impact were always incumbent on the Member States, as was the bulk of aggregate territorial 
redistribution*. 
165 See note 7 Sapir Report (2003) p.162 
m ibid p. 146 
167 ibid p. 146 
m ibid p,146 
169 ibid p. 146 
170 ibid p. 146 
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funds as they see fit whilst the 4 . . . operational principles . . . ,' of the CP remain intact. 
The multi annual programming method combined with Member State co-financing and the 
securing of additionality ensured " . . . political acceptability . . . ,' l72by keeping contributors 
on board. It also prevented;4 . . . crowding o u t . . .,'173domestic investment and 4 . . , shielded 
i ^ J 
investment expenditure from the economic cycle.' Interestingly enough the budget would 
not need to be above 1% of Union GDP, as opposed to the 1.27% it is presently. It would ap-
pear to be the case that sorting out a cupboard makes more room even if it takes more effort 
than simply buying another one. 
There is a need to adopt policies to meet the need of growth which 4 . . , is also crucial to help 
the Union fulfil its political objectives.'175 The Sapir Report calls for an end to the mismatch 
between the spending priorities of the EU and its current economic priorities, and thus a 
change in the inertia which is found in the 4 . . . allocation of EU spending.'176In the area of 
CP they call for policy instruments to no longer combine objectives like growth and cohesion, 
it should be one or the other.,77Some of the CP elements have even had a somewhat detrimen-
tal effect on the regions they were supposed to assist, 4As our analysis makes clear, policies 
carried out at the EU level have in a number of cases interfered with the specialisation of re-
gions in the aftermath of economic integration, and quite deliberately so since such policies 
were aimed at preventing agglomeration effects in the first place.'1 8The situation was one 
where 4 . . . some specific instruments chosen to preserve cohesion in the course of the proc-
ess of market liberalisation and integration may have exerted too high a toll in terms of 
growth.'179The DG and the Commission desire to stress the positive link between the CP and 
economic growth is the current bugbear of the EU, but at times convergence can be seen as a 
negative to growth. !80The funds should not be used to fund 4 . . . grand objectives of growth, 
employment and regional c o n v e r g e n c e . . . a s the link between these and the funds is too 4 . . 
. tenuous . . . , ' to justify the use of European Common funds.181 
The report stresses the importance of administration in the development of M S s , 4 . . . the qua-
lity of local administration can be a binding constraint on the effectiveness of EU Cohesion 
Policy and on the convergence process as a whole.'182 In particular the ability of a MS to ab-
sorb SFs is dependent on its administration. Administrative capacity and the need to develop 
I an 
it in the NMSs was stressed by the Copenhagen criteria. Part at least of the Irish success sto-
ry is that it4 . . . has been able to maintain good standards of administrative capacity and in 
171 See note 7 Sapir Report (2003) p. 147 
172 ibid p. 146 
m ibid p.I46 
m ibid p. 146 
175 ibid p. 124 
176 ibid p. 126 
177 ibid p. 125 
178 ibid p.72 
179 ibid p. 72 
18(1 See note 79 Tarschys, (2003) p,92-95 'The fuzzy relationship between convergence and general economic growth is an-
other matter of concern, Growth is a key priority for the European Union, anchored in a range of recent texts, such as the 
1997 Stability and Growth Pact and the Presidency Conclusions of the 2000 Lisbon and 2001 Göteborg Councils. The pursuit 
of convergence is partially compatible with this goal in so far as it seeks to stimulate growth in lagging regions, adapt man-
power to new demand and support the modernisation of various distressed areas. But from the limited point of view of con-
vergence it would not be bad news if growth were to slacken in the wealthier parts of the Union. How the two ambitions in-
teract is at best uncertain.. On the basis of these considerations, it seems doubtful whether convergence is such a well-chosen 
priority for European policy*, 
ibid p. 95 ' . . .but if there is no European value added and no outreach to other countries, then there should be no European 
funding. Pouring Structural Policy resources into small and medium-size enterprises simply to "create jobs" or "maintain 
jobs" should come to an end. None of these tasks have been adequately defined, and the contribution of this effort to the 
grand objectives of growth, employment and regional convergence is too tenuous to merit common European financing. 
r82 See note 7 Sapir Report (2003) p. 62 
183 ibid p,62 
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general a favourable investment climate.'184The final recommendations of the report were for 
the CP to concentrate on institution building and R and D, education and training.,85This was 
largely shared by the article referred to previously which elaborated on the human resource 
side: 
'Moving from the present formula of "cohesion through economic convergence" to a new 
formula of "cohesion by the most cost-effective means available" would give added promi-
nence to investments in the non-material sphere . . , There would be more support for ex-
change and mobility programmes facilitating trans-national meetings between groups and in-
dividuals and for efforts to enhance the awareness of our common heritage and common pol-
icy problems. Since education, culture and mass communications would be crucial arenas in 
this pursuit, it is important to underline the need for pluralism and diversity.'186 
Transport and environmental projects with a European dimension could still be financed1 ^ ac-
cording to the same author. 
8.2.4 COURT OF AUDITOR CRITICISMS 
The problematic state of the Commission for the period of 2000-2006 was analysed by the 
Court of Auditors in their Special Report which highlights several areas needing attention. 
The statistics which the Commission used were not up-to-date and resulted in 10 regions re-
ceiving funding which would not have been the case if recent statistics had been used.I88Sev-
1 QQ 
eral 4 . . . unrealistic deadlines . . . set out by the Commission in the related regulation 
failed to be reached owing to the Commission's internal reforms and restructuring in 2000. 
Further reasons were 4 . . . changes in consultation procedures . . . ,' combined with a fuzzy 
division of responsibilities between it and the MSs and the 4 . . . cumbersome nature of the 
adoption process.'190The Commission and MSs also have ' . . . different approaches to the 
drafting and finalisation of programming documents . . . ,' with the former turning the pro-
gramming into a sequential series of steps each of which must be completed before the next 
can be considered whilst the MSs aim to be holistic, a lack of consistency resulted which led 
to delays. ,9 ,The expected simplification of the programming failed to materialise with bu-
reaucratic hurdles leading to delays192and a ' . . . hiatus in the aid-granting process, especially 1 Cl^  
where grants to enterprises were concerned.' The MSs use Commission working documents 
to successfully complete their programming work, however these are said to be still not good 
enough for the task and fail to assist political decision makers comparing the various 'public 
intervention' principles some of which may well have been more productive. 194The evaluation 
methods used by MSs at the ex-ante stage 4 . . . focused on justifying the chosen strategy. 
There was no critical appraisal or analysis of alternative strategies.' Whatever the theory, as 
stated by the Commission, the practice did not match it and although ' . . . the quality of 
184 See note 7 Sapir Report (2003) p,62 
185 ibid p. 147 
186 See note 79 Tarschys, (2003) p.96 
187 ibid p.94 
188 Court of Auditors, Special Report No 7/2003 on the implementation of assistance programming for the period 2000 to 
2006 within the framework of the Structural Funds together with the Commission's reply 2003/C 174/01p.8 § 9 
189 ibid pJO; § 19 
190 ibid p. 10; § 20 
191 ibid p. 10; § 21 
193 ibid p. 10; § 23 
m ibid p. 10; § 24 
194 ibid p . l l ; § 26 '...still not sufficiently detailed'; ' . . .made no attempt to investigate alternative strategies and activities'; 
' . . .do not specifically require detailed information on all the national and regional policies concerned; 'the basic principles 
which justify public intervention, and to which political decision-makers may refer, arc inadequately highlighted. The work-
ing documents and guidelines also fail to highlight other principles, such as those which aim to avoid deadweight or dis-
placement effects or to guarantee the added value or incentive effect of aid or the sustainability of results and impacts.' 
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evaluations was rather uneven and at times unsatisfactory . . . the Commission . . . intervened 
in only a few cases,' problems were present in the area of indicators and objectives and their 
quantification, which led to problems of verification and the best distribution of 
resources. 195The Commission 4 . . . recommended the use of state of the art macroeconomic 
models'l96which it did not use itself and the models 4 . . . were used to limited effect,' by the 
MSs. The models themselves seem to have limitations, in particular their national ap-107 
proach. The Commission is stated as not being in a position 4 . . . to obtain a valid compara-
tive analysis of results between member states . . . , ' as 4 . . . the Commission has not yet mas-I QQ 
tered this combining of approaches and models.' The, on the whole, top down approach to 
setting indicators led to a 4 . , . lack of coherence between indicators of different levels . . . ,' 
and so 4 . . . the indicators expression of objectives, results and achievements was often in-
complete or sometimes irrelevant. . . , ' but improvement is stated to have occurred. ,990ther 
means of monitoring and evaluating the financing plans were said to have lost their effective-
ness and to 4 . . . simply reproduce the annual breakdown set out in the financial perspective, 
without including realistic forecasts of how the structural action will progress.'200The per-
formance reserve which was created to reward MSs which achieved certain objectives, was a 
good idea, but is said to have been 'severely compromised,' as 4 . . . in practice, the perform-
ance reserve entails a complex procedure for reallocating funds, where the almost free choice 
of criteria or indicators and the freedom to exploit them . . . may lead to inconsistencies and 
ineffectiveness in the use of the reserve . . . many of the choices made by the Member States 
depart substantially from the indicative list provided by the Commission.' Far from the fund 
being a reward it is often stated that4 . . . in no event will it remain unused.'201 
Guidelines 4 . . . for the closure of measures are not sufficient to compensate for the lack of 
binding provisions in the regulations, or to harmonise practices between the various funds. 
The current provisions do not provide a guarantee of the legality and regularity of the transac-
tions underlying the Community contributions for all completed periods. . . The checks car-
ried out by the Commission are still inadequate. The organisational measures taken in 2000 
have yet to produce any tangible results.'202There were 4 . . . delays in introducing the control 
structure and organising controls that are to cover the whole of 2000 to 2006 . . . , ' and 
weaknesses (no on the spot check, insufficient audit trail) were also found at the level of the 
internal controls for which the managing authority is responsible.'^Implementation was in 
2000 slower than expected, even though rules had been brought into force to speed things up 
and there was4 . . . considerable under-utilisation of commitment and payment appropriations 
. . . ,' and the Commission did not explain why some programmes had not been 
A A 4 
adopted. The Commission data base 4 . . . still has some gaps and is difficult to use for veri-
fying and analysing expenditure statements, annual reports and payment forecasts,' resulting 
in the Commission only using it for one task which 4 . . . makes the Commission's role more 
195 See note 188 Court of Auditors, Special Report No 7/2003 p. 13 § 35-36 'shortcomings in the quantification of relevant 
indicators and objectives...Generally speaking, the programming did not ensure that the methods used to quantify indicators 
and costs were verifiable. In a similar vein, the Commission and Member States seldom verified that the principles justifying 
public sector intervention had been applied. The other principles described in paragraph 26e were barely touched upon in the 
programming of CSFs and assistance...These are significant omissions, because they weaken the cohesion of CSFs and SF 
intervention. They are a barrier to the optimum choice of the resources to be used to satisfy the specific needs of the regions 
as regards sustainable development, convergence, employment, competitiveness, productivity and the integration of target 
groups.* 
ibid p. 13; § 37 
197 ibid p. 13; §39 
198 ibid p. 14; §41 
199 ibid p. 14; §43 
200 ibid p. 14; § 45 
301 ibid p.I8;§ 51-52 
202 Court of Auditor's Report on Activities Financed from the General Budget year 2000; information note p. 18 
2W See note 188 Court of Auditors, Special Report No 7/2003 p. 18; § 57 
20A See note 202 Court of Auditor's Report on Activities Financed from the General Budget year 2000 p. 16 
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difficult, since it has to use data interchange both for dynamic and strategic monitoring of pro-
gramme priorities and for formulating observations or recommendations. . . . '205The MSs 
logically enough had problems using the database206 and much of the data from the last pro-
gramming period had yet to be entered meaning that ' . . . in some cases there is even a risk of 
duplicate payments to beneficiaries.'^Insufficiently detailed instructions from the Commis-
sion led to annual implementation reports being submitted late.208The eligibility rules lacked 
precision and some basic concepts like 1 . . . legal commitment and financial commitment.. . . 
are less clearly defined than before/ and other changes to the text created problems with re-
gard to alternative financing.209Some concepts were included in the new rules but4 . . . their 
meaning has sometimes been changed . . . , ' which 4 . . . allows final beneficiaries a very wide 
margin for manoeuvre as regards limitations or differences of interpretation.... ,21° 
111 
All in all there appears to have been a lack in thoroughness right through the SF and the 
Commission was a partner in them and had a crucial role which it seemed not always to have 
lived up to. With regard to the issue of eligibility of private expenditure 4 , . . the type of deci-
_ ^ | ^ 
sion being equal, the Commission's management is not always consistent.' New mecha-
nisms led to delays and turned out to be bureaucratic additions213and 4 . . . the objective of 
simplification has still not been fully attained, and sometimes, the reverse has been achie-Oil 
ved.' Furthermore management systems 4 . . . are still incomplete and inadequately de-
fined.'215Far from there being one European-wide policy there seemed, at times, to be wide 
MS variance in many aspects of the funds2I6and too often the goal seemed to be to simply O 1 T 
spend the funds rather than concentrating on effectiveness. The undertaking by the Com-
mission to 4 . . . improve consistency between regional policy and competition policy' so that 
the areas allowed to receive state aid matched with those in a position to receive SFs, did not 
218 occur. 
8.2.5 THE COMMISSION RESPONSE; REFORM CALLS RESISTED; THE 
THIRD REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COHESION AND THE 
NEW COUNCIL REGULATION PROPOSED 
The Commission response to the criticism laid at its door by the Sapir report, the main con-
tributor MSs and others was seemingly to generate the Third Report on Economic and Social 
Cohesion. It was stated by the Economist that 'the Sapir Report suggested a rethink . . . Sadly 
the Commission, under pressure from national governments, ignored it.,2l9Instead the Com-
mission identified 4 . . . our challenges for the future . . . :' a need for more cohesion owing to 
the enlargement and a reinforcement of the Union's priorities. It stressed a need to 4 . . . pro-
mote more balanced and sustainable development and finally to establish a "new partnership 
for cohesion.'"220Overall the document acknowledges the need for improved targeting 4 . . . 
205 Sec note 202 Court of Auditor's Report on Activities Financed from the General Budget year 2000 p. 19; § 61 
20fi ibid p, 19; § 59 
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209 ibid p . l 9 ;§ 70-71 
2 . 0 ibid p.20; § 73 
2 .1 ibid p.21; § 79-78 and p,23; § 95 and § 92 
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213 ibid p.23; § 88 
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more concentration . . . '22Iof its resources on a more limited number of priorities in particular 
towards meeting the current Community priorities set at Lisbon and Gothenburg and only 
when 'Community intervention can be expected to bring about a leverage effect and signifi-
cant added value.' The previous objectives 1, 2 and 3 are replaced by the titles: conver-
* 22*3 
gence; regional competitiveness and employment and territorial co-operation. There are 
recommendations for: a ' . . . reformed delivery system . . . , ' which would involve the use of 
new strategic documents and annual assessments of progress made on progress towards the 
meeting of the goals set in these; more decentralization and programming simplification; T ^  
more emphasis placed on quality and performance. The way that state aids are dealt with at 
present in the EU would also be altered. The report also addresses the need to revise the way 
that contributions are paid to the EU, with a change in its 'own resources' appropriation 
method, to allow for its income to proceed from ' . . , energy consumption, VAT resources or 
corporate income . . . ,'226this would possibly reduce the situation of overt payments being 
made by national treasuries to the EU with all the political fallout that results. 
All in all, the document represents a dynamic and vigorous response to the criticisms made in 
the previous year. Far from the DG backing down or reducing the SFs as recommended, al-
though there is to be greater targeting and some of the observations made by the critics appear 
to have been addressed, the report states: 
' . . . that the Union's intervention in a number of key policy fields required strengthening. In 
particular, the Commission decided that an ambitious cohesion policy should be an essential 
element of the total package. Importantly, in the new budgetary structure, the Commission 
maintains the view that cohesion policy should be allocated a single, and transparent, budget-
ary heading which is essential in order to provide the certainty and stability necessary for the 
planning of the next generation of national and regional multi annual programmes . . . that co-
hesion policy, (is) one of the pillars of the European construction together with the single 
market and the monetary un ion . . . . '227And 'this also means that the concept of cohesion that 
has applied at the European level has not been a passive one that redistributes income but a 
dynamic policy that seeks to create resources by targeting the factors of economic competi-
tiveness and employment ,228 
The text continues with stressing how CP has served the Union well and will do more so in 
the future.229 Financially the report proposes that the CP annual expenditure increase from 
38.8 Billion Euros in 2006 to 51 Billion in 2013,230this 
represents a ' . . . substantial in-
crease.'23lWhilst the foreword states that the report is the result of three years work as op-
posed to purely a response to the Sapir Report, a later paragraph states,' . . . in the course of 
these consultations, 1 have been asked many searching questions on the impact, the "added 
value," of the interventions of the European Union in this field. For example, has cohesion 
policy succeeded in reducing the economic, social and territorial inequalities in standards of 
living and levels of opportunity? The report provides a detailed response to such important 
221 See note 115 The Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (2004) i p.xxxvi 
222 ibid p.xxvti 
223 ibid p.xxvii 
224 ibid p.xxxiv 
225 ibid p.xxxvii 
226 See note 92 Bachtler,; Wishlade (2004) p. 10 
227 See note 115 The Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (2004) p.xxv 
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questions/ Discussions with officials confirmed the view that the report did also represent a 
defense of the policy from the Sapir report and other critics.233 
The rather unfortunate backdrop to the Commission's report, was the combination of the en-
largement and more MSs which would obviously be eligible for considerable support under 
the CP. And this at a time of economic malaise in the EU and a lackluster progress towards 
achieving the Lisbon agenda. This last concern was reflected in the report's content and em-
phasis on the Lisbon goals.234More detailed analysis of the report and the policy changes that 
it outlines and recommends show that235the CP would be less project and area specific and 
time bound in its application, and would rather become a ' . . . permanent, horizontal policy 
pursuing the goal of balanced territorial development . . , ,' and thus assisting the goal of 
'economic convergence.' Under the convergence objective MSs and their regions which 
lost out as a result of the statistical change in calculating the GNP of the Union as a result of 
the enlargement would be compensated. This statistical change arose from the SF require-
ment, that only regions which have less than 75% of the EU average GDP per head receive 
assistance via the SF, being affected by the enlargement. The average fell as a result of the 
NMSs, meaning that some regions whose situation had remained unchanged in reality, found 
themselves suddenly above the 75% cut off line. Thus old MSs under the compensatory re-
gime to ameliorate the above would still be receiving considerable levels of funds 237Under 
the competitiveness and employment objective MSs would control the disbursement of funds 
within their territory which is maybe a move in the direction recommended by the Sapir re-
port.238The naming of the third objective 'European territorial cooperation,' was probably also 
an attempt to prove the European added value of the policy and to make it even more obvious. 
It is in practice ' . . . an expanded version,' and renamed version of a previous policy the IN-
TERREG initiative.2390n the CF front, Spain and Ireland would both cease to receive fund-
ing, but some authors found i t ' . . . difficult to envisage that no transitional arrangements will 
be made for Spain.'240 
The use of the 4% cap on payments to the NMSs would now be extended to all. The 4% cap 
worked on the basis that countries, in particular the applicant ones, were considered to be un-
able to effectively absorb more than 4% of their GDP in the form of SFs. Thus any funds 
which would have been allocated, owing to other methods of calculation, over and above this 
would be removed. Whatever its justification and the truth in it, it was only the NMSs which 
would be affected and they would otherwise have received more funding had it not been put 
in place. Extending it to ail MSs might look like solidarity and that the same rules apply to all 
but this seems a bit empty if not cynical.24'According to one article the so called Berlin for-
mula, would appear to have been the means of calculation that the Commission would use, 
but this was problematic as then the Commission's sums did not add up and despite the inten-
tion of applying one rule for all, in practice the NMSs would have their income decided by the 
4% cap whilst the old MSs by the Berlin formula.242Since the 4% rule applied to all payments 
232 See note 115 The Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (2004) foreword p.iii 
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including those from the CF and other instruments the amount the NMSs would be losing was 
even greater.243 
MSs have their own positions on the CP debate and these range from supportive to those wan-
ting the budget to be limited and the policy likewise, other MSs find themselves in between. 
In particular Spain, Greece and Portugal called for an increase in spending and linked this call 
to concerns about competitiveness and the Monetary Union; the NMSs supported them in 
this.244The richer countries called for a reduction from the current amount, unlike the Com-
mission they would like to see a ceiling set at 1% GNP and then decide on priorities, unlike 
the Commission which preferred to see expenditure levels set and then the required budget 
agreed.245An interesting range of arguments against any increase were given: Germany stated 
the budgetary pressure that contributor states were under;246the UK was unconvinced that 
elements of the policy represented any added value and even thought they had a negative ef-
fect on economic performance;247the Dutch saw that efficiency and effectiveness issues were 
not met by the policy and that it could be better dealt with at a lower level;248 and there was 
concern expressed that NMSs would in fact be negatively affected by any increase in the 
budget as they would also face increased contributions and would end up financing CP sup-
port to richer old MSs,249MSs in between the two extremes did not consider a reduction to be 
feasible but agreed that discipline was necessary and that it should be spread over all poli-
cies. MSs mostly regarded the move of the creating 'thematic priorities' to fit in with the 
Lisbon and Gothenburg goals to be a positive approach. Although some MSs thought that the 
concentration of the funds could be improved as the term 'competitiveness' could cover eve-
rything. Germany, the Netherlands and Italy took this view.251 Spain in particular wanted the 
statistical growth element taken into consideration.252 
With regard to the new ' . . . delivery system . . *,' and the stated goal of simplification of im-
plementation of the funds MSs expressed skepticism as they were promised this before in 
1999 and it was not forthcoming. This skepticism in the simplification of the funds was ex-
pressed by the EP as well, 'The Committee welcomes the strengthened strategic approach to 
cohesion policy in the draft Regulation and acknowledges the stated desire of the European 
Commission to simplify the procedures concerning the Funds. However, our Committee is 
concerned that these new procedures may increase bureaucracy . . . '253Given some of the 
proposals contained in the report, this skepticism would appear justified as will be discussed 
later, at this point it enough to say that it seemed hard for the Commission to add more evalu-
ative and monitoring devices and stages to the funds and at the same time expect them to be 
simpler. Federally inclined MSs expressed concern about the new planning framework which 
j 
might weaken subsidiarity in favour of the central government. Ireland and other states were 
uneasy about the ' . . . practicalities of the proposal . . . ,'and the ' . . . potentially dispropor-
tionate administrative cost . . . ,' where the drawing up of the new national strategy papers 
was concerned. Furthermore they were worried about the; ' . . . degree of detail . . . ,' that 
these must contain and also the role of the Council in drawing up the EU level strategies.255 
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Final points which require addressing are that the report failed to accept the fact that CP can 
do little to achieve the Lisbon goals. MSs like Germany thought that the Lisbon goals will be 
mostly achieved through ' . . . structural reforms such as market liberalization and not via in-
struments such as cohesion policy.' This maybe fits in well with the Sapir report and other 
critics which suggest that given the limited resources available to the CP it should avoid in-
volvement in the Lisbon agenda. The legitimation that this might give to the policy in the 
short term may well prove to be a liability in the longer term. The Commission proposals re-
veal possible 4 . . . conflict between the goals of competitiveness and cohesion . . . , ' with the 
shift in focus going from regions needing help to 4 . . . measures which encompass all regions 
and . . . shift the thematic focus away from investment and employment to issues such as in-
novative capacity.'257 Also the infra structure needs of recipient MSs could be detrimental to 
their ability to meet or participate in competitiveness schemes. To some extent the complexity 
of SF administration has already proven to be prohibitive in practice, to states dealing with 
competitiveness issues.258The policy shift of the Commission could lead to the situation of all 
regions being eligible to receive funds and this has resulted in Germany and the main recipi-
ent countries being skeptical and wanting the funds to be properly targeted. Maybe the report 
represents the Commission trying to offer something to everyone although this hardly fits in 
with the goals of concentration.2 9Finally the policy objective of territorial cohesion still re-
mained unclear.260 
Interestingly enough, although not particularly surprising, the Commission in its report ap-
peared to take the starting point of economic problems, lower growth and higher unemploy-
ment, as a justification for a new CP rather than cutting down or removing the old. The last 
paragraph under the title 4Why do we need a new Cohesion Policy?' stated, after making the 
connection between the enlargement challenge to competitiveness and internal cohesion and 
that there will be a larger gap between the poor and the rich in the new Europe combined with 
economic restructuring due globalisation, 'Finally, economic growth in the EU has slowed 
appreciably since 2001. As a result, unemployment has risen again in many parts of the Union 
with all the social implications which this entails. As a springboard to the future, the Union 
should fully exploit the opportunities provided by the current trend towards recovery.'261 
8,3 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1260/1999 AND ITS 
PROPOSED REPLACEMENT COM (2004) 492 final. 
In total the DG appeared to be striving to restore its position and that of the CP. If the regula-
tion of 1999 laying down general provisions on the SF is compared to the proposal of 2004 
then there are some clear differences in terms of content and also in tone. All in all, the pro-
posal is considerably more robust than the regulation and gives the Commission a more active 
and decisive role in the policy than it previously held, whilst also continuing the decentralisa-
tion process but at the same time weakening the role of sub national partners. The bare fact 
that the proposal contains 109 articles as opposed to the regulation which has 56 bears witness 
256 See note 92 Bachtler,; Wishlade (2004) p.46 
257 ibid p.51 
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to the apparent new drive by the Commission, to reclaim in detail what it maybe lost in the 
previous simpler regulation. 
The text of the proposal states under Article 10 titled 'Partnership' tha t ' . . . assistance from 
the Funds shall be decided by the Commission within the framework of close cooperation, 
hereinafter "partnership", between the Commission and a Member State. The Member State 
organises, in accordance with current national rules and practices, a partnership with the au-
thorities and bodies which it designates.' The text of the regulation Article 8 titled 'Comple-
mentarity and Partnership' states 'Community actions shall complement or contribute to cor-
responding national operations. They shall be drawn up in close consultation, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "partnership," between the Commission and the Member State, together with 
the authorities and bodies designated by the Member State within the framework of its na-
tional rules and current practices.' Whilst the regulation in Article 28 states, 'Provided that all 
the requirements of this regulation are fulfilled, the Commission shall adopt in a single deci-
sion the contributions of all the Funds.' The proposal states under Article 10 ' . . . assistance 
from the Funds shall be decided by the Commission within the framework of close coopera-
tion, hereinafter "partnership," between the Commission and a Member State. The wording 
reflects a more dynamic approach by the Commission. 
In particular it is the area of evaluation and monitoring which shows the Commission reclaim-
ing ground from the MSs. Previously its role was extremely limited at the outset of a project 
with the MSs and or the regions concerned responsible for the ex ante programming as set out 
in Article 41 of the regulation, ' . . . ex-ante evaluation shall be the responsibility of the au-
thorities responsible for preparing the plans, assistance and programme complement. . . , ' and 
Article 15 states,' . . . in respect of objectives 1, 2 and 3 member states shall submit a plan to 
the Commission. That plan shall be drawn up by the competent authorities designated by the 
member state at national, regional and other level.' The Commission can then ' . . . appraise 
these plans to determine whether they are consistent with the aims of this regulation ' The 
Commission is involved and can appraise the plans but is not responsible for them. In the re-
gulation it states that the plans have to be consistent with the aims of the regulation Article 9 
but these aims are more of a list of definitions than a basis for measurement. 
The proposal states under Article 47 titled, 'Responsibility of the Commission,' tha t ' . . . the 
Commission shall carry out evaluations to prepare and monitor the community strategic gui-
delines.' These guidelines are to some extent a new element in the CP, as they are drafted by 
the Commission, approved by the Council and are the measuring basis by which national 
plans will be assessed and evaluated by the Commission annually. In the explanatory memo-
randum of the proposal section 5.1 and 5.2 the strategic guidelines are explained as being de-
veloped as follows: 
'The Commission proposes that an overall strategic document for cohesion policy should be 
adopted by the Council, with an opinion of the parliament, in advance of the new program-
ming period and on the basis of a Commission proposal, defining clear priorities for member 
states and regions. This strategic approach would guide the policy in its implementation and 
make it more politically accountable . , . Each year the European institutions would examine 
progress on the strategic priorities and results achieved on the basis of a report by the Com-
mission summarising member states' progress reports . . . At the political level: on the basis 
of the strategic guidelines adopted by the Council, each member state would prepare a na-
tional framework document on its development strategy, which would be negotiated with the 
Commission and constitute the framework for preparing the thematic and regional pro-
grammes ' 
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This procedure is in principle new and the Commission would be deciding most of the guide-
lines which would then be the basis for all the other documentation and assessments, and sub-
sequently it would be drafting the reports and thus evaluating performance in a more direct 
manner than occurred before. There is a curious use of words when the Commission talks a-
bout MSs 'progress reports' this is reminiscent of the progress reports which the Commission 
made on the NMSs, or CEECs as they were called then, as it assessed their progress on meet-
ing the criteria for accession. Many of the recipients of the CP will be the NMSs. Also where 
evaluation procedures are concerned, usually the MSs were allowed to carry out evaluations 
as they saw fit so long as the criteria were met, now where the evaluations connected to the 
guidelines are concerned there is a requirement that 'Evaluations shall be carried out by inde-
pendent assessors,' Article 45: 3. This could well be to impress contributors and could be seen 
to be there with the weak administrations of the NMSs in mind. 
In general the proposal is stricter than the regulation. Article 71 of the proposal states, ' . . . 
without prejudice to audits carried out by member states, Commission officials or authorised 
Commission representatives may cariy out on-the-spot audits to verify the effective operation 
of the management and control systems, which may include audits on operations included in 
the operational programme, with a minimum of one working day's notice.' The regulation in 
contrast states in Article 38 §2 4 . . . without prejudice to checks carried out by the member 
states in accordance with national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, Commis-
sion officials or servants may, in accordance with arrangements agreed with the member state 
in the framework of cooperation described in paragraph 3, carry out on-the-spot checks . . , 
with a minimum of one working days' notice.' In the proposal the Commission is less con-
cerned with 4 . . . arrangements agreed with the member state . . . , ' and the ' . . . framework of 
cooperation,' ' . . . in accordance with national laws, regulations and administrative provi-
sions.' Whilst in practice these will no doubt be taken into consideration, the fact that the 
Commission chooses not to mention them in the proposal reflects on its new determination. In 
the proposal the Commission is tougher in its dealing with payments, now there are fixed time 
limits, article 91 states that there are 2 months placed for the MSs to make observations with 
regard to the suspension of payments, in the regulation there were none. 
Finally the proposal stresses in Article 68 that4 . . . the member states shall provide informa-
tion on and publicise co-financed programmes and operations. The information shall be ad-
dressed to European citizens and to the beneficiaries. It shall aim to highlight the role of the 
Community and ensure that assistance from the funds is transparent/ This is more authorita-
tive than Article 46 of the regulation which states, 4 . . . Member states shall ensure that pub-
licity is given to development p l a n s . . . the managing authorities shall be responsible for en-
suring that publicity is given to the package and particularly informing: a. potential final 
beneficiaries, trade and professional bodies, the economic and social partners, bodies promot-
ing equality between men and women and the relevant non-governmental organisations about 
the opportunities afforded by the assistance; b. the general public about the role played by the 
Community in the assistance concerned and its results.' The contents of paragraph a. are not 
explicitly included in the proposal and the proposal can be seen to be giving the MSs, as op-
posed to the managing authority, clear instructions, orders almost, unlike in the regulation. 
The renaming of INTEREG to 'European Territorial Cooperation,' in the proposal, Article 37, 
is another direct move by the Commission to stress the role of the Community and the Euro-
t 
pean level 'added value' that it provides, and to so answer the critics. 
The report by the EP on the proposal for the new regulation is useful to consider as it reveals 
both the parliament's position with regard to the CP and also because the report reveals MS 
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attitudes towards the proposal. The latter point is addressed several times by the parliament 
when it calls for the essence of various elements of the proposal not to be diluted; this implies 
that it is aware of the MSs' desire to do just that. This is explicitly considered in the explana-
tory statement of the report where the EP states: 
'These relate both directly to the Commission's proposal and to the information received by 
the rapporteur as to the 'state of play' within the Council of Ministers. With regard to the 
Commission proposal, there is clearly a high degree of conformity between it and the posi-
tions already adopted by the European Parliament. Nevertheless, a number of calls for change 
or addition have been made. In the case of the Council, Parliament may recommend a similar 
course of action, where the debate appears to be moving in the right direction. However, whe-
re that is not the case Parliament may, in the first instance, seek to deter unwelcome develop-
ments by indicating its rejection of them, but might ultimately have to refuse its assent were 
the Council's position to be considered politically unacceptable.' 
In general the EP states its support for the proposal and makes it clear that any re-
nationalisation of the policy is unacceptable. It is also against the idea of MSs being issued 
with ' . . . blank cheques . . . ,'263which would appear to mean something like the Sapir report 
suggestion of allowing MSs to direct the funds as they considered best which some MSs evi-
dently still supported. It was also in favour of support being maintained in the old MSs poor-
est regions as well as those of the NMSs, and stated that there had been suggestions from 
some quarters that 'the financial envelope' should either be increased or decreased. No doubt 
this was a reflection on wide differences in the Council between the recipient MSs and the 
contributors. It even called for ' . . . special compensation mechanisms to be established for 
those regions or Member States that face substantial financial losses, due to the disparities 
caused by the implementation of the Commission proposal regarding the allocation of finan-
cial resources... . ,265This would seem to fit with the expectation mentioned earlier that some 
sort of special arrangement would to have to be made for Spain and maybe other old MS re-
cipients. It recommended more flexibility266and support for SMEs, which sometimes appeared 
to be somewhat less relevant to the Commission than the EP.267A1SO environmental issues like 
' . . . the European sustainable development strategy . . . , ' were emphasised as needing to be 
stressed more in the proposal. The report was critical of the weakening of the partnership 
principle the EP, 'Rejects any weakening of the principle of partnership as envisaged in the 
original proposal, especially in terms of strategic planning and monitoring of the programmes; 
calls particularly for the maintenance of the list of appropriate bodies.' Interestingly it men-
tioned the method for rewarding performance related to absorption of funds, the 4% capping 
principle, and expressed concern that this should be made as fair and objective as possible to 
so allay suspicions, 'The current system, which simply rewards the best programmes within a 
Member State, cannot really provide a true motive to make substantial progress concerning 
absorption rates, growth or performance. Therefore, the criteria that apply to the allocation of 
these resources should be both fair and objective, so as to eliminate any suspicion that the 
money will only go to the richer EU states.' 70Possibly suspicions have been expressed by the 
NMSs in relation to this. 
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8.4 DG REGIO ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The DG for Regional Policy was set up in 1967 after the merger of the executives of the 
Communities, The elements of the Commission of the EEC and the High Authority of the 
ECSC which dealt with regional measures were combined and this is stated to have 4 . . . pro-
vided a new impetus to the development of Community regional policy,,271The new DG, re-
structurings and merging and EU organisations in general do thus have an impact directly on 
the policy they are involved with, right from the start. 
The DG has seen an increase in its size in recent times from seven to nine directorates and 
550 staff. There used to be four directorates dealing with geographical issues i.e. dealing with 
the day to day running of the CP in the various countries, and three so called horizontal direc-
torates which dealt with the development of policy, inter DG coordination, anything basically 
which did not directly involve the implementation of the policy. Now the balance has changed 
to four directorates still for geographical desks but an extra two for horizontal matters; these 
last two are for human resources and auditing. There has also been an increase in the number 
of deputy Directors with the creation of one for the geographical aspects of the DG and one 
for the horizontal ones. 
Staffing levels in the DG have been steadily increasing, in 2002-2003 it gained an extra 50 
staff; in 2003 an extra 70 temporary agents, many who then failed the exam to become per-
manent officials and 50 more in 2004, The Secretariat General decided to stagger the new 
staff allocations for the enlargement so that DG will get their full allocation of 271 by 
2008. On the 
one hand DG management members said staff were generally insufficient, 
on the other the DG was said to be ' . . . understaffed for what it wanted to do . . . ,'274as op-
posed to what it had to do. However there are evidently problems with obtaining staff as there 
are ' . . . big delays in getting staff, two years too late for one project, and enlargement must 
be given the resources it needs. For the staffing problems no new initiatives have been taken 
thus risks are taken with project quality.'275 The problems with staffing seem to have influ-
enced the policy decisions taken by the DG, there was said to have been a 50% increase in 
daily dealing with the NMSs with ' . . . huge demand on the geographical desks for (explana-
tions and instructions) of how rules should be applied, with the resultant work more complex. 
AHA 
. . . . This resulted allegedly in DG problems, 'the DG faced recently the possibilities either 
to do less since it had no more staff and to give up work to the MSs; to get more staff or to 
make development agencies in the MSs to distribute funds . . . this idea (the last one) existed 
for a while but it would have been bad to the DG . . . DG REGIO began to fear that they were 
becoming unnecessary and therefore opposed the idea.'277This was despite the fact that the 
DG received more staff than most owing to the enlargement, but they seem to have been in-
adequate for the tasks as well as inadequately used. Part of the problem seemed to lie in the 
inability of the DG to shift the staff it has from one less over worked directorate to another 
where they would have been most needed. There is apparently a fair amount of discussion 
between Desk Officers and the cabinet, and the management meet once a week in a fairly con-
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vivial manner, however there have been problems between the director generals and the 
Commissioners. 
8.4.1 MS INFLUENCE 
The first Commissioner of the Regional Policy portfolio after an enlargement was the UK na-
tional George Thomson and this set a pattern that would be followed later.279Recipient MSs 
have been keen on having one of their nationals in the top ranks of the DG and or as Commis-
sioner. With the Mediterranean enlargement the main recipients came from this area and so 
their nationals were to be placed high up in the DG and the policy area. The DG is 4 . . . still 
Franco phone, southern and speaking French. The majority of the over 40's speak French and 
under 40's English . . . ; ' however it has been stated to be facing the inevitable which means it 
4 . . . will become more eastern and less southern as the objective 1 area goes to the east. The 
1% group (main contributors) decided this; in addition to Objective 2 this will lead to tradi-
tional MSs losing funds . . . , ' and so 4 . . . the NMSs want the central European legal model 
and their style is more northern European.'280The DG has been linked to the habit of some 
MSs 'flagging' certain DGs which they consider to be very close to their national interest; 
Spain is said to have flagged DG REGI0.281It is interesting to note that the Director General 
for Regional Policy from 1986 up until 2000 was the Spaniard Eneko Landaburu and that the 
Mediterranean MSs have long had a joint interest in the DG for a range of reasons, not least 
the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes which were aimed at their MSs. This will be dis-
cussed more under the networking section. Poland seems to have understood the need to get 
its nationals into the highest places of the DG, which is important to its national interest, in 
ensuring the appointment of their national Danuta Huebner as Commissioner responsible for 
the DG. It is important in the Commission to have your nationals in place to prevent a policy 
being negatively directed towards the MS concerned. Although whether that is good news for 
the DG remains to be seen as, the 'Polish Commissioner thinks Europe is good for Poland but 
likes liberal economics and dislikes governmental intervention.'282Regardless of the recipient 
MSs' desire to dominate the DG for as long as it was important the DG was stated to have 
been 4 . . . moving away from having a real role . . . , ' in the CP and to have 4 . . . now a more 
and more macro role dealing with the priorities of funding. More of a German Länder system, 
money paid to the states and they do the rest, only audited later.' This was the logical con-
sequence of Commission weakness and MS power, influence and their desire to see a re-
nationalisation of the CP and or a reduction in the amount of the budget it gained. DG REGIO 
was stated to have in the recent past been covering broader subjects and to be not so control-
ling and therefore to have a less legalistic culture.2 4 
Valued qualities in Directors were alleged to have changed, in the 1980's Directors were said 
to have been 4 . . . top experts, real specia l is ts . . . , ' but now ' . . . Directors are just intended 
to be managers and do not need to have knowledge . . , odd as how can a Director negotiate 
with the USA when there are no experts present with the necessary knowledge; the USA have 
their experts there?' Directors and some Heads of Unit were alleged to have changed from 
being top technocrats to being political appointees with 4 . . . more political appointments over 
the 1990 ' s . . . . '286There was apparently a tendency for MSs to want to appoint politically fa-
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voured individuals to top positions in the DGs thus the 'Hierarchy are more exposed to the 
political levels of the MSs.'2870ne official alleged that the appointments of Directors appar-
ently baffled many and that expertise did not seem to be the deciding factor; at least one Di-
'JQO 
rector was actually said to have created problems for the DG. 
In some ways the DG seemed to be rather vulnerable to MS takeover. It has a habit of MSs 
taking over bits of it, like the national geographical desks. These are alleged to go through 
cycles of being 'nationalised' with the nationals of the MS they are serving coming to domi-
nate the unit concerned as the next quotation states. 'Geographical desks have lots of auton-
omy and have their own styles; nationals from these countries dominate (in them).'289This 
happened with Spain and was happening with Poland. Seemingly this is a natural progression 
on the one hand, since cultural and language contact were thus facilitated, on the other there 
was stated to be real danger of conflict of interest situations taking place.290 
The policy making directorate was allegedly the most unchanged part of the DG. This is said 
to be good for continuity but bad for new ideas and so progress, and 'counter productive' also, 
since French points of views were always heard and had been followed since the 1980s. The 
French for their part were alleged to support the DG ' . . . since money was paid to distant 
French colonies the same goes for Spain which provides for indirect funding of the colonies 
and does not appear in national French official budget;' and again 'The French policy making OQ 1 
directorate is more in favour of the French geographical unit.' Whatever other problems 
might be related to the policy making directorate, the most criticised element was alleged to 
be their addiction to ' . . , grand designs and dislike of details, the concept comes first and is 
then put into real world. Policy made by policy units is impractical policy and short term and 
fails to consider implementation.'292 One of the measures that the policy making directorate 
came up with apparently aroused annoyance, 'caused friction,'293with the geographical units 
was the so called n+2 policy. This aimed to force recipient MSs to spend the funds allocated 
within two years or lose them. This was seen by many within the geographical units as a ma-
jor problem and utterly unrealistic particularly where the NMSs were concerned, 'NMSs feel 
the n+2 rule is aimed against them.'294These views were shared by some of the officials both 
in the geographical and horizontal units, ' . . . the policy directorate follow the French model 
and dream up policy without asking Desk Officers. The n+2 idea was not reality based . . . the 
division between the policy making and implementation parts of the DG makes it less than 
practical. There is no feed back and there is not a tightly knit together relationship between * • 295 * * 
policy makers and paying desks.' It was alleged that the policy was decided on ' . . . to 
please some MSs and so to get the overall Cohesion Policy through, with the stated aim of 
getting money invested evenly.' More on the policy making directorate is included under 
the Enlargement and Policy Network section. 
8.4.2 DG BUREAUCRATIZATION AND RE-CENTRALISATION 
The DG was alleged to have had a situation where there was a ' . . . lack of a strong centre . . . 
,' and ' . . . its Directors are very autonomous , . . , ' which maybe accounts for the lack of co-
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herence that at times was alleged to have existed within the DG itself. In part the split was 
inevitable given the radically different tasks that the various elements perform and that the 
two key elements of the DG, the geographical and the policy making directorates take prece-
dence at different stages in the CP cycle. When negotiations are underway at the beginning of 
the budgetary cycle, then the policy and horizontal directorates are most influential then 
'eighteen months' later, the geographical directorates take over with the implementation of 
the agreements as the next quotation states, 'If spending is priority then power goes to the 
geographical desks; if negotiations are priority then power goes to the horizontals and cen-
tre. It would seem logical that staff would be moved about in the DG to cover for the times 
when the various elements are most busy but4 . . . even when little policy conception work is 
happening, staff are not moved from them (the policy making units). 98 
The DG seemed to be centralising itself^and 'in the last 6 months there has been an aim to 
strengthen horizontal services.'300The growth in horizontal units reflected the need to coordi-
nate the DG better and the fact that during ' . . . periods of reform the horizontal units have 
more power whereas routine periods benefit geographical units.'301 A further reason was than 
there was now a greater emphasis on inter institutional and civic society dialogue and coordi-
nation that there had been, 'when she joined, this process was already happening but now the-
•JA'S __ 
re is 25% more EP, Council and lobby group contact.' There had allegedly been a steady 
increase over the last ten years in the number of horizontal working groups and in the various 
institutional aspects of horizontal origin. One explanation for this is that the DG wanted to 
increase its 'thematic approach' rather than concentrating on one project after the other. This 
method would involve other DGs more in DG REGIO's work.303Another reason was that the ' 
. . . financial circuit in the DG is far more complex since 2000 and has resulted in a large in-
crease in work for the legal and financial units.'304The fall of the Santer Commission and the 
advent of the Prodi one allegedly saw an increase in 'fear management' with a heavy empha-
sis on decentralizing responsibility to the DGs which also had to implement more stringent 
financial controls and the Kinnock staff reforms. The horizontal units were alleged to be more 
hierarchical than the geographical ones with the Director General more ' . . . directly involved ^ AC 
as they (and the matters they deal with) are more sensitive. For a portion of the DG, in par-
ticular probably the geographical directorates, the move to a more 'thematic approach' was 
alleged that it ' . . . could be seen by some as power structure building. . . . ' An official 
stressed ' . . . thematic coordination is absent.' Whatever else, there has been a growing 
cleavage between the two parts of the DG and tension as a result.308 
The hierarchy of the DG has allegedly become more centralized in recent years, placing a 
growing emphasis on Desk Officers performing certain tasks and reducing their freedom to 
choose, and attempting to control Desk Officers more as the next quotations show. 'There is 
an attempt at control of Desk Officers but it is difficult to find the right control, hard to find 
good managers . . . ,'309and 'they are trying to standardise Desk Officers with (task) list con-
formity and internal audits; procedures are taking over everything; writing good briefings is 
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played down.'310 There was a suspicion raised by a few that the Kinnock reforms were aiming 
to turn the staff into civil servants and that1 . . . reforms will be passively resisted since those 
at the top are as bad or worse than before; merit is not rewarded. Parachutage is used more 
now than before. Kinnock and Prodi have done this more than before, and so rewarded people 111 for favours done.' 
The various reforms seemed to follow the general Commission pattern and were made into 
whatever was convenient for the DGs. The Kinnock staff reforms created a lot of extra work 
for the management and no doubt generated some positive effects, but the Commission seem-
ingly managed to turn them into a bureaucratic exercise. Heads of Unit were allowed to allo-
cate performance points to staff in their yearly assessment, but Heads of Unit ' . . . are in-
1 1 o 
structed to keep to the average; this is an odd way of rewarding.' The aim of the points sys-
tem was to give power to reward for merit to those that are closest to the staff concerned, in 
practice the Director General changes the 'priority points' which are the points crucial for ca-
reers.313The Kinnock reform required mobility of staff, in practice allegedly the ' . . . the Di-
rector General used DG reorganisations as a means of nullifying or ameliorating the Kinnock 
reform on mobility.'3 l4Staff seem to be formally moved and reorganised but remain in the 
same place.315 At times in the Commission staff are apparently moved but take their jobs with 
them. 
The problem of the Kinnock and general financial reforms, resulting from the fall out from 
the end of the Santer Commission, led to a dramatic increase in bureaucratic procedures 
which caused delays in much of the DG's work. The DG was said to have already been over-
worked in 1999 with the increasing work that the enlargement was bringing and then came ' . 
. . more rules and procedures . . . less time was available to spend on developing 
quality.'316The Director General allegedly first in 'January told staff to develop projects, then 
in October he told them to just spend the money regardless of the quality of the projects, just 
get it administratively correct.' 17This was said not to have been useful for enlargement, 
'there is a problem of project management quality, versus procedures which was not 
beneficial for enlargement but there were two sides to this. They were needed for the role 
model approach of Commission; but there was an over-kill in procedures.' 318 This 
ambivalence towards the reforms was standard, they were maybe a ' . . . good idea but there 
must be resources to achieve them . . . there was a big waste in time and delay in making 
-j I n 
payments.' Each financial reform that there was e . . . doubled the amount of paper work.' 
The latest reform ' . . . has been exaggerated and over done . . . they are being hamstrung by 
the financial regulation.'320The geographical desks and in particular their Heads of Unit were 
alleged to have suffered from the reform, ' . . . there are a lot of problems of bureaucratic 
procedures and geographical desks can not develop newer roles they are so overloaded with 
cumbersome procedures. . . . ' What is more, many Heads of Unit apparently had to perform 
more and more procedures for the Secretariat General which were sometimes duplicating 
what was already done. This organisation which aims to coordinate the DGs and thus the 
Commission had recently taken over the activity based management which the Director 
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cently taken over the activity based management which the Director Generals had previously 
performed, with the result that4 . . . managers make two lots of reports now, modules were set 
up in a bad bureaucratic manner. The agenda planning of the SG was a good idea turned into 
a bureaucratic disaster. What was meant to be a meeting turned into a one and half hour SG 
monologue and giving of orders for the 60 participants." 
The standard use of DG reorganisations is formally to 4 . . . lead to a more strategic basis,' but 
also allegedly conveniently provides the opportunity for4 . , . informally squashing people . . . 
and 4 . . . staff are stopped informally. . . . ' Staff changes are carried out partially using 
the reorganisation as an excuse. This is also apparently a favoured method of changing policy 
in the Commission as a whole, change the people involved and so change the policy. Staff in 
the Commission and the DG are said to have a sort o f 4 . . . feudal right to a job, once you ac-
• 
cept it you sort of own it.'* This makes major reorganisations allegedly justified in terms of 
strategy they are simply the 4 . . . only way to move people.'32 A further motive for re-
organization seemed to have been to create posts or to justify creating management posts, 
since a Director has to be in charge of a certain number of units. Units are deliberately created 
to allow for a Director's position. Something along these lines appeared to have been in-
volved in the DG's re-organisations 4job creation' and the need to create new positions was 
seemingly behind the new directorates,4 . . . it would have been better to have had more verti-
cal (geographical) and not more horizontal ones.' Similarly to DG AGRI, the DG and, in 
particular, elements of it remained oddly insulated from the reorganisation despite major 
changes in the policy they dealt with. Most of the important people in the DG were said to 
have remained unchanged and in particular this was said to have been the case for the policy 
making directorate. A more general reorganisation in 2000 was stated to have been desirable 
in particular for the enlargement, unfortunately it seemed to have been halfhearted and was a 
4missed opportunity.'326 
Rather than the DG integrating the enlargement into the DG a special directorate was created 
for the NMSs. It insulated the rest of the DG from the enlargement in the short term but meant 
that old MS geographical units which could have helped the NMS ones with their experience 
did not, and the 4wheel had to be reinvented' and this caused delays.327Somewhat bizarrely 
the DG got 4 . . . the lion's share of auxiliary staff,' from the NMSs since it was the leading 
DG in the enlargement area, but instead of allocating them to the units dealing with their 
countries, and so benefiting from their cultural, language and network skills and contacts, they 
put them everywhere else. The reason for this was because allegedly 4 . . . the DG did not trust 
them . . . they separated them from their national units for security and sensitivity rea-
sons. ,328Other DGs did not follow this way of doing things and DG REGIO's approach cre-
ated 6 . . . problems for the final policies.'3 9One possible partial explanation for this was that 
there was resistance to the nationalisation of geographical desks to ensure financial integrity. 
But the old MS units do not appear to have abided by this rule. Given the stated problems that 
the Commission had in obtaining staff at all and its problems with language skills, the transla-
tion service had been said to be collapsing or to have collapsed, the decision to squander the 
resources at its disposal seemed as odd as the officials all stated. This is particularly true as 
the 'sensitive post mobility rule' (staff handling finances were usually in positions defined as 
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sensitive and so had to be moved every five years at the latest) would apply to officials in the 
units anyway, and in these units it was applied strictly. 
The lack of a more fundamental reorganisation in 2000 allegedly had a serious negative effect 
on the enlargement which is discussed under the Enlargement and Policy Network section, 
'there is a natural resistance to change and we have suffered from it, 3 Directors were in-
volved in the re-organisation of 2004 and now the DG had to seriously consider the NMSs but 
I 
it was too late.' One possible reason offered for the absence of this type of re-organization 
in 2000 was that the 6 . . . delay in reorganising (was) owing to inertia in the system.'332The 
2004 reorganisation appeared to have been directly related to an attempt to coordinate the DG 
better, but again it was stated to have been 'too late' for certain key enlargement aspects and 
policies like ISPA.333 
8.5 COMMISSION FRAGMENTATION 
A much criticized aspect of the Commission is the ability of the DGs and their various sectors 
to work together in the interests of the institution as a whole. There were said to be struggles 
over CP between DGs described as a 'brutal battle' with the struggle between ' . . . a deeply 
rooted conflict of ideas and ideologies. Actors were often motivated by a number of issues: 
more or less supranational control; more or less Europe of the Regions; the prevalence of one 
DG over another; the need for a mobilizing idea for the Commission versus running things 
efficiently; public intervention versus free market, and career concerns.'334In the CP 'ideo-
logical domain' essentially the positions were of those who wanted to place the emphasis on: 
supporting the efficiency of markets; solidarity with those that might suffer from the market 
integration using the regions as key partners; extending democracy into the policy decision 
making.335The need f o r ' . . . internal Commission reform . . . , ' had b e c o m e ; ' . . , enmeshed . 
. . ,' in the discussions about the future of the CP. One group the 'reformers' was f o r ' . . . 
simple and effective management. . . , ' and so a ' . . . radical restructuring of cohesion policy. 
. . . ' But DG REGIO amongst others 4 , . . remain fiercely opposed to such wide scale reform 
and continue to favour a "grand vision" of cohesion policy.' 
Conflicts between DGs was and is all too normal 'there are political contests between DGs; 
DG EMPLO has no overall policy goal with social funds; DG REGIO fights with DG EM-
PLO and there are problems for NMSs in terms of employment and training etc.' The strug-
gles between DG Enlargement and DG REGIO seemed to be well known, but the Sapir Re-
port and the sudden vulnerability of DG REGIO apparently brought out the worst in the other 
DGs; ' . . . the other Commissioners were not helpful and did not support DG REGIO . . . 
Commissioners wanted to take over projects from DG REGIO and did not see that the MSs 
were the only winners.'338AllegedIy some DGs like DG ENT and to some extent DG ENV 
have a policy agenda but no money to further this agenda, and would like to have it directly 
rather than going through the filter which is DG REGIO. The existence of funds seems to 
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have had a strong attraction to other DGs, 'DG REGIO has financial instruments and DG 
ENT policies. If DG REGIO does not get more influence it will lose money from CFs; it must 
show that economic growth and employment are linked to it or otherwise DG ENT will get 
the money instead, the MSs want this to happen.'3390ne way of looking at this is that some of 
the DGs should be allowed to receive funds directly and thus avoid the duplication which go-
ing through DG REGIO involves,340but understandably the DG is not over enthusiastic about 
this possibility. The Sapir Report and its aftermath revealed two points, firstly that 'DGs are 
not well integrated,' and secondly that the practical value of 'DG REGIO's work is unknown 
in the Commission, other DGs push their policy agendas more and use the budget to promote 
them. DG REGIO does not have the highest profile, now that delivering the Lisbon agenda 
could be assisted by DG REGIO.' There has recently been a major attempt at improving 
this, in particular by DG REGIO promoting itself and its policy to the other DGs, in part as an 
attempt at survival. The drive to achieve these goals is proof in itself that there was a major 
problem beforehand which needed addressing. One official alleged that 'Inter institutional 
matters are as bad as ever. As of summer 2004 other DGs will be brought via the thematic ap-
proach into the heart of DG REGIO.' This goal of involving other DGs more in the alloca-
tion of funding and so assuaging some of their thirst for them, seems to have had some suc-
cess; 'the DG has been able to sell itself and to show its experience . . . they showed the ca-
pacity building and stakeholders built by DG REGIO and they won with this argument.'343 
The NMS officials rated the inter DG Communication and Coordination very harshly and 
seemingly rightly so. The respondents were critical about the state of inter DG coordination 'a 
disaster,'544and 'awful.'345There 
was almost unanimity about the poor state of inter DG coor-
dination. The enlargement has not brought any improvement on this front, maybe even the 
opposite; one respondent stated that it had got worse.346One NMS official stated they them-
selves had ' . . . coordinated well on issues with all ministries involved, but faced five fighting 
A »1 
DGs.' Another NMS official explained the chronology of the problem 'DG Enlargement 
was first then there was DG Enlargement and DG REGIO, but no coordination between them, 
and then DG EMPL was added and this added to the problem.'348Another added ' . . . inter-1/1 o service consultations are still a problem, slow, they take months.' 
Various DG officials interviewed took different approaches when discussing this issue, some 
accepted that inter DG relations were problematic. Some stressed that the NMSs in particular 
failed to understand what the DGs really meant when they said things; 'NMSs misunderstood 
DG REGIO's 'yes' as meaning yes for a project, when it only meant yes to prepare for a pro-
ject. The whole of the Commission must be involved in structural funds,'350and 'NMSs think 
DG REGIO is very powerful and the most powerful DG but it is not.'351What this seemingly 
meant in practice was that the NMSs thought DG REGIO had given the go ahead for a project 
and they began working on this assumption, then they would hear from another DG that this 
was not the case, or would hear from DG REGIO that another DG had expressed doubts. The 
different DGs also used different methods when dealing with the NMSs which was stated to 
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probably be a reason forNMS problems; 'Sometimes DG REGIO and DG EMPLO have dif-
ferent ways of dealing with problems. There is a different focus for DG REGIO, a broader set 
of players are dealt with and more complex rules used due to a longer policy cycle involving 
lots of estimates unlike the cash based activities of DG EMPLO. ,352Some officials empha-
sised the NMS's lack of ability to understand the Commission's complex systems;4 . . . envi-
ronmental compliance is very complex for NMSs and related procurement likewise and NMS 
do not seriously understand how complex,' and 'NMSs have not understood and implemented 
the environmental acquis and have not put it into force, DG ENV blocks most proposals any-
way.'353 One official stressed that it was the ' . . . policy making DGs,' like DG ENV which 
cause the problems rather than the paying ones.354Another acknowledged the difficulties be-
tween DG ENV and DG REGIO.355 
8.6 POLICY NETWORK POTENTIAL 
The Commission uses the somewhat confused institutional circumstances that surround it to 
the full, ' . . . cohesion policy lacks a dedicated Council. Cohesion policy is covered by a va-
riety of Councils and it thus lacks the routinised collaboration enjoyed by ministers and offi-
cials in other s e c t o r s . . . , ' and so ' . . . sometimes the result is that Council members are not 
terribly well informed about cohesion policy . . . Arguably, once overall funding is set, the 
Council has played a primarily reactive role, responding to institutional designs drawn up by 
others, especially the Commission.'357The unanimity voting rule can work in the favour of the 
Commission as it only takes one MS to prevent any decision going through and any major 
reforms are difficult, since there is a division of the Council into recipient states and contribu-
tors. The following quotation illustrates the above,4 . . . a representative from a large "donor" 
Member States complained: "The smaller Member States have a tendency to latch onto the 
Commission . . . it's my impression that the Commission always has some kind of ally on the 
Council (which means) the Council is not as strong as it could be institutionally;"'358which 
leaves the general rule being that the Commission is crucial in the 'setting' of CP.359The 
Commission is stated to have ' . . . proved an important ally for those member governments 
favouring a substantial community role and provided important foundations for later devel-
opments. '360^ its dealings with the Council and the MSs the DG used the standard Commis-
sion tactic of desiring to apply "non political" criteria vis-a-vis the MSs who use ' . . . pres-
sure to include regions for political reasons,' but really 4 . . . objective 1 decisions will always 
be political decisions. Moreover the Commission's virtuous insistence on "non-political" 
technical criteria is itself somewhat misleading: the Commission ultimately is concerned with 
its own institutional power which lies, not least, in its ability to apply "neutral" criteria.'361 
Simply, within the European institutions the Commission and thus the DG officials, have con-
siderable scope for manoeuvre and using a network of like minded actors to achieve their 
goals, at times the defence of the policy itself. It has to be said they have been more than ca-
pable of defending their policy: 
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'In the Council, the privileged arena for member state interests, Commission officials success-
fully resisted attempts to weaken the Commission's new policy position. When some member 
states tried to further erode partnership and to weaken the Commission's role, the Commis-
sion negotiators mobilized support in the European Parliament, among a dissenting minority 
in the Council of ministers (Portuguese, Irish and Belgian governments), and among sub-
national governments. This enabled the Commission to largely deflect Member State pressure 
for further dilution of the reform. Whether one focuses on the tug of war in the Commission 
or in the Council, Commission officials emerge as actors with access to a variety of power 
resources. These enabled them to contend for policy adjustments that best suited their inter-
ests and ideas.'362 
The main institutions and actors involved in the CP: MSs, the Commission and the Council 
are even divided internally as well as there being fluctuating relationships between them and 
these ' . . . divisions inside these institutions had a profound impact on the policy.' This situa-
tion is ripe for Policy Networks as the institutional backdrop seems to fragment, to an extent, 
into 1 . . . sets of political rules which provide the context for a variety of political actors to t f 
pursue competing agendas.' * 
Networks of single units in various DGs were affected by the 1988 reform of SF and resented 
it but were outmanoeuvred by * . . . a small group around Commission President Jacques De-
1 f A 
lors. This Group then developed a DG (Co-ordination of Structural Policies) and gathered a 
' . . . coalition of Commission actors favouring an integrationalist conception of cohesion pol-
icy . . . , ' which was resisted by ' . . . a coalition championing a more flexible, decentralized 
cohesion policy.'365 DG REGIO was a key actor in this latter coalition which finally won, and 
DG Co-ordination of Structural Policies was disbanded. It won the battle by regaining the 
initiative and 4 . . . by exploiting its hold on the purse, by relying on contacts with national 
and regional authorities, and by using its relative autonomy in policy direction, administrative 
organization and personnel policy to restructure on its own terms.' The power of small num-
bers of determined actors working in and with a Policy Network is clear, 'Individuals or small 
groups matter. "The structural funds were developed by three people. The opposition was to-
tal . . The preferences or motivations of Commission officials mat ter . . . Rules constrain 
powerful actors, but actors can also change rules. Specifically, they can use existing rules to 
institute new ones that place them in a more strategic position to pursue what they 
want.'367DG REGIO, or probably groups inside it, was very able to activate and use a Policy 
Network to oppose even the Commission President, a point which cannot be stressed enough. 
DG REGIO has been examined by and held up as an example of MLG and thus Policy Net-
works, indeed it has been said to have considerable Policy Network potential whether defined 
as dual networks or tri-level networks.368CP has long been considered to be an area of Com-
mission activity where the Commission has considerable autonomy and a range of actors with 
whom it can choose to work and who can choose to work with it. The following quotation 
shows this, 'The Commission had become used to interacting with institutions, networks and 
lobbies of organized actors from sub-national authorities and interests in the operation of re-
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gional policy, despite the strengthening of the role of the Member States in this policy area 
after 1993.' 69The policy involves a range of actors and disburses large funds which inevita-
bly will result in close relationships if not bonds forming between recipients and disburser. 
The policy has been stated to be one of those where there is real danger of resistance to re-
form being shown by many of the actors. This is likely to grow in particular as pressure 
mounts for such a reform: 
'A policy which consumes a third of the budget has inevitably yielded powerful constituen-
cies. In many cases, the institutions setting policy, and the networks shaping it, will resist 
change. High-level intergovernmental bargaining will in part be constrained by resistance on 
the part of actors reluctant to forgo the financial prizes or institutional power enjoyed under 
the existing cohesion policy framework. In short, radical change in cohesion policy may be 
inevitable, but it will not occur without a fight, and one not just between Member States.'370 
Given that the enlargement and the reforms of several key policies and the Commission itself 
have been so closely connected, the enlargement could be expected to be involved in any se-
vere case of reform resistance. 
Within Policy Networks there is considerable power located at the lower levels. A lot of the 
policy i s ' . . . decided or molded by networks of actors,' where the drawing up of regulations 
and programming is concerned, before the inter institutional bargaining stage is even rea-
ched,371 with decisions made by these officials which ' . . . restrict or shape intergovernmental 
bargaining.'372The actors in these networks are said to ' . . . typically include Commission of-
ficials, Sub-National Authorities (SNA) representatives, national civil servants within CORE-
PER, MEPs, interest groups and private actors.' Particularly powerful groups are stated to 
be ' . . . key players . . , ;' one important one was called 'Groupe des Amis' and was made up 
of MS representatives and senior Commission officials. These are some of the "'actors' 
0 HA 
within cohesion n e t w o r k s . . . , ' who ' . . . shape policy behind the scenes. There are many 
cohesion networks which vary in ' . . . form, size and influence, across and between member 
states,' often they are ' . . . tightly knit and can mobilize within their member states, across 
member states or across governmental levels to shape EU policies.' They have had some 
considerable successes like the creation of the Committee of the Regions, also the ' . . . inclu-'xnfi 
sion of Article of 203 . . . ,' of the Maastricht Treaty. Some networks seemingly emerge 
from the actual system of structural programming which encourages vertical networks with 
Commission, MS and SNAs officials closely involved. The bargaining in the networks is for ' 
. . . information, legitimacy, constitutional . . . ' factors.377 Networks involved in the imple-
mentation of the policy are also able to shape the regulations in the first place. The Commis-
sion itself is vulnerable to networks and their power. A commercial network ' . . . forced the 
Commission to rewrite regulations to prevent abuse of structural fund regulations;' prior to 
this companies had ' . . . shopped around,' to find areas for opening a factory where they 
would benefit from SFs. Other networks of national and private actors were able to effect 
changes in the policy. SNAs have formed coalitions amongst themselves and with MSs to 
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force the Commission to change elements of the policy. MSs see the regions as being use-
ful to bring the Commission around to their way of thinking as 4 . . . the Commission listens 
more to regions than to member states . . . ' 
At times the structures that the EU and MSs have proscribed seem to also invite problematic 
networking at the lower levels. The partnership principle is seen in particular as a problem, as 
it is ' . . . laborious to administer, and vulnerable to clientelism and corruption (Hooghe 
1998:465);'381and 'allocating the entire responsibility (for management, payment and certifi-
cation) to a single authority, even in the form of different departments, may lead to conflict of 
interest, unless their operational independence has been safeguarded in advance. Some de-
partments even combined several functions.*382This sort of informal network atmosphere can 
be described as that of * gentleman's agreements' which has been criticized, T h e Commission 
agrees with the court that changes to the administrative division of regions on the basis of 
"gentleman's agreements" with the national statistical institutes is unsatisfactory. 
Within the DG itself there was evidently potential for networking. As was stated earlier the 
DG has been linked to the habit of some countries to 'flag' certain DGs which they consider 
t * \ flA to be very close to their national interest; Spain was 
said to have flagged DG REGIO. The 
Spanish Director General for Regional Policy up until 2000, was clearly aware of the political 
economic compromise that the funds represent; 'Regional policy is the cement which allows 
bigger ambitions like the internal market and economic and monetary union to take place.' He 
is also seemingly more on the side of the old MSs recipients of the funds, ' . . . the bill for 
eastern Europe should not be paid by southern Europe - by reducing aid to Portugal, Spain, 
Italy and Greece - but by all EU countries . . . '385From the 22 top members of staff surveyed 
in 1992-93, two thirds were from the southern European MSs.3 6For those MSs involved in 
the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes set up in the mid 1980s only seven officials origi-
nated from the contributing MSs. The Committee of the Regions was also under the Spanish 
leadership of Jordi Pujol through the nineties, and made at least one ' . . . overly ambitious 
report,' during this period and is expected to see its consultative role strengthened further; in-
terestingly the Commissioner * . . . established a policy of consulting the committee more of-
ten than required by treaty, and set up a "code of conduct" for Commission-committee rela-
tions. . . . ' ^Commissioners are often, if not usually, acting on the worked out policies of 
their services and of course the Director General. 
8.7 ENLARGEMENT AND THE COHESION POLICY 
8,7.1 PRE ACCESSION PHASE 
In order to get some feeling for the likely future interaction between Commission and NMSs 
in the CP area, the critical 'pre accession' phase reveals many of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the actors and the governance structures concerned. Two pre-accession instruments were 
set up, ISPA and PHARE aiming to prepare the NMSs to manage the SF and the CF; ISPA 
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concentrated on the ERDF and the ESF whilst PHARE dealt with the CF and the EAGGF. 
Learning by doing was the method and the instruments confronted the NMSs with the reality 
of receiving funds from the EU with all the procedures and planning that that entailed.388DG 
Enlargement, staffed largely from DG REGIO and DG External Affairs along with; 4 . . . de-
partments in national governments with relevant expertise in delivering technical and struc-
tural assistance, often at the regional level,'389was formally responsible for PHARE but 
should have had; ' . . . a high degree of coordination . . . , ' with DG REGIO. ISPA was in the 
hands of DG REGIO which managed it. Both the instruments turned out to be problematic 
and whether they fully achieved their goals seems to be doubt. 
PHARE was particularly difficult, soon after its outset there was confusion and a seeming 
lack of coherence in the strategy that was being followed. The two DGs involved quickly be-
gan taking 'significantly' different approaches.390DG Enlargement failed to; ' . . . take into _ 1 
account two key aspects of Structural Fund implementation mechanisms . . . ,' despite the 
fact that PHARE was to a large extent intended to prepare the NMSs to cope with SF leading 
DG REGIO to state in 2001; 'There has been quite a lot of confusion concerning the role of 
the regions with regard to the programming and implementation of the Structural Funds. The 
"target region" approach has contributed to this basic misunderstanding by initiating a process 
of programming and setting up of Regional Development Agencies at sub regional 
level. The targeting approach was that being followed by DG Enlargement. Small sub-
national levels of government were required to manage funds for which they lacked the ca-
pacity ,393under normal SF, small countries like Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania and Estonia would 
represent a region and thus the administration would be dealt with by the national govern-
<2 f\a 
ment. Finally the DG REGIO method was adopted and the Commission then changed its 
mind. Thus for a country like Latvia at first it had to follow one series of instructions to de-
centralize and then this was reversed a couple of years or so later.395 
Another problem cropped up when DG REGIO decided to adopt for the NMSs a sectoral ap-
proach towards the negotiations it was holding with them over operational programmes which 
contrasted with the approach of DG Enlargement which kept to the regional basis of its ap-
proach396which it only modified later, and then adopted regions more like those of DG RE-
GIO. The subsequent result was that the programmes were both sectoral for some and others IQfl 
regional, leading to some regions being; ' . . . less prepared for Structural Funds.' Where 
Twinning was concerned the 2000 Twinning covenants were first of all prepared for each re-
gion then in 2001 DG REGIO decided to only; ' . . . allow one regional Operational Pro-
gramme per country . . . ,' which resulted in the covenants having to then be 
' modified.'399Thus; 6 . . . the Commission's use of the PHARE programme to prepare Candi-
date Countries for managing the Structural Funds suffered from the lack of a wider strategy 
identifying both the requirements to be met by Candidate Countries in the field of regional 
policy prior to accession and the approach to be followed by these countries to structural fund 
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prior to accession and the approach to be followed by these countries to structural fund man-
agement after accession.'400 
The Commission's 'Extended Decentralized Implementation System' (EDIS), was intended to 
be a major move towards making the PHARE implementation procedures more like those of 
the SF; it involved replacing the ex-ante controls that the NMSs had been using by ex post 
ones which were more like those of SF. Decentralization of the financial management was 
intended to give the NMSs practice in having; 4 . . . full responsibility for implementa-
tion.'401However the Commission allowed considerable delay in ensuring its usage, as a re-
sult; 6 EDIS was not introduced for the management of PHARE funds into any of the Candi-
date Countries before the accession on 1 May 2004. It meant that Candidate Countries would 
become Member States less well prepared for the financial management of the ERDF and the 
ESF than the Commission had intended in the PHARE Review 2000.'402It also led to compli-
cations and more bureaucratic procedures. 
The Sapir Report was quite critical with regard to the enlargement and the role of the Com-
mission. The amount of pre-accession aid actually paid out had in fact been rather low with 
only 50-70% of the funds allocated to NMSs actually paid out and long delays experienced by 
recipients with the blame lying both on the NMS side and the EU's.40 Total pre accession aid 
was 3.5% of the total budget Agricultural and Structural support combined, and for the 2004-
2006 period the NMSs were given around; ' . . . 25% of the structural expenditure going to 
the current Member States.'4 5The report stated that greater effort will have to be made by 
both sides and that the EU needed to; ' . . . improve its mechanisms . . . '406 and; T h e Euro-
pean Commission would also need to improve its expertise on the situation within the NMSs 
to ensure that their partnership is fully effective.'407 
Another basic which the Commission intended to see created were the National Development 
Plans; these would lead to the multi-annual-programming like in SF. However the NMSs' 
administrations were over stretched already and saw little use in a document which smacked 
of planned economies, and the Commission for its part allowed very little time to get the do-
cumentation ready and;1 . . . made it impossible to establish a proper partnership approach to 
planning, involving consultation with regional and local authorities and NGOs.'408 The result 
was that the multi-annual-programmes were not introduced and the reason for this does not 
seem to have been adequately answered,409In several NMSs (excluding Hungary, Poland and 
Romania) despite the expectation that they would be using up more funds as their ability to 
absorb it improved in fact the opposite was the case.410 
Delay seemed to have been extremely common throughout PHARE,41'and in part the respon-
sibility seems to lie in complex bureaucratic procedures involving the Commission and the 
NMSs, as well as in the inability of the NMSs to generate the right documentation for the 
Commission4l2no doubt partially due to the frequent personnel fluctuations in NMS minis-
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tries4,3as well as the lack of clarity resulting from; ' . . . changes in responsibilities between 
ministries and the internal restructuring of ministries.'4I4The personnel changes in the NMSs 
of course made the process of training their staff more difficult if not fruitless, particularly 
where the twinning exercise of MS officials working with NMS officials was 
concerned.415The problems which the NMSs had, were said to; 6 . . . raise doubts about their 
capacity to absorb the much greater allocations planned under the Structural Funds.,416The 
final conclusion about PHARE was that it; 4 . . , had a more limited impact than expected in 
preparing the Candidate Countries for the ERDF and ESF to the extent the Commission had 
planned in its policy documents . . . '417 
Where ISPA was concerned DG REGIO had administrative capacity problems itself; 'The 
Commission's own capacity to appraise applications and supplementary work carried out by 
consultants was initially limited by the fact that in January 2000 it had allocated only five A 
grade officials to ISPA. For by far the largest beneficiary country, Poland, (ISPA commit-
ments of l33Million Euro in 2000) only one official was allocated to the environment section 
until November 2001. A further constraint was the lack of engineering expertise in the Com-
mission. To help overcome this, a framework contract was made with the European Invest-
ment Bank, whose engineers and economists already had a large amount of experience of Co-
hesion Fund projects. However, the Commission could not make systematic use of this high 
quality assistance . . . '418ISPA suffered from delays in contracting matters if the Financing 
memoranda of the Commission are used as a base line and they are said to have been realistic. 
The reasons for the delays seem to have mostly Iain with confusing and inconsistent Commis-
sion procedures and lack of correct personnel in its delegations; ' . . . in some cases projects 
suffered from delayed and inadequate work by consultants financed by the Commission to 
draw up the tender documentation; initial problems related to different provisions for tender 
evaluation in the Commission's decentralized implementation system manual and the new 
Practical guide which it introduced in January 2001; problems with EBRD co-financing, 
mainly in Poland and Romania, because of differences between ERBD and Commission pro-
curement procedures which were eventually modified in December 2001. . . . ,419Thus the 
Commission could have done more itself to improve the NMSs much criticized 'absorption 
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capacity,' whilst this does not mean that the NMSs could not have done more as well. 
Whilst the NMSs would obviously be in favour of receiving the maximum amount of funds 
possible, there is economic theory evidence which indicates that this may well harm them in 
the longer term and damage their goals of growth. According to some the widely spread as-
sumption that the recent enlargement was very different to previous ones insofar as there are; 
'enormous income gaps' between current and future members is stated to be 'incor-
rect,'421This enlargement was not much different in this perspective from previous ones. The 
case of Poland seems to serve as a warning as it is said to have at first; ' . . . followed a well-
established EU policy . . . , ' which reduced labor mobility by encouraging workers to remain 
in areas of high unemployment and raised minimum wages. The resulting unemployment 
forced the government to reverse their policies however well meant they were, and this had a 
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better long term effect This is said to be one of the problematic aspects of the CP that it en-
courages a labour immobility and encourages it to go contrary to where the market would o-
therwise suggest. 
Owing to CP's shortcomings, economic theory would appear to suggest that the policy should 
be discontinued as it currently stands as it is; 4 . . . based on incorrect or at least unsubstanti-
ated economic theory, badly designed, poorly carried out, a source of wrong incentives and, in 
some cases, of corruption. The lack of direct enforcement mechanisms which evaluate the ef-
ficiency and the effectiveness of the allocation of funds creates an environment where corrup-
tion breeds,'4230n the positive side the policy might have some; 4 . . . indirect benefits for the 
NMSs . . . ,' by helping to; 4 . . . solidify the democratic rule in the East, help institutional 
changes, create international partnership and reduce social tensions generated during the tran-
sition.'424It is here maybe that the policy is justified as an expensive but useful method of se-
curing some of the basics of EU membership as laid out in the Copenhagen criteria, which 
stressed that the applicant states had to democratic, stable and able to implement as well as 
transpose the acquis. 
One of the main economic dangers that the CP could contribute to if not create, is that it 
might allow the NMSs to carry out the wrong policies to secure political support by avoiding 
continuing with serious reform and ameliorating the apparent economic and social situation of 
some; 4 . . . practically, they may postpone the elimination of state subsidies to obsolete and 
inefficient enterprises, the creation of new or the reinforcement of already existent "income 
maintenance programmes", thereby reducing labour mobility and providing incorrect incen-
tives to entrepreneurial capital . . . may also provide a further reason to delay adjustments in 
the utilities sector, with negative effects for overall efficiency.,425Given the experience of CP 
in the regions already receiving them, where there is little growth unless as in Ireland there are 
changes in the national policies too, the NMSs would be better off avoiding the 'trap' that the 
policy can bring and has already brought to the majority of regions. 426 
Regarding the corruption factor, the NMSs have been struggling with the legacy of commu-
nism and the ex communist carve up in which corruption reached high levels, more in some 
countries than in others; it is hardly in their interest to introduce another source of corruption 
creation. That said in the pre accession phase funds were directed towards developing the in-
stitutions of the accession countries and the developing their 'administrative capacity'; some 
of the CP funds are to be directed towards institution building as stated under Article 3 para-
graph 2 (a) of the proposal for a regulation,427but it is only one goal amongst many and not 
one of the two goals of the policy as suggested by the Sapir Report as discussed earlier. Also 
the Commission's greater emphasis on evaluation and control in general in the regulation 
proposal, both confirm the presence of the problem of efficiency and effectiveness, and offer 
some degree of protection against them. But;4 . . . chains of responsibilities and coordinating 
bodies can complicate management and control if there is no back up in the form of precise, 
detailed guidelines and instructions to intermediate bodies on EU rules, the requisite lists of 
i AQ ' 
controls and procedures to be followed, this was not always the case.' The problem is that 
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the Commission's controls are said to be paper based, administrative controls and that these 
lOO 
may well not be sufficient to achieve their stated goals. 
8.7.2 ENLARGEMENT AND THE COMMISSION 
A somewhat surprising fact about the CP element on the enlargement negotiations is that the 
actual amount of acquis that the NMSs were required to take on board was said to be 'thin' as 
Chapter 21 which related to CP was largely subject to subsidiarity. This meant that where 
conditionality was concerned there was a lack of precise conditions (conditionality here 
meaning the use of conditions to assess a NMS) which the Commission could require the 
NMSs to fulfill. But that did not mean that the Commission would be less active, where there 
were a lack of formal rules it created informal conditions;' . . . operational pressures and rec-
ommendations,'431and these increased proportionately with the absence of the formal condi-
i ^ 
tions. So the Commission made new rules and standards for the NMSs to fulfill when rules 
were not present. The whole concept of capacity and in particular 'administrative capacity' 
was expanded beyond recognition, at first it had been only intended to have economic effects 
later it came to; ' . . . include elements such as legislation and regulation, and, in particular 
with regard to Chapter 21, the idea of "regional administrative capacity,'" although funnily 
enough the Commission failed to follow its own stated goals of including regional authorities jt 
where the NMSs were concerned. In effect the absence of 'thick' acquis allowed the Com-
mission considerable discretion,434and did not empower the NMSs apart from extending to 
them some degree of choice of the acquis available. The ability of the Commission to create 
new goal posts quite apart from moving already existing ones,435was fascinating; the follow-
ing quotation illustrates this; 'The formulaic criticism that the candidates suffered from prob-
lems of weak or inadequate "administrative capacity" at the regional level became a mantra 
for the Commission. It did not, however, set explicit benchmarks for measuring progress to-
wards an appropriate level of such "capacity". Thus in regional policy, an absurd situation 
arose where the Commission was pursuing a form of conditionality that had a very weak legal 
basis in the acquis, and no definable benchmarks for compliance.' 36 
Oddly enough the Commission appeared to the NMSs to be judging them from the basis, ori-
ginally at least, of a model, although such a model did not exist. Rather there were differing 
views about regional policy within the Commission as mentioned earlier, and thus the rules 
changed as different views prevailed,437Logically rules set on paper are less vulnerable to 
changes in mood and mode within organizations and the opposite also follows 438The Com-
mission internal differences have been described as; ' . . . the Commission itself was riven in-
ternally by the struggle over competences and in contested visions of regional policy based on 
departmental interests . . . '439 Here the interests of the departments i.e. the two DGs seem to 
have been important, no doubt a turf war that got out of hand in the fragmented Commission. 
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Commission inconsistency was noted by the NMSs who were faced by a dogmatic seeming 
Commission which was critical of their administrative capacities and;4 . . . a general percep-
tion among key actors in the CEECs that the Commission was attempting to foist an EU "mo-
del" or regionalization on them,'440whilst it was itself far from perfect. Denials by the Com-
mission that they promoted a special model or way of doing things does not stand up to the 
facts. The regular country reports that the Commission made annually on the NMSs, were 
seemingly critical if countries failed to follow whatever the 'model' at any given time was. 
Unfortunately for some NMSs they changed their structures to fit in with one Commission 
'model' but when this changed so they were seemingly criticized. The Commission ignored 
structures and regions already present in some NMSs like Hungary for those they desired to 
see installed.441 
All in all the perception of the NMSs was that they were involved in an unequal relationship 
with a partner which moved or changed the goal posts as it required. One DG official stated; ' 
. . . a "top - down approach" had been imposed from Brussels in the early years of the acces-
sion process . . . in the early years PHARE made the mistake of telling them (the candidates) 
what to do.'442The way in which the Commission had pursued some of its policies in particu-
lar regionalization one meant that; ' . . . the Commission's leverage on the CEECs to develop 
regions had been applied "in heavier ways than in previous waves of enlargement."'443 The 
needs and requirements of the NMSs and their regions which the DGs were supposed to be 
serving as well as the wider EU seem to have been forgotten, or at least put onto the back-
burner. The Commission officials seem to have been badly informed about the NMSs and so 
À A A 
made considerable blunders. It seemed to have been ignored that regional policy was an 
area where the NMSs were very sensitive to outside interference as; ' . . . this was policy area 
where the enlargement process touched issues of territorial governance that were sensitive for 
political sovereignty,' thus it is not surprising that; ' . . . there was open resistance to the Com-
mission's attempts to interfere.'4450ne Estonian official stated the Commission; ' . . . saw 
candidate countries as mice in laboratories . . , anything could be asked of them.'446This ap-
pears to be explained by the Commission's desire to make up for; ' . . . its lack of power in 
regional policy in the Member States . . . ;' which lead to the next statement; 'There is evi-
dence to suggest that Commission officials, who had been frustrated in an attempt to extend 
the Commission's competences in regional policy by the 1993 reform, were motivated to use 
enlargement conditionality to pursue their particular agenda for the implementation of re-
gional policy in the candidate countries.'447 
8.7.3 ENLARGEMENT AND OLD MS OPPOSITION 
Two problems emerged for the enlargement, firstly from contributor MSs which wanted to 
see the CP reduced and the budget as a whole, and also from the opposition mentioned above 
and the likely recipient MS support for it. Reductions in payments in general combined with 
more recipients could only lead to less for old MSs and their lobbies. The CP has often been 
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seen though as a means of paying for enlargement in particular where poor 'old' MSs are 
concerned, payment for those currently receiving funds, as well as for those wanting to join 
them. The Commissioner for Regional Affairs seemingly fully supported the notion of pay-
ments being made, seemingly in particular for the old MSs, almost as a prerequisite for a suc-
cessful enlargement. In 1996 the Commissioner stated; 4 . . . the Union could not take in new 
members for free. . . . '448and; 'The Commissioner insisted . . . that enlargement was "not 
conceivable" economically or politically without guarantees to the Union's existing poorer 
regions.,449Whilst MSs had their clear interests in mind when dealing with the enlargement so 
too did many Commissioners, no doubt representing the perspectives of their DG and so sec-
tor but also maybe their national interests too; placing them above the 'objective 
criteria'450decided on and measured by the Commission itself. In the preparations for the 
Agenda 2000 in 1997; ' . . . some Commissioners wanted to recommend that negotiations 
should begin next year with only three candidates: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary 
(the Union has already promised to start talks with Cyprus). But Hans van den Broek, the 
Commissioner in charge of enlargement, argued that, judging by objective criteria, Slovenia 
and Estonia should be added to the list. He won the argument, but only just.'45Political, 
interest based criteria and not 'objective criteria' play and have played an almost leading role 
in the enlargement with the Commission itself. The Commission from the start refused to give 
a timetable for the enlargement but aimed for 2002 for the five best states. The Economist 
stated; 'However, given the complexity of the negotiations, and the scope for squabbles over 
related matters of budgets and CAP reform, this timetable looks rather optimistic.'452lt was 
correct and it is shown here that the enlargement was bound together with policies such as 
CAP reform and the CP in which all their related interests and actors would be able to delay 
things by defending their turf. The problems were not long in coming from the old MSs, with 
Spain in 1998 threatening to block the research budget, the threat was; ' . . . prompted by fears 
that it could lose out in the allocation of EU regional funds when the Union expands,' it 
backed down but only after getting the budget split into two time periods the second of which 
would be after SF had been allocated to NMSs and it would then be able to renegotiate if 
necessary .453The unfortunate proximity of discussions by foreign ministers in December 1998 
where regional aid and the budget were planned to be 'frozen,' which the four cohesion 
country colleagues were; ' . . . bitterly opposed to . . . , ' and the Spanish foreign minister 
stated was 'unacceptable,' to discussions about the progress being made by NMSs was 
unfortunate, and this sort of problem has pursued the whole enlargement process.454 
A meeting of the foreign ministers in 2001 had the Spanish foreign minister blocking an 
agreement; ' . . . on the free movement of workers from the enlargement countries. Spain 
wants to link its support to a pledge that it will not lose out on regional aid funds to new 
member states . . . , ' an approach which the Swedish minister called 'irresponsible.'455Inevita-
bly the NMSs began to get annoyed with the process of the discussions about the CP, and the 
Polish Prime Minister responded to the Spanish demand that it would not see a decrease in its 
share of the funds after the new members join; Buzek made it clear that from Poland's point 
of view the absorption limit of 4% was too low and that Poland could easily absorb more 
funds. He stated that the application of the 4% rule only to NMSs was; ' . . . not acceptable . . 
. ,' and would result in the poorest regions in the NMSs receiving less than the old MSs. He 
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wanted the NMSs to be treated the same as the old MSs on the criteria of eligibility 456Spain's 
GDP per person was 80% of the EU average in 2001 Poland's was 35% and Latvia's 
27%. Spain;' . . . though twice as rich as Poland, would probably still get far more regional 
aid. The Commission estimates that by 2006 the new members would be receiving regional 
aid worth euro 137 per citizen, against an average of euro 231 for Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland... . '458The Commission;4 . . . is already floating some ideas for buying off the Span-
ish and the others. Though their structural aid will be reduced, it will not be cut off at one 
blow.' Other ways of easing the way for Spain that the Commission considered was to; ' . . . 
use unemployment, still high in Spain, rather than relative wealth as a basis for calculating 
eligibility;' the SPD of Germany produced a paper suggesting renationalizing most of the 
funds.459 
Evidently in 2001 the enlargement was coming into danger as a result of the 'haggling' over 
the budget; ' . . . the EU's next expansion, first promised in 1990, could be indefinitely de-
layed, or the applicants could be presented with a deal so unattractive that some will reject it. 
Opinion polls in Estonia . . . already show a majority of voters opposed to joining the 
EU.'460Again in the same year, Spain tried to trade in favours with France and Germany; the 
Germans got from the Commission an agreement to restrict movement of labour from the 
NMSs for seven years, the French wanted a solution to losing CAP receipts; ' . . . the pre-
ferred French solution is clear: find an excuse to deny the applicants full access to the farm 
programme;' the Spanish supported by Italy, Spain and Portugal wanted the CP; 4 . . . rules 
rewritten, to ensure that the subsidies keep flowing.'46ICertainly the Germans got what they 
wanted, the Spanish got a phasing out of some of their regions and other compensation and 
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the French got a phasing in period of the NMSs into the CAP. 
The Commission in 2002 suggested a solution to the budget difficulties, which entailed for SF 
a means of limiting the amount to be paid to the NMSs via the 4% absorption rule which 
would be applied to all MSs but in practice affect only the NMSs.463The Third Annual Report 
on Cohesion Funds of 2004 saw the old MSs lined up to receive 52% of the funds and the 
NMSs would get 42% with the rest set aside for Bulgaria and Romania. The French Commis-
sioner for Regional Affairs, Commissioner Barnier set out to reassure the old MSs and their 
regions;' . . . while most of the poorest regions are in the new member states we still need to 
help the regions in the 15 present member states . . . the process of catching up is still incom-
plete.' This led an MEP to say; 'This shows those who said enlargement would be bad news 
for the regions have got it completely wrong.'464The regions referred to were naturally the 
'old' MSs' regions, which had been successfully defended at the cost of the NMSs. Spain was 
still expected to; ' . . . fight to keep as much as it can manage . . . ,' after the 2004 enlarge-
ment.4 5The budget question this time over the; " ' . . . financial perspective for 2007-1013 . . . 
"'again featured regional aid as a major source of friction with Spain expected to; ' . . . fight 
hard for their money . . . , ' Britain was said to have been; ' . . . leading a camp demanding a 
switch of regional aid to the new members from central Europe, plus Greece and Portugal. 
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There is something ludicrous in the Commission's plan to spend over half of EU regional aid Aff 
in the 15 older members, 13 of which have above average incomes.' 
The above demonstrates the danger was always present, that reforming the most expensive 
policies of the Union would be linked to enlargement; it was hoped in a positive manner, with 
enlargement forcing the policies to reform, but equally the opposite was always possible if not 
likely; 'It would be nice to think that the prospect of enlargement could be used to force the 
existing 15 to reform both the CAP and the regional funds in advance, but so far, that is not 
what has been happening. Many countries would prefer to delay EU enlargement indefinitely 
rather than sacrifice any of the benefits they currently receive from the EU trough.,467The si-
tuation was not positive, leading to the statement that the reforms should be left until after the 
enlargement; 'As things stand, the first new members are unlikely to get in before 2005 . . , 
Once in, they could help make the rules, rather than having to accept a fait accompli rigged 
against them. A messy fight might ensure but that might be better than delaying enlargement 
indefinitely.'468This sentiment is repeated with suggesting that linking the reform to enlarge-
ment could be a 'trap' and; ' . . . risks playing into the hands of those who would like to delay 
the EU's expansion indefinitely, ideally keeping the CAP as little changed as possible.'469 
8.7.4 POLICY NETWORKS, MSs AND RESISTANCE TO ENLARGEMENT 
At the early stage of the enlargement process the so called EA agreements were used (Europe 
Agreements) to guide the NMSs towards the Union and the negotiations for them began in 
1990; there were problems at this stage between those who favoured long term political objec-
tives or those; ' . . . under pressure from short-term problems'.470Basically DG Enlargement 
was opposed by DG AGRI and DG Industry; the latter under pressure from their respective 
sectors, much the same happened in MSs in their governmental departments; although DG 
Enlargement is said to have also been split between; ' . . . the units dealing respectively with 
the CEECs and those responsible for trade defence instruments.'47'The result was that; ' . . . 
the ability of the sectoral logic to constrain a more politically motivated agreement was great-
ly facilitated by the fragmentation of the policy process and the lack of close oversight by the 
macro-policy-makers in the member governments. Defensive sectoral interests were able to 
insulate specific aspects of the EAs from political pressures for a more generous approach to 
the CEECs and to set the baseline of what would be on offer. As some of those involved on 
the CEEC side were able to observe, as fast as they identified issues on which they wanted to 
press for more open market access, they found that an EU-based lobby had beaten them to the 
EU negotiators.'472Thus even at this stage in the enlargement the Commission was overly eas-
ily influenced by sectoral lobbies, and its relevant DGs particularly so; DG REGIO was unli-
kely to have been any exception to this basic rule. The most powerful lobbying groups in the 
EU are stated to be those of; ' . . . fanners and recipients of regional aid,' and that 'the pros-
pect of major cuts to pay for increased transfers to the East would provoke opposition . . . '473 
The Commission is known to be prime territory for networks both internally and as the hub 
for policy networks. The DG has had a loose if not fragmented structure with little coordina-
tion and communication between the directorates. The DG was one of those flagged for Spain 
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and was dominated by those of a southern nationality in the higher posts. Internal networks 
are of a nationality as well as task based character; in particular in the DG the southern MSs 
and the French were a likely powerful Policy Network. The French in particular were alleged 
to dominate the policy-making directorate and to have been more favourable towards the 
French geographical unit than others. Over the last few years however there was a growing 
trend towards moving the focus of the policy to the East rather than the south and the English 
language and all the cultural issues that accompany that becoming more the norm; this was 
quite clearly a threat for the French speaking, southern oriented officials and DG culture. The 
enlargement brought with it, hand-in-hand, demands for reform if not abolition of the CP and 
its re-nationalisation, for many officials the enlargement could have been seen as bringing 
with it the pressure for reform and general emasculation and it would have been resisted for 
that reason. 
There would appear to have been a nationality, task-based, network possibly including the 
policy making directorate or members of it and that it was seemingly not over enthusiastic 
towards the enlargement. Granted the Policy Network aspect of the DGs work, the open op-
position to any move from the CP status quo by Spain and other of the recipients and that they 
lined up with the DG often in opposition to the rest of the MSs showed a degree of coordina-
tion that seemingly implied a Policy Network. MEPs and members of other of the European 
institutions were quite possibly also members of the network. The DG was known to have 
garnered support for its fight back against the Sapir Report, from amongst the MSs and re-
gions as well as other institutions who subsequently seemingly backed it up. The Policy Net-
work probably also helped the DG survive the fall out within the Commission itself when the 
DG was under pressure to give up some of its policies when a display of the successful capac-
ity building and stakeholders creation by the DG was used to win the day.474The effect of the 
constituencies, which had close relationships with the officials and stood to lose a lot of sup-
port both politically and financially if they were removed from the remit of the DG, on the 
officials cannot be overestimated; often the officials shared the same nationality as those in 
the regions and MSs and will have worked together with them for years. The DG will proba-
bly have been under pressure to assist the constituencies, regions and old MSs and to pay 
back any favours made. 
Resistance to DG reorganization and so policy reform is seemingly a sort of chicken and egg 
situation, as if there is not effective reform of a policy then there is also likely to be little staff 
reorganization at least within the Commission and the same works in reverse, without staff 
reorganization effective reform of a policy is difficult. Staff who resist policy reform will be 
unlikely to favour reorganization either, as in the Commission often policy is decided by 
which members of staff run the dossier. The first reorganization in 2000 following the fall of 
the Santer Commission introduced a new Director General who was not of southern origin but 
several of the other important posts allegedly remained unchanged until the 2004 reform and 
enlargement was apparently conveniently isolated from the rest of the DG in its own director-
ate unlike in other similar DGs. This failure to reorganize the DG more effectively and to 
properly integrate the enlargement related units into the structure was allegedly a mistake, and 
only four years later was it remedied. The lack of efficiency in the DG's handling of the 
NMSs and the delays and constant reorganizing of their related desks seemed to contrast 
rather starkly with the lack of change in other parts of the DG; there was something along the 
lines of a lack of 'administrative capacity' in the DG. It would appear that networks within 
the DG opposed any alteration of the status quo. 
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In policy terms there are possible indications of the practical effect that the Policy Network 
had on the enlargement process, in particular before 2000 when the agenda 2000 was being 
constructed. The n+2 instrument seems likely to have been aimed at the NMSs and made their 
A 
lives more difficult; the same goes for the absorption level of 4%. Both seem to have been 
directed towards preventing the NMSs receiving their fair due. The obvious logic behind the 
4% rule was that from a fixed limited sum, increasing the number of people receiving from it 
could only lead to less for those who receive most now. It seems to have been clear to many 
a 
commentators that the 4% rule was rather over convenient for the old MSs. The introduction 
a t t 
of n+2 in 1999 exacerbated what difficulties with absorption that the NMSs had. It was said 
that its introduction; 4 . . . may lead to unequal treatment.' There are other details of; 4 . . . 
modulation controls and contracts of confidence . . . , ' which seemingly aimed to favour the 
old MSs at the expense of the NMSs and which the latter naturally protested against.479In par-
ticular the fact that over half of the funds were still going to the old MSs despite demands for 
this to be stopped showed on the one hand that the recipients could wield their power effec-
tively in the Council but since the DG or elements of it have hardly been fighting them in this, 
and rather came up with the instruments that enabled the status quo to remain to some extent, 
the DG must be implicated in the result. It is also more convenient for MSs not to be seen to 
be the ones constantly opposing a policy but rather to encourage the Commission to do this 
for them, however, the Commission as a whole seemed to have been in favour of some reform 
of the policy and discussion about it. 
The existence of groups within the DG who at times acted in ways which allegedly dismayed 
their colleagues was spoken of by officials and there were said to be two quite clear groups, 
some of the policy making group in their directorate which was said to be French/ Mediterra-
nean in its make up and culture, and the so called geographical desks which are said to be 
Germanic. The policy making group seemingly saw little change in its higher managerial 
posts for years whilst the geographical desks seemed more liable to fluctuations. The rela-
tively small policy directorate and a small number of officials in it are likely to be those being 
referred to in the fo l lowing ; 4 . . . within the Commission, the tension between conflicting pol-
icy positions and objectives became more apparent over time and as the enlargement process 
progressed. On the other hand, the early pressures from the Commission were driven by pref-
erences among some key officials within DG Enlargement and DG REGIO for an institutional 
design in the CEECs that would embed decentralization and partnership with the regions . . . 
'480Such key individuals were readily able to direct policy and affect enlargement in one di-
rection and they and or their colleagues could no doubt affect it in another less positive direc-
tion if they so chose. 
The interviews with DG officials and also with NMS officials seemingly strengthened the no-
tion that a southern European Policy Network had probably had a seemingly negative impact 
475 See note 79 Tarschys, (2003) p.l 1. 'As they are introduced to distribution mechanisms built up by the Old Member states, 
the new arrivals cannot fail to note a number of features favouring the original architects. An example of this is the specific 
"absorption ceiling" introduced by the 1999 Berlin Council, limiting Structural Policy benefits to any country from the EU 
budget to a maximum of four per cent of its GDP' 
476 The Economist Jan 31 2002 To get them in, cut the costs 'The proposed solution on regional aid is similar. On current 
criteria, virtually every region in Europe's east would qualify for generous EU aid. This would imply either a large increase 
in the EU budget or a big switch of resources from today's poor regions in places like Spain and Greece. But the EU invokes 
a rule that no country can receive regional aid that is more than 4% of its GDP. Any more than that, so the theory goes, could 
not be safely absorbed. Conveniently, given the small economies of the eastern applicants, the 4% rule would tightly limit 
how much they could get.' 
477 See note 388 Court of Auditors Special Report No5/2004 p. 16; § 53 
478 See note 202 Court of Auditor's Report on Activities Financed from the General Budget year 2000 p. 18 
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480 See note 116 Hughes; Sasse; Gorron (2004) p.539 
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on the enlargement.481The policy making directorate was alleged to have been problematic for 
geographical desks and NMSs and the n+2 rule was highlighted as one of the bigger prob-
lems.48 A NMS official stated; 'Geographical units understand NMSs but the centre and pol-
icy making directorate then comes into play and then understanding is gone.'483More alarm-
ing was the statement that there was; 4 . . . strong opposition from the DG to NMS regional 
policy, illegal resistance by the Commission,,484and; 'They (the DG) wanted it (enlargement) 
to go on longer, their experts definitely wanted to keep the Hungarians out, "better for Hun-
i A f 
gary to have more preparation."' The activities of certain groups and internal networks 
within the DG made for problems with the enlargement; 'Internal (DG) networks existed 
which were and could be negative, and were negative to NMSs, technical issues had a big im-
pact, internal networks had a impact on the results of policies and were seen to influence is-/IRA 
sues on a day to day basis e.g. in the details of implementing system negotiated.' 
The Commission and the DG and their internal reforms were alleged to have had a negative 
effect on the enrolling of NMS staff there is; ' . . . clear resistance by Commission to NMS 
staff joining and this is a big problem.'487DG problems affected a wider group than might 
have been imagined; ' . . . the problems in the DG caused problems for the enlargement proc-
ess and problems for NMSs internally vis-à-vis their civil services.'488Ironically the lack of 
internal DG communication and coordination was stated by two of the respondents to have 
been beneficial for them once they could; ' . . . see what is wrong', evidently it created room 
for canny NMSs to use to manoeuvre in.489 
8.7.5 DG AND NMS PERCEPTIONS ABOUT EACH OTHER AND THE 
ENLARGEMENT 
The experience of the enlargement and the manner in which it was carried out have not al-
ways been conducive towards creating an atmosphere of trust between the NMSs and the DG. 
Possible reasons for the DG's behaviour and attitude were given by NMS officials; two of the 
respondents stated that the DG was full of fear, they were; ' . . . afraid of us,,490and the DG is; 
' . . . paranoid about NMSs . . . '49IOthers stressed the desire of the DG to 'teach' the 
NMSs;492 ' . . . they were trying to fulfill their dreams for old MSs on NMSs,'493and; 'They 
wanted to make sure that Hungary will be blamed for DG mistakes.'494 One official stated that 
the; 'Commission wanted political control over all the funds spent and therefore national rules 
were not accepted.'495Another said; ' . . . there is a feeling that old MSs did not have to do the 
NMSs' controls.'496The lack of real Commission understanding of the NMSs was stated to be 
because; ' . . . the Commission believe that they know the NMSs but they only know them 
j 
technically,' the corollary of this was the over use of paper administrative tools which was 
unfortunate; ' . . . the Commission was very worried about the lack of civil service law and 
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therefore they issued detailed manuals; they should have put pressure on the Czechs to change 
their civil service, the Czechs do not understand this.'498The solution was stated to be that the 
Commission should have given the responsibility to the NMSs and used their rules. Generally 
the NMSs felt uneasy or had negative memories and experiences of the enlargement which 
still rankled; 'NMSs had to do what MSs do not; ,499and; 'The Commission pushed the Czechs 
to do things they did not want to do and these are now problems.'500The Commission was sta-
ted to have been; ' . . . too dominant and overbearing,' With regard to the pre accession phase, 
' . . . horrible management of pre accession funds, Brussels rules had to be used not national 
rules;'501and; 'Some assistance was rejected when requested, the DG was not flexible.'502One 
NMS official stated that DG; ' . . . officials see NMSs as on the moon;' and; 'French officials 
know more about Morocco than Prague . . . ' . One said; ' . . . the Commission was very dicta-
torial before the enlargement.'503The DG's staffing measures were criticized as; ' . . . bizarre, 
informal Commission staffing methods.'504 
Regarding the DG's general effectiveness and efficiency, on average it was rated as adequate 
to good before the enlargement and moderately improved since. Two of the respondents rated 
Commission leadership of dossiers as needing some or a lot of improvement and either re-
maining unchanged on the pre enlargement performance or worsening. Particularly good was 
and are the DG's control mechanisms; 'the DG is fast with audit and control missions.'505 Al-
so the networks associated with monitoring were graded very highly both the speed with 
which they were set up and their performance.506However internal DG communication and 
coordination was criticized and most respondents thought it still needed some improvement 
even after the enlargement;507one stated;' . . . the problem of geographical desks and the pol-
icy making gang . . . details are made by the German implementing (geographical desks) gang 
no one between them, no communication,' and; ' . . . a lack of /no communication between 
low and middle and top management,'508 
Generally the DG was considered to have been pretty inflexible and unhelpful with regard to 
projects with a tendency to double or treble bureaucratic procedures in the pre accession pha-
se. 09The DG was seen as not really being prepared for the enlargement and needing some 
improvements.510Decision making procedures were seen to be slow and needing improve-
ment.511 The Commission's methods and project management skills were criticized 12 and 
these led t o ; ' . . . long delays and projects not followed.' The DG was said to have been as a 
whole just adequately supportive of the enlargement,514but; 'not enthusiastic.'515The DG was 
stated to have been; 'very inflexible,'516one respondent rated the DG as needing a lot of im-
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provement on this point.517Desk Officers and Heads of Unit were perceived to be either ade-
quate or needing some improvement, the top management scored moderately better.518 Most 
noted an improvement in the DGs attitude to the NMSs since the enlargement although; some 
felt they w e r e ; 4 , . . still second class citizens.'519 
Regarding the decision making situation after the enlargement, the respondents considered the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the various management groups and comitology committees 
and the Council in general to be problematic and needing improvement and all actors to be the 
cause.520NMSs and the DG were stated to lack experience and the increase in size made the 
various groups; 4 . . . slow and more difficult to make decisions,'521whilst; 4 . . . some take a 
very long time.' The Commission was said by one respondent to have been strengthened by 
t h e ; 4 . . . very lengthy Councils,' as it could;4 . . . divide and rule and the end package is un-
changed, there is not enough time to discuss details.'523Commission bureaucratic procedures 
were considered to be; 4 . . . always increasing although some are necessary,' and the Com-
mission; 'is getting more and more power.'52 There was skepticism about the DG's goal of 
simplification; 4 . . . there is no meaningful simplification, the DG is pushing for more con-
trol,' and regarding the 2013 negotiations; ' . , . still limited simplification and financially no 
simplification.'525The NMSs stated that they work together and the Poles;4 . . . speak for eve-
ryone although they over do i t . ' 5 2 6 The; 4 . . . focus of regional policy is going to the East,' ac-
^ O 7 
cording to one of the respondents. 
The mixed bag which is the state of NMS ministries was also a cause for concern which the 
NMS officials openly admitted to. Poland's size and liking to be independent were stated to 
be a problem for the DG;1 . . . we are big and full of problems therefore we have our own u-
nit,' administration is very hierarchical although their ministries are said to coordinate well 
and as a result seem to have 'been powerful enough' to deal with the Commission.528The 
Czech Republic does have had some administrative problems and a lack of staff; 4 . . . unsta-
ble administration,'529and problems with the civil service remain. The ministries were; 4 . . . 
hierarchical and potentially top heavy,' and the projects; ' . . . not of the highest,' with ' . . . 
expertise missing as staff are badly paid.'530 The Hungarian situation was said to be no worse 
than Ireland's with a strict central administration which they have spent;' . . . 10 years build-
ing up,' but the local level;' . . . is a problem'531 
8.7.5 DG OFFICIALS VIEWS ABOUT THE NMSs 
In general the officials interviewed were sceptical about the state of preparedness of the 
NMSs for the enlargement and also of the appropriateness of DG REGIO's controls for the 
NMSs' situation on the ground. Some of the comments made were decidedly pessimistic, 'Y-
ou cannot trust the information you get from the NMSs. DG REGIO needs to go there and see 
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on the ground. DG REGIO think they know what is happening but they are dreaming . . . the 
NMSs at the beginning will be a disaster.'532Part of the problem lies with the; ' . . . complex 
sequence of institutions put into place,'533 with independent agencies to check on governmen-
tal administrations, and also municipalities, lots of actors are involved. There is said to be a 
problem of inter-ministerial coordination in the NMSs, much like the Commission and; 
there is an absence of middle aged - middle management in NMSs ministries and this is a 
problem;'534this point has been raised by all the DGs and accepted by most of the NMSs 
working with them. 
Poland was alleged to be extremely legalistic in their approach; when requested for a policy 
document they produced a statute.535Their ministries had a coordination problem;536in addi-
tion the officials involved in the CP were said to be all young and lacking experience which 
meant they are inappropriate for dealing with 'big sums.' A further problem was that the 
civil service paid badly in Poland and staff turnover was 'vast.'538All the staff currently in the 
ministries dealing with the DG were said to be 'consultants;' Poland was said to; ' . . . need 
control and help in dispensing the funds.'539According to one official Poland over per-
formed,540which was what the Poles themselves said they were trying to do; ' , . . the Com-
mission was obsessed with absorption capacity, the Poles wanted to prove it to them. '^Ap-
parently the; 'Poles got huge advances but are holding them and not spending them, thus no 
incentive to project proposals . . . , projects are there but not happening'.542 
C A T 
Slovenia and Estonia were said to be more advanced than the rest Slovakia shared the NMS 
problem of a lack of experts and therefore also a lack of confidence. Staff turnover was high 
and there was a problem with the separation of the political layer and the administration, there 
was a lot of very 'grey' area. Regarding eligibility questions sent to the Commission, these 
were said to be a sign of lack of confidence and experts, and the high turnover of staff by 
NMSs; the Commission said ministries should decide for themselves. Auditing institutions 
were there but there was a lack of certainty as to whether they would function correctly or 
not.544 
8.8 CONCLUSION 
The DG is another 'paying DG' like DG AGRI and was found to be likewise the target for 
MS attention in every respect. The policy was expected to show both the hallmarks of MS and 
DG/Commission pressure and interests. Given the very different Presidents who have been 
involved in the CP it is a useful example to use, to demonstrate the differences of interest be-
tween Commission President and MSs at various times. 
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The general affects of the Commission cycle of MS influence and subsequent bureaucratiza-
tion would be expected to be visible in the DG. Its changing organisational structure should 
show increases in hierarchical attempts at control over the lower echelons and this will be ex-
amined at length. Policy Networks could be expected to be found in the DG given its similari-
ties to DG AGRI, whether this was in fact the case remains and will be laid out in detail in 
this chapter. 
Furthermore the Enlargement would be expected to have been negatively influenced in vari-
ous ways; the New Member States (NMSs), the term CEEC is also used to identify this group 
in the literature, were quite simply outsiders who were forcing changes on a system that had 
existed happily enough without them. Where large sums of money are concerned there are 
likely to be large vested interests extremely anxious to defend their allocations against all co-
mers. The CP is unlikely to be any exception to this principle and problems and resistance 
could be expected from various quarters. At the same time the CP has often been important in 
assisting poorer regions and MSs to integrate, without its presence the EU might look rather 
different today. 
All in all of course, there were and are, more major difficulties that affected the enlargement 
process than the just the Policy Networks within the DG, in particular the lack of communica-
tion and coordination between DGs created serious problems. It is hard to get a precise esti-
mate of the wasted administrative capacity of the NMSs which was spent on tasks based on 
inconsistent policies and DG inter service problems but it appears to have been considerable. 
Given that the NMSs were affected by these policies and that NMSs were criticized as a re-
sult, the Commission and DGs own internal problems can be said to have directly affected the 
enlargement process. 
At the level of the individual official; his or her motivations will have a cumulative effect par-
ticularly when enhanced by Policy Networks, but maybe more important was the disinterest 
and disorganization which the DG as a whole showed towards the enlargement process which 
allowed the n+2 rule and the 4% absorption levels to be put into practice. Some seemingly 
had 'negative* motives which were more actively linked to defending their policy particularly 
those most closely linked to its conception and aware of the dangers to it, posed by the enlar-
gement and the Commission President sponsored Sapir Report, which finally forced action 
onto the DG. Interestingly the Sapir Report came out in summer 2003, and the DG was seem-
ingly desperate for all and any allies; the July 2004 reorganization which followed saw old 
and new MSs together on geographical desks545and the emergence of a more enlargement 
friendly DG. In between the report and the reorganization, DG officials had probably found 
support for their response to the Sapir Report amongst the NMSs and of course the enlarge-
ment itself had taken place. The reorganization was officially no doubt intended to align the 
DG to the needs of the new regulation, which was itself seemingly an answer to the Sapir Re-
port, but it was also due to the enlargement. It is tempting to see the reorganization as both a 
recognition that the NMSs would not tolerate as MSs the system that had served them unfa-
vourably earlier but also a measure of reward, the NMSs had supported the DG through the 
Sapir crisis. Finally some within the DG, as with the Commission as a whole, have had to ac-
cept reality that the enlargement could not be stopped so the reorganization could take place, 
nothing to lose anymore 
It is a pity that the NMSs were caught up in the upheavals surrounding the reforming of the 
policy or the attempts at achieving this and the probable defensive tactics of Policy Networks. 
The negative political effect of the miserliness by EU as far as the NMSs were concerned has 
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hardly been ideal for creating a harmonious atmosphere for the development of the EU, most 
NMS officials were quite cautious about their desires for the EU.546The NMSs have been and 
are facing, a difficult situation where the CP is concerned, and certainly elements of it ap-
peared to have been aimed against them.547The political fallout from their treatment may well 
take years to show; certainly the progress towards ever closer union has not been made any 
easier by annoying and frustrating the NMSs as much as has been the case. Officials expect 
that the real difficulties will only emerge as the NMSs become more confident about their po-
sitions and gain more information and, no doubt, build up their own networks inside and out-
side the Commission.548 
In terms of bureaucratic success the DG has had a rather paradoxically mixed bag of results; 
its policy has survived for the moment, but for a period it almost looked as though the CP was 
very much under threat. However it is no longer as able to function independently as it had 
now that other DGs are becoming more involved in the internal making of policies in the DG, 
or at least this is intended. The DG has seen its staff resources increasing and as the lead DG 
in the enlargement it gained the majority of the staff though in an oddly staggered manner. 
But whether these represent a real gain in the number of staff is dubious since the DG will see 
an increase in work with the NMSs and the phasing out of the old MSs. The DG has gained 
two extra directorates and the management positions that they entail, however these are pre-
dominantly in audit and finance posts which will control and manage the DG and its officials, 
and police the policy as with DG AGRJ where the auditors are kept separate from the man-
agement of the DG. 
There were the usual signs of MS influence on the policy and the DG after the end of the 
Delors period, gradually the CP seemed to be not just moving back into the hands of the MSs, 
a 'creeping' re-nationalization, but also it had its fundamentals challenged. The DG seemed 
pretty vulnerable not just to MS influence on the geographical desks and seemingly in the pol-
icy making directorate. A Policy Network, or maybe more than one, seemed to be quite able 
to sour the enlargement process to an extent, and to create problems for the NMSs. The re-
sponse of the DG, as for the Commission as a whole, was reorganization and bureaucratiza-
tion, to the extent that efficiency seemed to suffer quite considerably. Unfortunately the net-
work seemed to be quite capable of avoiding the reorganization of 2000 with the result that 
the policy remained fairly unchanged and the attitude towards enlargement likewise, it was 
only once the DG was more thoroughly reorganized that a more positive attitude seemed to 
emerge. 
After the increase in bureaucratization there seemed to be signs that the DG was fighting back 
against its detractors and claiming back territory lost as the proposal for the new regulation 
shows. Maybe like DG ENV and DG AGRI the DG had not experienced a real cut back but 
had experienced a clipping of its wings or rather networks, and the enforced realignment of 
the policy with the priorities of the Commission and EU as a whole via the realignment of the 
staff within it. A re-launch of itself and its policy seemed to have been on the cards although 
the final budget reduction dampened this expectation considerably. 
As with DG ENV and DG AGRI it is hard to see that the DGs have really benefited from the 
enlargement, rather there is a real sense that their independence has been and is being modi-
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fied. The DGs were gradually being mainstreamed, the enlargement brought on and forced a 
reassessment of their policies and the process of making them and so also changes in their 
administrative cultures all of which are becoming more Anglo-Saxon in orientation and lan-
guage. The policies that the staff in the DGs wanted to have and believed in have all come 
under serious attack and still are. There is a sense of the CP, as desired by the staff in the DG, 
hanging on by the skin of its teeth; several of the officials interviewed were decidedly pessi-
mistic about the future of the policy in its current form.549So far, at the European Council in 
2005 the DG appeared to have retained the 'essentials' of the proposed regulation, although 
specifics are hard to come by, but the resources of the budget were not the 1.24 % GNP that 
the Commission wanted or the grander numbers of 1.4 and above desired by some of the re-
cipients but rather 1.06%, down from 1.27% in 1999. This means a fall of 8% for the 
CP,550modest in a sense, but given that the DG and Commission had wanted a lot more it is a 
defeat. Far from there being any increase as had been expected, there was a decrease. The 
Delors glory days of independent policy making and DG autonomy and CP growth seem to be 
over. For all the seeming resistance of officials and Policy Networks to the changes that were 
so entwined with the enlargement they are happening. The 'disaster' of inter service commu-
nication and coordination which resulted from extremely individual DGs and seemingly Pol-
icy Network driven agendas following their own logic and desires at the expense of coherence 
and consistency resulted from the post Delors administrative culture and structures. This 
seemed to be a few signs that the DGs are gradually being limited. The DGs were being made 
more like bureaucratic ministries with their time for policy making seriously reduced as op-
posed to that spent coordinating and communicating with other DGs and institutions and civic 
society and carrying out bureaucratic procedures. Management were becoming just that and 
their staff were heading in the direction of civil servants and the MSs seemed to be the real 
winners in the enlargement game. 
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Dates of Interviews Held with DG REGIO Officials 
Interviews carried out with officials between 31,03.04 
and 12.04.2005 
Dates of Interviews Held with NMS Officials 
Hungarian Official 1. 01.03.2005 
Hungarian Official 2. 15.02.05 
Czech Republic Official 1. 01,04.05, 
Czech Republic Official 2. 25.02.05 
Polish Official 17.03.05, 
Estonian Official 04.03.05 
9. CONCLUSION 
SUMMARY OF THE THEORY AND CASE STUDY FACTS 
So we come now to the conclusion. But before we begin it is as well to remind ourse] 
bout the main steps that have been taken so far. First we will review the theoretical apj 
once more before summarising the main findings from the case studies. That done m 
consider the broad trends of fragmentation in first the EU, and then the Commission, 
we move on to consideration of the less macro trends at work in the Commission o f inc 
Policy Network activity and subsequent bureaucratization and their implications. One 
main implications was for the enlargement which is then discussed at length. Finally 
turn to a more theoretical stance to draw together the theoretical 'corset' about our fac 
trends. Everything discussed so far would suggest that a degree of organisational pathol 
at work so we return to Mintzberg and Hofstede who are used to analyse the Comrnissic 
a longer perspective we bring in again the Papal model which will enable us to state 
dangers ahead. Then to round off we will look at a possible solution to remedy the sho 
ings of the EU as it stands. 
9.1 SUMMARY OF THE THEORY 
In the first chapter we considered the broad sweep of European Integration History and 
fied a rather particular dialectic process underway, namely an organic biological evolu 
the heart of Europe. Several aspects of the High Authority - Commission could be cons 
to be benevolently pathological from a democratic and a theoretical perspective. The b 
lent quality of the process implies that some sort of vaccination was at work and requi 
very good reasons. Closer inspection revealed a dual vaccination taking place with MSs 
main parts of the new 'polity' host being prevented from making war and being lured I 
erate prosperity instead. A range of European-level institutions sprang up to contain tl 
democratic organisation operating in its midst. This combination of institutions creal 
European layer of governance that has secured the immunisation of the MSs and their 
further still. 
The Commission, as the vaccine, has its own organisational structure and logic which i 
gued is both highly original, 'pathological' and potentially unstable. It contains the pc 
to be a government of Europe and uses Policy Networks to bind the national civil serv 
itself. This perspective is of some help when considering the 'pathological' range of 
berg organisational types which are found in the Commission. It is rigidly bureaucrat! 
mes but there was something superficial about this. It seems to be more bureaucracy 
pearance than an attempt to make a true bureaucracy. At the same time it is very missi 
like and able to be flexible and full of entrepreneurial talent but more on Mintzberg 1 
the chapter. It is an organisation that is looking to expand, indeed made to grow. The 
isational logic of the Commission drives it to be the main governmental structure in a 
Europe. It seems likely that this was always intended however vaguely by the found 
thers. 
The steps by which the Commission expands its scope and competences is by f ragme 
and engrenage. It essentially divides the opposition whether in the Council or in the Mi 
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istries and then binds the officials who have been lured towards the possibilities for them-
selves and their positions to the European project. Ministries will always have a centrifugal 
tendency to follow their own sectoral agenda rather than that of the centre and are also easily 
lured towards the European possibilities for furthering their sectors. As long as the Commis-
sion remains dynamic and mission oriented it can bind its multinational staff and multi sector 
DGs more or less together. However, when it has been over dynamic and so potentially patho-
logical (from an MS perspective) then the MSs who make up the host 'polity' can and will 
arrest the Commission much as an immune system can. This is done by removing the dy-
namic head of the organisation and making it clear that less legislation and dynamism are 
wanted and possible. The second stage is to dissolve the Commission internally back into a 
collection of national staffs. MSs apply greater pressure on their nationals and appoint them 
deeper into the organisation. Without a sense of mission and dynamism to bind the loyalty of 
such a diverse collection of nationalities the Commission itself begins to give way to centrifu-
gal sectoral pressures. Often these are closely linked to national loyalties. Fragmentation of 
the Commission proceeds apace and a formal decentralisation is put into force to try and set 
limits to the disintegration. Large scale bureaucratization is introduced to try and allow the 
College to control the staff of the DGs more and to re-integrate the DGs. Reforms will be re-
sisted in particular by the DG hierarchies and sectoral Policy Networks which have seen their 
influence grow in the absence of a strong centre. 
Finally the period of Commission slow down will come to an end. The EU was created to be 
Commission driven to a specific goal with ever continuing integration. The period of slow-
down succeeds in restoring a sense of security and control to the MSs and their domestic au-
diences. The Commission will then gradually begin to prepare itself to relaunch the project 
and prepares for more spillover possibilities. The history of the EU shows that this process 
runs in cycles and it is argued will continue until a final traditional democratic governmental 
structure is found for the Commission to be a part of. Currently the case studies have made 
quite clear we find the Commission working its way out of a slow-down phase and struggling 
to re launch the project. 
We would expect to find the EU and the Commission in quite a serious state of fragmentation. 
The two opponents the MSs and the Commission having achieved a stalemate as it were. In-
stead of reform and rationalisation we would expect to see a lack of compromise and a will-
ingness to create new procedures and empower new governance actors rather than grant new 
competences to the opponent. The MSs are not in a position to really provide a sense of mis-
sion and leadership to the EU and the sectors which have been fragmented from the total con-
trol of their governmental remit. The Commission is, but not when it has been deliberately 
weakened. Without the dynamic of expansion and spillover potential the Commission itself 
would be in danger of fragmenting as sector loyalty proves greater than organisational loyalty 
for an organisation that has lost its sense of mission. 
We saw the need to find some historical model to assist the analysis and that classic state 
formation theory is unfortunately not ideal for this task. The medieval papacy was found to 
have been useful in this regard and certainly the many parallels which exist between the EU 
and the papacy make it a worthwhile object of investigation. The result of the use of the pa-
pacy model was that both the papacy and the EU can be said to have developed in a similar 
organic manner. The implications of similarity in organisation and development are that we 
can look to the later papacy to locate problems which may well affect the EU unless it is very 
careful. 
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So we have reflected once more on the theoretical approach to the thesis. We will now run 
through the main facts that were found in the case studies. 
9.2 SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDY FACTS 
9.2.1 ANTI FRAUD AGENCY (OLAF) 
The case of OLAF usefully illustrated the relationship of the Commission to a specific reform 
and so to reform in general. Much like the EU and the problems of fragmentation, discussed 
next, generally OLAF can be seen very much in the light of the creation of another actor in 
the EU system, or rather the re-invention and strengthening of an old one, to solve a problem 
which could maybe have been better solved by a more rational organisation. Like the Com-
mission it had a combination of tasks presented to it to perform which do not seem veiy con-
sistent or complementary. This despite the fact that it had rather scarce resources for its first 
period of existence and the Commission was not free from blame in this regard. It seems to 
have been used as a political pawn in the larger EU game, with the Commission and the EP 
vying for power. The essence of the agency was and is investigatoiy in an administrative 
manner whilst doing a task which really requires police power. 
The first stage in the reform which resulted in the creation of UCLAF was put onto the agen-
da by the EP but subsequently the responsibility of the Commission. UCLAF was ultimately a 
reform which failed largely due to Commission unwillingness to fully accept the logic and 
implications of its existence and function, There was a very real sense of half heartedness a-
bout UCLAF and the manner in which the Commission dealt with it. Maybe reluctance would 
be nearer the mark, quite possibly because UCLAF was perceived as unnecessary and foisted 
on the Commission by the EP more as a control mechanism than anything else. Importantly, 
the Commission was able to continue for over ten years with UCLAF in this state. OLAF was 
seemingly forced onto the Commission after the Santer College fell; once again the EP insti-
gated this, required independence for the agency and also pressed for new staff untainted by 
the problems with UCLAF to be recruited. OLAF's actual structure, competences and posi-
tion in the Commission itself was also the result of EP, Commission negotiations. The Com-
mission at first seemed in favour, so long as the pressure was on and the memory of the scan-
dal fresh, but then the mid term report apparently shows inexorable pressure being turned on 
OLAF to blunt the reform. The staff required for the agency to function were not initially at 
least fully made available by the Commission despite the availability of funding by the EP. 
Instead of the agency investigating the allegations of mismanagement from within the Com-
mission, the latter wanted the agency to concentrate on investigating VAT fraud on cigarettes 
etc, basic police and Customs and Excise work, labour intensive and not a rational use of 
scarce expert resources. This is particularly the case when it is remembered that OLAF alone 
has the right to initially carry out investigations in the European institutions. To finish off on 
the Commission's attitude to reform, one could sum it up as apparent welcoming acceptance 
then growing reluctance is shown followed by steady attempts by various sources in its ranks 
to quietly undermine and where possible render reform harmless. 
It seems ironic that the Commission employed very similar tactics when reining in OLAF to 
those that the MSs have traditionally used to curb its activities in terms of restrictions of staff 
numbers and increases in tasks. Staff numbers and resources were kept limited and hard 
fought over. At the same time a large, almost incredibly large array of tasks thrust onto the 
organisation. From fraud proofing legislation to raiding industrial and EU premises; from in-
ternal management tasks like investigating mismanagement and making recommendations for 
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improvements to carrying out internal investigations into staff and management. Like the 
Commission, OLAF enjoys some independence in actual activities, in particular the Director 
has a legally guaranteed independence, whilst its resources are decided on by the very people 
it is supposed to be guiding and investigating. 
Policy making and neo functional spillover is what the Commission is about, in its own eyes 
at least, and many of its staff and certainly the hierarchy, assess success in terms of policy 
making. OLAF was no exception to the rule and sure enough the simple existence of OLAF, 
in however an emaciated form, was stated to require proper legal controls over it, formal legal 
status and, of course, new European level legal competences in the form of EUROJUST and a 
European Prosecutor. Rather than the agency, which only gradually acquired its three hundred 
odd staff, concentrating on leading a radical overhaul of the EU institutional structures and 
the Commission in particular and making the organisations as absolutely fraud and misman-
agement proof as possible, the new spillover plan was immediately set into motion and 
chased. In essence what at first appeared to be an organisation that would reinforce the bu-
reaucratic identity of the Commission by insisting on standardisation of management prac-
tices and reinforcing the management's control over the staff via disciplinary proceedings, is 
in fact very quickly turned to the use of the Commission's plan to begin to expand again. 
OLAF was to be used by the Commission to control the MSs rather than investigating Com-
mission internal difficulties. 
UCLAF to a minor extent but mostly OLAF were required, by the EP at least, to perform ma-
nagerial-investigatory tasks into the Commission, tasks which required enough formal inde-
pendence to be credible. Implicit to this was that the Commission and its management by 
themselves, were not capable of enough objectivity to investigate and discipline their staff. A 
situation which would in most companies send shareholders racing to protest and demand ra-
dical changes. Only radical changes do not happen in the Commission and the EU, and this is 
not just the fault of the Commission. MSs have stalwartly resisted changes to the Commis-
sion's organisation which in anyway threatened their influence and ability to place nationals 
in relevant positions. The result is that instead of the radical restructuring of the Commission 
(and the EU) and radical re thinking of its function and reason for existence that were and are 
necessary, a fudged bureaucratic compromise is and was the result. Another partially empow-
ered organisational actor was created with all the complications that that generates, to perform 
a task which could more simply have been performed by a reformed Commission in a re-
formed EU. It is true that the Commission in its mid term report does call for the tasks to be 
unravelled to a degree and suggests that some internal matters be performed by itself again, 
but that would only work in a very different Commission to that which wrote the report. 
Maybe it could be suggested that such a Commission would not have made such a recom-
mendation; probably it would not need to as such changes would have been effected long be-
fore anyway. 
The relationship between OLAF and the other DGs and in particular the staff is interesting. 
Given that one of the operational remits of OLAF is to allow officials whistle blowing possi-
bilities and this is combined with a general right of the agency to consider mismanagement, 
this cocktail of possible competencies could be powerful indeed. Now that other reforms have 
come on line, the financial reforms in particular, the staff especially at the Head of Unit level 
seem to be quite aware if not worried about the possibilities. One such staff member talked 
about having the possibility of an OLAF case against you, was an additional uncertainty and 
worry for his rank. This woriy was combined with a feeling that the agency would home in on 
the lower managerial ranks and that the upper ones would drop the lower ones in it, as it we-
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re.'Since individuals under investigation will often do deals and reveal other people involved 
in the case in question, there could well be effects on policy networks let alone networks 
within the DGs themselves. 
The relationship of OLAF to the enlargement was complex. Firstly it was one of the reforms 
intended to make the Commission ready for the expansion east. Secondly OLAF showed the 
tendency of the Commission, and EU in general, to require things from the NMSs which 
would not have been necessary had the Commission been in better shape itself. Institutional 
weakness in Brussels raised higher requirements for institutional strength in the NMSs than 
should have been the case. OLAF, like in other policy fields the relevant DGs, revealed the 
Commission effectively examining and assessing NMS readiness for enlargement from a ra-
ther dubious position itself. The final political decision to enlarge the Union can be suspected 
to have led to the glossing over of details like corruption and fraud in the NMSs. Given the 
continuing weakness in Brussels with regards to protecting EU finances this may well mean 
their greater vulnerability in the future as enlargements continue. 
9.2.2 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY (EEA) 
The case study of the EEA was the only one to be performed on an organisation not directly 
controlled by the Commission. In this sense it also served the function that discussions with 
NMS officials had, in providing external feedback on the performance of the Commission de-
partments concerned. The EEA was an interesting case as it revealed some trends in the EU 
and also showed once again the Commission's apparent resistance to reform and any organi-
sation that is in a position to inspect it and its performance. OLAF was also resisted for simi-
lar reasons. The Commission is alleged to react rather allergically to European agencies re-
gardless of their usefulness, understandable granted that the MSs do indeed seem to perceive 
the EEA at least as a useful institutional counter to the Commission. 
On a more fundamental level the combination of a sector interests with MS actors, as hap-
pened in the EEA, and also happened in the ECSC with the steel cartels and MSs working 
together to effectively restrict the Higher Authority, could be the nemesis of the Commission. 
It is likely it senses this, this theme is discussed more fully under the heading networks.4The 
EEA, in a similar manner to UCLAF/OLAF, was also created originally to plug a gap in the 
policy making arena, namely that of policy evaluation and feedback. The EEA reflects what 
would appear to be a concerted attempt by the MSs to reassert control over the environmental 
field. 
It is interesting that the EEA evolved to have a heavy emphasis on 'Programming and evalua-
tion', particularly of the output of DG ENV. To some extent any organisation in the Commis-
sion or EU which declares its intentions to be those of improving efficiency and effectiveness 
and stress programming and evaluation, can be suspected of political as well as neutral ad-
ministrative concerns. This issue is discussed later under Policy Networks. In a system and 
organisation as political as the EU and the Commission it is hard for them to be anything else. 
The fact that the MSs have ' . . . succeeded in packing the influential management board of 
the organisation (EEA) with their own representatives, thus further ensuring not only that the 
1 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG REG 10 
Kassim, H and Menon, A. EU Member States and the Prodi Commission in Dimitrakopoulos.D, D. (ed) The changing 
European Commission p.37. (2004) Manchester, Manchester University Press, p.97 
3 ibid p.97 
A S pence, D, Staff and Personnel policy in the Commission in Edwards G (ed) The European Commission, (1997) Cartermill, 
London p.89. 'The increasing number of European Agencies created to take on tasks arguably the legitimate province of the 
Commission is seen as a further illustration of the endeavour to weaken the esprit de corps of the statutory staff.. . ' 
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Commission's prerogatives in this crucial policy area were challenged but that their own were 
not, ^ suggests that they have every intention of reining in the extremely productive Commis-
sion where the environmental field was concerned. If for no other reason than that they had 
come to realise just how expensive environmental legislation could be and as economic inter-
ests reasserted themselves.6 
The EEA seems to be a symptom of the general sectoralisation of the EU policy fields, much 
like the other agencies and so related networks. The danger is that these represent an accelera-
tion in the centrifugal tendencies already apparent in the EU, with more power going to sec-
tors and MS-Commission rivalry resulting in yet more actors with diluted compromise com-
petences which are not effectively coordinated by any central authority. A more sensible ap-
proach might as usual be for the functions of the EEA to be incorporated into the Commission 
or rather a new governmental structure which will be outlined in the recommendations sec-
tion. Part of the problem is the ongoing unwillingness of the MSs to provide the necessary 
resources to the Commission to manage the policies it has been given properly. 
Without wanting to deny that the MSs may well desire to turn the EEA into a 'tool' and are 
using the EEA, there is also the basic organisational rivalry and apparent resistance to reform 
of the Commission to be taken into consideration. As with OLAF the Commission seems to 
see the EEA as a rival, and competitor where they should be complimentary; 'This attitude is 
partiV explicable in terms of a desire not to delegate real authority to a potential competi-
tor.' The EEA offers the Commission the necessary policy evaluation required for improved 
future policy making and programming and this should be complementary to DG ENV's ac-
tivities. The Commission proposes legislation and so retains real legal authority which the 
EEA simply does not have and yet it resists the agency. The Commission controls EEA fund-
ing to some extent and seems to be willing to use this mechanism if needed. It has also ap-
plied the same method used with OLAF of wanting the EEA to concentrate on external data 
collection and the generation of general reports on the state of the environment and others for 
the benefit of the DG, rather than concentrating on the evaluation of DG policy. This is in line 
with the general Commission desire to down-grade agencies where it wil l ' . . . criticise their 
functioning and propound a highly restrictive view of where and how they should be de-
ployed. Indeed, Commission officials have in practice attempted to restrict the effective au-
thority of agencies. . . . ' ,0Granted that some environmental legislation could well have been 
improved on, according to some DG ENV officials themselves, the agency should be wel-
comed for this reason alone. Some have even stated that the EEA and agencies are ' . . . a step 
in the direction of more effective "administrative integration'"nor 'a sensible outsourcing of 
specialised knowledge so the Commission can concentrate on its core tasks.'12Whilst the po-
litical motive cannot be denied, these authors' views are also accurate. Which leaves the ob-
server with the feeling that the Commission, here DG ENV, is possibly jealous about its mo-
5 See note 2 Kassim; Menon (2004) p.97 
6 Mazey, S and Richardson, J. The Commission and the Lobby in Edwards G (ed) The European Commission, (1997) Carter-
mill, London p.184. ' ...officials have over the years gradually acquired for themselves a de facto policy role often supported 
by attendant interest groups and so called "epistemic communities" of experts (Haas 1992). Thus, a considerable corpus of 
environmental law was developed without a strong Treaty base and finally legitimised in the SEA in 1986...Only now, per-
haps, do Member states realise the huge implementation costs of such environmental polices... National governments (includ-
ing Britain which now leads the opposition to these laws) went along with it, largely in ignorance of implementation prob-
lems ahead.' 
7 Metcalfe, L. Reforming (he Commission, Journal of Common Market Studies Dec 2000, vol.38.No.5. p.823,833, 834, 835. 
8 See note 2 Kassim; Menon (2004) p.97 
9 ibid p.97 
10 ibid p.97 
11 ibid Kreher (1997) quoted p.97 
12 ibid Christiansen (2001b) referred to p.97 
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nopoly over all aspects of policy making and reluctant to accept any reform of the policy 
making process and so indirectly of itself. 
With regards to the enlargement, there seems to have been a measure of rivalry here too. The 
DG seems to have wanted to curb the EEA from enlarging first and so beating the Commis-
sion to it. There seems to have been little policy reason for this but just another sign of the 
organisations unhealthy rivalry. The EEA was quite critical about the DG and its enlargement 
activities and stressed the habit of the Commission failing to coordinate itself internally and as 
a result requiring that the limited resources of the NMSs be used to construct networks which 
were duplicating each other. This was particularly bad where different sectors were involved 
and the DGs did not coordinate or check first, whether or not, a network was already in exis-
tence before simply requiring another to be made. Duplication between the DG and EEA is 
also a danger if for no other reason than that the DG had seemed to lack a degree of coher-
ence. The competition between the two organisations, as also plagues the whole of the EU, is 
counter productive and leads to confusion and duplication rather than positive synergies; 
thankfully there are signs that this is gradually moderating. 
A particularly interesting finding was the changing relationship of the EEA and DG ENV. 
Whilst the DG was more environmentally active and in a state of internal conflict, the conflict 
with the EEA was at its worst. As the DG was re-oriented via personnel reorganisations at va-
rious levels and economic interests allegedly came to be more influential in it, so the conflicts 
with the EEA subsided, In fact the interviews even seemed to show a quite cordial atmosphere 
existing between the senior management of both. There would appear to have been a take o-
ver of the environmental field, to some extent, by MSs and these in part for economic reasons. 
In that sense a larger MS strategy seems to have been followed of which the EEA was just a 
single element, a useful means of applying influence whilst the DG was re-oriented internally. 
The EEA as an organisation seems to be remarkably like the Commission itself, or rather an 
interesting mixture of the Commission during its earlier phases, dynamic and acting like parti-
sans almost, and also the more problematic Commission of the present day with resistance to 
reorganisation and a lack of coordination. This young organisation was not surprisingly quite 
critical about the old fashioned, slow, bureaucratic DG and Commission. In this sense it see-
med at times to almost present an alternative sectoral approach to managing the policy field, 
far more modern and less formal, with a more partnership approach to the MSs than the DG. 
Whether this merely reflects greater sectoral self confidence and willingness to go it alone and 
to drop the old rivalries of the EU, or rather a desire to see the Commission restructured and 
rejuvenated remains to be seen. On balance the latter seems somewhat more the case than the 
former. 
9.2.3 DG ENVIRONMENT (DG ENV) 
The findings for DG ENV are several. It has been extremely successful at developing a sec-
toral area and associated legislation for which there was little real treaty base,I3The structure 
of the DG and the departments in it were considered, in particular the recent bureaucratic ri-
gidity which had followed after high levels of discretion being available for officials. The de-
centralised state of the DG and the apparently weak management had provided great scope for 
regulatory entrepreneurs. Their presence in the DG in the past was established by the research 
and their ability to spot and use windows of opportunity to promote legislation. Indeed the 
sheer amount of environmental legislation would be hard to explain if it was not for the highly 
13 Edwards, G and Spence, D. The Commission in Perspective in Edwards G (ed) The European Commission, (1997) Carter-
mill, London p. 19 
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motivated activity of the officials that populate the DG and an extremely effective external 
network.I4The DG was shown to be similar to the rest of the Commission in the sense of at-
tracting highly talented individuals whose careers were and are very much in their own hands. 
The existence of networks of possible principals for the officials to locate and seek the assis-
tance of, was laid out in the chapter about the DG and the fact that this allowed and enabled 
officials to circumvent problematic parts of the Policy Network, which can be the hierarchy 
since they are but one element of it.1 
The method of adjusting policy within the DG by personnel reorganizations was outlined. The 
existence of departments, and units within them, with quite a large degree of independence, 
discretion and power made such reorganizations seemingly the most effective method of ef-
fecting policy changes. The emphasis on individual officials and the need to move them about 
and so to exert control over the DG showed the existence and strength of networks in the DG. 
Equally the literature on the DG and the findings, revealed that one important network and 
group of officials being moved about were ironically those who held to the old culture, and 
ideology of the DG. They adhered closely to the most idealistic forms of Europeanism and 
environmentalism. But the MSs were allegedly willing to exert pressure to control the DG and 
it was also no longer in tune with the more economically oriented Commission and EU. One 
official thought that maybe an interesting draught game style of management had come into 
play.16Over productive officials were allegedly capped, and prevented from generating legis-
lation by placing a DG senior manager, a cabinet member as well as the Commissioner, all of 
whom shared the same nationality, above the officials concerned in the hierarchy to prevent 
any possible outmanoeuvring within the DG at least. This illustrates the Policy Network po-
tential within the DG which results in such methods allegedly being used. There was to some 
extent a noticeable difference between some of the officials of specific nationalities in the 
DG. Those from the UK followed a less legalistic approach and prefered to use non legal 
methods and voluntary agreements with industry as opposed to those from Germany and Italy 
in particular who were more legally oriented. The emphasis is on some, as there were German 
officials who favoured the less legalistic method and British ones who were in favour of it. 
The paradoxical stance of the DG on implementation and infringement cases was stated. That 
despite large numbers of infringements the DG was not increasing the staff members involved 
in the DG's legal service department and there was discussion about reconsidering the MSs' 
control over the infringements. The likelihood was that this was done to reduce the friction 
that the Commission had with the MSs, particularly as over half the infringement cases before 
the ECJ were of environmental origin. At times though, the lack of implementation seemed to 
have been because of problems with the legislation which should have been changed or drop-
ped before being adopted. There has to be a question mark at least over the intentions of the 
DG and or the Commission as a whole in the infringement issue, given that some of the more 
environmentally friendly legislation was the result of the highly productive officials in the DG 
and no doubt their network outside it, and that there were those in the DG that seemed to have 
14 See note 6 Mazey; Richardson (1997) p, 184. \ . . officials have over the years gradually acquired for themselves a de facto 
policy role often supported by attendant interest groups and so called "epistemic communities" of experts (Haas 1992). Thus, 
a considerable corpus of environmental law was developed without a strong Treaty base and finally legitimised in the SEA in 
1986... An effective advocacy coalition of Commission officials, the international scientific community, and a vociferous and 
skilful environmental movement acting as a "megaphone for science" made the running.' 
15 Page. E. The People who run Europe. (1997) Oxford, Oxford University Press p. 140. 'As officials appointed and promoted 
(at least below the A3 level and to some extent above) on merit and length of service criteria, the belong to a hierarchically 
structured organization...and operate ina bureaucratic arena On the other hand EU civil servants belong to an organization 
whole multinational character can shape internal organisation, careers, and relations with outside groups and with political 
masters. Its direct political master the Commission, does not have control over the legislative process. As a consequence, we 
know that officials are involved in seeking to mobilize support among other EU institutions and member states..,' 
16 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENV 
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done what thev could to stop some of the legislation being adorned. In particular the UK was 
alleged to be at the core of the attempts to blunten the environmental legislation, The suspi-
cion must be that mavbe it was convenient all round for some in the DG, and some of the MSs 
if the infringements were quietly allowed to slip. Furthermore new methods apart from legis-
lation are being considered which would then avoid infringement proceedings. These are 
known as 'strategies' which are harder to control infringements of than policies/legislation. 18 
Assessing whether or not a DG gained or lost from the enlargement and the changes around 
this period is particularly difficult with DG ENV, On the one hand it gained more units and 
staff, but this seems to have come at a cost to its policy purity and sense of direction. The mo-
rale amongst some elements of the DG was low and its staff turnover was rather high. Ille 
DG has become more centralised, in particular due to the wave of bureaucratization which 
was discussed in the chapter, and certainly controlled its officials more closely, but at the sa-
me time the issuing of legislation has decreased and its profile has become blurred. It is closer 
in line to the economic growth emphasis of the current Commission and its old adversary DG 
ENT as a result, The mirroring unit in the latter, whose task was to keep DG ENV under scru-
tiny, decreased the staff members in it considerably as, presumably, it no longer required to 
keep a constant watch for the emergence of possibly industry unfriendly legislation from the 
old rival. 
The effect on the enlargement was also considered. NMS officials were on the whole positive 
about the work of the officials in the DG. It should be stated that the intensive work that was 
carried out between the DG and the NMSs was after the more dramatic of the reorganisations 
had taken place. There was a sense that the NMSs would be less in favour of stringent and 
expensive environmental legislation, but whilst this had to be the case neither the DG officials 
nor the NMSs expressed many worries about this. Possibly since the NMS officials came 
from the less venerable environmental ministries which saw in the DG a helpful fulcrum 
when raising their own domestic profile. Infringements are high but in DG ENV the staff in-
volved are not increasing and tolerance and restraint is being shown to NMSs and other meth-
ods are being considered to replace legislation, 
9,2.4 DG AGRICULTURE (DG AGRI) 
The findings relating to DG AGRI are now presented. The first point is that the growing po-
wer and willingness of the MSs to interfere in a DG seems to be most clearly shown in DG 
AGRI. There are examples of MSs pressing their nationals into positions as low as Head of 
Unit level and MS officials showing some MS loyalty in their decisions. According to the lit-
erature, there is a process of re-nationalisation going on in the policy and there are some who 
would like to see this continue. Unsurprisingly many within the DG have resisted this ten-
dency and the reforming of the policy or the DG. The French are stated to be one MS which is 
strongly present in die DG and very resistant to any changes. The influence of the MSs in the 
DG after the Delors period was considerable and this was shown clearly. The growing bu-
reaucratization was also outlined in the chapter, serving as it did the multi purposes of chang-
ing the image of the DG and Commission from dynamic political actor to slow, safe bureauc-
racy and reducing the power of Policy networks and MSs. Also the case chapter demonstrated 
that the outsiders, the NMSs, lost out as a result. The complex bureaucratic requirements re-
sulting in minimal payments to them in the period stated, and excessive requirements made of 
them perhaps to make up for DG weakness. 
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The CAP is stated to be well known for its complexity; 'The "Byzantine complexity" of the 
CAP is legendary.519This is a situation which has given large amounts of discretion to the 
specialists and also reinforces the general notion that complexity leads to opacity which keeps 
all but the experts on the outside. °There are said to be 'Intimate, even incestuous, relation-
ships between national agricultural ministers, and farmers' groups have manifested them-
selves in quite insular and integrated national policy networks.'21The reforms that have been 
agreed upon seem to have made the CAP even less understandable to all but the experts. The 
complexity is said to have assisted in the formation of 'tightly integrated farm policy commu-
nities' and their making sure that they 'keep a grip on decision making.'22The 'highly frag-
mented decision making mechanisms at the sub systematic level' are stated to be a major hin-
drance to reform and 'sweeping policy changes.' The literature and the reactions of CAP of-
ficials seem to confirm the presence of'policy networks' and it seems clear that the Commis-
A i 
sion is the "ring leader" of CAP networks, and its officials remain that too. It is interesting to 
note that 'The CAP's complexity is almost impossible to overstate, and in many respects is an 
anathema to coherence or centralisation.' Excessive complexity encourages and covers for a 
range of problematic if not unsavoury activities of which fraud is the most common.25This is 
not so dissimilar to the situation in the rest of the EU. The CAP's complexity has: kept offi-
cials enjoying considerable power, reform and reorganisation at bay, farmers reasonably safe 
and content, agricultural ministers content and the sector both inefficient and absorbing too 
many funds. EU complexity has likewise probably been extremely useful to a similar range of 
actors as well. 
The DG is stated to have been traditionally run following a French and now Mediterranean 
management style. At times this means it has been seen to be extremely bureaucratic and hi-
erarchical but somehow able to make quick decisions when required with 'élan and effi-
ciency.'26Criticism was laid at the management's door by the Court of Auditors who were 
critical of the management and in particular the quality of its proposals. They also stated that 
there was inadequate documentation of the facts behind reports issued by the DG. Unfortu-
nately the national split in the DG is alleged to run quite deeply through the management. 
Whilst the management have been very Southern European in outlook, the Commissioner 
was, until recently, Austrian and in favour of reform. There are said to be other large group-
ings, the largest are the Scandinavian and British officials who press for reorganization and 
reform and have problems with the management style in force. There are the European ideal-
ists of all nationalities and now a growing number of reformers and auditors. This last group 
has seen large increases in their numbers and are said to 'have an armlock' on the DG. 7The 
DG was described as being a tense place in part due to the different national management 
views. The management of the DG was stated to be not able to cope with the many tasks they 
are called on to perform: the enlargement, the CAP reforms, the Kin nock reforms and finan-
cial reforms in general, the reorganisation. An atmosphere increasingly lacking in trust was 
alleged to have ruled between the Commissioner, Cabinet and the DG. The Director General 
in 2004 was alleged to have problems communicating with the Commissioner and this has 
only added to the general tension. There was said to be a lack of trust in the DG which re-
sulted in the insistence by the hierarchy of bureaucratic procedures in relation to communica-
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tion being strictly adhered to. Officials were forbidden on a monthly basis from making or 
accepting any contact to the cabinet or Commissioner. 
As with DG ENV there has been a twenty five percent staff turnover per year recently, which 
seems all too common in demoralised DGs. According to some officials the DG is over staf-
fed and badly so, according to the personnel department it is understaffed. Thirty percent are 
said to be surplus and do little, thirty percent are demoralised and therefore work less hard 
than they could whilst thirty percent are highly motivated and work extremely hard. There is 
little staff transfer between departments with staff hoarding28 being carried out by Heads of 
Unit and these staff then create unnecessary work to justify their positions in the Units. There 
was said to be conflict and general tension owing to the increased workload and problematic 
staffing policies. Staffing levels appeared to be utterly resilient to changes in work load and 
regime make up. The decline of the DG and the CAP should be leading to a gradual decline in 
staff numbers but this is not the case, rather staff numbers are increasing. Part of the explana-
tion was the need to implement new and old policies at the same time and the growing com-
plexity wrought by the reforms, but the officials were sceptical that there would ever be a de-
cline in staff numbers. 
In organizational terms the DG has witnessed more power going to horizontal units and direc-
torates. From eleven directorates three are now directly dealing with coordinating tasks rather 
than sectoral contact. Most new staff are immediately attached to the horizontals. A major re-
organization was planned for October 2004, the main features of which were that the units 
paying for the CAP were to be separated from those monitoring the market and setting the 
rates and placed in different directorates. The need to fully implement the Kinnock reforms 
and in particular the reforms associated with accountancy methods to protect against fraud led 
to the creation of a new directorate solely charged with this task. Most new staff were to be 
allocated to rural development and the audit directorate. Before, the units had financial control 
members of staff attached to them, but with their increasing importance so the directorate was 
created. The personnel department stressed that the reorganization was to rationalize the DG 
and to integrate the New Member States fully into the organization. Some officials stressed 
that the reorganization was intended to incorporate the changes required after the Mid-Term 
Review and the reforms of the CAP, i.e. a purely logical step. Others stated that the Court of 
Auditor's report recommended the changes be made. This is true but the same recommenda-
tions were made in 1990 and ignored. More staff stressed that the allegations of fraud and cor-
ruption in one of the market sectors in 2003 forced the DG to change. The balance seems to 
lie with the use of the reorganization as tool to achieve many goals the majority of which we-
re to overcome the resistance to reform that had been successful before. 
The DG was allegedly remarkably resilient to reform and reorganization. The Court of Audi-oo 
tors made a report in 1990 which called for some fundamental changes in the DG's methods 
of organisation. These recommendations were supported by the European Parliament and ig-
nored by the DG as the report made in 2003 repeats several of them.3 The attempts at reform-
ing the administration of the Commission and the DG have also floundered on the issue of 
mobility and the ability of staff to resist being made mobile. There is a great unwillingness to 
take individual responsibility and the creation of OLAF, the anti fraud agency has only en-
couraged this phenomenon. No-one really trusted anyone in the DG and therefore they were 
unwilling to put their head on the line and prefer to pass the buck upwards. The Kinnock re-
forms were alleged to have been disliked and resisted by many in the management. The ABM 
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(Activity Based Management) procedure had been quietly dropped after resistance. Whether 
the 2004 reorganisation would work or not was a moot point, some seemed to think that it was 
badly thought out, and seemed over rushed and this threw doubt on the probable long term 
success of it. 
The DG was excellent ground for Policy Networks and not surprisingly there were plenty of 
indications that this was the case. On a purely organizational level first, staff stated the fre-
quent uses made of networking and personal contacts when discussing project and task distri-
bution, as opposed to objective criteria like merit or qualifications; this was stated to be en-
demic. People were alleged at times to have been given positions on the basis of who they 
knew. It seemed to be possible to affect officials' promotion prospects to a certain degree if 
they were willing to join various networks and to use the hierarchy to their advantage. Some 
50-70% of the officials in the DG were alleged to be loyal to their sector and idealists in terms 
of promoting agriculture. 
According to Commission sources there was alleged to have been resistance in the market 
units (CMO) to the reforms which would affect their sectors and of course their units. The na-
ture of this resistance appears to have involved: utilizing networks, MS pressure, and the use 
of information in the DG. The failure of the DG to reorganize itself in the light of the CAP 
reforms apparently weakened the reforms themselves. The Sugar CMO and its personnel are 
cited as an example of longevity in post and an unchanged, unreformed policy being neatly 
correlated, with the result of initially successful reform resistance. When asked to consider the 
reform of their policy the officials of the Sugar Unit allegedly refused to give it their support 
and ensured that the study that was performed on the topic failed. Other reports issued by the 
DG appear at times to have been problematic if not misleading. Finally there was no other 
way forwards and the Commissioner allegedly intervened to force the reform; he appeared to 
have lost trust in the CMOs. He apparently used his power base, which was political, to op-
pose theirs which was technocratic and MS based. Implicitly the DG and the CMOs were seen 
up until this point to have successfully resisted necessary reforms which dragged the DG and 
the Commissioner into a bad light. The Commissioner allegedly made use of ever smaller 
groups to avoid the opposition to reform in the DG. He was apparently all too aware that the 
opposition was backed by some MSs and that he could be outmanoeuvred and out gunned by 
them. Thus the mid term review was planned secretly by a very few individuals and sprung on 
the MSs and DG, and so it was successful. Indeed the problems that the un-re-organized DG 
had had for the reform of the CAP itself were increasingly clear and it is probably for this rea-
son that the 2004 reorganization was carried out. 
For the enlargement process the DG was able to play an all too effective braking role. The 
close relationship at times between the process and the CAP was made clear; 'Eastern enlar-
gement puts the CAP, as we know it, under threat as never before, Fischler insisted that his 
1998 reform package provided a "much needed example to Eastern candidates for EU mem-
bership. The European model of agriculture no longer justifies artificially high 
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prices."' Some NMS officials, when asked, expressed their problems at dealing with the 
CMOs and this is backed up in the progress reports made by the Commission on them. Insid-
ers alleged that some in the DG were not positive about the enlargement. The enlargement 
was stated to have been in some danger of failing or being postponed on the basis of agricul-
ture alone. The CMOs were alleged to have done this by ensuring that the acquis was hard for 
the NMSs to accept and absorb, it was 'aimed against the NMSs in the period leading up to 
the Agenda 2000.' The CMOs were stated to be an ongoing problem. One official put the 
31 See note 19 Peterson; Bömberg (1999) p. 143 
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current and old NMS problem succinctly enough; basically if you are not represented in a DO 
by your nationals then you will lose out directly in policy terms.34The NMSs are likely to 
have further problems down the line. 
9.2.5 DG REGIONAL AFFAIRS (DG REG 10) 
The Cohesion Policy of the EU began its life more as a MS creature, but over time the Com-
mission over took the MSs and saw the possibility of promoting regions and developing loyal-
ties between them and itself The MSs have gradually clawed back control over the polity 
with the DG taking a more checking role than a decision making one. More recently, the pol-
icy has come under sustained attack from economic academics who stress its negative eco-
nomic effects and challenge its positive role and assumptions. Some MSs who contribute 
funds to the policy consider it should be downsized or re-nationalized, and recent reports have 
stressed similar points. The Sapir report in particular made it clear that there were serious 
problems related to the poIicy.35One major problem is that inter-regional differences have 
grown within countries even as countries have converged. With the increasing emphasis 
within the Commission on competitiveness and economic issues, the policy has attempted to 
move in this direction too, and emphasized its economic growth promoting aspects and ef-
fects. This is disputed by several sources and it remains unclear as to the actual effect of the 
policy although it has probably done some good. The latest documents generated by the DG 
showed that it seemed to be taking a harder line on the policy with the MSs and at the same 
time defending it robustly and even beginning to push for a revival of it. There was a real 
sense that for all the rhetoric about solidarity as the foundation of the policy; it has served as a 
useful method of securing integration by allowing payoffs to MSs which might have seen 
fewer advantages in the liberalization of their economies than others. This notion of an MS 
getting its rightful payoff, or maybe pay back, from the EU as a sort of compensation is the 
root of the current problems for reform. The funds appear to have a more political effect than 
economic and have acted a lubricant for the European project.36 
Amongst the MSs there are very different attitudes to the policy depending on the whether or 
not they receive funding or pay it. Oddly enough the unanimity procedure which applies to 
the policy was stated to have worked to the benefit of the DG as the Commission always had 
an ally, particularly amongst the smaller nations, and helped to prevent the re-nationalization 
of the funds.37The main institutions and actors involved in the cohesion policy: Member Sta-
tes, the Commission and the Council are divided internally as well as there being fluctuating 
relationships between them. 
The DG is broadly divided between: the sector directorates and their geographical desks 
which interact with the MSs and regions directly; the policy making directorate which decides 
overall strategy and the horizontal directorates which are more hierarchical and deal in par-
ticular with personnel matters and auditing. There have been considerable problems in the DG 
in terms of the communication and coordination of the various directorates with hurried at-
tempts to strengthen the horizontal units in 2004-2005. There has been an increase in horizon-
tals; the growth reflected the need to coordinate the DG better and the fact that during 'peri-
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ods of reform the horizontal units have more power.' There has been a gradual increase over 
the last ten years in the number of horizontal working groups and in the various institutional 
aspects of horizontal origin. As with most of the DGs there is apparently the problem of staff 
not being transferred when required and reorganizations are carried out to achieve policy 
goals, to move staff most of whom enjoy 'feudal' rights to their position and to circumvent 
the Kinnock Reform goals of mobility. There is a pretty constant cycle between the sectoral 
directorates and the policy making directorate as to importance, this cycle is matched to the 
seven year round of budgetary negotiations. The sector directorates are stated to be more 
Germanic in mentality whilst the policy directorate is French- Mediterranean. There are stated 
to be plenty of problems between the two; the sectoral directorates having problems with the 
lack of understanding about the 'on the ground reality' which has been shown by the policy 
making directorate. This directorate was alleged to have managed to avoid the effects of the 
reorganizations and to have had the same management for many years. It was also alleged to 
be over fond of grand schemes and seemingly to be close to the French geographical unit*/' 
Geographical units seem to be routinely taken over by nationals of the MS they deal wiffi, 
thus Poles deal with Poland. 
The DG was alleged to 'lack a strong centre,'40and that 'its Directors are very autonomous'41 
which maybe accounts for the lack of coherence that at times seems to have existed within the 
DG itself. Even though the DG will be, in staff terms, the big DG winner, some DG manage-
ment members said staff were insufficient.420thers stated that the DG was 'understaffed for 
J A 
what it wanted to do,' as opposed to what it had to do. Regardless there evidently are prob-
lems with obtaining staff, and there are 'big delays in getting staff.'44The DG seemed to be 
trying to centralise itself,45no doubt to deal with its lack of a centre, and attempting to control 
Desk Officers more; 'There is an attempt at control of Desk Officers but it is difficult to find 
the right control, hard to find good managers.'46This attempt at control is shown in the stan-
dardising of Desk Officers with (task) list conformity reducing their freedom to choose and 
internal audits adding to this. Procedures were stated to be taking over everything.47Not unex-
pectedly there had been a dramatic increase in bureaucratic procedures which caused delays 
with 'more rules and procedures . . . less time to spend on developing quality.'48The geo-
graphical desks and in particular their Heads of Unit were said to suffer from the reforms; 
'there are a lot of problems of bureaucratic procedures, and geographical desks can't develop 
newer roles they are so overloaded with cumbersome procedures.'49 
The hierarchy of the DG has allegedly become more centralized in recent years. There seems 
to have been a lack of communication between low and middle and top management in the 
DG. Heads of Unit and Directors have allegedly changed from being top technocrats to being 
'more political appointments over the 1990s.' °There was apparently a tendency for MSs to 
want to appoint politically favoured individuals to top positions in the DG whatever else the, 
'hierarchy are more exposed to the political levels of the MSs.'51 As in other DGs the Kinnock 
Reforms have been somewhat turned on their heads. The CDR still left the priority points in 
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the hands of the Director General who in practice therefore, decides who receives promotion 
whatever the intentions were that Heads of Unit would be empowered to do this. Some lower 
management were quite irritated by the manner in which they were expected to accept the re-
forms whilst they were being openly flouted further up in the Commission hierarchy; they al-
f ^ _  
leged that the reforms would be passively resisted as merit was not rewarded. The DG is 
said to 'be still Franco phone, Southern and speaking French. The majority of the over 40s 
speak French and under 40s English,' however it has been stated to be facing the inevitable 
which means it 'will become more eastern and less southern.'54 
As with all DGs there was stated to be a history of inter DG rivalry. This appeared to have 
taken many forms which at one point led to DG Enlargement and DG REG10 pressing differ-
ent models onto the NMSs even in the absence of any objective criteria in the form of acquis. 
There were said to be struggles over cohesion policy between DGs described as a 'brutal bat-
tle' with the struggle between 'a deeply rooted conflict of ideas and ideologies.'55The major-
ity of the NMS officials stressed that they had been given contradictory instructions to follow 
which had resulted in considerable amounts of wasted time and resources, the latter of which 
were and are in scarce supply in NMSs.56The DG seems to have taken a leading role in trying 
to work together with the other DGs and to draw them into the heart of its policy making, af-
ter all it had the funds to disburse and the others like DG ENT and DG ENV had the policies 
that needed the funds. The MSs were said to favour giving the funds directly to the DGs con-
cerned.57 When the Sapir report was released other DGs and their Commissioners were said to 
have tried to take over DG REGIO projects, not realizing that the MSs were the only ones 
who gained from them doing this.58 
On the theme of networks in general and policy ones in particular, it seems highly likely that 
the DG had plenty of both.59Indeed there have been stated to be Policy Networks and that this 
is natural considering the large sums of money which inevitably encourage powerful constitu-
encies to form and these Policy Networks will be in a position to affect the policies: 
'A policy which consumes a third of the budget has invariably yielded powerful political con-
stituencies. In many cases, the institutions setting policy, and the networks shaping it, will re-
sist change . . . In short, radical change in cohesion policy may be inevitable, but it will not 
occur without a fight, and not just between Member States.'60 
The DG seemed to have been flagged by Spain meaning that the Spanish held the Director 
General post for a long time. The majority of the top management were from the Mediterra-
nean. The now ex Spanish Director General who had held his post for well over a decade ap-
peared to protect the old MSs not from over suffering from the enlargement. The negative at-
titude of some in the DG to the enlargement and the emergence of some new rules which, like 
the 4 percent absorption rule seemed to have been targeted at the NMSs, seemed to indicate 
that a Policv Network of sorts was at work. Certainly Spain was quite effective at protecting 
its receipts 1 and perhaps protected the DG from radical overhaul. The NMS officials and 
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some of the Commission ones seemed to suspect that the French, Mediterranean groups were 
most problematic, and particularly some in the policy directorate. Allegedly some in the pol-
icy directorate; 4 . . . don't take into consideration what Desk Officers and the NMSs say, both 
are opposed by . . . , n+2 for cohesion policy is impossible for NMSs.'62Certainly, regarding 
the policy as a whole, the Commission made new rules and standards for the NMSs to fulfill 
when rules were not formally present. The 'thin' acquis was bulked out to include items like 
administrative capacity which simply did not exist before and this was expanded beyond rec-
ognition. This all resulted in a negative conception of the process by NMSs, and a feeling that 
it was geared against them. 
There is more to add on the enlargement. The Commission was not particularly efficient in 
disbursing pre accession funds only 50-70 percent of that available was paid out and this was 
subject to lengthy delays. Whilst the problems were on both sides, the Commission was criti-
cized and recommended to improve its knowledge of the NMSs and also to increase staff 
numbers. Within the DG several directorates were stated to have remained apart from the en-
largement even though this should not have been the case. Finally in the 2004 reorganization 
they were allegedly forced to change but it was too late according to some; 'There is a natural 
resistance to change and we have suffered from it.'63The units dealing with the enlargement 
were isolated from the rest, and nationals from the NMSs were not encouraged to be in them, 
a mistake according to some.64 Some of the policies the DG promoted seem to have had po-
tentially negative consequences for the NMSs and possibly to have been intended to do just 
that. According to some figures NMSs would be receiving regional aid worth euro 137 per 
citizen, against an average of euro 231 for Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. The DG was 
said to have been as a whole just adequately supportive of the enlargement65 but 'not enthusi-
astic'66, and 'very inflexible.'670ne respondent rated the DG as needing a lot of improvement 
on this point; Desk Officers and Heads of Unit were perceived to be either adequate or need-
ing some improvement, the top management scored moderately better. 
9.2.6 DG ENTERPRISE AND INDUSTRY (DG ENT) 
This policy field is said to be a classic example of the Commission proceeding by neo-
functionalist stealth and building up momentum and pressing reluctant MSs towards granting 
it certain desired competences. The development was achieved by a Commission-led advo-
cacy coalition, centred on a partnership between the Commission and big business, aimed at 
market liberalisation and competitive enhancement. The Single European Market initiative 
reflected a dirigiste-liberal line up. At times there are close connections between big business 
and the Commission and tendency for the Commission to allow the concentration on national 
champions to continue. There is an absence of a more holistic approach to industry as a whole 
including SMEs as well as major industry. This branch remains under represented despite lar-
ge amounts of rhetoric to the contrary. It receives low levels of financial support and promo-
tion; which some argue is inevitable given its vagueness and lack of group coherence and 
consistency. Some even argue that this is the best approach and that SMEs belong rightly 
within the national ambit. The balance of the evidence seems to weigh against this as many of 
the SMEs are quite large companies and the backbone of industrial nations like Germany. 
Whatever else the rhetoric of the Commission and its placing SMEs very high on the agenda 
sets a standard that it can be expected to be reaching. Unfortunately the proof lies on the side 
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of the Commission continuing to predominantly represent large industry, and to generate 
large amounts of legislation which takes into consideration the concerns of this branch of the 
economy but not the SMEs who are under represented in the DG and Commission. Some ar-
gue that if the SMEs were left in peace by the Commission this would be fine, but they are 
not, as industrial legislation affects them often more severely than larger companies;4 . , . our 
main criticism is that legislation at European level is done for a minority of businesses' some 
of the laws agreed by the main institutions missed chances to back SMEs and even worse, 
took decisions against their interests.'68 
In terms of EU research funding, the NMSs and SMEs have even seen their share drop lower 
still. Both are relative outsiders (newcomers) in the EU game and shared a similar fate. The 
SME initiatives that the Commission has supported like: the observatory of European SMEs; 
the Multi-annual Programme for enterprise and entrepreneurship and the SME envoy who 
was created in DG Enterprise, have all had a mixed record and do not appear to have helped 
the SMEs much. The creation of the envoy seemed to rather prove the lack of effect of the rest 
of the DG-Commission's SME policies. The envoy was to try and protect their needs in the 
DG. The subsequent creation of the DG inter-service 'SME Network' to perform similar tasks 
to the envoy seemed to prove the underlying inability of the DG and the Commission to do 
more to affect the problem than create more actors. Good for the officials, DG ENT was ar-
gued by some to be over staffed,69 and the observatory was well met by officials but not ex-
ternal clientele seemingly; the 'foreseen impact of the activity of the Observatory is not evi-
dent.' More recently the failure to achieve the Lisbon Criteria has helped to throw doubt on 
the Commission quite apart from the MSs. Both have responsibilities in the area and certain 
established interests seem maybe to have been successful at preventing both Lisbon and the 
the proper working of the Common market itself. The re-emergence of MSs protecting na-
tional champions and the growing tendency to try and 'roll back the single market' is alarm-
ing.71 
Part of the problem with the policy can be explained by considering the organization of the 
Commission and in particular the DG. The result of the break down in Commission coordina-
tion and cooperation has been 'In recent years legislative initiatives proposed by the Commis-
sion often lacked coherence to the point that some beneficial measures for SMEs were 
promptly choked-up by proposals from other Commission services, that added burdens for 
small enterprises,'7 and 'if there is non implementation, then rather than solving this prob-
lem, they simply introduce new legislation.'73This has led to a hard comment being made to 
the neutral leader of the EU; ' . . . the shortcomings of the Lisbon agenda reflect the weak-
nesses of the Commission's internal organisation and working practices. It is no longer as ca-
pable as it needs to be of focusing the Union on a few objectives and ensuring it has the right 
instruments for achieving them.' 4The current state of inter DG communication and coordina-
tion was described so; 'Inter-service cooperation is "bad" there is no communication at all 
between DGs.' The result of the lack of DG communication and coordination was the crea-
tion o f ' . . . a mirror unit in DG ENT which checked up on DG ENV and went from 2 to 20 
staff members. This did help to increase DG ENT power; the REACH file shows this increase 
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in ENT power over the last five year. It is harder for DG ENV to enforce things against DG 
ENT.'76The increase in decentralisation had several unexpected consequences, there 'was a 
loss in the shared and sharing of a legal culture.'77Food policy is an area where DG III was 
frequently involved in 'bitterly contested' arguments between it and DG Agriculture. DG III 
came into conflict with DG XI Environment which is often at loggerheads with the industrial 
DGs. 
The forced combination of two and half DGs to form DG ENT, which was performed in 
1999-2000, led it seems to the practical disbandment of the much smaller and weaker DG 
SME which had been doing a good job at promoting SMEs throughout the nineties. Over all 
in the new DG, staff were reduced from 1000 in the three old DGs to 800 in 10 directorates 
and 51 units. Finally staff are said to have fallen by 30%, and the DG was well known to have 
all too frequent changes of staff and positions. There was a major drop in morale and hints 
that the DG had lost its culture. Projects were dropped and disruption was a problem. There 
were a range of reasons said to have been behind the reorganisation, part of it was no doubt 
logical enough but a wide range of other motives were stated, including macro ones like Prodi 
wanting to return the DG and Commission to policy making leadership rather than managing 
policies. To many within the DG and outside, combining units concerned with multinationals 
with a few dealing with small companies was not logical and would lead to problems. There 
were three units from the 51 which appeared to deal directly with the needs of SMEs. The 
subsequent weakness of SME representation after 2000 can be seen to have its origins in the 
loss of its institutional backer. DG Industry (DGIII) an older, larger, and more powerful DG 
was put in charge of the combination and creation of the new DG and it is not so surprising to 
find that the SMEs seemed to go under. Several SME projects well performed by the DG we-
re either stopped or handed over to other organizations. The reorganization resulted in large 
numbers of Heads of Unit leaving and these are the backbone of the Commission, thus in part 
the subsequent weakness of the DG vis-à-vis other DGs and DG ENV in particular, can in 
part be explained by the loss of these experts. For a while the DG seemed to be searching for 
a task and reason to exist, despite the Commission's stated intentions. Officials in other DGs 
underlined this problem for the DG. All in all, for a while, the reorganization proved negative 
for the DG and as the REACH debate revealed DG ENV, or elements in it, benefited from the 
lack of DG ENT organization. DG ENV had seemingly to be reined in by a complex series of 
personnel reorganizations, successfully from the Commission stand point, and now the DG 
ENT mirroring unit has been more or less stood down. 
The MSs have allegedly been increasingly interfering in the DG.78MSs had apparently begun 
to 'lean on their Directors.' So although 'formally there is no new political influence in terms 
of quality more pressure is applied.'80When the MSs want to stop a piece of legislation in the 
DG they have allegedly been seen to get their staff placed in it to achieve just that.81The Di-
rector General of the DG was stated to have often been German, reflecting German concerns 
about industry. 
The current organization has, like all DGs, seen changes resulting from Commission de -
centralisation. One effect of decentralisation on the DG's internal structure was the dramatic 
increase in the number of staff involved in the horizontal units, those coordinating the DG in-
ternally and with the rest of the Commission, rather than drawing up legislation. Before, the 
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personnel budget was done by 10 people now there was a directorate o f 120. The conf l ic t be-
tween the hor izonta l and the vert ical (sectoral units) exists in every DG to a greater or lesser 
extent. The prob lem is alleged to be one o f one o f too many would be bosses in hor izonta l 
units, whose numbers are constantly increasing, and an ever w iden ing split between hor izon-
tals and vert icals. T o try and compensate for de-central isation inter D G problems, there are 
more and more inter-service consultations to deal w i t h them and coordinating departments are 
ever increasing to per fo rm these. 
There used to be more sector units, there are now more horizontal ones. In sector units the re-
al legislation used to be done by the specialists wh ich in D G E N T meant engineers who deal t 
wi th the detai ls and specif icat ions wh ich make up the bulk o f the f inal document. Howeve r 
'over t ime there are less technical elements in legislat ion than there used to be; no min is ter 
understands what is in the legislation as it is so technical . '8 2The move is therefore in the di rec-
tion o f out sourcing the ' technical content' and details to be completed by 'external inst i tutes. ' 
The legislat ion d rawn up by the D G has got less technical as a result and 'the qual i ty o f the 
legislation has improved. ' 8 The main splits in the D G i tse l f are between the former S M E D G 
elements and the heavy industry ones; ' D G coordinat ion and communicat ion got worse af ter 
2000 and this is a b i g problem. '^Ef fect iveness and ef f ic iency also seemed to suffer; a fact 
resulting f r o m this and the increasing bureaucracy in general is that the budget approved by 
the EP was not and cou ld not be committed as there were so many procedures. The var ious 
parts o f the D G seemed not to have a clue about what the rest o f it was doing and this seemed 
to be a relat ively new problem. The communicat ion between the lower ranks o f the D G and 
the pol i t ical layer seemed allegedly not to exist. The constant reorganization o f the main ho r i -
zontal directorate intended to coordinate the DG, was indicat ive o f the problems o f pu l l i ng the 
D G together and ind i rect ly showed the scope for internal networks and po l icy-making ones to 
f i l l the gap lef t by the directorate. The seemingly vague and at times contradictory pol icy to -
wards SMEs, for example, seems to underscore the weakness o f the centre in the DG. One 
last point, the D G was said to be 'good at being the worst at archiv ing and f i l ing. ' 8 5 
The staff and hierarchy in the D G saw certain changes. Directors allegedly gained m o r e 
power in the decentral isation o f the D G and saw their competences increase at the same t ime 
as M S inf luence on them increased. But over t ime w i t h the increase in bureaucratization, the 
Directors seemed al legedly to have taken to 'm ic ro management Directors were more fear fu l 
Q J7 
and want to control th ings more. ' This led apparently to a reluctance to delegate despite the 
need for even more delegation being present; 'Communica t ion , delegation are not there . . . I t 
is hard to bypass Directors and that means delays. '8 7The relationship between the C o m m i s -
sioner and the Di rector General seemed to have been easy and relaxed unl ike in some D G s , 
and staf f seemed not to be tempted to c ircumvent the hierarchy by going to the Cabinet or the 
Commissioner. Heads o f Uni t took the burden o f the K innock Reforms and appeared to be 
seriously over worked ; there seemed to an opin ion that this was hardly beneficial fo r the 
enlargement. They also faced the need to be made mobi le wh ich seemed to be creating p rob-
lems o f loss o f expert ise and cont inui ty . This seemed to be a problem for the Commiss ion 
when fac ing the EP and Counc i l . A generally jaded v i e w o f the reforms was present and a 
v iew that they were methods to drop responsibi l i ty on the lower ranks to a l low the C o m m i s -
sioners and the pol i t ica l leadership even less accountabi l i ty and responsibil i ty. The example 
o f the budget was g iven fo r wh i ch the College had been responsible which was then made the 
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responsibi l i ty o f the DGs. This does not at f irst glance throw a good light on the College as a 
pol i t ical leadership. 
The problem o f bureaucracy and its increase combined w i th the reforms is discussed now. 
The general idea o f the reforms was not questioned by most o f the off icials but rather the 
manner in wh ich they were carried out and their suffocat ing bureaucratic character. The DG 
was allegedly becoming more ' . . . centralised and hierarchical than ever and t h a t . . . there is 
more and more focus on procedures.'88Some figures provided illustrate the problem: '40% 
less t ime for pol icy and Heads o f Uni t and Desk Off icers are easily doing 5 times more pro-
cedures-taking double the t ime; 60-70% more t ime is spent on the budget . . . '8 9 for which 
there are said to be; ' 5 0 % more procedures;' and the 'Budget was not committed due to the 
number o f procedures, 2-3 times as much t ime taken for calls to tender procedure.'90One of f i -
cial stated ' . . . Every th ing was slowed down; it used to be 50-50% for financial control and 
management o f projects, then 60-40 now 95-5%. W e avoid making studies for projects. ,91He 
added 'there are 5 times more procedures than before; they took short cuts but not i l legal ones 
0*7  
in the old Commiss ion. ' This last statement reflects those noted by others before, that the 
over formal , ever increasing amount o f procedures and often empowered actors force off icials 
to leave the gr id locked formal ways to adopt in formal ones which at least function. The al-
leged increase in behind the scenes Commission chair ing o f the Counci l and other committees 
to ensure ef f ic iency reflects this. Units and staf f have to show determined entrepreneurial 
ski l ls to get anything done, the Commission and D G fortunately allowed this to happen, by 
accident at t imes, it seems. It an interesting thought that some o f the poli t ical skil ls o f the of-
f ic ials, so important for promot ing integration and new integrationary bursts are no doubt 
honed by their need to demonstrate opportunist ic self suff ic iency in the Commission itself. 
The R E A C H dossier w i t h its close connection to the very highest poli t ical layers allegedly 
enabled the Desk Off icers concerned to get around the bureaucratic log jams. 
The picture remains o f a D G wh ich appeared to be geared to being technocratic and close to 
b ig industry and power fu l lobbies. Whatever l ip service was paid to the SMEs the facts did 
not seem to support the rhetoric. Whi ls t the D G did not show too many obvious indications o f 
Pol icy Networks, these are stated by several observers to be in existence and powerfu l ly so. 
A t t imes in its history, or rather the history o f D G Industry, its main element, there have been 
indications that the D G had been captured by various industrial groups who had almost dic-
tated legislation. I t had also been taken over by MSs at various times. The sectors have shown 
themselves able to create problems for the N M S s , and the SMEs have apparently suffered, as 
the D G was seemingly not able to move i tsel f mental ly or organizationally f rom its depend-
ence and commi tment to b ig industry. The s low speed o f decision making owing to the co-
decision process al legedly encouraged Pol icy Networks and backroom deals to occur even 
more: 
'The application o f the co-decision procedure has enhanced the importance o f policy net-
works as arenas for in formal bargaining on most internal market questions. The procedure is 
complex and potent ial ly t ime consuming . . . Co-decision has made the E U a more pluralistic 
system o f government, but also increased its reliance on informal deals and backroom bar-
• • s93 gaining. 
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I t is worth not ing that the amount o f time that o f f ic ia ls were spending interacting (presuma-
b ly ) in networks in particular wi th the EP and the Counci l . For the DO as a whole the t ime 
spent deal ing wi th the Counci l went up by 10-20®® and dealing wi th the EP from 20-25%, for 
some units up as much as 50%. Whilst this was in part no doubt due to the move to the co-
decision procedure the increase in Council communicat ion seems to suggest that more back-
room deals and bargaining were occurring. Thus the time available for DG or Commiss ion 
work alone, l ike drawing up legislation, had presumably decreased accordingly. The need to 
have another major reorganization in 2004 to br ing the DG into line with the Lisbon cr i ter ia 
and to house the new Competitiveness Commissioner* seemed to show the weakness o f the 
D G prior to this and its inabi l i ty to properly further the Lisbon Criteria. Whatever else the 
new competitiveness vice President Verheugcn has stated he w i l l aim to amend the legislat ion 
to make it more industry f r i e n d l y t a c i t acceptance it would seem that DG E N V had won 
out so far» The dramatic 2000 reorganization probably eliminated many networks posit ive and 
presumably negative ones too. 
The enlargement process was affected by the D G and its and the Commission's weakness at 
various t imes, In the earliest phase o f the European Agreements various sectoral lobbies es-
sentially got in first, before the NMSs, and ensured that the EAs were more negative than they 
needed to have been and that sectors were protected. Arguably this was due to Commiss ion 
polit ical leadership weakness and also that o f the EU which stil l has a deficit in this depart-
ment.95The S E M was stated to have been hardened for the NMSs, and that the pharmaceutical 
industry was more or less invi ted by the DG to % identify regulatory problems in the CEEC's 
and to propose solutions . . . , % N M S off icials said that the 2000-2005 DG was badly organ-
ised and structured.97Whilst clearly anti- enlargement networks are not evident, it can be said 
that the overal l weakness o f the DG owing to splits and reorganisations left D G E N V stronger 
and this was problematic fo r industry in general. I t was stated that the many reforms af fect ing 
the DG and in particularly those affecting the Heads o f Uni t were negative for the enlarge-
ment as they simply d id not have the time to concentrate on al l their tasks at once. Parts o f the 
D G were stated to contradict each other, according to N M S off icials, who also cr i t ic ised the 
excessive bureaucratic procedures which doubled or trebled. Inter Service communicat ion and 
Coordinat ion was crit icised and that DGs had too much discretion and the decisions reached 
had been ' odd ' . ^The reorganizations o f the DG were stated to have generated problems com-
bined w i t h its 'o ld fashioned policy.1 That said, things were considered to be gradual ly im-
proving, after the 2004 reorganization the D G was considered to be less bureaucratic w i t h the 
French style on the way out , before problems had been strangely combined now they were 
more logical according to some and 'enlargement changed its (the DG) culture, there are two 
Directors under forty. And the Commission is t r y ing to cut down on bad bureaucracy."100 
9.2.7 DGs: ANY ENLARGEMENT WINNERS? 
A t this point a short answer to the initial question to be answered by the thesis w i l l be of fered. 
As to w h i c h o f the DGs benefited from the enlargement the answer has to be al l o f them, in 
one sense. That is i f the enlargement is linked to the reforms and their effects, and their pres-
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ence in the overal l cycle o f the Commission w i th the downturn fo l l ow ing the end o f the De-
lor 's Commission. In terms o f greater sectoral independence and power for the Director Gen-
erals and also to a degree the Commissioners DGs have increased their power and prestige, 
but largely at the expense o f the Commission as a whole. 
D G E N T wou ld appear to have defended itself successfully against the rest and in particular 
D G E N V and, g iven its host ing the new super Commissioner for the E U economy, it can be 
seen to have been successful in promot ing its cause. However , in terms o f resources it does 
not seem to have changed over much. Generally the D G seems to have viewed the enlarge-
ment posi t ively. 
D G E N V has paradoxical ly seen staf f numbers increase whi ls t its prof i le has become more 
confused. Its strongly environmental agenda seemed to have been di luted and its strength in 
the Commission as a whole, at the same t ime as its resources increased. DG E N T stood down 
its mi r ro r ing unit that watched over D G E N V , presumably because it was no longer seen to be 
a threat. The answer to the D G E N V paradox could no doubt be that the increased resources 
were a sort o f reward for the move towards the current economical ly minded Commission. It 
had before faced opposi t ion f rom the EEA and D G E N T . Overal l the D G seems to have vie-
wed the enlargement posi t ively and as a posit ive development. 
D G R E G I O saw its resources increase most w i th the enlargement and yet it also saw the pro-
port ion o f the budget that it wanted to supervise d imin ish and a powerfu l information cam-
paign against its activit ies reduce its appeal and that o f E U solidarity. Whi lst it resisted the 
more wholesale reform that the Sapir Report recommended, its future seemed and seems un-
sure. Enlargement w i t h the increase in possible MSs requir ing a share o f the funds seemed to 
have led to a decl ine in support for the DG and the sector as a whole. There seemed to be 
g row ing tension between its directorates, which the enlargement exacerbated. Again elements 
seemed to have seen the enlargement as a threat to scarce resources. 
D G A G R I seemed to have been in a demoralised state, al though it was getting a large propor-
t ion o f the budget. Resources seemed to be more than adequate although staff hoarding by 
Heads o f Units seemed to be cont inuing apace, wh ich no doubt resulted f rom anxiety about 
future staf f al locations. The resultant staf f surpluses seemed, at times, to have resulted in un-
necessary regulation occurr ing to jus t i f y the staf f concerned. Better staff allocation could un-
doubtedly have happened. The discretion o f some o f its of f ic ia ls and their departments was 
deliberately diminished. The enlargement seemed to have been perceived as a threat by many 
in the D G and related reforms resisted. 
O L A F saw its resources soar over the period since 1999. A l though this was largely due to EP 
pressure and wi l l ingness to see the resources allocated. I t f i t ted very neatly into the EU's de-
sire for greater control to be placed over f inancial resources and arguably the MSs1 desire to 
s low integration r ight down. The b ig winners o f the enlargement were those of fer ing and in-
vo lved in greater bureaucracy and the production o f bureaucratically waterproof paperwork. 
Fear o f O L A F investigations were cited by Commission of f ic ia ls as reasons for being reluc-
tant to even do posit ive activit ies. O L A F added edge to the bureaucratic reforms. Fear o f cor-
rupt ion and irregularit ies ar is ing f rom the enlargement no doubt also assisted in strengthening 
O L A F ' s posit ion. 
The E E A saw its numbers and resources increase considerably. W i th new MSs it saw the 
funds allocated by them to i t soar, i.e. it has enjoyed a direct f inancial benefit as a result o f the 
enlargement. The room for manoeuvre and the opportunit ies afforded by the enlargement al-
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lowed the agency to t rump D G E N V by enlarging before the DG. This provided the agency 
wi th considerable kudos. The increasing acceptance o f the D G that the EEA can and should 
have a role in the evaluation o f legislation is a sign that i t had successfully carved out a niche 
for itself. 
In summary, one must state that the real winners were O L A F and the EEA in general and f i -
nally DG ENT, Wi th in all DGs those connected w i th increasing and strengthening the bu-
reaucratic corset saw their numbers increase most i.e. personnel of f ic ials and accountants. Top 
levels in the hierarchy saw their powers and competences increase and this no doubt was 
compensated to an extent by the new corps o f of f ic ia ls . These new corps were presumably 
less bound by any organisational loyalties and dependencies. 
THE EU SINCE DELORS: MS ASCENDENCY 
So having reviewed the theory outl ined so far and the facts derived f rom the case studies it is 
t ime to look to see i f there are broad long term trends v is ib le wh ich support the facts and the-
ory. We are o f course looking to see i f there are signs o f increased MS strength and w i l l i ng -
ness to use it and greater fragmentation o f the E U and the Commission. Furthermore Pol icy 
Networks should be benefit ing f rom the pol i t ical weakness in the fragmented EU. In the l ight 
o f the above there should be a trend o f Commission reforms and bureaucratization to try and 
curb both M S influence and sectoral fragmentation. Unsurpr is ingly the enlargement wou ld be 
expected to have suffered as a result. So on to the first trend. 
The balance in the E U has been stated to have shifted since the Delors era f i rm ly in favour o f 
the MSs as the fo l low ing quotation indicates, 'The decl ine o f the Commission, evident 
throughout the 1990s, has continued since the Prodi Commiss ion took of f ice in 1999.'101 As 
has been suggested in the theoiy section, this does not have to be seen as a fai lure in integra-
tion, or proof that the MSs want a slow Commission. What it does show is that the pol i t i -
cal/federal aspirations o f the Commission as perceived by the MSs in the Delors era have on-
ce again resulted in them using their various inst i tut ional options to apply the brakes. The fo l -
lowing quotation shows the extent o f the M S advance: 
'The Member States have consolidated their power across a range o f key pol icy areas, most 
notably, E M U , the CFSP and the emergent Common European Security and Defence Pol icy 
(CESDP). They have also considerably enhanced their role in domains, such as social po l icy , 
not previously been considered an area o f " h i gh pol i t ics" . . . N e w methods and techniques, 
such as O M C , (Open Method o f Coordination) moreover, have enhanced Member State po-
wer, whi le further downgrading and displacing the Commiss ion . , ! 0 2 
The MSs are said to 'have asserted their control , wh i l e marginal is ing the Commiss ion (and 
the European Court o f Justice) in a number o f areas.'103One o f these areas is said to be that o f 
the economy. 
There has arguably been a decrease in E U wide M S sol idar i ty: 
'Moreover, a decrease in solidarity among E U s t a t e s . . . has brought into o f f i ce heads o f state 
or government that are less instinctively supportive o f ever closer Union, less ready to recog-
l0lSee note 2 Kassim; Menon (2004) p. 92 
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nise the achievements o f integration, and prepared to challenge the Community method w i th 
the Commiss ion at its heart. '1 4 
This has been v is ib le in the Structural Funds discussion and decrease in the money available 
discussed in the chapter on D G REGIO. Al though given the major problems wi th the funds 
and their past, less sol idari ty might have been better anyway. However as a pay o f f system the 
funds, as we l l as the CAP, were important for lubr icat ing agreement between MSs who bene-
f i ted and MSs who arguably gained less f rom l iberal is ing markets. The discussions about 
mu l t i speed Europes is another symptom o f the decreasing interest in solidarity and l ikely to 
become more pronounced. I 0 5The decline in sol idari ty and the high thresholds set for the 
N M S s in the enlargement, combined w i th longer term restrictions in the movement o f their 
cit izens, reflect the caut ion and pessimism o f MSs towards the possibi l i ty o f solidarity given 
such large differences. I t was maybe expecting a lot to expect that solidarity such as existed in 
the o ld Europe wou ld be possible in the new, given the number o f new members and their 
problematic economic situation. Economic downturn and domestic poli t ical concerns about 
unemployment have replaced long term th ink ing w i th short term pol i t ical survival. Protection-
ism and conservatism in the fo rm o f rejecting the new services directive became all too much 
the norm. But the decline in sol idari ty is particularly noticeable between old MSs and is there-
fore wor ry ing . One might wonder whether the weak Commission during this period was also 
responsible for both, or at least contributed. 
Most o f the actors in the E U have become less centralized and more sector oriented. Wi th in 
MSs the methods o f N e w Publ ic Management have encouraged a process o f breaking admini-
strations down into governmental agencies and less hierarchical controls. Wi th in Europe the 
growth in the number o f sector oriented agencies has increased and the trend for more o f them 
continues. There seems to be a process o f sectoral growth occurr ing at the expense o f coordi-
nation and central control. The role o f the Commission in al l this has been traditionally to en-
courage sectors and sectoral actors, at t imes at the expense o f the MSs. 
A n d yet at the same t ime the policies intended to benefit sectors seem to be experiencing 
problems. There seems to be something bizarre that various policies o f the Union, which the 
Commission has been key to generating, have all too often had negl igible effect on the sectors 
they are supposed to help, cost huge sums, generated vast amounts o f debate keeping large 
numbers o f of f ic ia ls, at every level o f government, employed and ever increasing numbers o f 
consultants and lobbyists. U C L A F - O L A F was created to deal w i th disciplinary problems and 
mismanagement and yet the serious cases reported have risen and remain stubbornly high, 
suggesting a greater problem.1 0 6 The EE A and D G E N V are there but the environment has not 
broadly improved in Europe.107 D G A G R I secures massive funds for the farming lobby ar-
guably to protect the smal l holder farmer, but the major i ty , 80%, goes to ' r ich farmers.'1 8 D G 
R E G I O sets out to help regions but achieves greater regional disparities.109Implementation 
has not improved over t ime and yet the Commission seems to be doing, in certain areas, even 
less than before to enforce it. The Lisbon criteria to improve Europe's economic performance 
were agreed upon but not enough has happened. I t seems quite l ikely that the increase in sec-
tor strength is not and has not been coordinated ef fect ively, thus the sectors are nu l l i f y ing e-
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lements o f each others work . Wi thou t want ing to over exaggerate there seems to have been 
something o f a crisis in the coordination o f the sectors, and thus the EU. 
The European Counc i l is perceived by some as having become far more dominant and perva-
sive and in a way w h i c h is less posit ive towards the Commission: 
' . . . the Heads o f State and Government laid c la im to leadership across a broad swath o f ex-
is t ing po l icy areas. Objectives were set under t w o headings - preparing the transit ion to the 
new economy and modernis ing the European social model . , . The European Counci l has not 
only def ined the aims, but w i l l also orchestrate their realisation. It has assumed 'a pre-eminent 
gu id ing and coord inat ing role to ensure overal l coherence and the effective moni tor ing o f 
progress towards the new strategic goal. '110 
The MSs, after the Delors era, can be said to have had less trust in the Commission and so to 
have decided to change their approach, they: 
* . . . become wary and suspicious o f the Commission, and were re-orienting the Un ion in an 
intergovernmental direct ion. Through a process o f " learn ing" , Member States had become 
increasingly wise to the Commiss ion 's abi l i ty to exploi t possibi l i t ies o f expanding E U compe-
tencies. Since Maastr icht, they have shown far greater v ig i lance in institutional matters, l imi t -
ing opportuni t ies fo r entrepreneurial expansion on the part o f the Commission. '1 1 1 
The coro l lary o f be ing sparr ing partners as the Commiss ion and MSs often are, is that the 
success o f one is seen as the fai lure o f the other. The Commission tends to overplay its hand 
and then be arrested by the MSs. Decreases in the amount o f legislation leaving the Commis-
sion, discussed later, can be seen to be part o f the s low down apparent in it and this was not 
least in response to M S pressure. When combined w i t h large implementation problems for 
what legis lat ion lef t the insti tut ions, the picture is one o f legislation becoming less attractive 
and M S resistance g row ing towards it wh ich is a larming given that most legislation results 
f r om M S proposals in the first place. Their suspicion seems to be towards the E U method as a 
who le and the be l ie f that it is the best method o f MSs doing business w i th each other. 
9.2 EU FRAGMENTATION 
W e have considered the trend o f increased M S power and wi l l ingness to use it and seen that 
this trend is indeed observable. Bu t the paradox is, that w i thou t a strong Commission, the cur-
rent E U has a problem o f coordinat ion and coherence that the MSs are not in a posit ion to re-
medy. The result is the next trend, that o f major E U fragmentation. 
' The E U suffers f r o m t w i n problems: some o f its methods o f governance are obsolete; and the 
system as a whole has become too complex and fragmented. '1 2 
I n the f i rst chapter we saw how the Commission has succeeded in expanding its remit by 
f ragment ing the M S s and the Counci l . The neo funct ional ist process wou ld expect that the 
f ragmentat ion o f M S s into sectors wou ld result in these attaching themselves to the European 
governance structure above all the Commission. However i f the Commission is weak then EU 
See note 2 Kassim; Menon (2004) p. 94 
1,1 ibid p. 92 
112 See note 35 Sapir Report (2003) p. 125 
364 
fragmentation is the result. There are increasing numbers o f political-bureaucratic-sectoral 
actors113 who have been empowered to be involved in decisions making,1141 i5and a large in-
crease in the number o f procedures.116117The E U is fragmented into a number o f competing 
actors often w i t h compet ing sectoral loyalties; the result is complexi ty and less eff iciency 
'Structural ly , the Un ion is enormously complex and potential ly involves an extraordinary 
number, range and diversi ty o f decision makers. It is frequently d i f f icul t , sometimes impossi-
ble, to shift the E U in any one (especially new) pol icy direction, thus reinforcing the status 
quo. Vetoes are abundant and distributed w ide ly , part icularly in the Council and its offshoots, 
thus inv i t ing lowest common denominator decis ions. '1 1 8 1 1 9 
The list o f empowered actors is long: there are the various ministers detached f rom their na-
t ional government 's control in the various Counci ls; the COREPER off icials; the national ex-
perts and c iv i l servants who attend the Commission- led meetings; the growing number o f 
wo rk i ng groups; 120MEPs in various roles and capacities as members o f national groupings, 
transnational parties, representing lobbyists and as special committee members; the various 
more legal actors l ike the ECJ and Court o f Audi tors; sector M S off icials and experts, sector 
stakeholders - business and NGOs ; Commission staf f in various capacities and combinations; 
Commissioners act ing both as M S top polit icians and of f ic ia ls, supporting their D G and as 
College members. The number and range is m ind bogg l ing . 1 2 1 MLG reflects this new reality 
and the apparent break down in the tradit ional governmental structures. A further problem is 
that responsibil i t ies are also w ide ly dispersed between actors: 
'Responsibi l i t ies not only overlap, but the same institutions (Counci l and Commission) also 
play di f ferent roles depending on the domain. Lack o f clar i ty in the core functions o f the insti-
tut ions is detr imental to both ef f ic iency and legi t imacy. '1 2 2 
More government means in the E U in particular, more complexi ty, potentially more ineff i -
ciency and more in formal sectoral Pol icy Networks.1 2 3This is especially the case where pol icy 
management is concerned, since many in the Commiss ion top ranks are not over fond o f it 
and leave the Pol icy Networks to deal w i th i t .124The g row ing complexity o f the environment 
in wh ich the Commiss ion operates seems to have left i t unable to cope; 'Many o f its problems 
o f ef f ic iency and accountabi l i ty stem f rom a fai lure to come to terms wi th growth in complex-
113 See note 95 Shackleton; Peterson (2002) p.349. "There are more players-more governments and affected interests, plus the 
EU's increasingly assertive institutions themselves-making compromises more difficult to strike.* 
1,4 ibid p.353-354. T h e price often seems to rise inexorably as more voices must be accommodated at every turn, especially 
as the EU enlarges.* 
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130 See note 19 Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p.37. 'Their political effect (Council working groups) is to expand enormously the 
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ity rather than size per se/ " The introduction o f new actors and procedures does not seem to 
hive k d to less power for others and so to an equi l ibr ium, but rather to gridlock. 12fe!27This is 
hardly likely to increase transparency, * rather it adds to the incredible complexity. *"It is a 
curious fact that extensions o f Q M V w i l l probably increase the importance o f 'transectoral 
Policy Networks centred upon the European Commission' and so add to the democratic defi-
cit problems in the long run,n<) 
In the EU outlined above, organisational structures and hierarchies can dissolve and have do-
ne, wi th Commission officials able to out manoeuvre their managers owing to the large num-
ber o f alternative principals they can refer to. The structure o f the EU forces many, i f not 
most, key bargaining to be done and decisions to be "set" in the informal pre legislative phase 
and consensus h arrived at bere.M 1 , 2The formal proceedings are then more o f a sort o f rubber 
stamping. A recent study o f EP committees noted some weaknesses o f these in that particu-
larly the first reading process in the EP, is seemingly opaque and seems to be operating in a 
rule free manner,m lobbyi$ts can easily apply pressure at this point. Furthermore meetings are 
held between the various European institutions very early on seemingly prior to the formal 
proceedings. As a commentator pointed out the MEPs have such loose mandates that agreeing 
to issues is cheap for them-1"5 
Evidently national systems o f government are also complex and fragmented to a certain ex-
tent but not to the degree o f the EU. Thus whatever the similarities a leading authority stated; 
"The EU political process is particularly f ragmented/B 6and another stressed; 'The macro-
level analysis undertaken here shows that, in the EC7EU, authority is dispersed. Compared to 
i ^ 
most nation-states, t h e ElCZ/ELJ 
h a considerably more fragmented polit ical system/ That 
national governments are increasingly fragmented is also, in part, due to their interactions 
1 "'See note 7 Metcalfe- < 2000 > p 826 
See nose 95 Shackteton, Peterson (2002i p 349 and p 354 
i : ' See note 19 Peteram, Bömberg I1999)p 2D mid p 257 "We have fmmd the EU to be an unusually differentiated polity, in 
which broad pd*c\ initiatives are dfffictifc to co-ordmais An eq&ally enduring trend in KU decision making is that major 
chmge m policy often seems tmpowbk without a cban§e m process, which produces a kind of' "organic accretion" of deci-
sion making procedures' 
m ibd p 256 'More generally, ^nonmltsetT politics are precluded by the HU's vast number of procedures for decision mak-
mg, reliance cm backroom hargammg and blurred lines of accountability T he politics of the EU remain underdeveloped, and 
its democratic legitimacy weak " And further cm the same page, 'As it is now, EU decision makers generally operate with 
both w p m m g b wide cfcscreteon and predictably kwv legitimacy ' 
l2"* See mtis 95 S W t e i , Peterson (2C»2) p 349 
See note 6 Maeey. Richardson (IW7j p 192 'linder QMV m national government can be relied upon to "deliver" pre-
ferred policy outcomes &mJ groups must take note of that m further developing their lobbying strategies. If nothing else, 
QMV vi botmd to make these strategies more fcranssiatKmal in their focus The pluralistic nature of the EU decision-making 
process, combined with Öse reliance of Commission officials upon outside expertise, will facilitate the continued develop-
ment of transnational sectoral policy networks centred upon the European Commission In terms of the policy process, the 
existence of effectiv e EU level policy networks is functionally beneficial However, the considerable influence wielded by 
organized mterests within the European Commission md the close-often informal- links whtch exist between some groups 
and Comrpiss-ion officials have served to increase puhbc unease about the Community's "democratic deficit" 
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24 05 06 
J^ Official commentator's points made to Neuhold, C "The Committees of the European Parliament, conflictual foras or 
consensual arenas''* presentation made at the research colloquium 1 Polities and Culture in Europe, held at Maastricht Uni-
versity Faculty of Arte and Culture oft 24 05 06 
m See note 121 Wallace, W (2000) p 528 
i V 
Dftugberg, C Hefarmmg the ( AT: P^ttv Networks and tirtnakr In\n tutu trial Structure* In Journal of Common Market 
Studies Vol.37. No 3 September I W p 422 
366 
wi th the EU, quite apart f r om the increasing complexi ty o f pol icy making in general; ' I n 
North-South relations and in biotechnology . . . fragmented networks, which l ink the Com-
mission's Directorates-General to funct ional agencies w i th in national governments and to in-
terest groups, make for a struggle even to define a coherent agenda.'138 
None o f the parties involved in the E U are w i l l i ng to rel inquish power and this is the root o f 
many o f the problems and results, in part, in a fragmentat ion o f pol i t ical authority. This is 
what makes the EU ' s fragmentation problems hard to remedy. The poli t ical leadership neces-
sary to lead, rationalize and reform is not there. Indeed it is increasingly more d i f f icu l t to f i nd 
any real focus o f authority: 
' A second feature o f the E U system that leads to fragmentation is the absence o f a focus o f 
authori ty. Un l ike most West European democracies (but in a similar manner to the United 
States) pol i t ical authority i tsel f is fragmented throughout the EU institutions . . . This frag-
mentat ion is further reinforced by the absence o f direct executive powers for most E U ser-
This leads to and "creates" a situation where there is ' A h igh degree o f autonomy o f Policy 
Networks in E U governance.'140 
Despite the need to rationalise and s impl i fy , the EU, in fact the Commission wi th its ' c i v i l 
society ' concepts seems to want to involve even more stakeholders and actors in its pol icy 
mak ing procedures wh ich may result in more complexi ty and f inal ly chaos. This happened 
w i th the Structural Funds as the Commission pressed to have ever more sub national actors 
involved to, in part at least, enhance its abi l i ty to d iv ide and rule in its endless struggle w i th 
the MSs. This led to a pol icy plagued w i th vested interests which has achieved doubtful re-
sults. The same w i l l probably happen elsewhere, since finally, funding and legislation are si-
mi la r as money is of ten involved in both. There seems to be a basic truth that the E U currently 
often means complex i ty and compromise, and more compromises, which f inal ly leads to a 
total complex i ty that leads to confusion and or a pressure fo r s impl ic i ty ; ' I t has, however, rea-
ched a stage o f excessive complexi ty and sometimes confusion. ' 4 1This sense o f current com-
plexi ty and the pressing need for change is stressed by several authors. 142Ironically, the cen-
tral goal o f a technocracy, ef f ic iency also suffers. Bearing in mind that the E U and Commis-
sion had the mission to encourage col lect ive action, the fo l l ow ing quotation reflects ineff i -
ciency; 'The EU ' s insti tut ional system often seems to lack the capacity to foster truly collec-
t ive action in the pursuit o f shared goals, and moreover appears enormously complex, arcane, 
1 jl ^ 
and far more convoluted than its counterparts at the national level. ' 
Regardless o f anything else, h ighly fragmented pol i t ical structures seem to have some nega-
t ive side effects and one o f these is resistance to change and reform. In essence the greater the 
number o f possibi l i t ies there are for effective vetoes to be placed on a policy or element o f it, 
138 See note 121 Wallace, W (2000) p.528 
m Peterson 1995:78 quoted see note 15 Page (1997) p. 19 
140 See note 19 Peterson; Bomberg (t999)p.3L 'The EU's treaties are astoundingly vague. Links between societal interests 
and EU decision makers ('agents') are weak in the absence of traditional structures-such as strong political parties-for aggre-
gating interests. EU policy networks may be 'captured* by agents who shape major decisions in ways that effectively prede-
termine them before Member States can 'make' them.' 
141 See note 35 Sapir Report (2003) p.89 
142 BOrzel, T. Policy Networks A New Paradigm for European Governance? EUI Working Paper RSC No 97/19 p.24. 'It is 
argued that policy making in the EU takes place in a highly dynamic complex environment where public actors at both Euro-
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territorial units...Hierarchical coordination either through the Commission or the national governments has become ineffi-
cient.* 
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then the more l ikely it is that compromise and reform resistance w i l l result as is the case in the 
EC/EU as the next two quotations show. 'Pol i t ica l systems in which the structure disperses 
political power to several decision-making centres provide for many veto points wh ich can be 
used, often successfully, to mobil ize opposit ion to reform. '1 4 4 And thus 'Furthermore, the 
EC/EU is a highly fragmented polit ical system w i th many veto points . . . Therefore, the re-
form process concentrated on accommodating the interests o f all decision-making centres, 
that is pr imari ly the Commission and the 12 Member States.'145 
The question o f democracy and how far EU fragmentation and complexi ty affects it needs 
closer examination. In order to accommodate the requirements o f the new actors to have a 
'real' say, new processes and procedures are decided upon which become overly complex and 
counter productive. As so often happens changes can be made for the best o f intentions, such 
as making decision making more democratic by increasing the powers o f the European Par-
liament v ia co decision. Al though the effect o f this introduced complexi ty is that decision 
making has been driven more and more into opaque corners f rom which it is hard for actors to 
really be sure who gave the ini t ial impulse or the f inal nod. The more complex the institutions 
and the more power the EP has received so the more backroom deals are done. l 4 6Democrat ic 
elements need to be located in a structured democratic context and environment to funct ion as 
intended, and that is not really the current E U real i ty, rather actors or extra procedures tend to 
be added instead o f system reform which is not necessarily beneficial: 
'Br ing ing more players into the system, whether through a stronger role for the European Par-
liament or national or regional legislatures and perhaps even more important ly, their staffs, 
might not reduce the democratic deficit. Increasing the range o f interests and bodies that have 
to be squared might increase the di f f icul ty o f ident i fy ing accountabil i ty, turning a democratic 
deficit into a less democratic surfeit o f institutions, groups, and individuals, all w i th some sort 
o f valid claim to represent European cit izens.'147 
I t is fair to question who then gains f rom the complexi ty i f not democracy; the answer seems 
to be that of f ic ials and the opaque network members gain considerably f rom it. The greater 
the complexity and number o f actors the worse the system and the worse the qual i ty o f the 
decisions made: ' too many cooks spoil the broth ' or ' too many captains on one ship. ' The 
complexity o f the C A P and its inefficiencies il lustrates this. A similar process to that wh ich 
happened in the Commission itself; its excessively complicated rules and bureaucracy drove 
its own off ic ials to take short cuts to get their jobs done at al l . The logic seems to be the more 
'controls1 the more transparent the organization w i l l be, in fact the opposite seems to be the 
case. Thus it is to be expected that w i th enlargement and even more actors, more complexi ty 
w i l l result, not less, and more pressure for informal deals and more power for pol icy networks 
f inal ly. These w i l l reluctantly accept enlargement and integrate it and the new actors into their 
ranks and then resist any more changes.148 
Several eminent commentators agree on the crisis that is facing the EU, ow ing in part to its 
excessive complexity and so confusion, wh ich is shown in the treaties themselves,149 and o f 
144 See note 137 Daugberg, (1999) p.423 
145 ibid p.423 
146 See note 19 Peterson; Bomberg (1999)p.86 
147 Seenöte 15 Page(1997) p. 163 
148 See note 142 Börzel (97/19) p.29, 'But what makes policy networks so special is that they provide, above all, an arena for 
non strategic, communicative action to overcome deadlock situations and problems of collective action. 
149 De Schoutheete, P. 'The European Council' in Shackleton M and Peterson J (ed.); The Institutions of the European Un-
ion, (2002) Oxford, Oxford University Press p. 43. 'The complexity and confusion of the treaties...' and 'It took legal and 
linguistic experts, under the guidance of COREPER, two months to establish in legal terms what had been decided at Am-
sterdam. * 
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course the Commission. The first to mention is Delors h imse l f who stated, wi th the Counci l o f 
Ministers part icular ly in mind; ' W e are confronted now w i th a situation that cannot last. No 
one is in cont ro l . ' I 5 0The next dealt w i th the complexi ty : 
'The E U can act as a rule maker, a pol icymaker, a regulator, a supervisor or a facil i tator. Tho-
se are very di f ferent roles and it should be no surprise that having the same institution(s) per-
fo rm such a variety o f tasks creates perplexity. In short, the picture that emerges is one o f 
confusion and tension. Confusion is created by the complexi ty o f the E U system and the di-
versity o f the roles performed by the union in its relationship to the MSs, sub-national entities 
and private agents. Tension comes f rom the gap between goals and means. It is hard to recon-
ci le the v iew " f r o m above"- the goals enshrined in the treaty and announced by the European 
Counci l - and the v iew " f r o m be low"- the nitty gr i t ty o f legal acts and budgetary choices. This 
gap is a natural consequence o f the pol i t ical character o f the EU. ' 1 5 1 
The same report continues in the same vein: 
' . . . summing up, our assessment is that the E U is now confront ing a fundamental choice: it 
must either abandon some o f its present ambit ions or seriously address governance weak-
nesses. One possible response wou ld be to conclude that its ambitions should be scaled down 
to what it can credibly commi t to deliver . . . A streamlined, scaled down union that would 
concentrate on prov id ing monetary stabil i ty, a pro-compet i t ive environment, and development 
assistance to catching up countries - but not endorse responsibi l i ty for growth, innovation, 
employment or social cohesion - wou ld certainly be preferable to an E U that claims to have 
higher ambit ions but is not able to deliver. The Commission is also stated to be unable to 
decide on its ideal 'administ rat ion ' fo rm and so to be ' . . . ripe for change and its role is in 
need o f re-def ini t ion. '1 5 3 
A n important element o f E U and Commission fragmentation is related to sectoral fragmenta-
t ion and ample evidence o f this was found in the research as was stated in the last chapter. A l -
so the f indings concurred w i th the increasing number o f 'actors' competing in the EU envi-
ronment. In part icular, as the Commission became more fragmented w i th its DGs behaving 
increasingly l ike empowered actors themselves, and their units al igning themselves wi th ac-
tors in Policy Networks . A lso the fragmentation o f MSs has been discussed which has l ike-
wise added to the actors in the E U and available for Pol icy Networks, 
9.3 COMMISSION FRAGMENTATION AND MS INFLUENCE 
Under ly ing E U fragmentat ion is the trend o f Commission fragmentation. The MSs are a ma-
j o r factor in achieving this for the reasons stated before. That said, the Commission has to 
share responsibi l i ty for the state o f fragmentation in its own ranks. The fo l lowing section ma-
kes both these points clear. A useful starting point are t w o quotations which sum up many o f 
the Commission 's problems: 
'Dissat isfact ion w i t h the Commiss ion 's performance pr ior to the 1999 crisis attributed ineff i -
ciency to excessive bureaucracy and over-centralisation combined w i th power struggles a-
150 Delors, J. quoted in European Voice 16-22 July 1998 
151 See note 35 Sapir Report (2003) p.80 
152 ibid p. 115 
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mong DGs and the intrusion o f national interests into personnel decisions and pol icy mak-
ing .^ 5 4 
' Too many over lapp ing approvals and excessive checking o f decisions made at lower levels 
result in sluggish responses and unclear divisions o f tasks and responsibilities. Co-ordinat ion 
among DGs has been seriously deficient. The lack o f effect ive means o f resolving ju r isd ic -
t ional disputes and managing conf l icts have had a damaging impact on the coherence o f the 
Commission and its publ ic image/ 1 5 5 
A br ie f l ist ing o f the observations gained f rom three years o f research and elite interviews in 
the Commission is called for now which broadly support the above. The Commission in the 
post Delors phase went through a period o f decentralisation, both controlled and uncontrol led, 
the latter occur r ing f irst and the former attempting to contain and formalise what was already 
fact. The f o l l o w i n g quotation has been mentioned in part in the first chapter, but it is wor th 
quot ing it in f u l l o w i n g to the statements made, and the fact that the speaker is the second in 
rank to the Commiss ion president. He stresses that the post Delors era saw considerable po-
wer going to the senior bureaucrats who also defied the Commission's stated aims to f o l l ow 
their own agenda. Power ef fect ively had devolved to the DGs and bureaucrats and away f rom 
the poli t ical leadership 
'European Commiss ion vice-president Guenter Verheugen has spoken out strongly against the 
power o f h igh- rank ing c iv i l servants wi th in the commission who are able to influence deci-
sions according to their personal w h i m s . . . In an interview w i th German dai ly Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung, the German commissioner in charge o f the important industry port fo l io said " the 
who le development in the last ten years has brought the c i v i l servants such power that in the 
meantime the most important pol i t ical task o f the 25 commissioners is control l ing this appara-
tus . . . There is a permanent power struggle between commissioners and high ranking bu-
reaucrats. Some o f them th ink: the commissioner is gone after f ive years and so is jus t a house 
keeper, but I ' m st ick ing around," he continued. He suggests that his own project to s imp l i f y 
54 E U laws has fal len foul o f stubborn commission bureaucrats. Before the summer he 
"strongly cr i t ic ised internally some general directorates who evidently did not want to take 
the heed o f the commiss ion 's aim to reduce bureaucracy seriously, because it did not f i t in 
w i t h their o w n ideas . . . The commissioners have to take extreme care that important ques-
tions are decided in their weekly meeting, and not decided by the c iv i l servants among them-
selves . . . Unfor tunate ly it sometimes happens in the communicat ion wi th member states o r 
parliament that c i v i l servants put their own personal perspective across as the v iew o f the 
commission," he to ld the newspaper. Ci t ing a concrete example the 62-year-old social democ-
rat commissioner said that commission bureaucrats had tr ied to sort out the use o f pesticides 
between them and the issue on ly came to the attention o f their pol i t ical masters - the commis-
sioners - when the bureaucrats fel l out over the issue. " I n my opinion, too much is decided by 
c i v i l servants," he said in conclusion',156 
When considering Commiss ion fragmentation a quotation f rom the Commission i tsel f regard-
ing its state in 1997 sets the scene rather nicely: 
'Managing a h igh level o f integration w i l l require a thorough re-evaluation o f the Commis-
s ion 's executive and management functions and a change in its administrative culture. '1 5 7 
154 See note 7 Metcalfe (2000) p. 826 
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Whi ls t the quotat ion does not directly mention fragmentation it does reflect the profound 
problems fac ing the Commission and the urgent requirement that changes were required for 
the future. Fragmentation is one o f the vi ta l elements that w i l l have to be addressed for the 
changes to be performed. The effects o f E U fragmentation reach their apex in the Commis-
sion; 'One o f the most enduring myths surrounding E U decision making is that the Commis-
sion is a purposeful, single-minded institution. In reali ty, it is highly fragmented, even i f it 
often unites in defence o f its institutional prerogatives, as it did in 1999 when it resigned en 
masse.'158 
On the surface the Commission appears to be a uni f ied bureaucratic institution wi th many 
Weberian touches. However , in several ways the Commission services are anything but a 
Weberian bureaucracy despite appearances. As the case studies showed, the majori ty o f pol-
icy -mak ing act iv i ty takes place at the level o f the desk of f icer , at grade A7/8. There is very 
l i t t le control placed on the o f f ic ia l and also l i t t le direct ion set, higher management appears to 
enforce direct ion by a process o f f i l ter ing and e l iminat ing proposals. Promotion often seems 
to defy explanation even at the lower levels in the hierarchy, and off icials refer to many fac-
tors inf luencing promot ion and performance rates low in their lists and reports. This leads to a 
situation where pol i t ical power is di f fused throughout the Commission and not neatly con-
tained in the Col lege o f the Commissioners. It leaves the of f ic ia ls, de facto, the masters o f a 
particular pol icy dossier and the network o f actors: MEPs, sector stakeholders and MS of f i -
cials work ing on it. The organigrams o f the Organisation suggest a strictly hierarchical struc-
ture w i th expl ic i t levels o f management and yet the staf f and management at the main policy 
mak ing levels call i t at t imes a ' f la t organisational structure.' 
In fact the existence o f a very excessively Weberian hierarchy, which has at times become 
more r igid, combined w i th of f ic ia ls who are the mainstay o f pol icy making and are extremely 
we l l educated, has apparently produced the predictable result o f complex networks forming 
between the Desk Off icers and the other parties direct ly involved in the legislative process. 
These networks seem to be both effective and complex and have evolved in response to the 
complex r ig id i ty o f the management system. In order for pol icy to be made in such a system 
complex network ing around the management is of ten essential for anything to happen. Of f i -
cials learn very qu ick ly that being 'creative' in network ing is one o f the most important as-
pects o f their j ob , both for pol icy making and also for promotion. Part o f the reason for the 
of f ic ia ls ' discretion is to be found in the ethos o f the organisation wi th its emphasis on en-
grenage, but part too is found in the many cleavages wh ich criss-cross it. Effect ively the of f i -
cials are located on islands separated by network cleavages. They f ind themselves defined as 
it were by national, sectoral, dossier networks. Thus the Commission has fragmentation po-
tential at the best o f t imes. Less leadership and idealism and less legislative generation can be 
expected to result in Commiss ion fragmentation at the level o f the of f ic ia l as wel l as at the 
D G level. 
The problem o f inner Commiss ion coordination was constantly stated to be a problem by al-
most everyone interviewed. The fo l l ow ing quotations in the literature are interesting reading 
and say all that needs to be said: 
'One o f the perennial complaints about the Commission is that it is too fragmented. For an 
organisation whose business is integration, the Commission is embarrassingly poorly inte-
University Press p.70 Whilst the paper referred to is for 1997 that the Kinnock reforms were calling for similar things evi-
dently not much had changed in the intervening years. 
158 See note 19 Peterson; Bomberg (1999)p.39 
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grated. It lacks the capacities to contain rivalries and jur isdict ional disputes among DGs. The 
DECODE report amply demonstrated the deficiencies o f internal co-ordination and the way in 
which the workloads associated wi th co-ordination have grown in recent years.'139 
The author adds: 
T h e widening range o f the Commission's responsibil i t ies increases the need for better co-
ordination among DGs. Established co-ordination methods are inadequate to ensure coher-
ence and consistency o f the increased range o f specialised and more interdependent activit ies. 
The ambiguities surrounding the role o f Commissioners' cabinets seem to have confused ra-
ther than clarif ied the processes o f co-ordination . . . In October 1999 the Commission pub-
lished proposals for strengthening co-ordination. By the t ime the Whi te paper Reforming the 
Commission was published, only a passing reference to co-ordination remained.'160 
Almost all the off ic ials interviewed in the Commission and the NMSs reiterated that the DGs 
simply do not communicate or coordinate and that whi ls t this has been a constant problem for 
the Commission it seems to have grown worse. The fragmentation o f the Commission is 
shown at its clearest in the weakness o f its central co-ordinat ing capacity. One notable exam-
ple o f this is the Secretariat General which was always supposed to be the coordinat ing or-
ganisation o f the Commission. Wi th the decentralisation o f the Commission, wh ich no doubt 
had some strategic uses, the SG's own abil i ty to coordinate activit ies seems to have been di-
minished.161This f i ts w i th the impl ic i t v iew o f one academic author when he states; 'Further-
I / - n _ 
more, efficient organisations centralize in order to decentralize.' The weakness o f the cen-
tralizing department and all centralisation i tsel f was made clear in the interviews w i th its s taf f 
and their frustration was barely concealed. They know, as do observers, that the Commission 
has great sources o f potential i f correctly aligned and thus effectiveness and ef f ic iency, but 
there has to be a clear strategy and the requisite managerial skil ls to achieve this and those are 
lost in the current system. Details about the SG perspective are in the next section. The fol-
lowing quotation also makes clear that decentralisation has almost been made concrete by the 
Director Generals and d i f f icu l t to reverse, although this is being attempted, a point wh ich quo-
tations made by European Commission vice-president Gi inter Verheugen and referred to pre-
viously made very clear: 
'Experience at the national level suggests that strong leadership is necessary to achieve fun-
damental reform. However, power and authority are fragmented in the Commission. A t the 
political level, the College lacks cohesion, whi le the Commission President, even after the 
Treaty o f Amsterdam, is l itt le more than primus inter pares, lacking the authority to impose 
far-reaching change and the institutional resources to oversee i t A t the level o f the services, 
meanwhile, Directors General enjoy considerable autonomy, which they are keen to pre-
serve.'163 
As was stressed at the beginning o f this section there has been increasing penetration o f the 
Commission by the MSs. That they were very much present in the cabinets has already been 
stated, and that cabinets have been l ike min i Councils,164but they have also been more w i l l i ng 
to apply pressure to their respective Commissioners to achieve what they require: 
159 See note 7 Metcalfe; (2000) p.826-827 
160 ibid p.828, 
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'Cer ta in ly , the incl inat ion and abi l i ty o f Member States to place, and use, their nationals in the 
Commiss ion as sources o f informat ion and influence varies considerably, but there is less re-
spect for the independence o f the Commission. Even in countries where Commission inde-
pendence has histor ical ly been regarded as sacred such as the Netherlands, contact wi th the 
Dutch Commissioner is no longer regarded as taboo.'165 
The Commission becoming a highly fragmented bureaucracy had gone hand in hand w i th 
g row ing signs o f national ism in Commissioners166 and also ineff ic iency in projects; no doubt 
al l these were related. 167Whatever the legal posit ion o f Commissioners may be wi th regard to 
their neutrali ty the f o l l ow ing can be said 'S imi lar ly , in other areas o f competit ion pol icy, gov-
ernments have mul t ip le means to put pressure on " the i r " Commissioners and the Commission 
as a whole when controversial measures arise, so that they may successfully prevent deci-
sions. , 1 6 8The penetration into the Commission extends r ight down into the ranks o f the staff; 
' A s Kassim and Wr igh t have put it, the Union 's bureaucratic system is "shot through wi th na-
t ional of f ic ia ls and inf luences. '" 169The Member States, to sum up the paragraph, are stated to 
have even got around Prodi 's reform o f cabinets ' . . . Member States have continued to use 
other means to ensure that their interests are articulated and protected wi th in the Commis-
The many E U and Commission problems that have been listed and more w i l l fo l low show 
that the Commiss ion sometimes appears to have problems coming to terms wi th or even de-
c id ing on its identi ty and role in the EU. It seems to be caught between playing it safe and be-
ing ambit ious. That said this is the organic tactic o f the vaccine which seems to dictate Com-
mission actors' behaviour whether they are fu l l y aware o f this or not. In part this appears to 
lead to confused organisational behaviour as w i th the apparent attempt by President Prodi to 
base the Commission on that o f a M S c iv i l service structure. By this is meant the location o f 
Commissioners and cabinets in their respective DGs, much l ike wi th M S ministries. On the 
one hand this seems to reflect ' federal ' governmental ambit ions171on the other it could be ar-
gued to reflect an attempt to regain control o f the organisation f rom the MSs. This seems par-
t icular ly to be the case when considered in conjunct ion w i t h forced reductions in cabinet sizes 
combined w i t h mak ing them mult inat ional and the meri t promot ion approach which has been 
applied to the services. The reorganizations have been, in part at least successful.172 
165 see note 163 Kassim II in Dimitrakoiiplos (2004) p. 99 
166 See note 19 Peterson; Bomberg (1999)p.76 'Moreover, the Commission began to reveal itself as a highly fragmented bu-
reaucracy and really a political system in itself. Despite their oaths of neutrality, individual Commissioners often found them-
selves supporting their own Member States when decisions had to be taken as to whether internal market rules were being 
violated. In 1995, the Greek Commissioner, Christos Papoutsis, blocked a move to take Greece to court for an illegal ban on 
toy advertisements. The Commissioner from Ireland, Padraig Flynn, foiled an attempt to haul Dublin before the ECJ to chal-
lenge laws requiring Irish radio stations to play 30% Irish music.' 
167 ibid p.76. 'The Commission also seemed incapable of taking clear, timely decisions of the kind needed, for example to 
create a single market in financial services (McHugh 1996). Poor interna! management hampered the introduction of the "CE 
mark", a guarantee that products meet EU health and safety standards.' 
lf,8Schmidt, S. The European Commission's powers in shaping European Policies in Dimitrakopoulos.D, D. (ed) The chang-
ing European Commission (2004) Manchester, Manchester University Press p. 109 
' See note 2 Kassim; Menon (2004) p. 99 
170 ibid p. 99 
171 ibid p. 100;4 'The early decisiveness shown by Prodi in declaring the Commission to be a putative government, which led 
him to locate Commissioners and their cabinets in the same premises as the Directorates-General for which they are respon-
sible-just as ministers in the Member States are based in their departments-has not been followed up.' 
172 ibid p. 99; 'Finally, although there seems to be some evidence that cabinets have been less ready since 1999 to act as 
spokesmen for the national capital and for chef and special chef meetings to resemble mini-Councils (Peterson and 
Bomberg, 1999:39)-the consequence of Prodi's decision to locate the Commission and the Cabinet in the same building as the 
Directorate-General...' 
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Having discussed inter D G problems it is worth ment ioning the fragmentation o f DGs them-
selves internally which has occurred. D G internal communicat ion and coordination have been 
very bad resulting in attempts, some more successful than others, at central izing them. The 
Commission and the DGs are more pol i t ical ly top heavy, in part, to counter balance knowl -
edge power f rom below. More micro management by higher management usually the Director 
General level was seen in some DGs. DGs were found to be divided internally into horizontal 
versus sectoral units, and also into sectoral units and their associated Policy Networks, wh ich 
maintained their adherence to the init ial sectoral goals o f their D G and those which d id not. 
Units seem to have been left largely up to themselves w i th even important issues l ike enlar-
gement. The large numbers o f reorganisations in some DGs showed the extent to wh ich they 
had to go to strengthen coordination and communicat ion. In some ways this is a natural de-
velopment, i f there is not enough active control asserted by the hierarchy. Interestingly inter-
nal D G problems seem to match inter D G problems, decreases in antagonism between D G 
ENT and DG E N V occurred after DG ENV had been re centralised. The absence o f a real 
'clerical layer' and normal archiving became more problematic as did the increasing number 
and complexity o f bureaucratic procedures. 
The irony is that the current situation in the EU and the Commission is remarkably s imi lar to 
that which faced Monnet in the France o f the late 1940s. He had to organize a major reform o f 
the French state for it to modernize and he and his colleagues had to organize the leadership 
to achieve the reform. He was all too aware o f the problems o f an absence o f any central co-
ordinating body and sectoral fragmentation which is that most bureaucratic o f diseases: 
' In their separate areas, the c iv i l servants had worked very wel l , each doing his best to de-
velop that sector o f industry for which he was responsible. But whi le they had incidental ly 
consulted a few industrialists, they had not collated their respective inquiries, w i th the result 
that their plans were neither wel l coordinated nor ranged in any order o f pr ior i ty. On the con-
trary, all were competing for the same l imited resources o f energy, manpower, and fore ign 
currency, which at this rate wou ld soon be exhausted. . . . People in different administrat ive 
departments or different branches o f industry spoke to one another, but their respective inten-
tions remained secret and uncoordinated. Everyone was entrenched in his own posit ion. '173 
I t was his goal to create and head the necessary body to remedy the situation. He set up the 
planning off ice to set priorities for the other ministries as was explained in the theory chapter. 
Monnet was also very aware that the French c iv i l service was excellent at promot ing and 
maintaining the status quo but not good at enterprise. It seems most appropriate at this point 
to stress the similarit ies between the situation that Monnet faced then and that which the E U is 
engrossed in currently which the fo l lowing quotation illustrates we l l : 
'Yet , the EU's lack o f hierarchy creates problems o f management as wel l as pol i t ical dr i f t . A t 
earlier stages in its evolution, the EU's business might have been managed effect ively by the 
Hallstein or Delors Commissions . . . Now, the reality is different. I f it is accepted that opt i -
mal E U pol icy outcomes are possible only i f objectives are clearly specified . . . then the Un-
ion's lack o f any hierarchy o f pol icy goals, as wel l as any body or institution able to impose 
one, are highly damaging.'174 
I t is possible to suggest that Monnet would h imsel f have recommended radical change to re-
solve the current E U economic problems and sectoral fragmentation. He wanted to ' t ransform 
the French establishment' and the ' training' o f the men who ran it in order to then tackle the 
'"Monnet, J. Memoirs. (1978) New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc p.235 
174 See note 95 Shackleton; Peterson (2002) p.353 
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1 re form. Leadership by his p lanning department was required in France directly coupled to 
the legi t imacy o f the Pr ime Min is ter 's o f f ice to wh ich it was hierarchically attached. The E U 
needs something s imi lar ; i t needs to be modernized and reorganized. 
9.3.1 COMMISSION FRAGMENTATION AND ITS CENTRE 
THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL (SG): VIEW FROM THE CENTRE 
As part o f the methodological approach three interviews were carried out in the Secretariat 
General (SG); the central coordinat ing organisation o f the Commission. l 7 6The general per-
spective o f the interviewees was that o f caution and cynical pessimism and not the dynamic 
goal setting leadership that one might have expected o f a 'head of f ice ' sort o f organisation. 
This is understandable g iven the fact that the Commiss ion in recent t imes simply has not been 
an organisation w i t h a dominant head of f ice. The SG's apparent weakness is p roo f o f the pro-
cess o f sectorization; 'The SG is seen to be another D G and in the Commission is seen to be a 1 "7*7 
source o f bureaucratic burden. The SG feels l ike a D G and competes for resources.' Increas-
ing ly the SG has seemingly become more dependent on the Commission President and as a 
result ' the SG is becoming closer to the President o f Commiss ion and less independent, so the 
person o f the SG w i l l of ten change now w i t h the new Commission, not l ike in the old 1 "7ft 
days. A n d i f more p roo f were required o f the apparent weakness o f the SG it is stated to 
only be as ef fect ive as its abi l i ty to forge coali t ions o f DGs to 'get recalcitrant DGs into l i -
ne. '1 7 9 
The SG's perspective into the lack o f D G coordinat ion was i l luminat ing; 'The Commission 
has many opinions but no centre. The SG needs to " knock heads together" and get DGs to fol-
l ow a central l ine. '1 8 0 A n d 'There are mul t i splits in the Commission and it is hard to get an 
agreement and y o u need an i ron f ist, but only i f a rule is there can the SG insist on it, i f not, 
not.1 8 1 ' This was a surpr is ing acceptance o f reality to hear f rom a pol icy making of f ic ia l in the 
SG, but candid, as was most o f the interview; 'The SG feels it has lost the possibi l i ty to bang 
heads together, i.e. too decentralised, this is a "downs ide . " ' 1 8 2 The decentralisation process, 
wh ich was intended to improve the smooth running o f the Commission, has resulted in prob-
lems o f coordinat ion; 'The Commiss ion is st i l l centr i fugal, some want to reverse it, or at least 
stop it gett ing worse ' . 1 8 3Communicat ion is also stated to be a general problem; 'There is not 
real ly communicat ion in the Commiss ion wh ich is a prob lem. ' 1 4DGs are stated to suffer f rom 
short term th ink ing and this is encouraged by the SG as a whole and should be 
changed. 1 8 50ne interviewee sounded posi t ively puzzled at the method o f doing business in the 
Commiss ion when compared to what he knew o f M S governmental practices, in particular the 
defensive hosti le manner in wh ich the DGs fought w i t h each other and refused to share 
documents and used lobby groups to force the issue; ' Leak ing to lobbies occurs to get pres-
sure appl ied to ensure DGs get their way, this happens regular ly. The Commission doesn't 
th ink as one institute. I nvo l v i ng a w ider stakeholder group is disl iked. Lobbyists have tr ied to 
t OiT 
misuse this. ' At tempts by the SG to introduce a standardised approach to management 
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agenda planning and so DG management was resisted by the DGs, " IRMS (Integrated Re-
source Management System part o f the information provision system for Act iv i ty Based 
Management) was very unpopular wi th DGs. Agenda planning for management was intended 
to allow monitoring o f progress but was seen to be inf lex ib le and didn't meet DGs indiv idual 
needs. Now they are back to the old system monitor ing and developing management plans. A 
study took place to replace IRMS as there is not a Commission s t a n d a r d . ' D G s are said to 
want to measure their progress but do not accept a Commission wide method instead they act 
l i ke isolated organisations and bring in consultancies to make checks and recommenda-
tions. 1MOne result o f inter DO competition is slowness and inability to respond when re-
quired; 'Wi th Gali leo the Commission took so long, as IX i s fought over it on scope etc, that 
the MSs went forwards with their own solution. There were no clear objectives* vague, amor-
phous objectives at Impact Assessment ( IA) meetings/ 
The Impact Assessment system o f assessing proposed legislation o f one DG by putting it up 
fo r discussion to all IX i s was an attempt to "integrate' the Commission seemingly first and 
foremost.1 'wUnfortunately the DGs were extremely suspicious about this method o f doing bu-
siness; k ln I As the DGs are encouraged to consult any DGs which might be involved. But 
most DGs "shudder" at this idea. They see it as interference from other DGs rather than coop-
eration with other stakeholders/ I 9 I I f this is not enough o f a problem then i A s are seen as 
4bureaucracy" from SG "bad^uys " by Desk Off icers. I X i s go through the motions but Com-
missioners don' t support i t / 1 "The result is that " IAs are not working as well as had been ho-
ped but the SG is pleased." Part o f the IA plan was also to improve legislative quality in l ine 
w i t h the less but better approach and there was said to have been an approximately 50% re-
duction in policy proposals as a result and also simpiif lcation,1<wThe Council had called for 
less spending and 'wiser ' legislation and indeed seems in part to have been behind the dr ive 
i fjt J 
f o r IAs and has found in them some sort o f * toof value; 'The Commission must give the 
Counci l evidence and information to possibly reject legislation . . . delay was the unwri t ten 
expectation by the Council to result from IAs, IAs forced them to choose between market ba-
sed solutions or legislation, and not just to choose legislation. The Commission had to provide 
information which gave the Council teeth, ' l 95What seems to be clear is that IAs have been 
turned into part o f the polit ical struggle between the Counci l and the Commission, w i th the 
real subsidiarity issues being fought here rather than in the EC J and also a polit ical struggle 
between Commission departments, l %The SG was crit icised for reducing the important re-
source o f legislation generation for the policy making DGs; *DG ENT and DG ENV complain 
about IAs as less legislation is generated/19 IAs are supposed to be even more integrated now 
and involve the fu l l participation o f all relevant DGs, but "The integrated 1A approach is riot 
properly applied, DGs are resistant to i t / m In fact there is a situation where ' I n effect some 
DGs do IAs by themselves/ An important element o f the problem is the tendency in the 
Commission to turn reforms on their heads; the IAs should have been applied to see i f legisla-
t ion was required instead DGs decided on legislation and later carry out an 1A to get it ac-
cepted. m 
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W i t h regards to the many reforms that the Commission has undertaken, the SG is quite reti-
cent i f not negative. The first issue was that o f the DGs reducing their dossiers and policy 
commitments v ia a 'negative pr ior i ty ' system whereby the D G wou ld indicate how internal 
capacities could be freed by g iv ing up work, the result was not wonderful ; 'no Commissioner 
repl ied or of fered any, Commissioners and Commission f ind it very hard to give anything up. 
It is the f ie fdom idea, they don' t want to give anything up; they defend their terri tory, sectors, 
keep resources and gain more to boost their sector. '200 Regarding Act iv i ty Based management 
( A B M ) ; 'Ac t i v i t y based management was not logical ly thought through, it was too focussed 
on D G objectives. The Commission should have had a stronger strategy. DGs should have 
been forced to take a common line. A B M was meant to be applied wi th decentralisation but 
1 
wasn' t , there should have been more integration w i t h decentralisation but there was not.' In 
fact, decentralisation has brought dupl icat ion o f tasks and some inefficiencies and seems to 
have been generally dis l iked by the SG for this reason202and no doubt also for their loss o f 
competences. The Career Development programme ( C D R ) has had some success in increas-
ing compet i t ion between of f ic ia ls and wor ry ing them into work ing hard according to one in-
terviewee b u t ' . . . the a im was to s impl i fy but it is very complex. '2 0 3 In general 'Commission 
human resources, budget and some areas are not wo rk ing effectively and must be chan-
g e d . ' 2 0 4 ^ is was stated after the reform wave, a sobering thought. 
The old problem o f the Commission want ing qual i ty checks on the surface but not actually 
^ n f _ 
apply ing resources to attaining them occurred again in the SG. This is similar to the D G 
E N V pattern when facing more infr ingement problems and stating more effort w i l l be placed 
on solv ing them but then not al locating more resources to them. Something similar happened 
to the under resourced state o f O L A F for a whi le . The SG, which is supposed to be doing co-
ordinat ion in the Commission, is understaffed, w i t h the example o f the I As which the SG f i-
nal ly has to approve provided to show this; ' D o they want I As to work but then why are there 
no resources for it, on ly extra tasks for the unit? In D G E N T there are maybe three economic 
guys or 14 staf f in total to oppose just three staf f in SG. '2 0 6Often the SG doubts the work done 
on the IAs by the D G concerned and sends it back to D G but 'of ten . . . pol i t ical pressure is 
applied or the threat o f i t . ' The end result is that 'overworked SG Desk Officers then let it 
through' and Mess than one ha l f o f IAs wh ich get through should have been accepted due to 
the SG being under resourced/2 0 7 The Commission as a whole 'goes through the motions' o f 
IAs as w i t h reforms and checking in general, but they do not really support them.208 
Regarding the enlargement and the abi l i ty o f the Commission to cope w i th it, one o f the inter-
viewees was quite pessimistic: 
'The K innock Reforms were due to enlargement. A t the B i rmingham conference 2 weeks be-
fore K innock said that enlargement drove his reforms. The College w i l l be unmanageable due 
to enlargement. On ly in 2012 there w i l l be a reduction to 18 Commissioners. The SG has been 
asked to see how to put Commissioners together on problem based lines. The SG would then 
serve sub groups and not just the College. V ice Presidents w i l l get more power. But it w i l l be 
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hard to get the o ld Commissioners to change. There w i l l maybe be a super Economic M in is -
ter.'209 
There seems to have been a major crisis brewing in the area o f translation services; 'w i t h en-
^ J A 
largement (there w i l l be a) crisis in translation services.' 
To sum up the f indings f rom the SG it seems fair to say that contradictory pressures are pre-
sent in the Commission and seemingly unable to be contained. I t really seems to lack a strong 
centre although there is said to be a recentralising process underway. Accord ing to an o f f ic ia l 
in DG ENT part o f the reason for the Prodi reforms was to gradually re-orient the Commis-
Oil 
sion back to its core task o f pol icy making, as it was w i th Delors. DGs are strong enough to 
resist reforms or to turn them on their heads, and the centr i fugal processes always at work in 
the Commission seem to be getting worse or at least not improving. The fo l low ing quotation 
is useful in i l lustrating the problem just mentioned: 
'The German commissioner, in charge o f Brussels' industiy port fo l io, on Thursday (5 Octo-
ber) voiced unprecedented cri t icism o f high-ranking commission bureaucrats for their hunger 
for power in the EU executive, resulting in a "permanent power struggle between commis-
sioners and high ranking bureaucrats . . . M r Verheugen said in an interview w i th Sued-
deutsche Zeitung that the off icials, apart f rom frustrat ing key reforms, also sometimes "put 
their own personal perspective across as the v iew o f the commission'1 in communicat ion w i th 
member states or the European P a r l i a m e n t . . . The affair is l ikely to heat up what has become 
an increasingly visible power struggle between the pol i t ical leadership o f the commission -
including European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso - and high of f ic ia ls . . . In a 
fol low-up interview w i th the Financial Times on Tuesday (10 October), M r Verheugen said 
that because o f bureaucrats' obstructionism, the commission w i l l this year fai l in . , . its of fen-
sive against red tape. ' 
There is formal decentralisation, which instead o f assisting the integration o f the Commiss ion 
has had the opposite effect, combined wi th attempts at bureaucratic integration v ia lAs wh ich 
has also been a mixed bag. D G ENV and D G E N T need to generate legislation to prove their 
worth and eff iciency but are then constrained by the I As wh ich have different eff ic iency crite-
ria. The IAs aim to integrate the Commission but also seem to have been seen as a cause o f 
fr ict ion as less legislation is available to be passed; thus inter D G competi t ion exists side by 
side with a range o f integrating mechanisms. The effect on the enlargement was three fo ld: 
f irstly, the weakness o f the SG and the processes for generating coordinated coherent policies 
put larger emphasis on the N M S administrative capacities and coordination. Secondly, the 
Commission which is supposed to protect smaller states, wh ich many o f the N M S s are, was 
weaker and less unif ied than ever, which could only mean problems for the NMSs . A n d lastly 
the prospect for reforms o f any sort in the Commission was made worse by its recent inabi l i ty 
to communicate and coordinate. 
209 Interviews with Commission Officials: Secretariat General (SG) 
210 ibid 
211 Interviews with Commission officials: DG ENT 
2 , 2 Beunderman M. 4EU officials stand firm after Verheugen attack' EU Observer 10,10,2006 
378 
9.4 COMMISSION AND DG FRAGMENTATION: POLICY 
NETWORKS 
W e have considered the general trends o f f ragmentat ion o f the E U and Commission particu-
lar ly into sectors now we w i l l look at one o f the forces invo lved in this in more deta i l One o f 
the culpr i ts for this fragmentat ion wh ich also benefits f rom it is the Policy Network, That said 
the Pol icy Ne tworks have also taken up the slack for the Commission and MSs and ensured 
that pol icies cont inued to funct ion regardless o f any pol i t ica l stalemate between the pair. 
9.4.1 POLICY NETWORKS AND THE DGs 
The f indings o f the research revealed that some pol icy areas had become dominated by Pol icy 
Networks , o f w h i c h D G of f ic ia ls were members, w h i c h were not amenable to change and re-
sisted reforms to the pol ic ies concerned. Some sectors and Pol icy Networks had come to re-
gard the enlargement as a threat to themselves and their main recipients and some actors were 
power fu l enough to impress their wishes onto the enlargement itself. Some units adhering to 
the in i t ia l and now 'o ld fashioned' sectoral goals o f their D G came into confl ict w i th the mo-
dernised goals o f the Commiss ion and DG. In the cases o f agriculture and structural funds, 
whose reform was and is desirable, the conf l ic t was necessary and yet the resistance o f the 
related po l icy networks was at t imes successful. But other Commission departments and net-
works such as those relat ing to SMEs and those in the environmental f ield, wh ich had less 
support f r om inf luent ia l vested interests, were more radical ly reformed although maybe this 
should not have happened as it did. 
The Commiss ion and also even the DGs can be described as organisations which are ex-
t remely vulnerable to networks which are defined as being opposed to the main organisations' 
goals and missions and often consist o f sectorally loyal , pol icy entrepreneurs. Lower off icials 
had been g iven greater discretion in the immediate post Delors era and the hierarchy o f the 
DGs had been weakened by the Delors 'breaking o f the f rame' by his poli t ical appointments 
deep into D G s to ensure that his polices were successfully pushed through. Some DGs were 
not only themselves direct ly l inked to sector networks and so unwi l l ing to cooperate w i th 
each other, but they were and are, prone to internal networks wh ich could mobi l ize certain 
elements o f sectors i f not who le sectors, to oppose in part icular new Commissioners and new 
Commiss ion targets and goals. This is especially the case where the network had been previ-
ously in control o f the D G and its pol icy, or, i f not tota l ly in control, at least partial ly so. This 
was now being challenged by the hierarchies. Small groups, and counter networks are created 
by the organisations themselves to f ight back against the negative networks. Often the nega-
t ive networks were so in control that only secretive counter networks based around the Com-
missioner were able to resist them. In the next section an academic states that the same pattern 
happened in D G V I I I as seems to have happened in D G A G R I . 
The abi l i ty o f certain sectors to resist pol icy re form is p roo f that a Policy Network is able to 
organize actors to oppose in various forms the decision to reform a policy. One o f the meth-
ods o f assessing whether or not a Pol icy Ne two rk is act ive in a f ie ld is stated as fo l lows; 'The 
existence o f a Pol icy Ne twork w i th in a pol icy f ie ld can usually help to explain why groups 
w h o benefit f r om a po l icy succeed in resisting pressure for radical reform. . . . '2 1 3 When ex-
ceptional ly a po l icy is reformed it is due to resistance fa i l i ng or being crushed. In D G A G R I 
there was quite clearly plenty o f opposit ion to the C A P reforms and this was organized in cer-
tain units a l though w i t h probable acquiescence by the management hierarchy at various times. 
2 ,3 See note 137 Daugberg, (1999) p. 413 
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Not only was the opposit ion there, it was successful. W i t h i n D G REGIO the same seems to 
have been true, and this abi l i ty to f ight o f f radical change to their pol icy is st i l l the case today; 
some would argue that those who oppose radical change to the pol icy are r ight others wou ld 
argue differently. Given the method o f ident i fy ing an active Policy Network provided above, 
the unchanged aspects o f the Structural Funds pol icy seem to make the existence o f a we l l 
functioning Policy Network l ikely. The abil i ty o f the main recipients o f the funds to avoid 
radical reforms even after the Sapir Report and its recommendations seems to show this. The 
end result is one which has not been to the benefit o f the newcomers and weaker parties l ike 
the NMSs. D G E N V revealed a network in action wh ich was able to resist internal attempts to 
moderate environmentally oriented legislation. This network was also able to resist the eco-
nomically oriented Commission's policies, rather l ike D G E N T did to environmental legisla-
tion. Both sectors and networks were resilient to Commission wide decided polices. D G 
ENV 's interactions w i th the EEA, which is at the centre o f a network o f agencies in the MSs, 
show that there are some in the D G who are resistant to this network competi t ion to them. D G 
ENT showed that various networks o f actors had been set up at times and some had been re-
moved during a major reorganization. The example o f D G E N T also showed that the removal 
o f some networks o f actors was not necessarily beneficial for the sector and the EU. In fact 
the closing down or rather transferral o f some networks came immediately pr ior to a period o f 
organizational weakness and defensiveness in the new D G itself. Arguably, the apparent 
downgrading o f the o ld DG SME, by being swamped in the new D G E N T dominated as it 
was by the old D G Industry and its connections to b ig industry, reduced the smaller D G to 
network status w i th in the new DG ENT and resulted in the apparent downgrading o f SMEs in 
the new DG. The inabi l i ty o f D G SME to resist bureaucratic take over and downgrading had 
coincided w i th its loss o f its networks o f support, i l lustrat ing Downsian logic wh ich suggests 
that bureaucratic departments aim to insure their survival by establishing a close body o f c l i -
entele to support it.214 
It is interesting when considering the various DGs for networks, it appears that D G A G R I and 
DG REGIO were successful at keeping away reorganisations and reforms, and struggled to 
keep their pol icy unchanged. They were both paying DGs and probably had more M S sup-
porters and also clientele. They were the most inf luenced by Policy Networks and really 
needed major reorganizations. The logic wou ld appear to be that i f a DG has strong enough 
networks and Policy Networks then it w i l l be able to resist reform and reorganizations longer. 
DG ENV and D G E N T had lots o f reorganisations and their pol icy areas were more altered, 
DG ENV in particular. Neither particularly resisted reform and enlargement much, although 
maybe D G ENV resisted more than DG E N T and had not been as totally reorganized. That 
said DG E N T in particular was seen to have been weak and not so effective, maybe due to too 
many reorganisations. 
The fact that in order to change pol icy in a D G there typical ly seems to have to have been a 
personnel reorganisation seems to be proof o f the power o f networks. The staf f in the net-
works evidently have strong views and have loyalties to protect and power over their dossier, 
more power than the management have and probably more contacts. Indeed the mob i l i t y rule 
which forces staff to move post every f ive or so years, particularly i f the post is Sensi t ive, ' 
seems to be indirectly aimed at networks. It is only by physical ly removing the o f f i c ia l f r om 
the dossier and its surrounding network that the management can change the way it is being 
dealt with. The blame does not only lie w i th the Commission but also wi th the MSs who are 
intensely aware o f the presence o f their staff in certain positions. Staf f are said by some to ha-
ve 'feudal rights' over their position,215these rights are supported by MSs which keep a care-
214 Downs (1967) referred to see note 6 Mazey; Richardson (1997) p. 181 
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fu l eye on their national members in important posts. A major reorganisation ostentatiously 
directed at a change in pol icy approach is a good t ime to quiet ly reallocate staff and to so redi-
rect pol icy. Even at the top o f the Commission, personnel are changed and moved around to 
achieve pol icy changes. The introduction o f the Commission reform agenda required a major 
bout o f pol i t ical appointments and re-organisation before it could take effect; T o r example, 
the President's and the Commissioner 's powers o f appointment a l low them to appoint their 
" o w n people" in key posts and push reforms forward. ' 2 7 
I t seems fa i r enough to posit the notion o f DGs being, at times, first and foremost members o f 
their sectors and related networks and secondly members o f the Commission. As one of f ic ia l 
explained the fact that D G E N T resisted environmental legislation and DG E N V as it did, de-
spite the Commiss ion and EU 's decision to have the environmental legislation concerned, was 
sectorally oriented resistance, and showed l i t t le Commission and European project loy-
alty 2 l 8 The DGs routinely resist College attempts to make them place Commission unity first 
and foremost. The attempt by the Prodi College to introduce reforms aimed at coordinating 
the DGs and integrating them and their staff closer together into a Commission wide unity, 
led to the DGs resisting the College and effect ively dropping the reforms that they did not 
want and turn ing the rest on their heads. Attempts at introducing standard methods for man-
agement and data processing to the DGs, wh ich were devised by the SG, were rejected as bu-
reaucratic dupl icat ion and unwanted. Impact Assessments by the SG were often resisted and 
resented generally even though their goal was to achieve better coordinated legislation and a 
better coordinated Commission. Fiefdoms appear to have had more importance than the 
Commission and project as a whole. One personnel s taf f member said quite openly that many 
o f the senior management in D G AGR1 were against the reforms2 I9and this seems to have 
been the case in most o f the DGs. Re-organizations o f the DGs internally were carried out to 
enforce control o f the D G ' s management over their s taf f and their networks. But Commission 
w ide attempts at the same th ing v ia mobi l i ty rules and Career development were resisted or 
used to maximise the D G management's position. Internal D G uniformity seems to be easier 
to achieve than Commiss ion wide uni formi ty . The Commission has yet to centralize the sec-
tors fu l ly and has merely increased the bureaucratic work load. 
The background to the growth in Pol icy Networks has been also to do wi th the situation in the 
MSs. By this is meant the increase in decentralisation in the national administrations o f many 
MSs: 
'The current style o f reform in administrat ive systems is to delegate increasing amounts o f 
authority to the lower echelons o f organisations and to d iminish the degree o f hierarchical 
control exercised by central agencies and pol i t ica l of f ic ia ls. Furthermore, another part o f the 
" N e w Public Management" is the redefini t ion by agents o f principals as "pol i t ical masters" to 
principals as "c l ients" or "customers". These changes make ex ante control over national bu-
reaucracies exercised by the Commission much more d i f f i cu l t to make truly effective.'220 
This trend has been cont inuing apace throughout the 1990s wh ich has also been the t ime in 
wh ich the Commiss ion has been weak. Given that weakness in pol i t ical leadership, which is 
216 See note 4 Spence, (1997) p.75. 
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true o f the EU in general, is stated to al low max imum bureaucratic influence and bureau-
crats form networks to get their work done, increases in network power seem to have been 
inevitable. 
EU political fragmentation and M S - Commission sparring are two o f the obvious causes o f 
Policy Networks. O f course the networks add to the problem o f fragmentation as we l l w i th 
their stress on a particular sector. Ministr ies in MSs f ight hard enough between each other and 
have strong sectoral identities and that is on a relatively small scale; the broader European le-
vel makes the struggles even sharper. It is not surprising to f ind the Commission ministr ies 
(DGs) f ight ing hard w i th each other and often producing confused and contradictory pol i -
001 
cies. The fragmented poli t ical state o f the EU seems to mean that Policy Networks w i l l have 
to emerge to enable pol icy to be made and enforced at all. That these networks w i l l enjoy too 
much discretion is related to their unoff ic ial nature, wh ich is also o f course what makes them 
appealing as wel l as necessary. A n amusing quotation by an academic f rom the Public Choice 
School about the motives o f actors and how complexi ty can work for them fo l lows: 
' . . , a moderate reform, and not a radical one, was enacted main ly because it was in the inter-
ests o f farmers who want subsidies, in the interests o f agricultural ministers who want rural 
votes, and in the interests o f bureaucrats who want complex regulation which, in turn, in-
creases their power base, their responsibilities, the number o f staf f members and their career 
possibilities.' 24 
There is also the issue o f lack o f oversight which is to the advantage o f networks as a who le 
and Policy Networks are no exception. The pol i t ical fragmentation o f the EU and the number 
o f problems o f poli t ical control o f the executive makes this a very real problem. I f there was 
more control and accountability in the EU and it was less fragmented then there wou ld be less 
scope for the networks, and also less need for them. The losers are the pol i t ical masters who 
have lost and are losing control o f their respective institutions. The other loser is o f course the 
tax payer who is not organized into a sector as such and so into a Policy Network. Tax payers 
are known to be badly organized i f at all and it is easier to placate sector actors w i th subsidies 
than it is to worry about the tax payer. This should for this very reason be at the heart o f par-
liamentary concerns, however i f the EP or rather many o f its MEPs are involved in Pol icy 
Networks, as seems to be the case, this protection is weakened. 
One leading academic mentioned in the theory section is clear about the problem o f E U sec-
torisation and fragmentation: 
'Pol icy Networks are under managed because the constituent organizations do not invest in 
the capacities needed to cope w i th interdependence . . . The management defici t in Pol icy 
Networks is a combined function o f inadequate organizational capacities, lack o f clari ty about 
the roles and mutual relations o f different organizational actors and insuff icient means o f co-
ordination among them. Even i f individual organizations are we l l equipped to look after their 
own interests, they tend to pay too l i t t le attention to interdependence. In a developing system 
like the EU, effectiveness depends increasingly on how wel l the constituent organizations 
221 See note 95 Shackleton; Peierson (2002) p.352 4 
222 Hague, R and Harrop, M, Comparative Government and Politics an introduction (1987) Basingstoke, Macmillan Educa-
tion Ltd p,263. 'Whether the bureaucracy and the military rule or serve depends primarily on the strength of the other institu-
tions in the political system. As permanent and coherent organisations power gravitates towards them unless more overtly 
political institutions are capable of providing an effective counter weight. Thus bureaucratic influence is greatest where po-
litical leadership is weak.' 
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w o r k together . . . Fai lure to resolve or even face up to the problems o f managing interde-
pendence is of ten rationalised in terms o f self interested bureaucratic poli t ics or, in the EU, 
national se l f interest.' 
The result is that the E U f inds i tsel f in a 'disturbed reactive to turbuIent '2 2 6environment as ex-
plored in organizat ional theory. In turbulent condit ions the 'centr i fugal tendencies o f organ-
izational se l f interest and bureaucratic pol i t ics ' dominate and result in 'an atmosphere o f mis-
trust and recr iminat ion. '2 2 7The 'disturbed reactive' environment is stated to be similar to 'o l i -
gopol ist ic markets in economics, '2 2 8 in the conclusion the author sums up the E U as currently 
hav ing ' incoherent Pol icy Ne tworks ' and 'po l icy systems' wh i ch require reorganization.229 
Thus he considers the situat ion in the E U to be pretty problematic and he locates the problem 
in the inabi l i ty o f the MSs and Commiss ion to adopt a new approach. The reforms o f the 
Commiss ion are maybe necessary but are chasing an improved fo rm o f management that mis-
ses the point .2 3 0 In a sense the Commiss ion is f ixed in its o ld m ind set, w i th management 
meaning organizat ional changes rather than management o f the network reality which is the 
EU . One does not have to accept al l the author's v iews about the reforms and the need o f 
them to see that the Commiss ion neglects and is not or rather was not interested enough in 
po l icy management.231 Far more it is and always has been drawn to the poli t ical, constitutional 
aspects o f its role, namely guarding the treaties and expanding its competences via pol icy 
making.2 3 2 I t is not on ly interested in def in ing i tsel f as a c i v i l service and doing this j o b wel l , 
rather it wishes to compete w i t h ministers and top level government. Policy Network man-
agement is neglected by the MSs and the Commission and so their actors have a resultant in-
crease in discretion. This is a curious blindness when considering that Commission i tself is 
very much network based dur ing its dynamic phases. But then that is maybe the old problem, 
networks are o f interest to the Commiss ion as a whole when they are useful in generating new 
legislat ion and competences and less when they are geared to management. Then the Com-
mission seems al l too w i l l i n g to delegate management to the networks themselves.233 
9.4.2 COMMISSION STRUCTURE 
The Commiss ion structure and its fragmentation have already been stated, which make it pri-
me terr i tory for Networks part icular ly given the fact that contro l over off ic ials is often relaxed 
for good reasons. I t is wor th go ing a bit more into the Commiss ion mental i ty to underline this 
point. The Commiss ion was and is an idealistic organisation w i t h a l i t t le respected formal 
structure. I t was set up by an idealist small group or ig ina l ly and imp l ic i t l y relied on network-
ing in the engrenage strategy. For the same reason it was and is vulnerable to such small 
groups. Staf f are and have always been empowered to be dynamic and this can be a strength 
but equal ly it can be a l iab i l i ty . Trust and idealism combined w i th common interests and ease 
o f communicat ion are important fo r Pol icy Ne twork bu i ld ing and organization bui lding. The-
se elements were al l present in abundance in the f i rst Commiss ion and appear to have been 
present under Delors. 
The danger is that ideal ism is rather close to loyal ty in terms o f being an 'af fect ion' and sector 
and Pol icy Ne twork loyal ty may we l l replace Commiss ion loyal ty. This may we l l be the case 
225 See note 7 Metcalfe; (2000) p.829 
226 ibid p.833-834 
227 ibid p.834 
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i f the Commission or rather the specific College at any given t ime are considered to be not 
properly defending the true Commission and European interest. Of f ic ia ls w i l l be drawn to 
sectors and related networks i f there is not a strong gravitat ional pu l l f rom the centre. Loya l ty 
to sectors w i l l be stronger than abstract loyalty to the Commiss ion as an organization, i f this is 
stripped o f its European idealism torch bearing attributes. Many o f the staf f interviewed stated 
their idealistic motivations and it seems fair to guess that many o f them are idealistic and loy-
al as a whole and that this w i l l latch onto the most deserving cause. This is not so odd g iven 
that an idealism based organisation should attract elites and idealists. Another point raised by 
some was that the generalists in the Commission and the horizontal unit of f ic ia ls tend to be 
more loyal to the Commission and the European ideal than sector unit of f ic ials and experts. 
The predilection o f the sectoral fixated Commission to home in on this group has the effect o f 
having experts whose expertise may wel l become, or be, more important to them than any 
more abstract ideals particularly i f these are seen to be unrealistic for the sector and or nega-
tive. Thus there are two forces which provoke networks to resistance, the first is loyalty to the 
old method o f running things both in terms o f the o ld D G method o f doing things and or the 
old method o f promoting Europe. The second is loyal ty to the sector and other experts w i t h 
whom off icials have more in common than w i th other Commiss ion of f ic ia ls in general. O f 
course linked to this last point is that off ic ials may we l l have developed positions o f great 
power and influence in a sector as happened in D G AGR1 as a result o f their long term inter-
actions wi th their particular sector members, and they w i l l be most reluctant to lose these and 
see other members o f the network losing out as wel l . 
What is very noticeable is that the Commission relies a lot on networks to counter networks. 
The most obvious is the use made o f Cabinets and advisors to the Commissioners who enable 
them to bureaucratically fo rm counter networks w i th in the DGs to control the services. A t t i -
mes the DG service's hierarchy behave somewhat l ike an outside network pursuing their o w n 
ends in try ing to interrupt the of f ic ia l 's business. Director Generals have resisted the K innock 
Reforms intention to empower Heads o f Uni t to assess their staf f v i a CDR. Instead the Heads 
o f Unit can provide some points to the staff member whi ls t the rest are distributed by the D i -
rector General. Given that Heads o f Uni t have often been seen to be important Pol icy Net-
work members, this move seems less than accidental. D G A G R I showed quite clearly how the 
Commissioner and a small inner group were called together to force through the more radical 
mid term review reform o f the CAP against expected resistance by D G members and the MSs 
supporting them. The point is that the Commission structure is, whatever its formal appear-
ance or because o f its formal appearance, a hotbed o f networks and that these f ind support fo r 
internal struggles externally, and that the opposite also occurs seems inevitable. The weaker 
the central authorities o f the Commission and the weaker the European ideology the greater 
w i l l be the l ikel ihood o f the off ic ials maximis ing their discretion particularly in Pol icy Net -
works. The strength and stated existence o f f iefdoms in the Commission support the basic 
view that it lacks internal resistance to them. Norma l l y dynamic off ic ials were and are desir-
able given the need for the Commission to lead integrationary drives. But when the opposite 
is the case, then such off ic ials w i l l become a l iabi l i ty and attempts w i l l be made to control 
them more. The Pol icy Networks o f which they are members w i l l also share the same fate. 
These can then turn defensive and against the reforming College. Al though, towards the end 
o f the defensive phase in the vaccine cycle, dynamic Pol icy Networks and of f ic ia ls become 
desirable again. 
9.4.3 NETWORK MEMBER MOTIVES 
As was outlined above the motives o f the networks do not have to be negative, far f rom it, 
they can be seen as highly idealistic. The network that seemed to have existed in D G E N V 
was highly motivated and idealistic. Indeed it might seem fair to consider its members to have 
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been the true environmental idealists who refused to a l low this great good, the environment, 
to be abandoned for economic goals. The network was true to the founding goals and motives 
o f the D G wh ich had 
as an organization gradually been changed f rom its environmentally 
act ivist l ine towards becoming a more mainstream DG.2 3 5 I t was also true to the founding 
goals o f the Commiss ion as a whole in dr iv ing forwards integration and expanding the Euro-
pean sphere wherever possible. The problem for the network was that the times had changed 
and that the emphasis in the E U and the Commission as we l l , was on economic growth and 
anything which hindered this new goal was to be stopped. F rom the stand point o f some MSs 
and the current Commiss ion and the D G hierarchy, the network appeared an extremely resil-
ient group wh ich generated legislation which was no longer in mode and resisted reform and 
controls. It is hard not to see something heroic in the network that stood up for the o ld values 
and lost out. 
D G A G R I of f ic ia ls can be seen as loyal ly standing by their clientele and other network mem-
bers. They sought to protect that which they had striven to bu i ld up over the years and consid-
ered themselves to be the most expert in. They remained loyal to a specific perspective on ag-
r icul ture and the place o f the C A P in its promotion. In many ways they remained true to the 
founders o f the pol icy and the goals wh ich were encapsulated in it. Unfortunately the agricul-
tural sector had changed and the of f ic ia ls were no longer protecting small farmers but rather 
plenty o f large agglomerates. But of f ic ia ls st i l l see themselves as protecting the modern Euro-
peans f rom farming methods as exist in Brazi l and other less regulated countries.236The CAP 
was and is seen to be something desirable to have regardless o f its faults. 
D G R E G I O and the resistance to the intended reforms o f Structural Funds can also be seen 
f rom this perspective. It can be seen as loyalty to the o ld method o f European solidarity and 
loyalty to network members w i t h w h o m off ic ia ls had been work ing for a long time and no 
doubt also have been assisted by in the past. The role o f Spain and other recipients in support-
ing the D G over t ime cannot be underestimated; that the D G or elements in it tried to assist 
the Spanish was to be expected. Indeed in the interests o f ef f ic iency good contacts should be 
maintained in MSs and these w i l l often be in the Pol icy Network(s) . This is both logical and a 
choice for the opt imal performance o f the DGs act iv i ty 's based on the criteria that had previ-
ously been fo l lowed. Unfortunately the goal posts had been moved and the new requirements 
o f the new Col lege and related def ini t ions o f effectiveness and eff ic iency made such old stan-
dards jus t that, old, and to be reformed, and resistance to being reformed is a sign o f a nega-
t ive network. 
Some o f the of f ic ia ls in the networks seem to have benefited considerably in more or less en-
j o y i n g absolute discretion. Expert ise and the abi l i ty to exploi t the network meant that w i th in 
the network they enjoyed considerable prestige, part icular ly so in D G A G R I , but no doubt this 
was also true in the other networks. On the whole though, the networks do not seem to have 
been used to deliberately achieve negative goals, rather they were used to protect what had 
been achieved. But , no doubt, some o f the basic problems w i t h bureaucracies and bureaucrats 
occurred; 'Bureaucracies . . . have the tendency to pursue their own interests and to serve their 
clients to the possible reject ion o f the mandates imposed upon them by their principals.' And; 
'The tendency o f these agents towards defection, in the sense o f seeking to pursue their own 
agendas rather than the agenda required by the Commission, may be increased by managerial 
234 See note 6 Mazey; Richardson (1997) p.184.' 
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changes occurr ing in most national bureaucracies.' This tendency certainly seems to have 
been the case in D G A G R I and probably D G REGIO and the other two to a lesser extent. A l -
so officials are stated to have a 'tendency' to put 'organizat ional interests before pol icy objec-
tives.'238 
It seems to be a basic that networks and organizational systems can only continue for a long 
duration i f they have enough support and benefit enough groups be they MSs, of f ic ia ls or in-
terest groups. They change or are changed only when the balance swings considerably against 
them. It is therefore l ikely that many in the top echelon o f the Commission and MSs recog-
nized the benefits o f the networks and what they generated. It is worth speculating, al though it 
is just speculation, that the Commission as a whole was happy to let the networks sort out the 
management o f policies, which they were not interested in. Paying rent to members o f the Po-
licy Network via: pol icy detail discretion and maybe excluding newcomers, was good for the 
networks and served as lubricants, keeping the network work ing smoothly, and a wor thwh i le 
price for the Commission and E U in general to pay for the eff ic iency and effectiveness gains 
that resulted. The notion o f pay offs has been examined in the chapter on D G REGIO but it 
has to be restated that pay offs in the form o f Structural Funds and maybe ineff iciencies were 
a worthwhi le cost to bear for the general acquiescence o f M S and other actors to integrate. 
Indeed integration would not have occurred wi thout a certain amount o f pay offs. Maybe ' in -
efficiencies' in pol icy details, targeting and del ivery, are the cost o f the overall increase in in-
tegration, which then makes the inefficiency rather relative. For the Commission, key network 
players could be placated who could have opposed the Commission, and who, as has been 
seen in the reforming o f policies l ike CAP and Structural Funds, have opposed the Commis-
sion. Commission off ic ials kept or extended their pol icy making powers and were content. 
But overall the continuation o f some o f the policies was bad for the organization as a who le as 
network staff could not be moved around. They were secure in their places ow ing to network 
connections, superior knowledge and expertise. Natura l ly they resisted reforms wh ich wou ld 
weaken their network position; mobi l i ty , one o f the K innock Reform bugbears was a real 
threat to network members as was reform o f their pol icy. Their knowledge monopoly wou ld 
be rendered worthless and their abil i ty to reward network members also diminished. Medieval 
Monarchs had similar problems when they were unable to give anymore to buy loyalty. 
To understand the appeal o f networks to most actors, discretion must be considered. In the E U 
as a whole and in Policy Networks it is hard to locate who said what and decided 
what.240For responsibil ity adverse polit icians and of f ic ia ls this is a j o y . Bureaucrats want to 
secure the abil i ty to make poli t ical decisions and yet to remain anonymous; pol i t ic ians enjoy 
grand projects but want to avoid parliamentary scrut iny; M S off ic ials enjoy outmanoeuvr ing 
their ministers and Policy Networks make this possible. Ow ing to the very existence o f Pol icy 
Networks it is inaccurate to say the Commission decided this or that and the same goes for the 
Council; al l studies based on measurements o f output f rom these organizations are in danger 
o f being meaningless i f they are used to support notions o f the primacy o f one inst i tut ion or 
the other. In practice v ia Policy Networks, actors in MSs, Commission, EP and Counci l can 
start an idea going in any o f the organizations, and they w i l l choose the one that carries least 
polit ical cost MSs are aware that nipping an unwanted pol icy in the bud by effect ively taking 
over a DG is a more elegant means o f stopping legislation than a veto or a scene in the Coun-
cil. The existence o f Policy Networks means that MSs have to be alert and f lexib le and ready 
wi th a 'rapid reaction force': a seconded of f ic ia l maybe or Commissioner to be activated or 
237 See note 220 Peters (2000) p.201 
238 See note 222 Hague; Harrop (1987) p.262 
239 See note 121 Wallace, W (2000) p.527 
240 See note 6 Mazey; Richardson (1997) p. 179. '„ . i t was very difficult to identify the actual origin of any policy.' 
386 
dropped into the D G wh ich has the legislative proposal at that point in t ime. I t seems quite 
l ike ly that MSs hear about policies early v ia Pol icy Networks , wh ich wou ld explain the ap-
parent increase in M S targeted act iv i ty in the DGs and also shows that Policy Networks can 
be used in every direct ion by al l their actors. Thus f ind ing where any decision was really 
started and f ina l l y made can only be found out v ia in depth interviews o f the participants in 
w h i c h they either al l agree or are all honest. Mere vo t ing on the Counci l ignores the power o f 
the Pol icy Ne two rk wh ich has set the vote up in the f irst place. B laming it on the Commission 
is the old favour i te but equal ly the Commission is keen to blame it on the MSs241242and the 
Counci l , In real i ty the Commiss ion w i l l be as gu i l ty , i f that is the r ight word, o f a pol icy as the 
Counc i l and al l the Pol icy Ne two rk members who w i l l have been fu l ly involved at every sta-
ge. 
9.4,4 A THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION 
The power o f Pol icy Networks o f various sorts can be considerable and decide what happens 
in a sector and wh i ls t Commiss ion of f ic ia ls are often very important in these networks the 
Commiss ion itself, as a whole , is not. There appears to be a feel ing in much o f what is wr i t ten 
about Pol icy Networks that they are beneficial and benevolent and that the Commission can 
only w i n as a result. A curious misinterpretation o f real i ty. That the Commission is often too 
weak and non coi legial to be able to benefit f rom the Pol icy Ne twork scenario seems to have 
been ignored. That the Pol icy Networks w i l l invo lve a range o f actors inside and outside the 
Commiss ion, in part icular in the MSs and Counci l and that such a combination may wel l pro-
ve more than a match for the of ten only weakly united Col lege and Commission seems to be 
ignored. Basic bureaucratic logic wou ld expect of f ic ia ls to try and carve out their own em-
pires, increase their competences and to develop constituencies outside the organisation to 
provide support when necessary. This is a problematic and negative development. Col legial i ty 
and a un i f y ing central organisation, i f effect ive, are better than Pol icy Networks, after al l 
committees are less easy to manipulate than indiv iduals and commissions active across sev-
eral industries less easy to manipulate than those concentrated on one industry. The tendency 
o f DGs and Commiss ion to al l too easily dissolve into Pol icy Networks is unfortunate. Par-
t icu lar ly g iven that the result was: reforms opposed; g row ing pol icy incoherence and there 
was even the danger o f the enlargement being delayed. 
The Pol icy N e t w o r k is gradual ly becoming a more power fu l regulatory form o f governance 
maybe in the future more power fu l than the Commiss ion itself. That Policy Networks are in 
the E U set up seems inevitable and that they reduce pol i t ica l authorities to the level o f o f f i -
cials seems inevitable too, as both are 'members ' o f the network. In order to understand the 
inev i tab i l i ty o f Pol icy Ne tworks ' g rowing importance, the role o f Monnet and the era in 
wh ich he construed his concepts o f integration needs to be remembered. Monnet developed 
his thoughts in a corporatist and communist dominated era. The emphasis was on bureaucrats 
gett ing together in various areas o f society and the economy and f ind ing common cause in 
w o r k i n g together and thus creating spi l lover effects. F ina l ly there was to be a pseudo Euro-
pean w ide c i v i l service o f l i keminded of f ic ia ls ne twork ing and pressurizing polit icians. So 
long as the of f ic ia ls were dominated by their loyal ty to the European ideal the process wou ld 
stay on the rails. However , the emphasis on of f ic ia ls w o r k i n g together to get a j o b done wel l , 
contained the seeds for the destruction o f the Commiss ion as a coilegial body; namely the 
various sectors migh t happi ly spi l lover and unite under Commission guidance or they might 
f o rm networks wh ich used the Commission when it served their purposes but could equally 
241 Smith, M. The Commission made me do it in Nugent, N (ed) At the heart of the Union, second edition, (2000) Basing-
stoke, Macmilian Press, 2000 p.170,171 
242 Levy R, Managing the Managers in Nugent, N (ed) At the heart of the Union, second edition, (2000) Basingstoke, Mac-
milian Press, 2000, p.213 
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do the opposite. The questions would then be where wou ld the loyalty o f the of f ic ia ls l ie; w i th 
the European project or to their sector constituents? In a wor ld o f poli t ical authorities reduced 
to network actors, wh ich actor wou ld prove the more effect ive the Commission or the MSs? 
Effectiveness is here defined not in terms o f tak ing over the networks but rather in f luencing 
them, for the more powerful networks, ru l ing them has been out o f the question and proven to 
be absolutely out o f the hands o f both MSs and the Commission. In a sense Monnet was cor-
rect in his fear that sectoral fragmentation wou ld lead to a weakening o f the Commission and 
al low MSs to apply pressure on sectoral actors and so control the sector and the Commiss ion 
at the top. However the networks are not necessarily amenable to control by anybody. Rather 
it is the presence o f a wide range o f powerful actors f rom a range o f institutions that enables 
the off icials w i th in them to play polit ical authorities against each other and to maintain and 
increase their power. Maybe the position o f Les Metca l f as he calls for the Commission to be-
come a network manager is correct, the only the question is whether this is already too late. 
The Commission contained and contains the seeds o f its own destruction or replacement in it. 
The Commission's special approach was to create a European level o f power by use o f its 
technocratic expertise that was not polit ical in nature and could so be used to defuse pol i t ical 
antagonisms. Greater integration, f irst o f al l o f of f ic ia ls in various sectors and then the sectors 
themselves would spi l lover unt i l all sectors were covered. In economic terms a fo rm o f vert i-
cal takeover o f another bureaucratic sector was desired, in economics the food processing 
manufacturer buys farms to control this level o f the supply chain more closely. In governmen-
tal terms the MS level of f ic ials would be taken over in a sense, bought out, by the Commis-
sion level. However the opposite can also happen and seemed to happen more in the 1990s, 
wi th MSs beginning to re-nationalise major policies and extending their inf luence into the 
Commission v ia Policy Networks. 
The rise o f the sectoral Policy Network and a layer o f of f ic ia ls probably loyal Heads o f Un i t 
and below wi th in the Commission, who either head these networks or are important members 
o f them, would appear to be what the dynamic Commission wou ld have wanted, or intended, 
Technocratic networks control l ing sectors very ef fect ively, ensuring that the networks and the 
policies they run are protected f rom MSs and all comers. The trouble is that these networks 
and their sectors have proven to be too good at their task. The pol i t ical level o f the Commis-
sion seems to have lost control over these networks and they are able to outmanoeuvre the 
Commission hierarchy i f necessary. In a sense the of f ic ia ls have taken over and run their sec-
tors usually very much as intended by the interested parties involved, M S ministr ies and sec-
tor actors, but not in the interests o f the Commission itself. The Commission always intended 
to have its off ic ials work ing closely alongside the MSs own and so co-opting them. N o w the 
networks would quite happily exist and regulate w i t h the Commission and to a degree the 
MSs, both keeping to the background. Both MSs and Commission are split into sectors w i th 
coordination o f pol icy becoming a real problem. The Commission armed its staf f w i th great 
policy making discretion to al low them to advance the Commission and Europe and so oppose 
MSs but this discretion can be and has been used against the Commission itself. Maybe the 
Policy Networks are seeds o f a new organisation and elements o f a pol icy making layer or-
ganised into sectors under one European pol i t ical authority. 
9.5 THE REFORMS AND COMMISSION BUREAUCRATISATION 
We have considered the weakness o f the Commission and its fragmentary trends w i t h f i rst o f 
all the MSs weakening its drive and abil i ty to lead and secondly placing their nationals deep 
into the organisation to keep control over its policies by control l ing key parts o f important 
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DGs. N o w we w i l l look at the response o f the Commission to these threats. As suggested by 
the theory combined w i th the case studies a process o f bureaucratization fo l lowed by a grad-
ual re- launching o f the project seems to have occurred. The overal l trend w i l l now be consid-
ered. 
When considering the reforms o f the Commission wh ich have been mentioned throughout this 
thesis, i t necessary to f i rst o f all go into the reforms themselves in more depth and then to dis-
cuss aspects surrounding them. T w o major drives for re form have dominated recent Commis-
sion history, the f i rst by the Santer Commission wh ich took over f rom the Delors College and 
then resigned, i ronical ly o w i n g to there not having been enough reforms and then the Prodi 
Commission and the K innock reforms. The K innock Reforms have been mentioned many t i -
mes throughout the thesis and they are part o f a series o f reforms aimed at improving the ma-
nagement o f the Commiss ion in general. They seem to be relat ively neutral in their calls for; 
' transparency, ef f ic iency, accountabi l i ty, performance, programming and evaluation . . . 
' These all resulted in large increases in bureaucratic procedures at all levels o f the DGs, but 
in part icular at the level o f A 4 , the Head o f Un i t level and those below. Mob i l i t y was forced at 
al l levels, although again part icular ly relevant for the Heads o f Un i t as these are often the ol-
der of f ic ia ls w i th long years o f experience and expertise in running the Commission and also 
vast amounts o f knowledge. These individuals are increasingly being made into managers o f 
s taf f instead o f experts w i t h vast amounts o f knowledge. The K innock Reforms were to an 
extent in response to President Prodi 's desire to return the Commission to its mission based 
sel f perception, creating Europe v ia pol icy making. This was matched by the Commission be-
coming more pol i t ica l ly active internally and t ry ing to ensure that it was in charge o f 
DGs. Many projects wh i ch were more sectorally directed and close to sectors and successful 
dropped and replaced by l ip service statements as w i th SMEs. Reforms o f staff structures and 
attempts at creating a meri t based c iv i l service style structure to reinforce efficiency and pro-
bably control over the Commission. 
It is wor th quick ly explain ing the use o f the wo rd bureaucratisation. It is a process expected o f 
c iv i l service ministr ies whereby c i v i l servants have clearly defined tasks and a set o f rules 
wh ich have to be obeyed. The tasks can be more or less r ig id ly defined and forcibly adhered 
too; the more bureaucratisation there is the more detailed the task definit ions become and the 
rules attached to them. In excess this can result in bureaucratic structures fa i l ing to funct ion in 
the manner intended by their founders and out o f accordance w i th their mission. They even 
cease to del iver goods and services to the publ ic, ef f ic ient ly and professionally. Instead there 
can be g row ing inef f ic iency, unavailable staff, l ow standards o f service and f inal ly corruption. 
This last is, obviously, a v i ru lent symptom o f the under ly ing problem. The Commission is and 
has been undergoing a wave o f negative bureaucratisation for years, as commentators have 
noted.245 
In terms o f the interviews and f indings, what they showed was that the intended reforms had 
resulted in movements w i t h i n DGs o f staf f f rom vert ical units w i t h sector contact to horizon-
tal units planning pol icy and administer ing financial and personnel matters. Large increases in 
f inancial control units and their status w i th in the DGs occurred. Heads o f Uni t seemed to have 
seen their work loads go up dramatical ly as they were the central management units dealing 
w i th the personnel issues wh ich were v i ta l for the K innock Reforms. Some o f the reforms 
seem to have been i l l thought out and DGs ensured that the effect ive power over staff wh ich 
243 See note 2 Kassim; Menon (2004) p.74 
w S pence, D. Structure, Functions and procedures in the Commission in Edwards G (ed) The European Commission, (1997) 
Cartermill, London p. 104 
245 Most notably The report of the Committee of Independent Experts on allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and 
Nepotism in the European Commission (CIEFR) 1999), 
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the reforms had generated, was accumulated by the very top layers o f management rather than 
going to those intended. Some good things seem to have come f rom the reforms but the work 
load was detrimental to the Commission service's other tasks. Some o f the Santer reforms 
seem to have been quietly al lowed to die, such as the Ac t i v i t y Based Management pro-
gramme, which seems to have been good in some cases. Generally the K innock Reforms 
seem to have been negatively received by many in higher management. 
Deep laid suspicions about the reforms seemed to be that: they had been rushed through to 
pay l ip service to MS concerns; that they were an attempt to make off ic ials normal c iv i l ser-
vants which was resented; that they sought to allocate blame on off ic ials lower down and to 
protect the top management and polit ical layer; that they were symptoms o f ' fear manage-
ment' by the Prodi Commission which was more scared about suffering the same fate as the 
Santer one than o f promoting the Commission. There was anxiety the reforms wou ld result in 
the emaciation o f the Commission in general. The mob i l i t y rule, requiring staf f to move every 
f ive years at the latest, was seen as a dangerous move wh ich wou ld lead to the loss o f Com-
mission expertise and organisational memory as Heads o f Uni t and of f ic ia ls who had domi-
nated policy areas were moved on. These fears were more grounded than they might at f irst 
appear when bearing in mind the absence of: effect ive (and un i form) archiving in the Com-
mission; dossier hand over procedures; unt i l recently training in dossier management and leg-
islative wr i t ing; a large enough clerical layer to handle the vast amount o f paper work . When 
these are combined wi th a culture which was only interested in new legislation and pol icy and 
not concerned w i th old policies and the related paper work , and an organisation wh ich has 
attached policies to persons and positions for years, then the anxiety seems rather just i f ied. 
There was a decline in expertise in the ranks o f the Commission that could have a negative 
effect on its dealings w i th the MSs and other international players. 
There was pessimism in the DGs about the reforms and apparently the mobi l i ty rule might not 
apply in practice to many dossiers as some DGs moved staf f but transferred their dossiers and 
work wi th them. So on paper they had been moved and the reform implemented but in prac-
tice they were doing the same work. Apparently mobi l i ty d id not have to result in staf f being 
moved out o f the D G at al l ; they could remain close enough to the dossier and their o ld posi-
t ion to be available to advise. Mob i l i t y could be effect ive, only i f top management wanted it 
to be. Policy Networks and C M O units were weakened by use o f the mobi l i ty rule. M a k i n g 
Heads o f Uni t personnel managers rather than pol icy experts seemed an odd reform. Some 
personnel support for staf f is helpful, but i f the structural problems remain o f MSs dominat ing 
senior positions and the other factors mentioned already then good l ine management probably 
w i l l not help. Rather an important layer w i l l be more over burdened than ever and even less 
able to manage and enable their staff to be the pol icy makers and regulatory entrepreneurs that 
they have been in the ' f la t organisation' to date. I t seems doubtful that the pol icy makers that 
many Desk Officers are really, need a line manager. Far more they need an expert to assist 
them but that is something different. In general the Commission is becoming more hierarchi-
cal. 
The reforms and bureaucratic controls are mostly paper controls and that these are in them-
selves problematic. Increasing paper work and controls in a Commission wh ich already had a 
reputation for struggling w i th excess work and lack o f management skil ls wou ld be problem-
atic at the best o f times, since when combined w i th the tendency o f hard work ing of f ic ia ls to 
want to get their work done, the result has been at t imes that shortcuts are taken. It is also a 
fact that the Commission has under spent often enough and that needy recipients o f finances 
simply do not receive the finances they apply for; although payment times as a whole are sta-
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ted to have decreased. The general sense the interviewer received in the interviews was o f 
frustrated of f ic ia ls struggl ing w i t h a system which steadily makes their work harder. 
The large increase in bureaucratic tasks for most o f the Commission staff and the strengthen-
ing o f rules and the power o f the hierarchy look good but do not seem likely to deliver the 
new organisation it was stated they would do; maybe they were never intended to at least not 
by all. A f t e r all the introduct ion o f the Santer reforms and the beginning o f the bureaucratisa-
t ion process ended in the fa l l o f his Commission, The weakness o f O L A F and the EEA both 
o f w h i c h aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and ef f ic iency o f the Commission as a whole 
and D G E N V have been mentioned. Both O L A F and the E E A would have helped the Com-
mission to be held to account by enabling evaluations to be performed on it. Both were either 
opposed or seriously weakened. There are two ways o f considering the facts, either the Com-
mission simply d id not want to be managed and resented any controls246 and so Commission 
actions are deliberate; or they were simply a result o f inabi l i ty ; the Commission was some-
what unmanageable. There is probably truth in both. 
Leav ing aside the motives o f some in the College, i f we consider the anti corruption measures 
that the Commission put into place after the 1999 fa l l o f the Santer Commission we see that it 
favoured further ineffect ive, bureaucratically complex anti corrupt ion measures to combat the 
problem o f corrupt ion, rather than effect ive methods. A l though these would only serve to put 
o f f honest project organisers f rom making an appl icat ion for funds in the first place. Some-
th ing s imi lar has happened w i th many o f the other reforms that were launched w i th in the 
Commission. The idea o f the reforms was good but somehow they get turned on their heads 
rather quick ly as di f ferent elements in the Commiss ion used them to their own advantage. 
M o b i l i t y at t imes was a good idea but i f the same members o f s taf f deal wi th the dossier f rom 
a di f ferent desk this was hardly wor thwhi le . Many o f the reforms seem to f i t more into l ine 
w i t h the various temporary concerns o f the College than w i t h any real intention or desire to 
permanently re form the Commission. First there was a decentralisation o f the Commission to 
devolve responsibi l i ty onto the DGs and away f rom the College, that achieved, there now the-
re seems to be a recentralisation taking place. What remains is a large increase in bureaucratic 
tasks for many o f the of f ic ia ls seemingly to the detriment o f qual i ty. As waves o f bureaucrati-
sation have taken place before, as happened after the 1965 empty chair crisis, it seems fair to 
say that the cycle continues. 
When considering the Commiss ion in general, its resistance to reform has been stressed, ma-
ny have been the reports made wh ich have recommended reforms and changes but precious 
l i t t le occurred on the ground unt i l the K innock Reforms and whi ls t these are having some ef-
fect there is resistance to them; ' W h i l e the Commission, as the engine o f integration, has 
spearheaded many important po l icy initiatives requir ing others to change, it has remained re-
markably impervious to outside cr i t ic ism. Dur ing the 20 years since they were made, the pro-
posals o f the Spierenburg Commit tee (1979) for a smaller and better coordinated Commission 
have provided ta lk ing points for wou ld be reformers w i thout prompt ing action. , 247It is even 
stated to be exceptional by international standards; T h e absence o f reform over such a period 
contrasts not only w i t h national administrations and international bodies, but w i th organiza-
tions more general ly, wh i ch are "characterized by gradual evolut ion and sudden revolu-
t ion " , 2 4 8 The same goes for the DGs and the Pol icy Networks that surround them, there is a 
perceptible reluctance and at t imes resistance to any change, any rocking o f the boat for a 
246 See note 132 Shore (2000) p. 198. '...practices of "Staff appraisal" or "performance review" accepted in the Danish, 
Dutch and British civil service, are "anathema" in most Mediterranean countries. For a Spaniard, the very suggestion of per-
formance appraisal would be considered an insult.1 
247 See note 7 Metcalfe; (2000) p.822 
248 Metcalfe (2000) referred to see note 263 Kassim (2004) p(34 
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number o f reasons. Firstly that off icials want to preserve the status quo "or at least . . . their 
last big achievement/ and they have *a vested interest in blocking radical change . . . This 
specifically bureaucratic version o f the model known as path dependency is discernible wi th in 
the European Union and acts as a deterrent to change which is liable to upset established pro-
cedures. 
A range o f reasons for the failure o f the reforms over and above those listed already should be 
run through now» First there is the problem that some countries and their off icials perceive the 
reforms as originating from other countries in particular the U K , and feel that they are there-
fore alien, thus they cannot 'own* the reforms and instead resist them, the off icials o f a south-
em European origin particularly hold to this. * Any reform which reduces the policy making 
^ c i 
aspect o f off icials work and thus their discretion would be resisted/ and there was a broad 
suspicion amongst many officials that there was a process underway which might have left 
them as order obey ing c iv i l servants and that this would, to an extent, amount to something o f 
a betrayal o f the European ideal which required them to be po l i t i ca l such reforms would be 
resisted/ These reasons for resistance were and are important: 
' A second obstacle is the perception on the part o f its staff o f the special nature o f the Com-
mission, the uniqueness o f its mission and the idea that it and it alone represents the common 
European interest. Any suggestion that it might change is interpreted as a challenge to the or-
ganization's independence and a threat to the inheritance o f Monnet and Schuman, In a mult i -
national institution, moreover particularly, one whose hybr id culture is considered an essen-
tial ingredient o f its uniqueness - administration and management are culturally loaded con-
cepts, and hence div is ive/2 5 3 
Linked to this are the interdependencies and loyalties which develop in Policy Networks and 
the status that off icials often enjoy in them. Off ic ials who have spent a decade or so deciding 
how much money a certain MS or region w i l l receive obviously w i l l enjoy a certain status 
with officials from that area and the regional off ic ials w i l l equally appeal to the of f ic ia l for 
support and vice versa i f their jo in t situation is threatened. This may well be particularly true 
i f officials have been deliberately placed in their posts by MS pressure.254MSs are very con-
scious o f their staff and where they are located in the Commission and extremely reluctant to 
allow them to be moved about over much which also results in reforms being resisted: 
kIn addition, the "geographical balance" historically applied to A1 and A2 positions, and more 
recently to appointments at A3 and A4, not to mention Member State support for dubious 
practices such as parachutage, has l imited the Commission's abil i ty to pursue an independent 
promotions policy based on merit. The wil l ingness o f national governments, acting through 
their permanent representations, to intervene in defense o f their nationals has, moreover, im-
posed restrictions on other aspects o f personnel po l i cy / 2 5 5 
The reforms have potential to be a form o f ' po l i t i ca l control ' too.256The pressure to reform the 
Commission internally came about for a variety o f reasons as stated above. There seems to be 
elements o f both reaction and deliberate poli t ical calculation in them. Yes, the reforms were 
11 mpiii.pip.ipn 
Stevens, A and Sttvem, H Hrimeh Bureaucrat*"' (2001) Basmgstc>k.e, Pal grave p 245 
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reacting to perceived problems w i th in the Commission structure, but also they seem to have 
been decided on as a means o f ensuring elite change over and confl ict reduction. Some in the 
Commiss ion saw the reforms as alien and Ang lo Saxon in or ig in and seem to have sensed that 
they were not a neutral as they seemed to be; 'Previously legit imate and effective methods o f 
management came to be seen as pure 'nepot ism' whi ls t their proponent was branded a 'des-
pot ' . The rationalisation o f management procedures, "p rogramming" and "evaluat ion" meth-
ods became tools in the quest for a new balance between di f ferent interests and groups w i th in 
the administrat ion. ' The study quoted f rom, broadly analyses the career o f Jacques Ferrandi, 
who was chef de cabinet to the first Commissioner o f the EDF (European Development 
Fund), and subsequently, Director. The abi l i ty o f the effect ive o ld management to bui ld up 
networks based on personal contacts and methods enabled them and the pol icy they ran to re-
sist reforms.258 I t is argued in the article, that ow ing to the continuation o f the old manage-
ment 's network much o f the pol icy remained unreformed. I t was only after significant per-
sonnel re-organisations that the pol icy could be brought back under some sort o f control,26 but 
the fai lure to br ing in more new of f ic ia ls l imi ted the extent o f the reform.261 
Several useful lessons that can be learnt f rom the case study are that: 
' I t is argued that reforms in the structure o f the inst i tut ion or policies and types o f public ac-
t ion are the means to regulate these confl icts. A n y administrat ion, national or mult inational, is 
a "bat t le f ie ld" where conf l ic t takes place between diverse groups o f senior c iv i l servants. 
They seek to maintain their posit ion, their power and access to various resources. The defini-
t ion o f reforms is part o f this conf l ic t for power or an attempt to control it. In that sense, it is 
h igh ly pol i t ical . I t is al l the more l ike ly to occur in a mult inat ional administration, for the rea-
sons presented above. '2 6 2 
Also the study refers to the Coombe's perspective and makes the connection between the loss 
o f power o f ' p o w e r f u l leaders,' who were 'capable o f def in ing and enforcing its mission,' and 
keeping cohesion on the basis o f ' m u t u a l trust and shared bel iefs' and the outbreak of: 
' . . . the compet i t ion wh ich was soon to appear between leaders bearing different interests 
and norms. This compet i t ion (faci l i tated by the mult inat ional character o f the institution) and 
the mul t ip l i c i ty o f the Commiss ion 's tasks were to lead to its gradual bureaucratisation . . . in 
order to ensure impart ia l i ty , neutral i ty, and balance between the various competing "clans" 
and leaders.'263 
The current reforms are stated to be 'exacerbating conf l icts o f interest and norms w i th in the 
Commission . . . '2 6 4 Imp l i c i t l y the author stresses that the ' reforms' serve the Bri t ish interest 
and help to remedy their complaint about not enough inf luence and are in practical terms l ike-
ly to introduce more 'red tape' wh i ch they are supposed to be removing. 65The l ikel ihood is 
that the reforms w i l l spark o f f even more bureaucratisation. 
257 See note 2 Kassim; Menon (2004 p.76 
258 ibid p.8l 
259 ibid p.81 
260 ibid p. 80 
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262 ibid p.75 
263 ibid p.82 
264 ibid p.83 
265 ibid p.83 
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The French pol icy makers at the heart o f the network described, were able to oppose aims 
a gig" 
more widely held w i th in the Commission and MSs. The possession o f wide networks in 
other countries, as wel l as in the DG, seems to have resulted in power in the D G and enough 
power to 'disturb' the French Government. Final ly such was Ferrandi's power that he stated 
have never had so much power to dispose o f publ ic money. D G V I I I was the EDF, and I 
was 
the EDF. '2 6 8 In summary, the study shows reforms as serving poli t ical purposes for one 
group whose influence is on the up, and also reflecting the attempt o f the organisation to con-
tain the outbreak o f competit ion and confl ict f o l l ow ing a change in leadership and also an 
enlargement and in preparation for another. Whi ls t , this case study was pr imar i ly about re-
forms in the Commission, the similarit ies between several o f the features o f the D G listed and 
those o f the DGs listed in the findings o f the thesis w i l l be readily apparent and provide some 
more support for the f indings o f my own interviews. 
A bureaucratic corset, appropriate maybe for an o ld fashioned national ministry, was being 
placed around off ic ials who were not issuing unemployment benefit in a predictable and rou-
tine manner but rather drawing up European wide legislation. That the quality o f projects and 
legislation deteriorated as the staff drawing it up were unable to focus on it ow ing to the ex-
cess bureaucracy should not be a surprise. A l though it is ironic that the organisation suppos-
edly creating most red tape was struggling to funct ion because o f it. Commission staf f are 
highly trained expert pol icy makers, regulatory entrepreneurs who respond quick ly to the 
needs and possibilities o f the environment in wh ich they work . They were, though, being ever 
more closely constrained by an inappropriate bureaucracy to the point that their work was be-
ing negatively affected. Overal l the last f ive years saw a centralization process occurr ing in 
the Commission and in individual DGs accompanied by a plethora o f controls; some DGs ha-
ve seen wel l over a hundred auditors and personnel staf f added to their staff lists and one o f f i -
cial stated he had maybe one check every so often before, and now he has over f ive teams o f 
auditors checking up on him.270 Attempting to control s taf f v ia more procedures brought lo-
wer management to a point where it was in danger o f collapse. 
To conclude the section on reforms it is wor th restating the two salient facts, f i rst ly that the 
Commission or rather elements in it resent and resist the reforms, and secondly that the re-
forms do not appear to be as neutral and objective as they might l ike to seem. This is not to 
deny that there are 'problems' in the organisation o f the Commission but that the reforms as 
implemented are not the solution and rather duck the real issues, a point which other authors 
l 
also stress, although they suggest different remedies. The Commission is too contradictory 
internally and pol i t ical ly charged to be reformed f rom wi th in , wi thout polit ics p lay ing a major 
role. It is part o f a contradictory external governmental environment which is equally po l i t i -
cally motivated. There are so many vested interests involved than any change to the E U or the 
Commission which does not represent a total overhaul o f both w i l l result in a pol i t ica l ly mot i -
vated game o f strategy and compromise. 
The reforms seem to be litt le more than another phase in the cycle o f the Commission vary ing 
between emphasising its role as: a policy manager; a pol icy maker; a c iv i l service bureauc-
racy; a proto federal government top level executive. In its dynamic phases the Commission 
266 Dimier. V Administrative Reform as Political Control Lessons from DG VIII, 1958-75 in Dimitrakopoulos.D. (ed) The 
Changing European Commission. (2004) Manchester, Manchester University Press 
p.80. 'This is why he opposed the extension of the EEC's development policy to the British Commonwealth.' 
567 ibid p.78 
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has lots o f loose network structures and personal contacts, and the staf f are highly motivated 
and cohesive, it behaves l ike a pol icy maker and federal executive. Then the opposite swings 
into effect, the networks are shorn back by reforms aimed at 'ef f ic iency and effectiveness,' 
and this seems to be deliberate and pol i t ica l ly motivated by those who see in the standard c iv i l 
service model for the organisation, an improvement o f their hand and who emphasise the ma-
nagerial aspects. That the reforms are accepted by more than just a few in the Commission 
reflects that there is a posit ive effect wh ich is that M S intervention, v ia their internal net-
works, is also reduced by the reforms. The t im ing o f the reforms is important as the problems 
they c la im to solve are constantly present and the reforms and bureaucratisation comes in wa-
ves. The resistance to the reforms is also a pol i t ical ly motivated act to support the network 
dynamic model o f the Commission, w i th its federal impl icat ions which often and r ight ly sees 
changes to this as not entirely neutral. I t is also resistance to a change in the status quo and 
perceived r ight way o f doing things and vested interests attached. Organical ly there seems to 
be an under ly ing trend w i th the shift in balance between the elites. There seems to be a cycle 
o f 'over ef fect ive ' networks in an 'over effect ive' and pol i t ica l Commission resulting in a 
change in the equi l ib r ium internal ly and externally, wh i ch at some point reverses as the losers 
strike back, using weapons that f ina l ly l im i t their advance as wel l . As w i l l be described more 
later the use o f bureaucratic r ig id i ty as a means o f the Commission protecting i tself from ex-
ternal inf luence seems to have been an organic defence mechanism. 
9.6 ENLARGEMENT AND THE COMMISSION 
W e have seen the main trends in the recent history o f the E U and Commission. Inevitably the-
se w i l l have had an effect on the enlargement as we l l as the enlargement exacerbating them. 
W e w i l l now move on to consider the negative effects that the problematic state o f the EU and 
the Commiss ion had on the enlargement. Hav ing completed this and so accrued a large body 
o f in format ion on the recent state o f the E U and Commission, above all including detailed ca-
se studies backed up by broader observable trends we w i l l return to a more purely theoretical 
perspective. W i t h the help o f Min tzberg and Hofstede we w i l l gain some more analytical in-
sights into the organization that is at the centre o f the immunizat ion process, the Commission. 
The f indings indicated in the chapters on the various DGs and the summary earlier in this 
chapter are pretty clear. The various DGs have been seen to have behaved in a fair ly mixed 
manner towards the N M S s . Usual ly the internal problems o f the various DGs which were 
mentioned by their o f f ic ia ls were mirrored in the complaints made by the NMSs. They obvi-
ously, as outsiders dependent on the DGs, were al l too aware o f the inefficiencies and disor-
ganisation wh ich existed. On ly one DG, D G E N V , came out pretty posit ively and that is pre-
sumably in part o w i n g to the environmental ministries in the N M S s , wh ich were tradit ionally 
weak, being grateful fo r the kudos they received f rom association w i t h the big brother in 
Brussels. The many fo l l ow ing comments are based on the interviews, mentioned before, car-
ried out w i t h N M S of f ic ia ls. 
The enlargement 'successful ly ' took place w i th in the Commission organisation but at a cost 
in terms o f delays, confusion and the inevitable frustration and disi l lusionment expressed by 
several o f the N M S of f ic ia ls interviewed. Much o f this could have been avoided, as it oc-
curred ow ing to the Commiss ion 's inabi l i ty to organise its considerable resources better. The 
combinat ion o f Commiss ion reform and reform o f some o f the key policies wi th the enlarge-
ment was intended to faci l i tate both reform and enlargement but maybe delayed the process 
considerably. A n organisation as confused and introspective as the Commission had become 
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was hardly free to dynamical ly concentrate on the enlargement. Some o f the internal reforms 
could have waited for the enlargement to be completed. 
The abil i ty o f DGs, or elements o f them, and Pol icy Networks l ink ing them w i th sectors to 
allegedly f ight reforms and any reorganization, drew the N M S s into major struggles wh ich 
they should have been kept out of. The C A P reforms were necessaiy and no doubt for the 
Commissioner concerned and the reformers the enlargement was a useful argument to back 
up their case for the urgency o f reform. But it also meant that those resisting reforms were, as 
a result, l ikely to resist the enlargement as wel l as the reforms, and to see the two as insepara-
ble. There seems to be enough indication that the N M S s did not benefit f rom this combina-
tion, at least not for the majori ty o f the enlargement process. The same can be said for the co-
hesion policy which saw the NMSs drawn into the struggle for reform o f the pol icy. The 
NMSs were seemingly negatively targeted by some o f the new procedures used when paying 
the funds. D G E N T and its weakness owing to the 2000 reorganization was seemingly un-
helpful for the enlargement. It might have been better to have been postponed the reorganiza-
tion as the NMSs had to struggle wi th some o f the results. W i th D G E N V the costs o f some o f 
the environmental legislation passed was and w i l l be considerable; the role o f networks in the 
promotion o f this environmental legislation is arguable but the resultant economic costs are 
clear.272More seemingly pol i t ical leadership by the Commission and better organized DGs 
could have worked out better legislation and condit ions for the enlargement. 
The vulnerabil i ty o f the enlargement process and the N M S s to the power o f the sectors in the 
EU was shown by the Europe Agreements ( E A ) which, whi ls t they occurred at the beginning 
o f the 1990s did set the tone for the future to an extent. Whi ls t the problem surrounding the 
EAs has been mentioned it is useful to consider this in more detail. The next three quotations 
make the problems the N M S s faced very clear: 
'Wi th in most member governments the foreign ministry was competing w i th ministries for 
industry and agriculture that were subjected to pressures f rom sectoral producer lobbies. The 
ability o f the sectoral logic to constrain a more pol i t ica l ly motivated agreement was greatly 
facilitated by the fragmentation o f the pol icy process, and the lack o f close oversight by the 
macro-policy-makers in the member governments. Defensive sectoral interests were able to 
insulate specific aspects o f the EAs from pol i t ical pressures for a more generous approach to 
the CEECs and to set the baseline o f what wou ld be on offer. As some o f those involved on 
the CEEC side were able to observe, as fast as they identi f ied issues on which they wanted to 
press for more open market access, they found that an E U based lobby had beaten them to the 
EU negotiators. 
4Fragmentation o f the pol icy process at the level o f detail made it easier for the meso-pol icy 
makers to insulate some o f the substantive pol icy issues f rom broader pol i t ical objectives and 
to prevent more far reaching moves to accommodate the concerns o f the CEECs.1 
'However, the forces o f divergence and fragmentation have also been present, especially 
when grand pol icy had to be turned into detailed implementation and on more technical is-
sues. Hence for example, the use o f commercial defence instruments has persisted, and peri-
odically the EU has taken inf lexible positions on the adjustments that the CEECs needed to 
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make to be a l lowed to develop their relationships w i th the EU. Thus we can also f ind plenty 
o f evidence o f incoherence and dysfunctionalit ies at the level o f detailed pol icy delivery'.275 
Furthermore, projects wh ich should have been performed for the benefit o f the NMSs were 
of ten delayed and f ina l ly underspent. The lessons wh ich the N M S s made o f their interactions 
w i th the E U and the Commiss ion in particular were, seemingly, o f a bureaucratic monol i th 
wh ich was hard to move and often issued contradictory instructions and itself took ages to 
reach decisions. The lack o f D G coordination and cooperation was hardly the picture that the 
E U wanted to present to the less than perfectly organized ministries in the NMSs. It wou ld 
have been useful had the Commission provided the effectiveness and efficiency that wou ld 
have made up for the deficits in the NMSs . A t t imes this occurred, and N M S off icials com-
pared the Commission favourably to their own, but al l too of ten this does not seem to have 
been the case. In certain f ields l ike Regional Af fa i rs the D G seems to have been problematic 
towards the N M S s even creating extra problematic rules and regulations where they were not 
legally required. Arguab ly the pressure that was applied to the N M S s to improve their 'ad-
ministrat ive capacity ' was geared to really make up for the DGs own weaknesses in that de-
partment that the D G i tsel f was all too aware of. Either way the image the NMSs had, seemed 
to be o f an imperfect instructor who fo l lowed the o ld adage o f 'do as I say not as I do' . 
The state o f N M S ministr ies and their permanent representatives in Brussels is salutary. In 
most o f these states the hurr ied growth o f the private economy was accompanied by a running 
down o f the ministr ies, result ing in badly paid staff. Many talented experts have allegedly left 
the c iv i l services for the private sector. There was said to be a split between an older genera-
t ion o f experts who spoke the national language and the younger generation who lacked ex-
pertise but spoke Engl ish. The older generation were said to be less posit ively oriented to the 
E U and more suspicious o f it and to disl ike the t ime it took to work w i th it. The role o f the 
pol i t ic ians in the N M S c iv i l servants was alleged to be too great and pol i t ical penetration into 
the ministr ies considerable. Some states l ike the Czech Republ ic had yet to pass the required 
laws to reform their c i v i l services. There seemed to be a problem o f coordination and coop-
eration between both ministr ies, and ministries and their associated permanent representatives 
in Brussels. Often the latter said that they fai led to receive instructions f rom their ministries 
on how to vote in the Counci l meetings and so either abstained or voted as they guessed they 
should. They said that the seeming ease w i th wh ich the Counc i l was functioning, despite con-
cerns expressed early in the enlargement process, was partly due to: the lack o f confidence o f 
the N M S s ; the lack o f proper routines and forms o f communicat ion and coordination between 
them and their national ministr ies, and so a lack o f the required sectoral expertise. On the 
who le the situation o f national ministries seemed to be rather grave w i th the few individuals 
who combined expertise w i t h language skil ls being snapped up by Brussels or private indus-
try. Thus, g iven such weaknesses the Commission and E U needed to be more united and co-
herent than ever. 
The effect o f the various stages o f the Commission vaccinat ion 'pathological ' cycle on the 
enlargement seem clear enough. The lack o f pol i t ical leadership fo l l ow ing the Delors period 
and the subsequent bureaucratic c lampdown had a negative effect on the enlargement process. 
The process also added to the extremes o f the cycle and helped make Commission problems 
visible. A l l too of ten the Commiss ion showed a lack o f independence f rom national issues 
combined w i th a decl ine in ef f ic iency. I t also seemed to have lost the abi l i ty to protect small 
states and instead put the bal l back into the Counci l large - M S - dominated sphere which was 
regrettable. 
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9.7 A MINTZBERG - HOFSTEDE DIAGNOSIS OF THE 
COMMISSION 
We hâve seen the fragmentary effects o f the Commission and its current state o f fragmenta-
tion and weakness on the EU. These effects coupled w i th those linked to the MSs" response to 
its dynamism are " pathological * and not helpful to the E l at least from a DP perspective. The 
Commission's behaviour and the MSs is logical i f their organisational survival and goals are 
taken into consideration. But i f there is more at stake than the Commission fu l f i l l ing its goal 
o f being at the heart o f a federal government or the MSs* goal o f preventing this happening 
then 'pathological" is the word to be used. Since warfare is no longer a real l ikel ihood in Wes-
tern Europe and Communism is pretty much a spent force, the need for the vaccination is less 
urgent now than in the past. From a Macrop&rasitism perspective is the cost o f the extra layer 
o f civil isation and government entailed by the E l ) bearable in the longer term, or does it need 
to be trimmed back as the dangers it was protecting f rom recede. Mas the inoculation been 
successful enough and the MSs are more than capable o f cooperating without the Commission 
and Monnet Method in its current form? The costs o f a continuation o f the current EU system 
wi th its MS - Commission antagonism are maybe simply too great now. What is at stake is 
DP; large amounts o f tax payer's money and economic prosperity. It is also arguable i f the 
economies o f the EU can really support the extra layer o f government and the legislation that 
it generates. The proof o f this being shown in the attempts to forcibly stop the generation o f 
more legislation from wi th in the Commission by the Commission itself, and the drive to re-
duce that which is already there. The excessive executive activity o f recent t imes has evi-
dently led to a vast accumulation o f technically correct legislation which is detrimental to 
business and thus citizens as w as seen in the chapter on DG ENT. But more on the rise o f the 
executive later* first let us al low Mintzberg's organizational theory to shed light on the Com-
mission to see just how 'pathological' it is f rom an organizational theory point o f v iew. 
9.7.1 MINTZBERG ON THE COMMISSION 
The theoretical 'pathological ' effects o f the Commission have been discussed, the word theo-
retical is stressed once again as "pathology' is defined as deviation from the theoretical ideal 
forms and norms traditionally held to. Logical ly, theoretical 'pathological ' effects as have 
been seen in the EU should proceed from a theoretically 'pathological ' organisation structure. 
In a sense all the 'or ig inal ' EU institutions took the form they did owing to the non-
democratic technocratic structure o f the High Author i ty - Commission. To establish the sheer 
extent o f the oddity o f the Commission f rom a theoretical perspective and to show it is a 'pa-
thological' version o f an organisation, Mintzberg's organisational theory w i l l be applied now. 
The theory offers a range o f organisational models and describes their attributes; the Commis-
sion fits into all the different models. To be a hybr id is not exceptional and hal f o f the organi-
sations reviewed by him were hybrids and were maybe a cross o f maybe two o f the five mod-
els. The Commission however seems more hybrid than the lot. 
For a start it is a blatantly polit ical organisation in itself, w i th the additional problem that o-
ther political organisations, the MSs, are active in its structure too. MS poli t ical influence is 
found via appointees and MS networks. The College and the 'services' down to Directors and 
even sometimes Heads o f Unit and Desk Off icer level, are poli t ical appointments and whi ls t 
avowing to be independent also show loyalties to their MSs. Not only that, but the Commis-
sion is divided internally into politically empowered off ic ials and groups often o f a specific 
national origins wi th their own agendas. The result seems to be Policy Networks which com-
bine: Commission, MS, Interest group and Policy Network concerns which often have a dis-
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t inct ly pol i t ical content. Wh i ls t this is not direct ly relevant f rom a Mintzberg perspective it is 
important to re-state some o f the points about the Commission. So to sum up, the Commission 
is a complex and div ided pol i t ical organization wh ich is also an administration. N o w onto the 
Min tzberg models. 
The def in i t ion o f the 'professional organisation' g iven by Mintzberg applies to Commission 
staff. When the detailed legislative work o f the Commission staf f is considered and their back 
grounds predominant ly in law and economics then the term professional seems appropriate. 
The Min tzberg def ini t ions fo l low: 
'Mos t important, the professional organisation relies for coordination on the standardization 
o f ski l ls, wh ich is achieved pr imar i ly through formal training. It hires duly trained specialists -
professionals - for the operating core, then gives them considerable control over their own 
work . Contro l over their work means that professionals work relatively independently o f their 
colleagues but closely w i t h the clients they serve, doctors treating their own patients and ac-
countants who maintain personal contact w i t h the companies they audit. ' And; 'Bu t no mat-
ter how standardized the knowledge and ski l ls, their complexi ty ensures that considerable dis-
cretion remains in their application. N o two professionals, no two surgeons or engineers or 
social workers ever apply them in exactly the same way . Many judgements are required.' 
Commission of f ic ia ls running a dossier are quick ly the experts in that area, more so than al-
most anyone else. They alone have all the experts to hand, in al l the MSs, and know all the 
facts that go into mak ing the European dimension o f that particular piece o f legislation or pol-
icy. Tradi t ional ly the Commission has al lowed them great leeway and much o f the of f ic ia l 's 
wo rk w i l l involve legislation. Heads o f Un i t served the role o f guidance and possessors o f ex-
pert knowledge through long years o f experience; they assisted the off icials rather than man-
aged them. Thus in practice of f ic ia ls held great responsibi l i ty and work alone wi th their Euro-
pean wide dossier network a lot o f the t ime. The compet i t ion for selection into the ranks o f 
the Commission, ensures that individuals o f the vety highest calibre are recruited. I t is debate-
able whether the of f ic ia ls enter the organisation as professionals in the fullest sense though as 
they are not as independent as the theory seems to indicate. The organizational imperative for 
the smooth funct ion ing o f such staff is that the structure should be ' . . . bureaucratic wi thout 
being centralized . . . the ski l ls o f those professionals can be perfected through standardized 
operating programs.'2 7 8These are stated to commonly be in ' . . . hospitals, universities and 
accounting f i rms. The professionals need to have a m in imum o f 'technostructure and middle-
l ine management. '2 7 9The in formal staf f structure o f the Commission contains most o f these 
aspects; Heads o f Un i t and Desk Off icers work ing alongside each other, or independently o f 
one another. 
Ye t the formal structure o f the Commission is h ighly bureaucratic and rigid, plagued by slow 
cumbersome bureaucratic procedures wh ich are antiquated. The machine bureaucracy in 
Min tzberg has the f o l l ow ing characteristics: 
' . . . h igh ly specialised, routine operating tasks; very formal ized communication throughout 
the organisation; large-size operating units; reliance on the functional basis for grouping 
tasks; relat ively centralized power for decision making; and an elaborate administrative struc-
ture w i th a sharp dist inct ion between line and staf f . '2 8 
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A glance at the Commission reveals that the 'very formal ized communicat ion, ' aspect o f the 
Mintzberg model is certainly present. The large units and highly specialised routine operating 
tasks cannot, in practice, be found in the Commission. The staf f are not making cars w i th one 
set action to perform; they have to perform a wide range o f actions. Decision making is made 
in the f inal sense by the top hierarchy and Commissioner, but in practice much o f the work 
and decisions are made lower down by the pol icy mak ing staff, and management plans are 
later modif ied around what the staff have actually done rather than the other way round. In 
terms o f the sharp dist inction between staff, it is a question o f def ining what this dist inct ion 
consists of. In terms o f work done and discretion in the generation o f legislation Heads o f l i -
nk and Desk Off icers have often done the same work . Directors are pol i t ical ly active and seen 
to be there to defend the DG and staff and to represent them wi th the other DGs. They also 
have the role o f accepting the legislation generated by their staff or not. But w i th regard to 
this last point often it is a question o f Directors accepting legislation and not deciding what is 
done in the D G as such. Whi ls t the 'machine bureaucracy' model states that ' the necessary 
knowledge is often at the bottom;'2 8 , the work wh ich is performed by off ic ials seems more 
than just this. Even the phrase ' implemented formulate . . . people who are naturally in touch 
wi th the specific situations at hand take individual ac t ions . . . '2 8 2st i l l cannot account for de-
tailed policy making which is done by lower level of f ic ials. The 'control mental i ty ' does seem 
to pervade the ethos behind the bureaucratic structure o f the Commission and there were signs 
o f it being strengthened. In a 'machine bureaucracy' there is supposed to be power and know-
ledge at the top o f the organisation; in the Commission, power is or was distributed more 
throughout the grades and knowledge held by the lower ranks, f rom Heads o f Un i t down-
wards. Besides this, a lot o f basic mechanisms for the hierarchy to hold their own were miss-
ing in the Commission whatever the formal structure. In formal ly , recruitment and promot ion 
were intransparent and often owed more to national networks than anything else. Staf f were 
and are, frequently able to circumvent the hierarchy as they are often the de facto boss o f the 
dossier and are at the centre o f Policy Networks wh ich involve M S off ic ials, MEPs other DGs 
and powerful interest groups. Pressure can be 'mobi l ised ' f rom outside the Commission to 
make the hierarchy decide in a certain manner. 
The 'machine bureaucracy model ' expects divisions according to functions l ike market ing 
managers f rom manufacturing managers and these divisions are created by them, each d iv i -
sion ' . . . must mirror the narrow specialization o f its operating core in its administrat ive 
structure . . ."each unit becomes jealous o f its own prerogatives and finds ways to protect it-
self against the pressure encroachments o f others." ' The problems wi th in DGs between the 
horizontal units and departments and their unwil l ingness to transfer staff f i t w i th this descrip-
tion. The moves by Prodi to make the Commission more 'machine bureaucracy'- l ike and 
closed, f i t w i th the defensive mentality just mentioned but on a bigger scale combined w i th 
the notion o f making the organisation more immune to external influence, in part icular the 
MSs and Policy Networks and so to revitalise it, wh ich Mintzberg also describes.285Machine 
bureaucracy is therefore a useful tool to achieve several ends. The actions o f Prodi also f i t 
wi th the fo l low ing observations: 
'Bu t i f mutual adjustment does not work in the administrative centre - generating more pol i t i -
cal heat than cooperative l ight - how does the machine organisation resolve its coordinat ion 
problems? Instinctively, it tries standardization, for example, by t ightening j o b descriptions or 
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prol i ferat ing rules. Bu t standardization is not suited to handl ing the nonroutine problems o f 
the administrat ive centre. Indeed it only aggravates them, undermining the influence o f the 
l ine managers and increasing the confl ict . So to reconcile these coordination problems, the 
machine organisation is left w i th only one coordinat ing mechanism, direct supervision f rom 
above. Specif ical ly, non-rout ine coordination problems between units are "bumped" up the 
l ine hierarchy unt i l they reach a common level o f supervision, often at the top o f the structure. 
The result can be excessive centralization o f p o w e r . . . ' 2 8 6 
The Commission has allegedly experienced an increased centralisation o f power internally 
and micro management by higher management usually the Director General level. Much o f 
this possibly done in obedience to the College's requirements in order to reduce MS influence 
and to try and coordinate the Commission better, but also probably to increase the power o f 
the Director Generals over their DGs. In addit ion, the vast increase in bureaucratic procedures 
and requirements absorbed increasing amounts o f t ime that Heads o f Unit and Desk Officers 
wou ld have normal ly used generating legislation and running projects. Thus 'machine bu-
reaucracy' tasks were substituted for pol icy making ones, as the Commission reverted to a 
more 'machine bureaucracy' form. 
Often, the Commission as a whole has been run l ike an entrepreneurial organisation as de-
f ined by Min tzberg and also units and staff w i th in it have behaved in this manner. The key 
element in this organisation is a chief executive; 'Power focuses on the chief executive, who 
exercises it personal ly. Formal controls are discouraged as a threat to that person's authority, 
as are pockets o f expertise. . . . '2 8 7The leadership is 'sometimes charismatic, autocratic/288 
and there should be among other things a sense o f mission; 'decision making is l ikewise f le-
x ib le, w i th a h igh ly centralized power system a l low ing for rapid response. The creation o f 
strategy is, o f course, the responsibi l i ty o f the ch ief executive, the process tending to be high-
ly intui t ive, of ten oriented to the aggressive search for opportunit ies. , 289The Delors period and 
the Hal lstein one before fa l l into this category w i th the Commission or elements o f it func-
t ion ing around the wishes o f the President. Delors, as the model states, was not a fan o f for-
mal controls wh i ch are expected to be 'discouraged as a threat to that person's 
author i ty . ' 2 9 0Delors found much o f the formal bureaucratic structure o f the Commission 
frustrat ing and s low and v ia cabinets and in formal ly created direct communication between 
himsel f , his cabinet and desk off ices, got things done but circumvented the rest o f the 
structure. M in tzberg 's def in i t ion is s imi lar to what Delors did: 
'when a ch ief executive . . . avoids or destroys the formal izat ion o f activity as an infringement 
on his or her r ight to rule by f iat, then an autocratic fo rm o f the entrepreneurial organization 
w i l l tend to appear . . . The structure thus becomes ef fect ively ( i f not formal ly) simple, as the 
normal powers o f exist ing groups-whether staf f analysts, l ine managers, or professional op-
erators, etc . . . w i t h their perhaps more standardized fo rm o f control - a re suspended to a l low 
the ch ie f to impose a new integrated vis ion through his or her personalized control. '292 
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One off ic ial stated that Delors 'broke the frame, '2 9 3meaning that he made Directors and even 
some Heads o f Uni t more pol i t ical ly acceptable to h imsel f and so ducked around the presence 
o f experts who defied him.294Leaders like this are, according to Mintzberg, said to arise in 
certain conditions and to fa l l later: 
' . . . . an organization . . , faces severe crisis . . . The leader may . . . attempt to effect an oper-
ating turnaround, or else re-conceive the basic product and service orientation, to achieve stra-
tegic turnaround. O f course, once the turnaround is realized, the organization may revert to its 
traditional operations and, in the bargain, spew out its entrepreneurial leader now v iewed as 
an impediment to its smooth funct ioning. '2 9 
Something similar happened w i th Delors who helped turn the fortunes o f the EU and Com-
mission around, but towards the end o f his period in o f f ice saw MSs want ing less o f his lead-
ership style. However it was the MSs that got r id o f Delors and Hallstein and not the organisa-
tion i tself The Commission, or elements o f it in direct contact w i th the President and his 
cabinet, often form an entrepreneurial organization wh ich exists side by side w i th the 'ma-
chine bureaucracy' formal structure. 
The use o f small groups wi th an effectively 'adhocracy' method o f management fits in w i t h 
yet another Mintzberg model, the ' innovative organisation.' The defini t ion runs as fo l lows: 
'Fluid, organic selectively decentralized . . . funct ional experts deployed in mul t id isc ip l inary 
teams o f staff, operators and managers to carry out innovative projects . . . coordination by 
mutual adjustment, encouraged by liaison personnel, integrating managers and matr ix struc-
ture.'296 
This model is useful in the context o f ' temporary and mammoth projects.' In the Commis-
sion, the use o f cabinets and small and often secretive work ing groups to achieve reforms to 
policies is common. The bigger the reform the smaller and more exclusive the group in-
volved. Something similar happens in the direction o f the respective DGs which reflects a 
general perception that seems to exist higher up the Commission that the 'services' are unre-
sponsive, large and cumbersome as a whole and the solution is to create small groups to cir-
cumvent it and so get things done. As even Cabinets were in general use, although unfortu-
nately allegedly dominated by M S appointments (so called ' l i t t le Counci ls ' ) , the use o f other 
working groups selected by the top ranks made sense; the organization was used to this 
method o f doing business. Commission units, often o f a mul t i discipl inary nature, were regu-
larly set up to achieve specific ends, l ike the enlargement units which were active in promot-
ing the enlargement process in their respective DGs. In some ways the statement that the staf f 
in an 'adhocracy' need to be trained and given special ski l ls on top o f those they j o i n the or-
ganisation, w i th seems to f i t Commission staff. Indeed when the sheer number o f DGs wh ich 
have been started f rom being a single unit created to serve a specific a market need and then 
developed into a DG are considered and the opportunist (posit ively meant) and innovat ive 
manner in which off ic ials act w i th in their highly complex institutional environment, then this 
model seems quite appropriate. Power in an 'adhocracy' is said to be: 
' . . . highly decentralised . , . That means that power over its decisions and actions is distr ib-
uted to various places and at various levels according to the needs o f the particular issue. In 
293 Interviews with Commission Officials; DG REG 10 
294 ibid 
295 See note 235 Mintzberg (1989) p. 120-121 
296 ibid p.!98 
297 ibid p. 198 
402 
effect, power f lows to wherever the relevant expertise happens to reside-atnong managers or 
specialists (or teams o f those) in the line structure, the staf f units and the operating core.'298 
Certainly the in formal power structure o f the Commission w i th the individual members o f 
staf f running pol icy dossiers and units being given a free hand to run the enlargement busi-
ness for the DG, show a degree o f decentralised power wh i ch is l ike this. The Mintzberg defi-
n i t ion continues; ' the need for tradit ional direct supervision is diminished, so managers derive 
their inf luence more f rom their expertise and interpersonal ski l ls than f rom formal position. 
A n d that means the dist inct ion between line and staf f b lurs. '2 9 9The relationship between 
Heads o f Un i t and staf f certainly was l ike this tradi t ional ly in the Commission. The role o f the 
top management seems to be simi lar too, as their main tasks are to liaise wi th the external en-
v i ronment and to ensure that more projects are for thcoming, and so keep the organisation in 
existence and also to manage the ' f l u i d work ing arrangements w i th power based on expertise, 
not author i ty, '3 0 0 The Directors also have to moni tor the project work done to ensure that it is 
done on t ime. DGs are alleged to have to generate legislation to jus t i fy their existence; their 
success was in the past measured on the quantity and qual i ty o f the legislation produced. Thus 
DGs and their s taf f are, in a sense, on the look out for more work and more possibilities to 
create new legislation as this is valued most h ighly in the Commission. The top management 
are alleged to represent the D G and to select f rom the proposals generated by the staff, those 
that f i t w i t h their interests and perception o f the D G ' s needs and prof i le and to make sure that 
it is promoted and gets the necessary resources. The 'adhocracy' model is stated to be found 
in 'environments that are both dynamic and complex. A dynamic environment, being unpre-
dictable, calls for organic structure; a complex one calls for decentralised structure. This con-
f igurat ion is the only type that provides both. l 3 0 ,The European pol icy making environment is 
usually both dynamic and complex w i th ever increasing numbers o f actors and procedures. 
What is part icular ly interesting in Mintzberg 's description o f the innovative organization is 
that: 
'A l t hough it is ideal ly suited for the one-of-a-kind project i t , the innovative configuration is 
not competent at do ing ordinary things. I t is designed for the extraordinary. The bureaucracies 
are all mass producers; they gain ef f ic iency through standardization. The adhocracy is a cus-
tom producer, unable to standardize and so be eff ic ient. I t gains effectiveness (innovation) at 
the price o f ef f ic iency. '3 0 2 
M u c h o f the wo rk done by of f ic ia ls is very much one o f f ; a piece o f legislation or pol icy de-
signed to f i t the specif ic problem needs detailed by the M S o f f i c ia l or stakeholder involved, or 
as also happens frequent ly, o f f ic ia ls see an opportunity to create a piece o f legislation to deal 
w i t h a disaster for example. Each piece o f legislation w i l l be l ike ly to affect different groups 
and inst i tut ional actors who w i l l maybe require additions and exemptions, in clause fo rm and 
word ing, to be made. Standardizing pol icy mak ing work , can only be done very carefully and 
require maybe that certain groups be included, or that s taf f receive training in wr i t ing water-
t ight legal texts otherwise it w i l l make the process inf lexib le. Managers are stated to be prime 
movers towards more rules in the organization but staf f get fed up. The fo l lowing Mintzberg 
def in i t ion matches the real i ty in the Commission; ' . . . confusion as to who their boss is, 
w h o m to impress to get promoted; a lack o f clar i ty in j o b definit ions, authority relationships, 
and lines o f communicat ion; and intense compet i t ion for resources, recognition and re-
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wards. ' 3 0 3 With in the Commiss ion 's in formal s ta f f structure, of f ic ia ls in po l i t ica l ly i m p c 
units enjoy special relationships to the Commiss ioner and cabinet which worr ies and an 
the hierarchy wh i ch feel circumvented. Staf f can use the many institutional actors ava i l a t 
do the same. Where promot ion is concerned, t radi t ional ly this has been a very o p a q u e 
and staf f are utterly unsure about who to impress, the standard methods o f p r o m o t i o n 
tainly d id not seem to apply. Under the current system the M S networks wh ich can i n f l i 
promotions remain, and the Director Generals, as w e l l as the Heads o f Un i t have a s; 
promot ion; s taf f f ind the system unpredictable. Job def ini t ions have been lack ing i i 
Commission leading to the request given to s ta f f a couple o f years ago that they s h o u l d 
out a j o b description to g ive to the management;304 i t should go in the reverse d i rec t ion . 1 
o f communicat ion are evidently problematic and authority relationships d i f f i cu l t w h e n 
have ' feudal r ights ' over their positions and some Heads o f Un i t share the same grade a s 
o f the s ta f f they assess. One o f the dangers o f the model , is that its ineff ic iency can annoy 
tomers and staf f get annoyed at the ambiguit ies. Certainly some o f this occurred in t h e < 
mission. 
The 'd ivers i f ied organisat ion' model can also be found in the Commission the d e f i n i t i o i 
lows; 'd iv is ions are created to serve distinct markets and are given control over the o p e r 
functions necessary to do so. '305The need o f the Commiss ion to serve specific s e c t o r 
their actors required the creation o f DGs wh ich serve these segments and are attuned t o 
special needs. The model requires that the div is ions and their managers be ' responsible f< 
performance o f their div is ions, they must have considerable a u t o n o m y . . . . '3 0 6 It also rec 
that there is a headquarters wh i ch . develops the overal l "corporate strategy" . . . an< 
ses down divis ions in order to change its por t fo l io . ' The headquarters also provides ser 
l ike a publ ic relations of f ice and legal counsel and is in control o f finances as a w h o l e , 
tainly the Commiss ion has a legal service, f inancial control as a whole and public r e k 
off icers. The Secretariat General attempts to coordinate the DGs and ensure some p e r l 
ance criteria are met. Wh i l s t it used to be strong; it has allegedly weakened but is n o w 
serting itself. I t also closes down, merges and creates DGs. The stronger the headquarte 
the model, the more 'machine bureaucracy' structured the divisions w i l l be. The mov< 
wards recentral iz ing the Commission taken under Prod i have seen bureaucratic c o n t r o l 
tended at every level. The fates o f D G E N V and D G S M E are relevant as both fe l l f o u l < 
Commissions desire to standardise itself; the former has become signi f icant ly less eco lc 
than it used to be and the latter was disbanded and absorbed in a b ig industry domina te ' 
ENT. Both the markets served by the DGs, the environmental and the SMEs have c o m p i 
about the unresponsiveness o f the Commission to their needs. Quite apart f rom this t h e 
dardization o f s ta f f w i th in the DGs to meet certain procedural requirements and to a c 
performance targets wh ich bear l i t t le relat ionship to a pol icy maker's work , letters ans^ 
w i th in a given t ime frame, or the number o f telephone calls made, are problematic. 
The last model that the Commission certainly has had traces o f over t ime, is that o f t h e 
sionaiy organisat ion' . The key element o f such an organizat ion is an ideology w h i c h c 
effect ive at shielding the organisation f rom external pressures and unites it at the s a m e 
The European ideology wh ich motivated the founders o f the Communi ty and M o n n e t i i 
t icular and the f o l l ow ing generations o f of f ic ia ls fits the b i l l wel l .3 0 8Unsurpr is ingly t h e < 
preneurial organisation fits reasonably closely w i th , or even complements the m i s s i 
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one.309 The problem is that this type o f organization is supposed to operate on a min imum o f 
rules and regulations, but this is not the case w i th the Commission. A l though what is interest-
ing is that as the ideological force and motivat ion o f staf f decreased, so the amount o f rules 
and procedures seems to have increased dramatical ly, although it is hard to say which came 
f irst . M a n y w i th in the Commiss ion seem to be motivated by the European ideal and seek to 
promote it where possible; 'The machine organisation buys the workers attention through im-
posed rules; the missionary organization captures the members hearts through shared val-
ues. ' 3 I 0 What the model stresses is that ideology and formal ized rules do not go wel l together 
and that ' f ledg l ing ideologies' can experience ' fo rmal rules imposed down a centralized hier-
archy o f author i ty ' as destructive.3 n F o r the 'd ivers i f ied organisation' the missions o f the va-
rious divis ions or in the Commission the sectors compete w i th the ideology. Whi lst this seems 
to be the case at t imes in the Commission w i th sector loyalt ies replacing those towards the 
more abstract European project, the two ideologies do seem to be potential ly combinable as 
one is abstract and maybe wants to promote a European dimension which can be added to 
want ing to support a sector; but the European ideology has to be dominant. The two organiza-
t ion models have the problem that of f ic ia ls consider themselves experts and specialists more 
than l inked to an ideology, however in the Commission this does not seem to be the case as 
the specialists are part o f a system whose mission and goals many believe in rather than free 
lancing professionals s imply brought together for a project. 
The role o f ideology, defined as fo l lows, is useful in c losing o f f an organisation; ' . . . an ide-
o logy is taken to mean a r ich system o f values and beliefs about an organisation, shared by its 
members, that distinguishes it f r om other organisations . . . the key feature o f such an ideol-
ogy is its un i f y ing power: i t ties the indiv idual to the organisation, generating an "esprit de 
corps" a "sense o f miss ion" in effect, an integration o f indiv idual and organisation goals that 
can produce synergy. '3 1 2 
When an environment becomes hosti le and or when external actors or sponsors start t ry ing to 
inf luence the organisation maybe by mot ivat ing groups w i th in it, then the organization may 
adopt r ig id 'machine bureaucracy' rules and procedures to ef fect ively close it o f f f rom exter-
nal interference313 and so restore some sense o f unity and control to and over its internal con-
f l icts.314 Or it can use ideology maybe v ia a charismatic leader.315Both can seal the organiza-
t ion o f f f rom external inf luence. The latter method pul led the Commission out o f the Euro-
sclerosis period o f the 1970s and early eighties and turned it back into a fair ly united dr iv ing 
force w i th a sense o f mission that essentially drove the MSs back. The 'machine bureaucracy' 
method then fo l lowed as MSs pressed back again; the ideological ly dominated organisation 
becoming machine bureaucratic.316The cycle was br ie f ly mentioned earlier, the Commission 
attempts to seal i tsel f o f f f r om 'external control . '3 1 7The Prodi Commission seemed to have 
wanted to combine al l the above to restore order, d imin ish M S influence and prepare the 
Commiss ion for a new burst o f action. But there was neither enough o f a new mission to reju-
venate the ideology, nor enough o f a charismatic leader. The ini t ia l use o f greater bureaucratic 
rules had the effect o f d imin ish ing the ideological mot ivat ion o f the staff even further. The 
MSs and maybe Europe as a whole, benefited f rom the less dynamic Commission, particu-
larly considering the pressures on the Union, but greater ideological motivat ion and idealism 
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wou ld have eased the enlargement process w h i c h seems to have disintegrated into a melee 
over technocratic details and miser ly payments w i t h each M S f ight ing for itself. Wh i ls t M S s 
have fought for their r ights at every enlargement th is has been more the case this time t han 
before and the U n i o n has rarely seemed less than the sum o f its parts. 
When an organisation becomes str icken by 'po l i t i cs , ' to use the Min tzberg term, then it is i n 
danger o f pu l l i ng apart; ' . . . means o f power technica l ly i l legi t imate, of ten in se l f interest, 
x 1 Q 
result ing in conf l ic t that pul ls indiv iduals or units apart. ' The growth in power by the sec-
toral DGs comes to m ind , and the Pol icy Networks . The s taf f concentrate less on their w o r k 
but rather more on f igh t ing against each other. The Commiss ion was very much div ided i n t o 
DGs, and a range o f groups more interested in f i gh t i ng each other than co-operating. W i t h i n 
DGs the struggle was also f ierce at times. A state o f ' po l i t i cs ' is a dangerous situation for a n 
organisation to be in and can mean its demise.319 Ideo logy can keep the internal forces f r o m 
pu l l ing apart and tone 'po l i t i cs ' down.3 2 0Usual ly th is has been the case in the Commiss ion , 
and its latency f o r internal pol i t ics and pu l l i ng apart was kept under control . But during i t s 
weak phases w i t h a less charismatic leader and ideology, 'po l i t i cs ' broke out and caused m a -
j o r problems. H i g h states o f pol i t ics can a l low fo r ma jor changes to occur in the organisat ion, 
and i f these are a l lowed and accepted as necessary then the organisation has chances o f s u r -
v iva l .321The Commiss ion is at one o f these moments current ly . 
9.7.2 MINTZBERG AND THE DGs 
Af te r consider ing the Commiss ion as a who le ; the log ica l corol lary fo l l ow ing the dictum t h a t 
the large is merely the smal l w r i t large should show the DGs, as the main organisational s u b 
units o f the Commiss ion, ref lect ing the larger Commiss ion situation. Thus consideration, on a 
case by case basis, o f the DGs w i l l now be performed. 
The 'machine bureaucracy' f i ts in part D G A G R I more than most o f the DGs. Certainly it i s 
said to be the most fo rma l o f the DGs and the most bureaucratic. But it does not have t h e 
'machine bureaucracy' trai t o f repeti t ive and standardized tasks. A lso knowledge is not k e p t 
at the top what w i t h the many alleged Pol icy Ne two rks and f ie fdoms run by Heads o f U n i t . 
That machine bureaucracies have compet i t ion between thei r units is one th ing; the insulated 
and isolated f ie fdoms o f D G A G R I ' s units goes way beyond this situation. Their compe t i t i on 
seemed to be more a imed at anyone who chal lenged thei r po l icy area and less at other u n i t s . 
There are tendencies pushing D G A G R I ; D G E N V and al l o f the DGs in the direct ion o f a c -
qu i r ing more o f the 'machine bureaucracy' characteristics, but these are tendencies and t h e 
real i ty on the ground is more complex and one o f m ixed M in tzberg models. 
The 'd ivers i f ied organisat ion' model can also be found, al l the DGs part icular ly, o w i n g to t h e 
decentralisation n o w have to, more than ever, p rov ide the typ ica l services o f the d i ve rs i f i ed 
organisation: legal and f inancia l services. Thei r headquarter funct ion has increased w i th t h e 
growth in hor izonta l units and the various personnel re forms w i th in DGs. That various u n i t s 
o f ten deal w i t h specif ic markets has always been the case, in part icular in D G A G R I and D G 
R E G I O . However , the autonomy o f the managers w i t h i n the DGs, i f the Heads o f Uni t a r e 
considered, has been weakened. Whi ls t the DGs were t ry ing to develop corporate strategies i t 
was st i l l the case that most o f the ini t iat ives or ig inated f r om the staff. That said, the inc reas ing 
strength o f the Di rectors General and the hor izontal uni ts have gone hand in hand w i th t h e 
increase in 'machine bureaucracy' elements in the 'd iv is ions ' as should be expected. But i f 
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this is the trend, as seems to be the case, it is far f rom complete and it is d i f f icu l t to see any o f 
the DGs as f i t t ing total ly w i t h i n this model at this stage. 
T w o DGs have elements wh ich f î t into the 'entrepreneurial organisation' as defined by M inz -
berg or to be precise units and staf f w i th in them have behaved in this manner. The key ele-
ment in this organisation is the personal, direct supervision o f a ch ief executive over an in-
formal , f lexib le organisation w i th few middle managers. There should be among other things 
a sense o f mission and a f lex ib le, very centralized, decision making system which enabled 
sw i f t and prompt responses. D G E N V showed remarkable entrepreneurial skills in particular 
under dynamic Commissioners in the nineties. The atmosphere was informal and mission ori-
ented. But what was noticeable was the power that individuals had, in particular the true en-
trepreneurs, the Heads o f Uni t . Again the Commission habit o f a l lowing fiefdoms to appear 
was shown in the DG. The chief executive role was l i teral ly devolved often to Heads o f Uni t , 
or a Commissioner wou ld set the general tone and leave the rest up to the dynamic entrepre-
neurs. That this was not what Min tzberg really expected in his model reflects the dif f icult ies 
o f analysing the DGs and Commission. D G REGIO had dynamic Commissioners in the past 
who empowered the s ta f f and drove the organisation on w i th a sense o f mission; organisa-
t ional in formal i ty and reasonably low staf f turnover were stressed to be typical and manage-
ment relaxed. 
The Min tzberg model o f the ' innovat ive organisation' f i t ted in particular DG E N V and DG 
ENT. Both had their organigrams changing fair ly regularly to take into account new projects 
wh i ch were of ten the result o f in i t iat ive being taken far down in the organisations and then 
incorporated into the formal management plans o f the DGs. The rapid increase in horizontal 
units in particular in these DGs reflects the pr ior absence o f effect ive 'machine bureaucracy' 
methods and stressed the h ighly decentralised and organic nature o f their structures which 
grew in l ine w i th the perceived opportunit ies in the regulatory environment. Units l ike the 
R E A C H Uni t in D G E N T and the Waste Uni t and others in D G E N V reflected the creation o f 
units to deal w i t h large projects. Other less dramatic projects were effected by smaller groups 
o f o f f ic ia ls detailed to complete them. These of f ic ia ls were either detached from their previ-
ous dossiers or d id the wo rk in addit ion to them. The entrepreneurial spir i t in D G E N V can be 
observed in the many directives that were the result o f open w indows o f opportunity as stated 
in the earlier chapter on the subject. The enlargement project l ikewise resulted in units dedi-
cated to the complet ion o f the mammoth project. D G A G R I and D G REGIO also had enlarge-
ment units set up for the purpose. 
However , the neat label l ing o f DGs is extremely d i f f i cu l t . Both D G E N T and D G E N V were 
being moved away f rom the innovat ive model and incorporat ing elements o f the 'machine 
bureaucracy. ' Wh i l s t greater coordinat ion was doubtless necessary in the DGs, and w i th in the 
Commiss ion as a whole , their management had become more top down and less that o f inte-
grat ing managers. The growth in horizontal units to integrate D G E N T for example went al-
legedly hand in hand w i t h increasing bureaucratic controls restr ict ing the sectoral units which 
had previously been very s imi lar to the ' innovat ive organisation.' N o w staff were being 
stripped f rom the sectoral units to man the horizontal ones. 
W h i c h leads to the last o f Min tzberg models the 'missionary organisation.' D G E N V in par-
t icular showed a strong adherence to ideological stances, both European and that o f the envi-
ronmental movement. The sheer scale o f the legislation generated by the D G is indicative o f 
their shared values and mot ivat ion.3 2 2The dismay and resistance at the increase in rules shown 
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by the staff323 indicates their comparative absence previously. D G REGIO was described as 
being a soft organisation almost fami ly l ike; the staf f o f this D G have promoted the European 
project extensively and M L G owes much o f its theoretical basis to their success. Indeed ideal-
ism and opt imism have been used to describe the management o f the D G and certainly when 
the DG was threatened by the Sapir report's recommendations, they pulled together as one to 
respond. However the spli t between the pol icy mak ing d iv is ion and the implement ing ones 
grew; and there seemed to be indications o f elements o f the D G being over swayed by other 
interests, 'external pressures,' than those o f the Commission. As wi th the other DGs more bu-
reaucracy and rules were being enforced in the DG. The danger o f over dependence on ideol-
ogy is that there are many shades o f grey and it is a question o f def ini t ion as to what is in the 
European project's best interests at any given point in t ime. A lso the loyalty to the o ld sup-
porters o f the project and an older vision o f it can be problematic for the present. Quite apart 
from this is the danger o f sectoral loyalty and ideology replacing European project idealism. 
Wi th in the organisational structure o f the DGs the horizontal units were said to be the most 
idealistic in terms o f the European ideal and also the more interested in grand projects and 
politics. Equally these units were said, by some, to be the most interested in extending bu-
reaucratic controls. The sectoral units had European idealism but also sectoral loyal ty; unsur-
prising considering their constant interactions w i th their sectors. The success o f the European 
project in terms o f legislation and integration show that usually European loyalty prevails and 
a min imum o f rule enforcement wi th in the DGs is necessary. However, w i th the decline in 
idealism and drive o f the project in the post Delors period, and the concentration on Mess but 
better' and more bureaucratic controls, the DGs also saw a decline in the strength o f idealism 
as a cohesive force w i th in their ranks, although there was a problem o f locating cause and ef-
fect. The centrifugal tendencies o f sectoral units was curbed by rules and this led to even less 
idealism in these units. Interestingly, though, the growth in more idealistic horizontal units, 
which first enforced bureaucratic measures for wh ich they were created, wou ld support the 
contention that there is f irst bureaucratisation in the Commission and then a g row ing idealism 
which then pervades the whole o f the organisation. 
The DGs investigated showed, on the whole, an in t r igu ing mixture o f the Mintzberg models, 
much like the Commission itself. Given that certain organisational types are better at achiev-
ing specific tasks logical ly there would be an expectation to see task and organisational type 
clearly related. Each o f the DGs had its own reasonably specific task: D G R E G I O and D G 
A G R I were largely paying DGs; DG E N T was a pol icy mak ing and governance gu id ing D G ; 
D G ENV was a typical pol icy making DG unt i l recently. A n d yet there was a clear mix ture o f 
organisational types in each o f the DGs and this is unusual. 
Unfortunately the various models would not work easily altogether in Mintzberg 's theory and 
they do not in the Commission. Some examples make this clear; the 'machine bureaucracy' 
elements are clearly wasting the potential o f 'adhocracy, ' 'professional ' organisational staff, 
who are professionals and policy-makers not standard bureaucrats. These off ic ials waste vast 
amounts o f t ime carrying out procedures rather than ensuring project quali ty. The 'mission-
ary' and 'entrepreneurial ' organisational adherents; the idealistic opportunist of f ic ia ls who 
have been so important for spil lover and engrenage have huge dif f icul t ies wi th the 'machine 
bureaucracy' organisation DG hierarchy which tries to control them.324 The 'machine bu-
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reaucracy' for its part has major problems w i th of f ic ia ls operat ing as i f they were in an 'entre-
preneurial ' or 'miss ionary ' organisation and leading units o f the DGs in such a manner to the 
detr iment and annoyance o f the hierarchy, as happened in D G E N V . The decline in idealism 
and the increase in 'machine bureaucracy' are clearly related in the Commission. A Delors 
w i t h a 'miss ionary ' and 'entrepreneurial ' organisational approach created major problems for 
the 'machine bureaucracy, ' and apparently tried to 'break ' elements o f it. The Cabinets are a 
fo rm o f 'adhocracy ' wh ich has openly competed w i t h the 'machine bureaucracy' and led to 
dupl icat ion o f tasks and great antagonism between the D G hierarchies and themselves. The 
DGs w i t h their 'd ivers i f ied ' organisation approach are pu l l i ng apart an organisation which 
was founded on 'miss ionary, ' ' innovat ive ' and 'entrepreneurial ' organisational elements and 
lacks the strong centre posited in the model. The end result o f all these conf l ict ing models is 
the fragmented Commiss ion o f the research; as its ideology declined so the level o f 'pol i t ics ' 
increased dramat ical ly. Ideology has often been the only th ing hold ing the organisation to-
gether and-or a strong leader, but neither o f those have been very evident recently. The con-
stant c i rcumvent ing o f rules and use o f ' i n fo rma l ' organisation management methods reflect 
the incompat ib i l i ty o f the various Commission elements. These have all played an important 
role in the surv ival o f the Commiss ion but are often h igh ly wasteful and destructive when 
combined as they are. I f the survival need could be removed then a far better organisation 
could easily be constructed. 
9.7.3 HOFSTEDE AND THE COMMISSION 
Hofstede makes the jus t i f ied step o f suggesting that Min tzberg 's data offers i tself to compari-
sons w i t h 'nat ional cul tural prof i les. ' App l y i ng Hofstede's Power Distance versus Uncer-
tainty Avo idance variables to the Min tzberg configurat ions resulted in some interesting re-
sults, The various countries score as fo l lows: U K style being close to that o f the 'adhocracy' 
w i t h L o w Uncertainty avoidance and L o w Power distance; France favoured the Mintzberg 
'machine bureaucracy' w i t h H i g h Power Distance and H i g h Uncertainty Avoidance; Germany 
combined H i g h Uncertainty Avoidance w i t h low Power Distance, and so f i t ted in w i th the 
'professional organisat ion, ' So the Commission and its m i x o f Mintzberg model types is 
probably also l inked to the many European national cultures involved in it. These have af-
fected it at various t imes w i t h the French - Mediterranean of f ic ia ls creating the 'machine bu-
reaucracy' elements and subsequently feel ing at ease when 'machine bureaucracy' elements 
predominate. The U K and many north European countries f i nd this method o f operating odd 
i f not autocratic, as was seen in the chapter section on reforms, and promoted the 'adhocracy' 
much to the displeasure and confusion o f their southern European colleagues. So t ry ing to 
mod i f y the Commiss ion to make it more l ike one o f the Min tzberg models and so less 'patho-
log ica l ' seems doomed to fa i l ; there w i l l always be an of fended national i ty, who w i l l feel 'a-
l ien ' to the organisation. The m i x o f Min tzberg models and Hofstede national profi les in the 
Commiss ion reflects, in part, the m ix o f nationalit ies in the E U and Commission which leaves 
the Commiss ion appearing to be a somewhat 'organic ' organisation. 
That said, Monne t ' s bureaucratic ideal, and the proto Commiss ion organisation he headed in 
the French bureaucracy was reasonably l ike the 'adhocracy - entrepreneurial' models so the 
nat ional i ty issue is less serious than it might seem. Monnet always wanted to keep national 
issues and methods o f do ing business away f rom the Commiss ion, I t was to be the exception 
that proved the rule. French bureaucracy, as a whole , behaved l ike a 'machine bureaucracy' 
but he was able to head a smal l organisation l ike an 'adhocracy - entrepreneurial' organisa-
325 Ross, G. Jacques Delors and European Integration, (1995) Cambridge, Polity Press p. 161 
326 Hofstede G, Culture and organizations; Software of the Mind. (1991) McGraw-Hill International UK Limited 
327 ibid p. 152 
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tional mix, Thus it was quite possible for Rational tendencies to be avoided i f the w i l l was the-
re, and i f the tasks o f the organisation were kept clear. T he organic mix in the High Author i ty-
Commission was somewhat art i f icial and unnecessary; it had a tendency to import national 
bureaucratic styles m h became more bureaucratic, and as MSs put pressure on it by de-
manded that quotas o f staff f rom MSs be recruited and that Commissioners be supported by 
Cabinets all o f the same nationality. Inevitably blocks o f nationalities were the result and 
strong nationality based networks in the Commission which reinforced the nationality issue. 
This was not what Monnet had wan ted Since his mode! had worked previously it could work 
for the E l ) but there would have to be a radical rethink about the allocation o f tasks, and the 
governmental environment in which the Commission operated, to enable Commission staff to 
return to top level priorit izing, and organizing and not pseudo ministerial governing. 
9,8 IMMUNISATION THEORY 
We now have the benefits o f Mintzberg and Hofstede who have shown us just how odd the 
Commission really is, They show that it is a benevolent "pathogen* which performed a highly 
specialised task effectively enough but as wi th al l "pathogens' they are hard to control and 
carry certain risks. Certainly the current state o f the E l i owes much to the immunization proc-
ess and the 'pathological* effect o f the Commission w i th its organisational goals and weak-
nesses. It is t ime to return to the general immunizat ion theory and the papal extension o f it to 
see what insights they can provide us with, 
9,8.1 IMMUNISATION THEORY REVISITED 
The first point is that the enlargement has had exactly the catalyst effect that i t was expected 
to have had. The severity o f the reforms was in part due to the enlargement and the effects 
were all the more visible. The enlargement forced changes in policy areas and so resistance to 
surface, which would otherwise not have been noticeable. The enlargement made unsatisfac-
tory organisational forms associated wi th the status quo in some policy areas simply unac-
ceptable and so revealed them. Indeed the enlargement seems to have been used by some to 
just i fy and force changes, reorganisations and reforms o f pol icy areas. The reactions o f N M S 
officials were a useful source o f insights into the Commission DCs. They were able to report 
on the downsides o f the organisation that they had seen all too clearly as outsiders very much 
dependent on it and the off icials on the inside. A t t imes the requirements that the Commission 
placed on the NMSs revealed the serious deficiencies in its own organisation. But above all 
the enlargement stress showed off icials at their most innovative and DCs at turning points in 
their histories. 
The thesis expected that the Commission would f ind i tself in an arrested state o f sectoral 
fragmentation in the absence o f polit ical dynamism, weakness o f idealism and decl ining sup-
port f rom the MSs. The backdrop o f a decline in 'European1 ideological commitment and ide-
alism has been seen to have occurred. That said it remains latent in the off ic ials and the 
Commission at al l levels. The decline in European idealism seems to have been matched and 
positioned to an extent against sectoral loyalty and idealism. The pattern o f European idealism 
succeeding in its first goals o f war prevention, but the weakening and fal l ing v ic t im to sector 
power began wi th the ECSC, wi th MSs ral ly ing behind their sectors and the ECSC finally fa-
ced by industry coalitions including MS governments which it failed to break. Idealism suc-
ceeded in blunting MS rivalry but not sectoral. The weakness o f the Prodi Commission was 
also apparently owing to weakness in ideology and sector strength, f inally the College even 
avoided formal voting. Political leadership seemingly naturally descended to the sectoral Pol-
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icy Networks and the Director Generals, the bureaucratic heads o f the DGs, whose power in-
creased accordingly. Often Pol icy Networks are based on the DG as a whole but not always. 
A lso power apparently accrued w i th the MSs dur ing the period o f Commission weakness. 
Sectoral fragmentat ion took place on a grand scale and the resultant problems o f the Commis-
sion and the E U as a result have been discussed. The lack o f Commission coordination and 
communicat ion, w i th DGs more concerned w i th in- f ight ing than creating coherent pol icy, 
grew after Delors, and almost al l those interviewed stressed that this has been a very serious 
problem and remains so. Furthermore sectors seemed to be increasingly fragmenting inter-
nal ly and the DGs l ikewise and allegedly the DGs were also a motive force in the fragmenta-
t ion. The Commission has been said to be increasingly more l ike a large collection o f organi-
sations than a monol i th ic organisation, and the interviews underscore this, but suggest that 
this is becoming signi f icant ly more pronounced, dangerously so. Some DGs seemed to be in-
creasingly split into war r ing parts, at times w i t h d i f ferent idealistic leanings and agendas, and 
also national origins. Pol icy Networks allegedly reinforced this div is ion o f the DGs into their 
elements and enable of f ic ia ls to practically construct their own organisation and so circum-
vent hierarchy. The Commission i tself increasingly succumbed to the division into sectors 
wh ich was useful in achieving the spil lover effect in the MSs. 
The MSs had responded to the over dynamic Commission as expected and forced the Com-
mission onto the defensive. The strong presence o f national groupings w i th in DGs was al-
leged to have occurred increasingly. Successfully, they appeared to have counter penetrated 
the Commission and encouraged its gradual dissolut ion or rather dissolving into its compo-
nent parts, its nationalit ies. For the Commission the balance between its supranational and in-
tergovernmental elements has always been tenuous and, as was argued earlier, the Commis-
sion has always had a certain intergovernmental character, but it became more pronounced. 
Pol icy Networks w i t h M S of f ic ia ls and other vested interests prominent w i th in them have 
helped to insulate certain pol icy areas and associated Commission off icials and sectors f rom 
reform o f anything but a superf icial sort. The C A P saw the Commissioner concerned alleg-
edly ef fect ively wo rk ing alone to outmanoeuvre the all iance o f MSs and large portions o f DG 
A G R J wh ich were bent on resisting change. The partial success that he f inal ly won revealed 
the alleged cont inuing strength o f the MSs, Pol icy Networks and associated Commission of f i -
cials. A n d it underl ined the danger o f them operating together alone to dictate pol icy. 
Wi thout leadership and ideology the Commission retreated back f rom its porous, mul t i sur-
faced self to become a more bureaucratic organisation although r igidi ty and defensiveness 
were not as effect ive as leadership and ideology in keeping it together, it had no choice. The 
Commission leadership responded to the arrested state o f their organisation and the growing 
evidence that it was fragment ing or rather dissolving, w i th a strengthening and mult ip l icat ion 
o f bureaucratic measures and reforms apparently aimed to insulate off icials f rom the MSs and 
vested interests and to a l low central control and coordination. I t also seemed less o f a threat to 
the MSs more o f an international bureaucracy than a proto federal government w i th ambi-
tions. Unsurpr is ingly the bureaucratic retreatism, in i t ia l ly at least, led to reform resistance and 
staf f frustration. A t the same t ime the reforms were patchi ly enforced and the Commission 
prepared for another outburst o f federalism by Prodi w i t h the attempt to make DGs more like 
national ministr ies and Commissioners l ike ministers. Prodi wanted to free off ic ials up to 
make pol icy again. The actual outburst came w i t h the creation o f a draft European Constitu-
t ion by the President alone wh ich surprised many w i th in the Commission quite apart f rom 
those outside, yet more evidence o f its mul t i organisational reality.329 
328 See note 263 Kassim (2004) p. 36 
329 See note 2 Kassim; Menon (2004) p. 101 
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EU and Commission fragmentation has resulted, w i th actors and procedures added at every 
E U level w i th increasing opacity, f rom the sovereignty stalemate that exists in the EU. T w o 
such extreme poles as the Commission and the MSs are unl ikely to be w i l l i ng to compromise 
and thus ever more actors and procedures are created to a l low some f lex ib i l i ty into the system 
since major reform seems nigh on impossible. L ike in the cold war, w i th the ideological im-
passe at the heart o f the system, reflected in a nuclear impasse, led to tension and skirmishes 
in outlying states w i th attempts at, or at least perceived attempts at, adopting and creating al-
lies and so encircl ing the opponent, the EU seems to function in a similar manner. Rather than 
set up a new simpl i f ied system, federal or not, neither side have proven w i l l i ng to compro-
mise on the issues at the core o f the EU, federal supranationalism or a more di luted affair. 
Complexity and opacity are the result. The Commission has been stated to have had not one 
person wi th a sense o f being responsible for something, surely a sign o f complexi ty and con-
fused lines o f responsibil ity and accountability rather than laziness or real personal irrespon-
sibil i ty .330The other EU institutions which contributed to this situation should be included in 
the responsibility problem; they certainly added to it and did l i t t le to resolve it. It took a sole 
individual to highl ight the problem and refuse to go away, to force the issue onto the table. 
Fundamentally the EU and the Commission i tself are unable to change their structures. A n d in 
both the effect o f structure and personnel on output is decisive, and poli t ical control f rom a-
bove minimal, it is simply hard for the hierarchy w i th l i t t le knowledge to dictate what the of-
ficials do in an organisation based on knowledge and expertise. Also there are simply too ma-
ny vested interests, foci o f power, and veto points, r ight through the EU to a l low major chan-
ges. Changes in pol icy direction, tone and content are often achieved in the Commission by 
placing, often using informal methods, staf f in key positions or by major disruptive reorgani-
sations o f staff. 
The High Author i ty - Commission have behaved l ike an inoculation, a mi ld disease infection. 
The defences o f the hosts were better prepared than might have been expected, and extremely 
quickly the DP institutions surrounded the new organisation. For a disease this wou ld have 
been a major b low, but for the deliberate inoculation it turned out to be positive, maybe not 
for the cause o f a federal Europe which possibly hoped for a crit ical mass to develop as spi l l -
over occurred to force a whole range o f federal institutions into being in a more favourable 
environment for them. The vaccine was intended to strive for and br ing about federalism and 
to that extent, by its own standards, it has so far fai led to achieve its federalism goal. 
The Commission, the vaccine 'pathological ' (deviat ing considerably f rom the norms) f rom 
organisational perspective, has been surprisingly successful in its dealings w i th the MSs, in 
part due to its alien form.331Its curious blend o f legal, bureaucratic, information based techno-
cratic and pol i t ical aspects all in one, have given it the edge in its dealings w i th the MSs wi th-
out actually destroying them.332 As an organisation it has been very successful and seen its 
competences, staf f numbers333and budget increase. Its abi l i ty to turn one o f its many aspects 
where it is strong to face the MSs where they are comparatively weaker, to either combat 
330 See note 15 Page (1997) p. 162 'The problem of identifying responsibility and generating accountability results more from 
the need to mobilize support from representatives of member states in diverse, but predominantly bureaucratic, arenas of 
decision making. While it is not possible for EU policies in reality to "emerge from nowhere" as Mazey and Richardson 
(quoted in McLaughlin and Jordan 1993: 129-30) put it, the fact that they may appear to underlines the special difficulties of 
identifying responsibility in Brussels.4 
331 Dinan, D. The Commission and the IGCs in Nugent, N (ed) At the heart of the Union, second edition, (2000) Basingstoke, 
Macmillan Press, 2000 p.269 
332 The Commission is at times: a policy making think tank, it is judicial and political in assessing the CEECs, police like to 
companies issuing fines, creates discusses and votes on legislation like legislature, typical ministry implementing policy in 
comitology, diplomatic corps in its dealings with MSs and other states, a political party pursuing its own ideological goals. A 
miniature government all in one. 
m See note 263 Kassim (2004) p.35 
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them or provide an a l lur ing compl imentary aspect to tempt them, has served it wel l . There are 
several examples o f where it has done this; to combat M S poli t icians w i th l imited mandates 
and t ime, the Commission can turn its bureaucratic strength o f longevity and organisational 
expertise and memory ; its legal posi t ion is helpful to MSs w h o can state that the Commission 
made them fo l l ow a course o f action and so circumvent national parliaments, vested interests 
and the publ ic ; its legal posit ion is attractive to M S of f ic ia ls want ing to pursue a project which 
is not supported pol i t ica l ly at home.334 
Its various governmental aspects have been very useful in the development o f the EU itself 
and its institutions. Its bureaucratic identity has, paradoxical ly, been crucial to the introduc-
t ion and development o f democracy in the EU. The apparent extremeness o f this faceless, un-
accountable bureaucracy drove DP and the MSs to race to catch up w i th the European project 
and to brake it.335This bureaucratic qual i ty o f the Commission constantly forces MSs to give 
power to the EP when the E U is expanded. Thus paradoxical ly the Commission's 'undemo-
crat ic ' nature helped g ive the E U the democratic identi ty it has.336The Commission has even 
used its 'bureaucrat ic ' identi ty to provoke legal responses. A f te r g iv ing U C L A F / O L A F , its 
anti- fraud agency, real powers to search premises the Commission then stated that it was only 
logical to provide a legal f ramework to contain the new organization and a new position o f 
European Prosecutor to use the f ramework. 
The relationship between host(s), here the MSs or E U pol i ty , and the disease is always cycl i -
cal. Commiss ion of f ic ia ls were allegedly aware o f the cycles o f centralisation and decentrali-
sation wh i ch took place in the Commission and in their DGs although they were more worr ied 
about the recent situation wh ich they stressed was more acute.337The Commission was seem-
ingly being fragmented internal ly ow ing to sector inf luence and Pol icy Networks. Rather l ike 
the unfortunate rat the 'carr ier ' o f the bubonic plague to human hosts wh ich was also infected 
by the pathogen and died as a result, so the Commission organisation seems to have become 
infected by the Monnet Method. The Method's technique can be summarised as fol lows: the 
breaking issues and governments down into manageable technical details and off icials; the 
placing o f sector interests above pol i t ical ones; the empowerment o f the innovative, expert 
o f f i c ia l ; the br ing ing together o f of f ic ia ls ow ing to their expertise and the holding o f pol i t i -
cians at arm's length or reducing them to mere fe l low network members; the championing o f 
small f lex ib le groups over large bureaucracies; the encouraging o f informal, egalitarian be-
haviour; the using o f an ideology to undermine and dissolve hierarchies whilst uni t ing the 
small groups and attracting new of f ic ia ls to it. Pol icy Networks seem to f i t the b i l l almost as 
neatly as the Commission, an unfortunate fact for the latter. I t wou ld seem logical to argue 
that so long as the fleas were content to feed o f f human blood and spread the pathogen 
amongst them the rats might be expected to have enjoyed some comparative peace, but once 
human hosts become less available then the rats alone w o u l d have to feed the flea. Sector 
fragmentat ion was always a possible danger for the Commission, but strong leadership; a dose 
o f ideal ism; pol i t ical power and constant expansion helped keep the Monnet Method con-
struct ively at work in the M S hosts. When MSs ef fect ively neutralised the idealism, pol i t ical 
334 Smith, M. The Commission made me do ii in Nugent, N (ed) At the heart of the Union, second edition, (2000) Basing-
stoke, Macmillan Press, 2000 p. 175 
335 Drake, H. The European Commission and the Politics of Legitimacy in the European Union in Nugent, N (ed) At the heart 
of the Union, second edition, (2000) Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 2000 
336 See note 105 Nugent (2000) p.29J. 'Over the years, these elitist arrangements have increasingly come to be seen as unsat-
isfactory. Pressures for reform have stemmed particularly from the growth of policy responsibilities at EC/EU level, and from 
perceptions of extensive powers being in the hands of appointed and unelected officials in the Commission on the one hand 
and indirectly elected politicians in the Council on the other (indirect in the sense that ministers in the Council attain their 
position via national, not European elections.' 
" 7 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG REG 10 and DG ENT 
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drive and expansion that kept the Monnet Method benef ic ial to the Commission and the pro-
ject, there was always the l ikel ihood that it wou ld turn on the Commission itself. 
L inked to the above was that whi ls t the sort o f organisation Monnet favoured wou ld be secure 
from his Method and could not really suffer f rom sectorisation; one that deviated f rom it 
could. Not just that, but it wou ld also be l iable for the other aspects o f bureaucratic disease 
like internal confl icts and lack o f coordination and strategic direction. As long as the organi-
sation kept moving, expanding and ideological, these wou ld be latent and there but weak, ho-
wever once the organisation slowed down then the symptoms would emerge in force; this is 
exactly what happened.338Unfortunately these are also constantly lurk ing in the E U wh ich of-
ten fo l lows the Commission's lead, or rather is direct ly affected by it. The Commiss ion has 
in a sense infected Western Europe wi th bureaucratic disorders where before there were po-
lit ical ones; sectoral competi t ion, lack o f coordinat ion and disintegration replacing the M S 
polit ical r ivalry. W i th in each D G or unit in it, the bureaucratic survival strategy o f strengthen-
ing and developing its own sector and thus guaranteeing a loyal cl ient support base (so for 
example for D G R E G I O small recipient states and regions make an ideal cl ient base) seems to 
have logically dominated the bureaucratic period that was observed. Unfortunately the only 
really helpful remedy for the various symptoms o f bureaucratic disease are clear lines o f re-
sponsibil ity and accountabil i ty340and democracy. 
9.8.2 EXECUTIVE POWER INCREASE 
It is impossible not to notice that the real loser in European integration has not been the MSs 
as such but rather democratic parliamentarianism. The real struggle has been between DP and 
the executive arm o f government; ministers and of f ic ia ls , although o f these the of f ic ia ls are 
the real winners. The whole M S versus Commission struggle seems to have been something 
l ike a red herring for what is really happening. Maybe there is a micro dialectic process much 
as there is w i th evolut ion and a macro one wh ich is between DP and bureaucracy. Or l ike the 
difference between long term climate change and short term weather fluctuations. Each micro 
stage o f MS-Commiss ion r ivalry fails to br ing the process to an end and the MSs are lured by 
the executive possibil it ies o f the project into further integrat ion wh ich they have proven to be 
both unwi l l ing and unable to permanently halt. The forces o f the executive have found many a 
possibility in the European project to cut pol i t ical costs and to decrease the DP controls over 
themselves. DP responsibil i ty has been stripped, to an extent, f rom the polit icians and the ex-
ecutive acting in the EU. They have been able to share in the Monnet dream o f experts ru l ing 
without pol i t ical restraints. They have become curious bureaucratic-poli t ician actors them-
selves rather l ike the Commissioners when they wo rk w i th the EU. The temptations o f power 
without accountabil ity seem to have proven too great for many. I t is the reform resistant Pol-
icy Network which is the model for the future at present and not a federal European govern-
ment. The EP is not able to provide a solution to this model as increases in the EP's powers 
unfortunately makes matters more complex and even less democratic. 
The creation o f each new governmental layer results in a theoretical b lock ing o f the Monnet 
Method by the Nat ion State's executive defence mechanism. However the sheer weight o f 
work combined w i th the tendencies already stated results in effect ive power devo lv ing to the 
off icials and the roles o f the off ic ials, ministers or Pr ime Ministers being fragmented. A t first 
338 Donelley, M and Ritchie, E. The College of Commissioners and their Cabinets in Edwards G (ed) The European Commis-
sion, (1997) Carlermill, London p. 45 Bureaucratic problems said to be internal conflicts, problems of coordination, lack of 
strategic direction. 
339 Peters 1992 p. 15 referred to see note 6 Mazey; Richardson (1997) p. 185 
340 See note 338 Donelley; Ritchie (1997) p.45 
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they appear to be in a perfect posi t ion to audit and carry out effect ive controls over legislation 
and so defend democrat ic pr inciples. The Counci l is of ten stated to be the democratic legisla-
tor w i t h a mandate. However the mandate is usually very much domestical ly oriented and ra-
rely l inked to the stances that the Counci l may take; fo r the E U level there is a mandate vac-
i * ' 
uum o f sorts. I t is i ronic considering how much 'domest ic ' legislation w i l l result f rom this 
vacuum. The execut ive and its members are drawn into the gears and so into behaving as 
members o f the European Un ion layer rather than defenders o f the Nat ion State; this is not a 
secret and is the goal o f the integration process. The possibi l i ty o f performing several roles al l 
at once wi thout one or more being downgraded seems Utopian. For pol i t ical players in rational 
choice theory, the ul t imate goal w i l l be personal and pol i t ica l power rather than constitutional 
responsibi l i ty as far as this is possible. Rational actors in the current system are l ikely to at-
tempt to secure and improve their o w n pol i t ical posit ions at home and in Europe by combin-
ing their roles to that end at whatever cost to the greater good. Tax payers are a notoriously 
diverse group, hard to un i f y , reward and gain loyal ty f r om domestical ly let alone in other 
countries. I t is better to reward small interest groups and constituencies on the cheap at the 
cost o f the European tax payer via Europe. Assist ing such groups increases a minist ry 's abil-
i ty to gain in format ion and per form its tasks w i t h a pleased domestic constituency o f fanners 
etc. This o f course also provides benefits for the minister concerned. So successful has this 
system proved for the executive arm o f the E U that i t resists any change to it unti l the very 
last possible moment when pol i t ical costs are f ina l ly too great. 
The impression that is g iven is one o f the executive increasing its power considerably;342 
much o f this increase devolves to the bureaucrats (COREPER) w h o do the work . The bureau-
crats appear to act of ten in harmony over the ' f o rma l ' divides, COREPER and the Commis-
sion and elude typ ica l controls on their behaviour. The we l l known t r ick to avoid taking re-
sponsibi l i ty is for the executive in the form o f the ministers o f the MSs to blame the Commis-
sion for the unpopular legislat ion or s imply problematic rules.343The Commission states 
r igh t ly , often enough, that i t was s imply doing what it was asked to do. The result is that c i t i -
zens treat both as responsible; no-one desires to accept accountabi l i ty thus all w i l l be held ac-
countable. In elections voters imp ly that national leaders as we l l as the Commission are re-
sponsible fo r their malaise and reject both whenever possible.344Reality shows that they are 
part ia l ly r ight, the Commiss ion is al l too happy to take on new tasks to extend Europe into 
new areas and national pol i t ic ians use the Commiss ion 's legal role to secure unpleasant, i f 
necessary, national goals. I n general, the bureaucrats o f the MSs and the E U are able to act 
almost w i thou t restraint and w i t h l ow legi t imacy.345The forces o f DP, in the form o f refer-
enda seem to oppose the E U , as it currently is. They seem to express a profound mistrust in its 
legi t imacy and as the 'u l t imate ' providers, at t imes, o f D P legi t imacy in MSs they should be 
341 See note 105 Nugent (2000) p.291 
342 Dinan, D (ed) Encyclopedia of (he European Union (2000) London, Lynne Rienner Publishers p.287 'empirical studies 
suggest that many European policies and practices-for example, the European Monetary System, European summitry (the 
European Council), and the weak role of the EP-were deliberately undertaken in such a way as to maintain and strengthen 
executive autonomy. 
343 See note 241 Smith (2000) p. 182 
344 See note 19 Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p.89. ' . . .yet falling public support for the EU as an institution may have been a 
consequence of the way in which the internal market was constructed in the post SEA period. While the internal market was 
(and remains) extremely broad as a sector, the representation of interests was often narrow and restricted in the frenzy to 
create „a Europe without frontiers". Although the EU embraced more „horizontal policy initiatives over time, many key deci-
sions after 1987 were taken in closed circles of ministers, officials and policy networks. Internal market directives were often 
transposed into national law using subordinate legislation which attracted little debate in parliaments or the press (Wallace 
and Young ,1996). One plausible explanation for declining public support for the EU, despite apparently solid support for the 
internal market, was that the 992 project at least promised benefits of one kind or another, for virtually all (in a way, for ex-
ample, that EMU never could). Decision making to construct the internal market, however, was often the domain or remarka-
bly few.1 
34 ibid p.256. 'As it is now, EU decision makers generally operate with both surprisingly wide discretion and predictably low 
legitimacy.' 
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accepted as correct DP reflex responses to the situation as it is, and not jus t a sign o f ignorant 
voters.346347 
To cope w i th the enlargement and EU complex i ty , Commission off ic ials w i l l and are, alleg-
edly doing more informal 'behind the scenes chair ing ' to ensure consensus pr ior to the vari-
ous committee meetings.348Inevitably more o f this chair ing w i l l probably take place in Policy 
Networks where complex procedures are kept to a m i n i m u m and where personal contacts lu-
bricate the processes. I ronical ly in these in formal networks the number o f actors who really 
make decisions are often said to be oddly few in number, whi ls t the same authors state that 
the EU allows unbelievably large numbers o f actors to formal ly seem to swarm over the pol-
icy making fieId.349Seemingly this results in the converse happening where real decision mak-
ing is concerned, the important actors w i th the real power get fewer and fewer.3 5 0The fo l l ow-
ing quotation is interesting; 'Bu t in judg ing the qual i ty o f pol icy, surely one important crite-
rion must always be how many actors have a voice in shaping it. We have been struck by how 
few actors sometimes shape, even, make important E U pol icy decis ions. , 3 5 ,Democrat ic po l icy 
making should empower a f ixed and sensible amount o f actors, w i th consti tut ional ly allocated 
competences and powers, w i th some l ike the parl iamentary opposit ion prov id ing a cr i t ical 
stance. Experts can be involved but not exclusively; unfortunately Policy Networks value 
technical detail and those who provide it very h igh ly . Inclusive democratic decision mak ing 
would therefore improve the quali ty. A possible explanation for the few actors is that Pol icy 
Networks can also exclude actors f rom the pol icy mak ing process. 
9.8.3 DEMOCRATIC ISSUES 
The promotion o f ' c i v i l society5 in the E U and by the Commission in particular should be dis-
cussed brief ly. I t seems to be offered as a sort o f alternative form o f democratic legi t imacy 
and this seems problematic; 'European level groups provide the remote central insti tut ions 
w i th a strategy to overcome the democratic def ic i t by put t ing them in touch w i t h grassroots 
opinion and the opportunity to s impl i fy their dialogue. '3 5 3and under a heading legi t imacy; 
'That said, there are pol i t ical forces actively engaged in the project to democratize the EU. 
The gl immer o f a European c iv i l society is discernable.*354This represents another spl i t t ing o f 
democratic actors, in this case the citizens and voters, into roles, and then w inn ing these ac-
tors over to be caught in the gears o f the Method wh ich w i l l result in the gradual g rowth o f a 
demos o f sorts. Whi ls t it is normal that w i th in MSs voters also support and are invo lved in 
various elements o f society as miners, church workers, trade unionists, there is not the sugges-
t ion that this addit ional membership detract f rom their democratic identity as cit izens. W i th 
corporatism there was the replacement o f vo t ing rights w i t h those o f interest representation; 
any tendency in that direction is democratical ly 'patholog ica l ' . Whi ls t it is not suggested here 
346 See note 19 Peterson; Bomberg (1999)p. 273 and p,256. 'More generally, "normalised" politics are precluded by the EU's 
vast number of procedures for decision making, reliance on backroom bargaining and blurred lines of accountability. The 
politics of the EU remain underdeveloped, and its democratic legitimacy weak.' 
See note 95 Shackleton; Peterson (2002) p.349. 'Moreover, the "permissive consensus" that allowed bold steps forward in 
European integration without public protest or even attention during most of the history of the EU is now gone. Citizens' 
sense of loyalty to the EU institutions is generally weak.,. Weak loyalties cannot be separated from increased institutional 
complexity. ...It might be comforting to pro Europeans, but almost certainly misguided to think that the response of Irish 
voters to the Treaty of Nice in the June 2001 referendum, where a majority rejected the treaty and a still larger number did 
not bother to turn out, was an aberration. Much needs to be done before the EU citizens truly identify with the institutions of 
the Union as "their own"' 
348 Interviews with Commission Officials: DG ENT 
349 See note 19 Peterson; Bomberg (1999) p.31 
350 ibid p. 89 
351 ibid p.272 
352 Benz(1995) referred to see note 142 Bfirzel (97/19) p.29 
353 See note 342 Dinan, (2000) p.291 
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that the Commission desires corporatism even the step towards equating a diminishing o f the 
democratic def ic i t w i t h the promot ion o f c iv i l society should be resisted. It seems doubtful 
that this wou ld be what Monnet wou ld have wanted in the long term. 
The E U as it stands leaves the observer w i th a rather undemocratic aftertaste: 
'Ou r tour d 'hor izon o f E U decision making may leave many readers thinking that the Union 
is not on ly democrat ical ly deficient, but also not very eff ic ient. Many o f its procedures seem 
undemocratic, indefensible or unsustainable (or al l three). The reader who draws this conclu-
sion might wish, however, to stop and consider how " y o u n g " the E U is as a pol i ty, and how 
recently it has been transformed f rom " a system essentially concerned wi th the administration 
o f things to one concerned w i th the governance o f people.'355 
These authors stress the youth o f the system as an excuse wh ich may or may not be an excuse 
for the current undemocrat ic reality o f it, but this reality does seem to demand a resolution; 
the next stage in the evolut ion that must now occur to make the E U f i t to govern people. A 
technocracy could handle ' th ings ' but the E U is increasingly affect ing people and a better al-
ternative is required. The same authors w ind up their conclusion by quite rightly quoting an 
expert wo rk ing in the E U system who makes the comparison o f a ' f unny ' EU system to the 
less funny system o f war it replaced.356The inoculat ion succeeded but is getting overly odd 
and ' f unny ' and begging for modi f icat ion. Basic controls on bureaucracy relate to merit and 
budgets, the first o f these has been notoriously absent in the Commission and the second is 
hard to use in practice. Other basic democratic controls over the growth o f bureaucracy men-
t ioned before are also missing and the growth o f executive bureaucratic power and output are 
the result. In a sense, though the ve iy heavily over-executive dominated EU, w i th its essential 
complex i ty and fragmentation, are creating the spi l lover cr i t ical mass that Monnet possibly 
hoped for to pressure for a comprehensive European federal democratic system. The natural 
over extension o f the executive wh ich the European project has provoked and al lowed for has 
generated an intolerable situation. The need for DP is more glar ing than ever, and the inade-
quacy o f the current system has rarely been more obvious. Certainly the voters in the refer-
enda are fu l l y aware o f this. The natural defenses to the executive need to be reinstalled. 
The thesis considers the E U and Commission to both have been effective and desirable; how-
ever it has also shown the increasing di f f icul t ies facing Europe o f a continuation o f the status 
quo. Part o f the problem is very much l inked to that o f the growth in executive power o f every 
description at every layer in Europe and that the Communi ty project has assisted this bui ld up. 
A p p l y i n g again the organic approach there is a sense that the Monnet Method has led to typi -
cal ly bureaucratic disorders spreading to the pol i t ical sphere in a manner which would not 
have been possible in a Nat ion State, or only in a modi f ied form. Sectorisation exists in MSs, 
but there is at least the possibi l i ty o f it being challenged by the centralisation procedures o f 
cabinet government and DP in parliaments, where MPs have to attempt to represent the vul -
nerable non lobbyist voters. Monnet , by targeting the Coal and Steel sectors, set the tone o f 
p lacing sector interests above pol i t ical ones and this continues. There is l i t t le that the present 
E U and MSs can do in the face o f this tendency wh ich affects their own cabinets and has al-
lowed them and national parl iaments to be outmanoeuvred by we l l organised sectors, related 
ministers, of f ic ia ls and vested interests. The rise o f the Pol icy Network , partly as a result o f 
Commission - M S deadlock, is an example o f the Commiss ion and E U becoming prey to what 
has become an unintended infect ion. 
355 See note 19 Peterson; Bomberg (1999)p.275 
356 McDonagh 1998:17 quoted see note 19 Peterson; Bömberg (1999) p.275 
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I f MSs are, as M L G literature often seems to stress, themselves becoming more mu l t i layered 
and divided, and no longer monoliths then it is undoubtedly in no small part ow ing to the type 
o f Commission and mult i layered EU which has set the pace. Whi ls t this Europe can be good 
for various lobbyists and organised groups it seems the average tax payer and voter, who was 
protected under the DP systems which had evolved and been fought for in MSs over the cen-
turies, is rather very vulnerable. Indeed the voters and E U citizens seem to have received a lot 
o f economic promises f rom the EU which have not been fu l f i l led ; they were told that schemes 
like the Single Market and the Euro would generate jobs and growth but s imply have not; e-
conomic stability is there but not a lot else. 5 7The alleged fragmentation o f the Commission 
and the EU; the growth in the executive; and the generation o f excessive and badly coordi-
nated bureaucratic - legislative output need to be restrained and reined in for the sake o f DP 
and the citizen. 
Whilst the organic comparisons and analogies discussed w i l l inevitably be, to an extent, 
bound by the old adage omnis comparatio claudicat, they are also extremely helpful . But now 
* Afi to the next stage, the Papal Model . 
9.9. PAPAL MODEL REVISTED 
Having laid out an organic analysis o f E U evolut ion and stressed the need for a change the 
question obviously arises, what w i l l happen i f changes are not made? And are they l ikely to 
be made? Unfortunately the answer using a work ing model w i l l be shown to be negative, un-
less the EU can shake o f f its historic evolution. That the medieval Papacy would be expected 
to show some similarit ies to the E U was stated in the theory. N o w that the reader is fami l iar 
w i th the E U it is t ime to elaborate on the similarit ies it shares w i th the medieval Papacy and to 
make clear the warnings that the comparison reveals. The text w i l l show how the Monarchs, 
l ike the MSs, the first l ine o f defence o f the medieval national bodies pol i t ic, became very 
much part o f the European Papal system and ensured that it was executive dominated. The DP 
reaction in its most f inal o f forms was resisted w i th disastrous consequences. But f irst to the 
Papacy as the system begins to break down. 
The most fu l ly developed stage in the medieval governmental system was found after the A -
vignon Papacy period which began 1309 where centralisation and governmental growth rea-
ched its heights. Soon afterwards fragmentation set in w i th a vengeance as w i l l be seen. It is 
interesting that the same sort o f thing has been said about the Commission recently; 'The 
^ ^ A 
Commission's combination o f over centralisation and fragmentation.1 The Great Schism, 
(1378-1417) and the related Church Councils capture the interaction o f the pol i t ical forces o f 
the medieval period in organisational form. To summarise the Schism the fo l l ow ing can be 
said. Basically the Emperor called the first Church Counci l o f the Schism to contain and solve 
the problem and the Church Counci l summoned the disput ing Popes and related Cardinals to 
attend it. The Popes claimed their sovereignty rights and rejected the right o f the Counci l and 
Emperor to decide over them. The Cardinals were spli t in their loyalties but were determined 
to l imit the power o f Popes in general and they were strongly l inked to secular regional au-
thorities which they often represented. The bishops and Monarchs were div ided about the 
Popes' claims and generally supported the Church Counci ls where they were either present or 
represented. The Monarchs were keen to take any opportuni ty to t r im back the Papacy as a 
357 The Economist p.38. 29.04.06 
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whole but they also recognised that their interests were best served by a viable i f weakened 
Papacy. This is the impasse w i t h wh ich the medieval Papacy f inal ly drew to a close. Some-
th ing s imi lar had existed when the Reform Papacy began the period o f Papal Monarchy. In 
the period between, the balance o f the opposing forces shifted to and fro, Popes de-
stroyed/weakened Monarchs (Emperor Frederick I I , and f ina l ly Emperor Henry I V ) and Mon-
archs destroyed/weakened Popes (Gregory V I I , Boniface V I I I ) . On the whole a form o f 
stalemate equi l ib r ium was present. 
Whi ls t the crises and confl icts make for interesting reading, basically the Monarchs wanted a 
Papacy wh ich provided the tools o f government and dip lomacy which were so desperately 
lacking but they d id not want to lose effect ive sovereignty. They were grudgingly w i l l i ng to 
pay l ip service to Papal hegemony in certain l imi ted spheres but not in their domestic affairs. 
The Popes were welcome to assist them in these when invi ted and so long as it was in the in-
terests o f the Monarchs but not otherwise. Thus attempts by the Popes to demand too much 
sovereignty and-or to interfere in domestic matters were generally f i rmly resisted and success-
fu l l y so. The Monarchs wanted the benefits o f a funct ioning Papacy but not the polit ical costs 
wh i ch is not so very di f ferent to the E U integration process. The fo l low ing quotations about 
the Papacy and the Monarchs shows jus t how close they came to be over time. Together they 
formed a massive 'execut ive ' power structure and whi ls t both were dependent on each other, 
both showed suspicion and competitiveness towards the other as far as was possible wi thout 
threatening the system as whole. Even MSs l ike the U K show opposit ion to the Commission 
and E U but do not threaten its survival ; the executives o f the MSs are too happily bound into 
the E U to contemplate a radical overhaul. A l though this is exactly what is required: 
'The sol idar i ty between the secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies, which became closer as the 
threats f rom below became more peri lous, is the most important factor in the exterior history 
o f the medieval church dur ing its last two centuries. Most secular rulers made some gains at 
the expense o f the clergy - at the expense, that is to say, o f what in previous centuries would 
have been called " the l iberty o f the church" - but they recognised that they could not go too 
far w i thout undermin ing their o w n posit ion. This explains w h y the Engl ish government, for 
example, encouraged anti-Papal legislation in detail, but drew back f rom a more general at-
tack and especially f rom anything w i t h a subversive tendency. K i n g and aristocracy became 
the ch ie f supporters o f conservatism in the church. '3 6 0 
When Popes or Commiss ion t r ied to c la im pol i t ical symbols o f of f ice that normally belonged 
to the national leaders and tr ied to impinge on important national issues and vested interests 
l ike the C A P then crisis loomed and compromise resulted. In formal ly , Popes and Monarchs 
l ike the Commiss ion and the MSs were often developing closer contacts and supporting each 
other. This is what happened w i t h Emperor Henry I V and Pope Gregory V I I before the latter 
threatened the Emperor 's power fu l vested interest, the imper ia l bishops. This is much l ike 
Hal ls te in d id w i t h the French fa rming lobby and de Gaulle. 6 IHal ls te in was very aware o f the 
importance o f the C A P for France and de Gaulle (29% o f the population in 1949-50 were 
invo lved in farming, many o f these wou ld have been catholic conservative voters) and seemed 
to want to use this as a lever to achieve majori ty vo t ing and EEC power. The trouble was and 
is that the new organisations 'on the b lock ' as the Americans wou ld put it, wanted pol i t ical 
power too in order to achieve their ends and tr ied for it again and again. The f inal decline in 
conf l ic t between the Monarchs and the Popes was due to some changes in the system. We are 
to ld that the major i ty o f Schisms happened in the f i rst hundred or so years o f the church; their 
360 Southern R. W. Western Society and the Church in The Middle Ages, (1985) Harmonsworth, Penguin Books Ltd p.51-52 
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decline coincided w i th the emergence o f a properly organised College o f Cardinals363and the 
growing governmental sel f suff iciency and confidence o f the Monarchs. A lso the Popes be-
came steadily more concerned wi th running the Papal States and general mundane govern-
mental business and less wi th grand pol i t ical enterprises.364Gradually Papal business in-
creased but not Papal power.365 
The fragmentation o f the pr imi t ive unity o f the Pre Reform Papacy wor ld, dominated as it was 
by Monarchical forces and Monarchical leadership o f the Church, into a new Papal Church 
sphere governing certain aspects o f l i fe in the whole o f Christendom, and a secular Monarch i -
cal wor ld control l ing the rest on a national basis, resulted in a range o f new ' authorit ies'366 that 
could flourish in the new environment. A specialisation o f tasks in all o f the medieval actors 
then took place. The Agreement at Worms in the twe l f th centuiy between the Empire and the 
Popes, which effectively al lowed churchmen to work for the Monarchs in their administra-
tions whilst owing spiritual loyalty to the Popes, set the tenor for the future. The new govern-
mental balance and its inherent tensions, rifts and cleavages al lowed and encouraged large 
numbers o f lawyers and off ic ials to enunciate on the differences and elaborate on the sparse 
legal fabric, furnishing it wi th ever more detail, c lar i ty and sophistication for a wh i le but f i -
nally leading to complexi ty and confusion. This state o f affairs had much to of fer the M o n -
archs and church for a whi le, in terms o f governmental and legal density. Fundamental as-
pects o f government l ike taxation, organisation and pol icy making were developed and f ine-
tuned during this period. However, the Monarchs had gained many o f the governmental ski l ls 
they had previously lacked. Domestically unity had been achieved often w i th the assistance o f 
Papal and church resources, and the Monarchs were in a sense able to be independent. A stea-
dy build up o f secular governmental resources and ideology had taken place wh ich made ab-
solutism possible. 
The irony is that gradually the teacher o f the Monarchs, the Popes, had become less o f a tea-
cher, wi th the abi l i ty to discipline pol i t ical ly, and more o f a competitor on their level wh i ls t 
the Pupil Monarchs had learnt the lessons o f the Popes we l l enough to set themselves up as 
'min i Popes,' f rom a governmental perspective w i th in their borders, as div inely appointed 
Monarchs. The old Imperial ideology had been revived and modernised, thanks largely to the 
Papal government. Domestical ly they did not need the Popes any more, certainly not on a po-
lit ical level. Popes and the Curia had become increasingly pol i t ical ly malleable by the M o n -
archs and secular authorities. The overall trend was that at f irst many c iv i l servants retained 
their clerical of f ice and t i t le but now under the authority o f the Monarchs, and Papal suprem-
acy claims became more and more a facade. Over t ime even for c iv i l servants, clerical status 
was stripped away as the church became a rel igious organisation and the c iv i l servants secular 
or rather obedient servants o f the new religious authority the div ine Kings or the g lor i f ied sta-
te. 
Reform and accountabil i ty were stubbornly resisted by both Popes and the Commission (sup-
ported it must be said by the MSs /Monarchs). The Popes wished to keep their absolute power 
no matter what the cost and what fragmentation this resulted in and the Monarchs seem to ha-
ve been interested in maintaining Papal effectiveness even at the cost o f reform. The Great 
Church Councils which could maybe have brought about a pretty democratic ( for those t imes) 
parliament for Europe, were first and foremost concerned w i th power and institutions and not 
the underlying malaise in Christendom caused by Church taxes, Canon law complexi ty and 
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the general confusion and excessive output o f 'Papal ' goods: excommunication, indulgences, 
canon law, etc. This excess production had led to inf lat ion and a devaluing o f these 'goods'. 
Real church power had become greatly centralised and governmental-executive growth was 
incredible in terms o f armies o f we l l educated c i v i l servants o f kings and Popes,367Indeed 
many considered that there was a secular executive conspiracy going on. Papacy and Mon-
archs were considered by many hand in glove and; 'secular motives were everywhere upper-
• i /h 
most and everywhere prevai led. ' Executive power was on the up as its resources grew enor-
mously and the dif ference between the pol i t ical actors in the face o f this steady executive 
power increase seemed negl igible.3 7 0 
The o ld struggle w i th the Monarchs had continued over the centuries since Pope Gregory 
V I I ' s Papal supremacy claims had been made and it is stated that the Papacy had lasted as 
long as it had done ow ing to the College o f Cardinals ref lect ing the wor ld ly poli t ical forces o f 
the times and part icular ly dur ing the election a l lowing these a deciding roIe.37*But this deli-
cate balance and weav ing o f various interests together to fo rm a common whole, more or less 
acceptable to all, was unravel l ing. The central role o f the Papacy as bringer o f government, 
order and prosperity and peace had been steadily undermined as Monarchs happily accrued 
the governmental resources they needed to run their countries more eff iciently and to under-
mine their aristocratic opponents. Papal taxation and church benefices had been steadily taken 
over by Monarchs for their own personal interests. Levels o f taxation had occurred which 
wou ld have been utterly unacceptable had the Monarchs tr ied to force them through them-
selves. Popes had accepted this as part o f the impl ic i t bargain for their clerical supremacy. In-
creasingly though the Monarchs were becoming aware that they could happily use the Papal 
system to their o w n advantage; ' . . . there were already signs that the Papal system o f gov-
ernment was beginning to produce its own anti-bodies . . . Conspicuous among them was the 
secular ruler operat ing for his own ends w i th in the Papal system.' Monarchs were good at 
ensuring that top churchmen, presumably Cardinals were their choice, and f inal ly they could 
enjoy all the benefits o f governmental resources wi thout the pol i t ical problems o f an increas-
ingly ineffectual partisan Cur ia wh ich ironical ly had lost its value as it lost its independence; a 
result also o f the Monarchs deliberate interference in it. 
Over elaboration, random - informal delegation, complex i ty , fragmentation and lack o f unity 
and coherence were the f ina l trends wh ich broke apart the uni ty o f Christendom. It is said that 
the sheer amount o f canonical and now secular legislat ion was suffocating: 
' A l l forms o f government had grown rapidly in the last two centuries, and in many areas o f 
government a degree o f complex i ty had been achieved that had a suffocating effect on the 
conduct o f business. Var ious causes contributed to this result. I n the first place, the ease wi th 
wh i ch an army o f o f f ic ia ls could be maintained on ecclesiastical endowments had encouraged 
the expansion o f government beyond the l imi ts o f effect ive action . . . Ar is ing f rom this, the 
tendency for jud ic ia l business to become increasingly complicated created a need for more 
of f ic ia ls, who in turn created more work . The Papal government suffered f rom all these symp-
toms o f over elaboration. '373 
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The example o f two important Papal instruments; the excommunication and the issuing o f 
forgiveness from sins in the form o f indulgences, sort o f influential and lucrative medieval 
church 'sectors'' to use modern parlance, show that both were vastly over used and had lost 
value; 'Another sinister feature o f the documents o f 1244 were the indications that excommu-
* A 
nication had been overplayed and was losing effectiveness/ ' The issuing o f indulgences had 
started out as the right o f the Pope alone, owing to his plenitude o f power, finally though the 
right to issue them was possessed by confessors* and seemingly local churches. The whole 
process was one o f issuing authority fragmentation and then over use; 'The propensity to car-
ry every innovation to its l imits and to elaborate every conceivable detail was ful ly satisfied in 
these developments. There were remissions at the hour o f death; remissions for a single dan-
ger o f death « . . ' ^ A m u s i n g l y enough the Pope ended up suffering from the fragmentation o f 
the system and had to compete wi th lots o f local church authorities in offer ing remissions o f 
sins in connection with jub i lees/^Wh&t had started out as a positive development of fer ing 
solace to many in fear o f eternal punishment became a farce : 
' Thus the Papal activity was associated wi th hope, confidence, and control. But after 1300 
there began a process o f over-elaboration and confusion, not indeed caused by any special 
moral or intellectual failure on the part o f the Popes, but by the relentless pressure on every 
side to drive the system to its l imit , in the process, the hope o f the earlier period became dim, 
the confidence was shaken by confusion and f inal ly d o u b t . , , , 3 T 7 
Re-organisation and bureaucratic efficiency rather than necessary radical reform resulted from 
the various crises o f the Papacy. The final arrangement o f the Council o f Trent in the six-
teenth century merely confirmed the process o f bureaucratisation that had been continuing 
steadily for the last few Popes although the position o f the Cardinals at the head o f congrega-
tions (Papal ministries) reflected a marginal improvement in their position when compared the 
period immediately preceding the crisis o f the reformation. 
The fragmentation o f the Curia and Christendom, which it could be argued had resulted from 
the excessive size and centralising tendencies o f the Av ignon Papacy, had led to ad hoc, de 
facto, power devolution, wi th Cardinals and others acting in the Pope's name and logically 
without accepting the responsibilities that would have and should have been attached to this 
use o f power. The result was seemingly uncoordinated eff iciency wi th the Papal mission and 
unity ignored, and corruption and alienation o f the institutions from the masses. These indi-
viduals and many lower levels o f the clergy faced ever more effective taxation and saw that 
their representation was diminished with clerical prebends being increasingly handled l ike 
goods, and some rich individuals holding many and cashing the tithes without doing a thing 
for their f lock. The flocks were getting fed up wi th being fleeced particularly given that they 
were increasingly religiously articulate. The similarities o f the above with the current situa-
tion in the EU should be readily apparent in terms o f excessive amounts o f legislation and bu-
reaucratic efficiency combined wi th excessive complexity, elaboration and fragmentation na-
tionally and sectorally rather than radical reform. 
Wi th the Church Councils o f Constance and Basle there was a very real possibility that a radi-
cal reform o f the church and Papacy could have been effected. There was a constitutional 
window o f opportunity which Monarchs had agreed to and the many representatives o f the 
church arid secular powers could have broken free o f their conservative predispositions and 
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agreed the necessary changes. Had this happened, Christians, defined in the poli t ical manner 
o f the medieval period, wou ld have achieved representation in a parliamentary setting, which 
wou ld have held great legi t imacy and credibi l i ty . Monarchs wou ld have been absorbed into 
this new consti tut ional set up, as important members but not the only ones. Small countries 
and regions wou ld probably have retained more independence w i th in this structure headed by 
a benevolent Papacy. A f te r all countries l ike England and others had played the card o f be-
coming Papal f i fes successfully enough before in order to retain territorial integrity . ^ U n f o r -
tunately no agreement was reached and changes were not made. The fragmentation o f Chris-
tendom into Monarch led national churches and countries resulted f rom the over elaboration 
and complexi ty o f the system clogged as it was w i t h empowered actors and procedures. The 
Papacy lost its sense o f mission and became l ike jus t another country concerned w i th secular 
matters. The Schism represented the last great opportuni ty that the European Papacy had to 
recover its in i t ia l mission v ia a radical demos creating act; creating a pretty democratic par-
l iamentary government for Europe. The irony is that the essential losses o f sovereignty had 
already taken place and that the main actors Cardinals and Popes were f ight ing for what they 
had already lost. The trends were for Monarchical power and national churches. The Popes 
and Cardinals had together alienated too many for too long to be able to recover their position 
alone. 
Monarchs and MSs shared/share their problematic relationship to their nationals in the supra-
national organization in question; on the one hand they want them to be neutral but on the o-
ther there is a great temptat ion to try and w i n unfair advantages by way o f them. In the 
Schism, the Monarchs were on the one hand, in i t ia l ly at least, unwi l l i ng to openly support the 
Cardinals when they appealed for their support. The reasons given were quite clear, that Mon-
archs were not interested in a fragmented Curia. O f course not, the power system o f that pe-
r iod was bui l t around the Papal Cur ia and it was an essential element in the foreign and do-
mestic pol icy concerns and considerations o f the Monarchs and regional powers. A major up-
heaval in the church could have had negative effects on their own power; the revolutionary 
tendencies o f their populat ions were becoming al l too clear in the aftermath o f the plague. 
A n d yet they equally saw the advantages o f securing as much national influence over the Cu-
r ia as possible Cardinals obviously included. Monarchs increasingly browbeat, dominated or 
tr ied to dominate the Popes.379The French K i n g seemed to have hoped that he could reinstall 
the Papacy back in A v i g n o n and secure a French Pope who wou ld reflect French interests mo-
re than the new Pope seemed to have done. 
Cardinals, of ten w i th regional loyalties and networks, acted increasingly and unoff ic ia l ly to 
further these rather than to pursue universalist, o f f i c ia l goals. Weak pol i t ical leadership saw 
power devolve downwards to them and away f rom the Pope. The great Schism was ini t ial ly 
more about inst i tut ional power and wealth than anything else and it certainly had nothing 
much to do w i th re forming the church. Cardinals each had areas o f competence and also seem 
to have had close, too close in fact, l inks to certain secular regions and related powers and no 
doubt church authorit ies. The exchange o f money and patronage v ia simony (the purchase o f 
church posit ions) seems to have been the norm as allegations o f corruption, over closeness to 
regional powers were made against the Cardinals. Thei r generally arrogant behaviour towards 
the then newly elected Pope seems to reflect their perceived sense o f importance and power. 
There are statements that some o f their number had quite deliberately abused their positions 
for personal aggrandisement; the French-Engl ish war was said to have been deliberately pro-
longed by the Cardinal concerned to a l low h im to keep accruing wealth and no doubt a posi-
t ion o f importance as the mediator in this conf l ic t . Thei r loyal ty was seemingly more inf lu-
378 See note 360 Southern (1985) p.148 
379 ibid p. 154 
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enced by their l inks to various regions and wealth generation than it was any concept o f the 
universal church. There is a sense that they were more than ever want ing to compete w i th 
their noble cousins in the aristocracy for power. In fact their main desire was to keep or in-
crease the positions o f power that they had i l legal ly bui l t up during the Av ignon period, and 
to institute an oligarchy and to remove the Monarchical unity o f the Papacy that had been 
there before. This is a situation similar to that wh ich Min tzberg described when an organisa-
tion becomes stricken by 'pol i t ics, ' then it is in danger o f pu l l ing apart;4 . . . means o f power 
technically i l legit imate, often in self interest, result ing in conf l ic t that pulls individuals or 
units apart. ,380They were even prepared to risk the universal unity o f the church by appealing 
to Monarchs for their support against the Pope. Before there had been splits between Cardi-
nals leading to Schism about religious issues, this however was purely to do w i th inst i tut ional 
power. 
The second issue o f the Schism was also nothing to do w i th reform or rather only indirect ly 
related to it. The issue was where the wealth and patronage o f the Papacy should be situated; 
in Avignon or in Rome. The Roman population and Ital ian Cardinals wanted the c rumbl ing 
churches and city to receive a boost by having the f lows o f church wealth redirected through 
it again. Not surprisingly the French Cardinals were more in favour o f staying near their we l l 
established power bases and networks in Av ignon. They had the wealth o f the church we l l 
under control there and plenty o f connections and were closer to their secular regional power 
bases. The numbers o f French Cardinals had increased considerably during the t ime in A v i -
gnon and the French networks seem to have f lourished and plenty o f wealth exchanged hands 
between the Monarch and the church. Thus the Papacy increasingly split along national and 
regional lines wi th blocks o f Cardinals representing these. The fo l low ing quotation reflects 
this and the importance that this had for the western church: 
' I t was only w i th the growth o f national blocks among the Cardinals in the fourteenth century 
that the system o f election established in 1179 proved inadequate to the task o f hold ing the 
western church together. The renewed period o f schism f rom 1378-1417 foreshadowed the 
national divisions o f the reformation. '381 
The Papacy lost its supranationality de facto whatever the appearance o f unity that remained. 
The Church Councils w i th their vot ing in nationes conf i rmed the new reality o f a universal 
church increasingly th inking in terms o f nations and countries rather than as any universal city 
o f God. Whi lst it is true that Cardinals and even Popes seem at times to have sti l l thought in 
terms o f the universal church the perceptions o f many o f the Monarchs o f the period were qui-
te clear; the Papacy had become a too French thing; ' In England they had a saying, "The Pope 
has become French and Jesus Engl ish. '"3 8 2 This scepticism o f Papal independence and uni-
versalism came to be l inked to the logical corol lary that it was impotent to resist a powerfu l 
Monarch as happened w i th Boniface V I I I . Real power resided w i th Monarchs and no longer 
wi th the church. There are signs that this perception was shared by clerical hierarchies wh ich 
came to see themselves as better served by Monarchs than by the Pope.383The Papal Cur ia be-
came a good place for Monarchs and their representatives to do business,384which indeed 
years o f channelling resources into had made inevitable, but it was no longer the power cen-
tre. 
3*üSee note 235 Mintzberg ( 1989) p. 237 
381 See note 360 Southern ( 1985) p. 156 
382 Tuchman, B. A Distant Mirror the Calamitous M'h Century ( 1978). New York, Ballantine Books p.250 
383 See note 360 Southern (1985) p. 135 
384 ibid p. 133 
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The international system o f the medieval period saw terr i tor ial and matching governmental 
changes. T w o curious developments seemingly result ing f rom the presence o f the Papacy. 
The f i rst was that previous uni ty o f the Empire gave way to a new situation owing to the Pa-
pal - Imper ia l r iva l ry ; ' I n Germany, I taly and Poland the opposite was happening: power was 
^ r t f i _ _ 
being devolved f rom the centre to princes, communes, and duchies.' The second was that 
Nat ion States were being developed f rom the weak Monarchies o f England and France a-
mongst others. The answer as to why some larger units were fo rming whist others fragmented 
lies in part in the attitude o f the Papacy to them and theirs to the Papacy, The Popes had been 
f ixated on the Empire as the secular power wor th competing w i th ; England and France were 
even encouraged by the Popes to support them in their wars w i th the Emperor. England and 
France were in a better posit ion to quiet ly take over their church based government bureauc-
racies, no doubt w i th tacit Papal acceptance, to support their statehood ambitions more than 
the Empi re wh ich had too openly opposed the Papacy. Lat in Christendom had greatly ex-
Q j" 
panded to cover most o f Europe and parts o f the M idd le East too. There was a 'network o f 
parochial control spread throughout Christendom' 387 and expanded Papal government to 
match it. The number o f more or less independent secular authorities had expanded and whi lst 
this number wou ld be mod i f ied by 1500 it was st i l l considerable, Christendom had effectively 
enlarged internally and external ly. The pressure had mounted f rom the Av ignon period for 
Cardinals to have more governmental say part icularly g iven their g rowing l ink to secular au-
thorit ies. A f te r the Church Counci l period several things became noticeable, ever larger num-
bers o f Cardinals,388and greater inequalities between them depending on their secular spon-
sors. The l inks between secular powers and Cardinals became ever closer and more explicit, 
as rulers expected and wanted Cardinals to represent them. The increase in the number o f 
Cardinals is due to several factors but one o f the most important was the Papal desire to sat-
isfy secular Monarchs ' requirements.389There was fragmentat ion and growth in Cardinal fac-
tions and networks,3 9 0which can be summed up in the f o l l ow ing quotation: 
' . . . exacerbated the tendency o f the Sacred College to fragment into networks o f clientage 
wh ich modi f ied the tradit ional dynamics o f its internal factions. Fed by numerous benefices 
wh i ch could not be conferred or redistributed wi thout the permission o f local sovereigns, the 
networks that criss crossed the sacred College l ike spider's webs tended to look outside Rome 
for support, to the great ones o f the earth. And i t was in the interest o f all these great ones to 
spend money in order to penetrate the ever shi f t ing factions amongst the Cardinals, seeking 
101 
thereby to inf luence the pol icies o f the Roman Church and Papal elections.' 
The end o f this development resulted in sovereigns really having considerable control over 
' the highest ranks o f the church, ' and also 'Papal central ism.' More powerful rulers had 
385 Morris, C. Papal Monarchy (1991) Oxford, Clarendon Press p.550 
386 ibid p.580 
387 ibid p.580 
388 peiiegrin^ m. lA turning point in the history of the factional system in the sacred college: the power of the pope and car-
dinals in the age of Alexander VI \ in G. Signorotto and M.A. Visceglia (eds.), Court and Politics in Papal Rome, M92-I700, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.24. 'Weakened by an enlargement which reduced each individual's share in 
the division of incomes and benefices, and further weakened by a policy of promotions that was entirely alien to its corporate 
interests, the Sacred College suffered from an ever increasing internal imbalance.' 
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secular sovereigns, especially Italian ones. This was a practice which, by opening the doors of the Sacred College to an im-
portant nucleus of Cardinal princes, diminished the spiritual authority of the Cardinalite as a whole and aggravated the ten-
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more Cardinals and provided them wi th more wealth to fo rm alliances to get things done.3 9 4At 
the same t ime that secular rulers increased their presence via the Cardinals and o f course as 
the number o f Cardinals made them less viable as a governmental organ so the Pope increased 
bureaucratisation processes in the rest o f the Curial organisation and introduced innovations 
which circumvented the unwieldy Cardinalate.395 
The enlargement o f the EU saw the numbers o f Commissioners increased steadily. Further-
more EU policy making has been increasingly inf luenced by fragmentation and DGs compet-
ing for various resources. The tendency o f pol icy f ields to be dominated by Policy Networks 
has also become seemingly clearer. The same goes for the pressure on the Commission to re-
form and its decision to bureaucratise. There are o f course plenty o f differences between the 
medieval period and that o f the research but the incidence o f these common factors is interest-
ing. In particular since the result o f the Papal organisational developments and lack o f major 
constitutional reform was the reformation and split in Christendom. A warning that i f the 
enlarged EU fails to change constitutionally then in the short term Commissioners w i l l f o rm 
alliances; new bureaucratic mechanisms may be sought to get around their excess numbers; 
Policy Networks may we l l become even more dominant and the Commission f ind that, as 
Monnet feared it might, that it is strongly influenced by MS actors in sectoral Policy Net-
works. Finally there is the possibil ity that a crisis o f faith in European supranationalism could 
fo l low much as we saw wi th the European Consti tut ion and result in its rejection on a grander 
scale than ever, and-or that the mul t i speed Un ion w i l l result in regions spl i t t ing of f . 
Both Papacy and EU assisted in the transition f rom one governmental system and related 
structures to another. The Papacy acted like an inoculat ion for the medieval wor ld and as sta-
ted under the theory chapter also improved the medieval economy; modif ied secular depreda-
tions and tried to reduce the internal warfare that plagued Christendom. Wi th increased trade, 
more economic activity and Papal governmental ski l ls came greater taxation possibil it ies al-
lowing for more employment o f off icials work ing for K ings and Popes and so more and at 
first better government. The Papacy was in fact too good at breaking down previous structures 
and missed the opportunity o f heading the mass o f new states that emerged f rom the Empire 
and o f course the new Nat ion States l ike France and England. It had the possibil i ty o f heading 
a loosely structured European governmental organization wh ich might have held the whole 
together and even over t ime formed a stable European government wi th l imited competences. 
Instead it chose to try to maintain its claims to supremacy made during the Reform Papacy 
and to refuse reform and reorganization and chose bureaucratic tools and centralisation. It re-
jected the moderate form o f democratic parl iamentarianism that could be seen in the Church 
Councils. 
It was successful at its outset ow ing to it serving the purposes o f the bishops and others in the 
church who were desperate for a new system wh ich was free o f war and which weakened se-
cular predations and dominance. The bishops and other clergy were the major vested interest 
which allowed the claims o f the Reform Papacy to have some chance o f success. The ton ing 
down o f the strident claims o f Pope Gregory V I I a l lowed Monarchs to quietly f ind a work ing 
relationship wi th the Papacy. It was only once both the clergy and the Monarchs found that 
they could get along perfectly we l l without the Papacy that it was in real trouble. A l ienat ion 
o f both lower clergy and a more articulate populace did the rest combined w i th obvious impo-
tency, excessive costs and corruption. In an environment stricken by fragmentation, u l t imately 
splitt ing geographically, pol i t ical ly and in terms o f rel ig ion and its role; the Papacy fai led to 
See note 392 Guarini» E. (2002) p.58 
w See note 388 Pellegrini, (2002) p.25 
3V5 ibid p.22. 'The extension of the Papal datary's bureaucratic functions during the pontificate of Alexander VI 
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reform and was back staged. The force that had helped unite Christendom and medieval 'Eu-
rope' f ina l ly achieved the opposite. 
The ECSC and EEC were successful at the beginning because they were respectively seen as 
a lesser evi l for the MSs to the danger o f other MSs in terms o f war. As long as the MSs were 
obsessed w i th f igh t ing each other and stuck in the tradit ional approach to seeing things then 
the Commiss ion was safe, an al ly, a useful construct to serve M S interests. MS mutual mis-
trust was the root o f Commiss ion success. But as soon as it was active pol i t ical ly and claim-
ing symbols o f state then the problems emerged for it. I t was recognised as a MS competi-
tor and dealt w i t h pol i t ica l ly as such by de Gaulle, much as f inal ly the German Emperor did 
to Pope Gregory V I when he employed mi l i tary means to hunt h im out o f Rome. A t f irst the 
ECSC and EEC served the interests o f various groups, inc luding the MSs, who saw opportu-
nities for themse!ves.397The loss o f Episcopal support for the Papacy helped weaken it and 
f inal ly br ing down the Papal Monarch. The g row ing antagonism towards the Commission 
shown by its tradit ional allies France and The Netherlands ( in the 1992 referendum and for 
the latter in a fa l l ing turnout for the 1994 European election3 8quite apart f rom the recent Eu-
ropean Const i tut ion crisis) and the apparent be l ie f amongst some MSs that the Commission is 
no longer necessary bodes i l l for the project.3 9 9Maybe the MSs really have changed enough, 
learnt enough not to need a neutral, objective Commission anymore, maybe that is what they 
th ink. That said what fo l lows seems to cast doubt on the MSs abi l i ty to go it alone. There are 
even disturbing signs that opposit ion to the Commission is becoming more usual; the opposi-
t ion to it shown by the service sector industries affected by the planned legislation in that f ield 
and the recent 'outbreak o f economic national ism' in relation to the energy sector, in fact the 
basic four freedoms, its foundations seem to have come under attack.400These setbacks com-
bined w i th reductions in the E U budget, curbs being placed on legislation generation and the 
promot ion o f other means o f regulation are serious b lows to the Commission, maybe more so 
than the constitut ional debacle. I f the Commission and E U fo l l ow the Papal model and simply 
increase bureaucracy and continue the cycle o f str i fe l ike the MSs and Popes did, then f inal ly 
the result may we l l be a spli t o f the EU. It wou ld be another missed opportunity. 
One f inal point is that both Commission and Papacy came in w i th reform movements aimed 
at the removal o f negative secuIar-MS activit ies, c la iming the moral high ground and the nec-
essary independence to stay there. They offered the solut ion to vested interests be they sec-
toral ones or Episcopal, aristocratic ones. However , over t ime the Papacy slackened and re-
laxed its dr ive against the secular authorities and vested interests and instead behaved l ike one 
itself. Much the same seems to have happened to the Commission which has over t ime come 
to protect vested interests in the areas o f CAP , SF and in terms o f the sectors. It f ights to resist 
reform, as its DGs f ight and resist Commission reforms, and refuses to even consider changes 
to its perspective on governance, as the recent governance whi te paper showed.401 There is 
also considerably more M S involvement in its organisation and the E U as a whole. There is a 
real sense that the Commiss ion is gradually losing its independence and being seen to do this. 
Newcomers to the system l ike the N M S s were faced by sectoral actors deciding pol icy rather 
3 % See note 335 Drake (2000) p.247 
397 Ziegler, D. War Peace and International Politics fourth edition. 1987 Boston, Little, Brown and Company, p. 386 
m See note 13 Edwards: Spence (1997) p.4 
399 Peterson, J. The College of Commissoners. in Shackleton M and Peterson J (ed.); The Institutions of the European Union, 
(2002) Oxford, Oxford University Press p. 92. 'At times, it appeared that EU governments no longer believed there was a 
need for a strong Commission which could act as an independent, honest broker between national interests.* 
400 The Economist 27.05.06 p. 22 ,This means, above all, safeguarding the single market and is competition rules. A nasty 
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than E U pol i t ical authorities and the Commission w i t h regard to European Agreements and in 
other areas too. Maybe it is t ime for the Commission to change and so avoid the Papal fate o f 
becoming a force for conservatism rather than reform, and f inal ly a play th ing for K ings or 
where the Commission is concerned, the MSs. These are all too happy to dodge reforms and 
remain in power; their legit imacy is not as fragi le and dependent on independence, perceived 
objectivi ty, reforming idealism and zeal. 
The medieval papacy during its heights o f power expanded its control over the church and 
Christians to an extent that wou ld have been unheard o f in earlier days. The EU is gradually 
expanding to include governmental areas wh ich wou ld have been considered clearly pol i t ical 
before and requir ing the assent o f the national parl iament w i th its simpler legi t imacy. The E U 
citizen wants to understand the project which is encroaching into their l i fe and they want to 
have a share in it. But the complexi ty o f the E U wh ich appears contrived at t imes as w i t h the 
lack o f real ministerial accountability and comi to logy committees requires that the ci t izen 
leave it to the experts, (Comitology committees were created by the MSs to prevent the 
Commission altering pol icy as it implements it, they supervise the execution o f E U policies. 
The EP is excluded f rom comitology committees where the bulk o f administrat ive decisions 
in the E U are taken and the major i ty o f decisions are administrat ive). Af ter all the ci t izen can-
not hope to understand such complicated matters. But presuming ignorance and therefore l im-
it ing the cit izens' rights to control the organisations wh ich are increasingly cont ro l l ing them is 
just what made the Christian citizen o f the church 'state' f ina l ly rebel and demand that their 
church be made understandable and experts removed f rom their positions o f power. It is quite 
possible to imagine a simpler more accountable fo rm o f E U government and this wou ld be an 
improvement on what is currently in operation. The citizens part icularly in the Nor thern Eu-
ropean states are used to greater transparency than they have w i th the E U and r ight ly suspect 
that the executive arm is benefit ing at the cost o f the parliaments. They are unw i l l i ng to give 
legitimacy to a system which could be improved upon. 
9.10 RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.10.1 CONCLUSION SUMMARY 
Growth in: Policy Network and executive power, E U and Commission fragmentation, lack o f 
effective pol i t ical leadership in d i f f icul t economic periods are reasons enough for a major re-
form. Excessive legislative output and economic costs are seemingly accepted by the MSs and 
Commission as reality and a reason for changing procedures and t ry ing to reduce bureauc-
racy, quite apart f rom public disi l lusionment w i th the European Project. But the l ike l ihood is 
that l itt le w i l l happen. The problem o f accepting responsibi l i ty, that essential o f DP, is lacking 
throughout the EU. MSs blame the Commission as it suits them; the EP at t imes jo ins them; 
the Commission unsurprisingly passes the buck internal ly. Essentially there w i l l be more E U 
activity in all probabi l i ty, and the Commission is needed to play its part in this, but in the cur-
rent form o f E U and Commission, this w i l l lead to major problems as already stated. Both 
must be reformed before they are given greater powers v ia a constitution, but major re form 
seems to be routinely resisted. Rationality is required in the EU , powerfu l groups o f bureau-
crats and diplomats l ike COREPER and areas o f decision mak ing l ike that o f comi to logy must 
be simpl i f ied and brought back under the obvious control o f DP. I f more DP were introduced 
and simpler lines o f responsibil i ty and accountabil i ty were decided on then more cit izens 
might associate democracy w i th the EU. Reform is v i ta l , or rather reorganization b u t . . . . Real 
reform and change s imply rarely i f ever happen, sadly. The Sapir report pressed for changes 
in Structural Funds and CAP in the budget but Commiss ion fa i led to act on it: 
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T h e r e is no question that the E U budget is broken, whether or not member countries manage 
to reach a deal at this week 's summit. There is equally no question that a more rational budget 
wou ld require huge changes in the pattern o f spending and in the sources o f finance. The Sa-
pir report urged radical reform, but true to fo rm the European Commission took the report, 
said thank you, and put it in the back o f the drawer w i t h the best linen, never to be used. Sha-
The inst i tut ional compet i t ion between the Counci l and the Commission has reached a stage 
where it is in danger o f damaging seriously the achievements o f the past; 
'The Member States' assertiveness, their determination to circumscribe the Commission's 
power and impose their control , may hinder the abi l i ty o f the Commission to carry out tasks 
that are crucial to the effect ive funct ioning o f the system as a whole and may ult imately prove 
counter productive to their own interests.'403 
Current ly the lack o f a formal opposit ion in the EU, such as exists constructively in MS par-
l iaments, seems to have some malignant form in Brussels w i t h various institutions openly op-
posing each other,4 0 4Unfortunately, constructive opposit ion on various pol icy issues which is 
the normal parl iamentary approach happens less than opposit ion simply owing to suspicions 
about the other organisation, essentially struggles about pol i t ical leadership. It is unclear 
wh ich inst i tut ion leads, whatever the rhetoric. The more formal institutional dead lock and 
compet i t ion there is, the more real power w i l l continue to seep down into the informal Policy 
Networks , wh i ch wi thout pol i t ical leadership might opt for inertia or more uncoordinated, o-
veral l incoherent act iv i ty . The compet i t ion between Commission and Counci l is not useful 
and damages Europe and legislative consistency. There should be competit ion between one 
set o f pol i t ical masters and the parliament, What is needed is a new system w i th the executive 
under Parl iament, and struggles over pol icy contained in the parliamentary structure. 
Using the immunisat ion analogy, the further the European project enters the host(s) and it be-
comes less economic and more obviously pol i t ical the greater w i l l the DP opposition be. The 
more glar ing w i l l seem the lack o f DP and the wrongness o f an unelected bureaucracy decid-
ing issues so much closer to the average voter. In that sense the vaccine has been quite effec-
t ive, it has reached deeply into the host(s). The pol i t ica l elites wh ich have allowed this situa-
t ion to come about and seem hand in hand w i th it w i l l suffer also. That the voter facing the 
fragmented, complex E U w i th its problematic democratic system, grows more suspicious 
seems not jus t expectable but almost proof o f the correct democratic instinct which is in every 
voter. The more pol i t ical and close to the voter the E U comes, quite r ight ly the more the voter 
should be empowered and have a r ight to decide. Many pol i t ical elites recognise their DP re-
sponsibi l i ty and that this is the next DP stage and that referenda are a must and not a choice, 
and referenda can be convenient too. Few leaders have ever made it clear that they were being 
voted into power to ef fect ively reconstruct their domestic pol i t ica l system in favour o f a Eu-
ropean one. This issue is far too important to be tagged onto the small pr int o f a manifesto and 
then declared to have received a mandate. I t must be overt, clearly labelled and there must be 
a real choice and real opposit ion to ensure real debate. The m ix i ng o f pol icy discussion w i th 
pol i t ical system discussion happens al l too frequently in the E U context, i f for no other reason 
than this is how the E U actually is internal ly. I t is constantly struggl ing to f ind a new balance 
between dissatisfied insti tut ions, s imi lar to the struggles between Popes, Cardinals and Mon-
402 The Economist December 17. 2005 p.36 Charlemagne a modest proposal. 
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archs over institutional competences, rather than discussing the threat o f a reformation. This 
has to be brought to a close; i t is hard for any voter to find any sort o f allegiance to a con-
stantly changing, vague governmental set up. Indeed there cannot but be a suspicion that some 
MS polit icians have wanted to keep it this way. 
Future referenda are l ike ly to remain negative as they have been for much o f the nineties, ini-
t ial ly at least. Demanding re-votes unti l the elites force the answer they want has an undemo-
cratic feel about i t4 0 5which w i l l weaken the voters' attachment to the project further st i l l . In-
deed this not ion about the deluded voter who is incapable o f vo t ing properly and is so easily 
misled is essentially as problematic406and undemocratic. The statement the authorit ies want to 
hear, which is o f course the right one f rom the authorit ies' point o f v iew and the answer they 
knew all along, w i l l be we agree. That the answer w i l l have l i t t le to do w i th truth but rather 
better sell ing techniques or voter apathy is obvious, and the main success is to devalue refer-
enda in general and DP as wel l . From the perspective o f this thesis, the Monnet Me thod has 
reached the end o f its useful l i fe and is opposed by DP f rom the total body pol i t ic o f the hosts, 
their voters in referenda. Final ly the essentially undemocratic reality o f the Monnet legacy E U 
must be transformed into a fundamentally democratic version. To oppose the voters wou ld be 
to let the 'pathogen' take over, f inal ly , and to become a real disease rather than an immunisa-
tion. Somehow it wou ld appear that Monnet wou ld have chosen to side w i t h the voter i f he 
could see the E U currently. The crit ical mass that he appeared to desire has arr ived and chan-
ge is a must. 
9.10.2 CONCLUSION RECOMMENDATIONS 
The EU must be altered and the Commission's posit ion in it. The hostile environment wh i ch 
gave rise to its mu l t i faceted unique organisational structure needs to be formal ly restructured 
to be more in l ine w i th the current needs and reality o f Europe. Some o f the Commiss ion 's 
confusing aspects, wh ich are problematic for i t too, could then be removed. Its r ig id complex 
bureaucracy dating back to the 1950s is an anachronism and serves l i t t le purpose apart f r om 
protection w i th in the cycle discussed. The Commiss ion wou ld be better o f f special izing again, 
dropping pol icy management wh ich it is not good at and also dropping the attempts to control 
policy implementation and simply concentrating on po l icy generation and the th ink tank proc-
esses surrounding it. Thus reform must involve a fundamental rethink o f the project, its goals 
and assumptions and its organisational specializations. 
The Commission vaccine has succeeded in many ways in creating, or provok ing the necessary 
elements for a new European government. European w ide sectoral power natural ly resides in 
the Policy Networks wh ich DGs or elements in the DGs have created or encouraged and at 
times lead. These should be formalised and rationalised; they are, to an extent, the natural go-
vernmental arms issuing from Brussels to the wou ld be federal ly organized states. The prob-
lem is that the Commission lacks the pol i t ical status, authori ty and power to control them, and 
over t ime they have come to over control it. As things stand Pol icy Networks and executive 
power w i l l dominate in the E U and democracy, accountabi l i ty and eff ic iency w i l l suffer. In 
fact Monnet 's ideal Commission is suffocating in its current organisation and the present EU. 
The bureaucratic disease and sectorisation wh ich a f f l i c t the Commission and the E U are the 
result f inal ly o f the Commission's unwil l ingness or rather inabi l i ty to keep to his principles, 
combined w i th the host i l i ty o f DP-MSs. He expected the Commission to have a stronger abi l-
ity to priori t ize; so that as the MSs lost control over their sectors so the Commiss ion should 
have taken over the control. The hosti l i ty between the environment and the Commiss ion 
405 The Economist 27.05,06 p.22-23 
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should end and a synthesis emerge and finally a l low the vaccine to find an organisational 
fo rm that lets it unfo ld and necessarily transform as its R N A are fu l ly integrated into a Euro-
pean governmental layer that compliments much o f its mission and elements. Thus tradit ional 
European-wide DP must be put into force; sectoral bureaucracy left to Policy Networks and a 
Monnet ideal Commiss ion set up to creatively organise, priori t ise and advise an elected Euro-
pean government. Then the ideals o f both DP and the vaccine wou ld be met and the vaccine 
have reached enough o f its goal to cease act ivi ty. 
For the new E U whole areas o f current EU concern should be re nationalised. The CAP and 
CP for example could very easily be removed f rom the E U budget and this money be allo-
cated to research and education for example. Possibly the process o f transferring pol icy areas 
f r o m the intergovernmental second and third pil lars o f the E U construction to the suprana-
t ional first p i l lar should be continued, to see pol icy areas then returned to the MSs once they 
have been suf f ic ient ly mod i f ied or harmonised. Whether foreign pol icy and security issues 
should be decided by the new European government or elements o f them is arguable. That 
said, the process is already underway o f the E U increasing its activities in this area which 
wou ld indicate that MSs are interested in this development and so it w i l l probably continue. I f 
this is the case then l imi ts should be accepted and set consti tut ional ly. 
N o w on to the discussion about the details o f the new E U governmental system. The ideal 
Monnet style Commission has to be created and separated f rom the bureaucracy around it. I t 
can be larger than the smaller number o f of f ic ia ls he wanted as the E U is much larger now but 
it should retain the characteristics o f f lex ib i l i t y , in formal i ty and expertise that he wanted. E -
lements o f the o ld Method could be retained by a pol icy mak ing group but restricted to some 
extent, whi ls t freed up by the removal o f pol i t ical responsibi l i ty and the need to compete wi th 
other institutions jus t because they are opposing institutions. It is t ime to free the staff f rom 
being the much maligned 'mal ignant bureaucrats' to being the dynamic forward looking pol-
icy makers and th ink tank o f the elected European Government. The Commission's staff seem 
to be ideal pol icy makers, most are innovative, h ighly motivated and expert, the whole or-
ganization is geared towards innovat ion, mov ing on, changing views and evolving new pol i -
cies and 'grand vis ions, ' this last point was sometimes a problematic quality in an unelected 
organisation w i t h l imi ted democratic aspects, but indicat ive o f what the Commission excels 
at. The ideal Commiss ion fo rm has tradit ional ly required a dynamic leader and European ide-
o logy .407The only problem was that Commission leaders lacked pol i t ical responsibil ity and 
democratic accountabi l i ty. What is needed is a European Prime Min is ter for the Commission 
to serve l ike Monnet ' s organisation did the French P M . 
I f the basic scient i f ic approach states that the simplest theory is probably the correct one, then 
the same approach should be used when deciding on a system o f government for Europe. The 
simplest structure w o u l d be the one wh ich has proven successful over centuries for Nat ion 
States and that is that there should be some sort o f separation o f powers and competencies and 
a democratic system o f electing pol i t ica l representatives who scrutinise and approve laws and 
choose a government. This executive then sets the pol i t ica l tone for their top c iv i l servants. 
There are o f course a mass o f additions to this but the basic design remains the same. Usually 
the number o f actors and their competences are l ikewise l imi ted and controllable. I t is not too 
d i f f i cu l t to conceive o f a f o rm o f government for Europe, i f one is considered by the elector-
ate to be necessary, w i t h reduced and consti tut ional ly l imi ted competences, where relatively 
407 See note 4 Spence, (1997) p.71. 'This conscious attempt to endow the Commission with a supranational ideology or mis-
sion was confirmed in the establishment of Walter Hallstein's first Commission of the European Economic Community in 
1958, Hallstein was unashamed to include "theory, doctrine, Utopia, forecasts, planning, futurology (and) vision" in his writ-
ings. 
431 
%mpk limitations o f power and lines o f accountability could be set in place. Given that such a 
system is conceivable and that it is simpler by far f rom the current system it would seem clear 
that a false or inadequate system is now in place, Democratic systems o f government where 
power is formally shared and ordered allow for wel l informed decisions to be made, better 
than those in a dictatorship. The latter often have opaque structures wi th a wide range o f ac-
tors competing with each other and often for the ear o f a very few. 
The European government should be constitutionally l imited The sectors and related Policy 
Networks should be placed under elected ministers chosen from and answerable to a much 
strengthened EP from whose number the ministers are chosen The Council would act as a 
second chamber. The staff o f the Commission should be allowed as much freedom to develop 
legislation as they have today, and be quite clearly labelled as policy developers and allowed 
to specialize their skills. But above all they should be above the bureaucratic work that is 
fragmenting the Commission currently, and rather they should be priorit izing it and setting 
broader conceptual frameworks for it in the future. Polit ical leadership would be provided by 
an elected President o f the Europe an government and from the voted-on manifesto would be 
derived the guidelines for the off icials to develop pol icy. Subsequent additions to the mani-
festo arising out o f the policy developer's work and discussions at the grass roots would then 
be put to yearly votes by the EP. The HP must be altered to ensure MEPs have a mandate they 
must defend and that more easily identifiable parties wi th clearer platforms be made. 
Since the absence o f a formal EP or European opposition and opposing views, leaves a rather 
suspect policy debate poverty, as shown in referenda wi th many stating the absence o f an in-
formed balanced debate, ideally parliamentary on both sides. There must be proper opposition 
to the ruling party in the EP and vigorous debates on issues, and not just inst i tu t ions,^and 
along colourftil party lines. Otherwise the debate w i l l continue to be for or against Europe, 
removal o f the whole system or bits o f it. The creation o f a l imited, properly elected govern-
ment in line with DP principles would help remove the DP knee jerk reaction, which is al-
ways to see European issues as alien and not really as valuable or democratic and legitimate 
as the national ones, which leads the discussion in many circles not onto a discussion o f issues 
but rather onto the project itself and whether or not to remove it. As long as it remains a pro-
ject with unclear goals and aims and unfinished then it w i l l be treated as a temporary phe-
nomenon by many wi th unsure DP value and worth and really just wait ing for the moment 
when it can be removed, l ike a healer's leech. It is not unt i l the project becomes a fixed gov-
ernment belonging to the people free from MSs and diplomats making the real decisions and 
is seen to be for the citizen and controlled by them in good old traditional DP manner that 
Monnet's Method can really be said to finally served its purpose and to now be at rest. 
** See rvute Peterson., Bomber^ ( V m ) p 20 
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Dates of Interviews with the SG 
Of f i c ia l 1.20.06.2004 
O f f i c i a l 2. 29.06.2004 
Of f i c ia l 3. 29.06.2004 
APPENDIX 1 
INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY 
The research for the PhD was carried out using a grounded theory approach. That meant that 
after reading the standard theoretical literature and carry ing out some in depth elite interviews 
it quickly became apparent that the facts so accrued required a rather different theoretical 
framework to explain and integrate them into a coherent whole. The other main theories that 
were applicable to the thesis were used where their explanatory power was greatest. 
Wi th regards to the interviews themselves they were conducted on an qualitative elite inter-
view basis w i th only a written transcript taken. Most o f the interviews lasted for we l l over 
three hours and the off ic ials were guided by certain questions but a direct question and answer 
format was not strictly applied. As the literature stresses l istening was o f the upmost impor-
tance. Much o f what was said by off icials was stated by them to be o f f the c u f f and they re-
fused to have their names directly attached to it. In order to corroborate the informat ion pro-
vided by one of f ic ia l other off ic ials were then asked indirect ly for information to conf i rm 
what their colleague had said. Thus i f a footnote indicates that Commission of f ic ia ls said 
something, then what was said, unless otherwise indicated, w i l l broadly have fitted into a pat-
tern indicated by information provided by other interviewees. 
Please note that since the elite interview answer sample sizes were o f necessity relatively l im-
ited, the words 'appeared to be', 'seemed to b e \ 'was alleged that' etc, could have been used 
throughout the text, especially where information gathered f rom interviews was concerned, 
but were not. This was not to indicate certainty but rather for styl istic, 'readabil i ty* reasons. 
Inevitably scientific work o f this nature retains a tentative qual i ty as it is not natural science 
with laboratory techniques to support it. 
To improve the object iv i ty o f the information sti l l further the triangulation pr inciple was ap-
plied. That meant that dif ferent interview methods were used as wel l as different sources o f 
information in order to double check statements made dur ing the interviews. Thus the inter-
views wi th the N M S off ic ials were carried out f o l l ow ing a questionnaire basis although they 
had ample room to extensively answer some questions more than others. In terms o f a variety 
o f sources use was made o f other DGs and agencies and o f course the N M S off ic ia ls to get 
different perspectives and to double check information. These were all able to comment on 
the information provided by one D G whilst ow ing loyal ty to a di f ferent organization. 
Furthermore as much o f the secondary and primary literature available as possible was used to 
back up the f indings f rom the interviews. In particular European Court o f Audi tors; European 
Commission; European Parliament; European Counci l ; U K Parliament documentation pro-
vided useful information along w i th articles and books wr i t ten by academics on the pol icy 
fields l inked to the thesis. The documentation generated by a variety o f European federations 
was also helpful and o f course articles wri t ten in the Economist; European Voice; E U Ac t i v ; 
EU Observer to name but a few. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
A B M Ac t i v i t y Based Management 
GEHOs Central and Eastern European Country applicants to j o i n the E U 
CESDP C o m m o n European Security and Defence Pol icy 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Pol icy 
C I Commun i t y In i t iat ive 
C I E Commit tee o f Independent Experts 
C O R E P E R Commit tee o f Permanent Representatives 
CP Cohesion Pol icy 
CF Cohesion Fund 
C A P Common Agr icu l tura l Pol icy 
C O R Commit tee o f the Regions 
CSFs Commun i t y Support Frameworks 
D G I Directorate General Enlargement 
D G I I I Directorate General Industry 
D G V ( E M P L O ) Directorate General Employment , Industr ial relations, and Social Af fa i rs 
D G V I ( A G R I ) Directorate General Agr icu l ture 
D G X I ( E N V ) Directorate General Envi ronment 
D G X V I (REGIO) Directorate General Regional Policies and Cohesion 
D G X X I I I ( S M E ) Directorate General Enterprise Pol icy, Distr ibut ive Trades, Tourism and 
Cooperatives 
D G ( E N T ) Directorate General Enterprise and Industry 
D G ( S A N C O ) Directorate General for Health and Consumer A f fa i rs 
DP Democrat ic Parl iamentarianism 
E A G G F European Agr icu l tura l Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
E C A European Court o f Audi tors 
ECJ European Court o f Justice 
ECSC European Coal and Steel Commun i t y 
E D C European defence Communi ty 
E D I S Extended Decentral ized Implementat ion System 
E E A European Environment Agency 
E I B European Investment Bank 
E I F European Investment Fund 
E M U European Monetary Un ion 
EP European parl iament 
EPC European pol i t ica l Cooperation 
E P U European Pol i t ica l Un ion 
E R D F European Regional Development Fund 
E R T European Round Table o f Industr ial ists 
ESF European Social Fund 
E T C European Top ic Centre 
E U R A T O M European A tom ic Energy Commun i t y 
E U R E K A European Research Coordinat ion Agency 
E U R O S T A T Statistical O f f i ce o f the European Communi t ies 
G A T T General Agreement on Tar i f fs and Trade 
H D T V H i g h def in i t ion Televis ion 
I A S Internal Aud i t Service 
I G C Intergovernmental Conference 
IMPs Integrated Mediterranean Programs 
ISPA Instrument for Structural Policies fo r Pre-accession 
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JHA Justice and Home Af fa i rs 
L I Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
M A G P Mu l t i Annual Guidance Program 
MEP Member o f the European parl iament 
MS Member State 
OJ Of f ic ia l Journal o f the European Communit ies 
N M S N e w Member State 
PHARE A funding program o f technical assistance for the development o f private 
enterprise and market oriented economies 
Q M V Quali f ied Major i ty Vot ing 
RACE Advanced Communicat ion Technologies for Europe 
SEA Single European Act 
SEM Single European Market 
SMEs Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
SNA Sub-National Authorit ies 
TENs Trans European Networks 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
UNICE Union o f Industrial and Employers Confederations o f Europe 
O M C Open Method o f Coordination 
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SAMENVATTING 
Het onderwerp van de onderhavige dissertatie is de verandering in functie en gedrag van de 
Europese Commissie. Veel literatuur over de Commissie is gericht op de unieke aspecten van 
het integratieproces en de rol van de instell ingen daarin. In deze studie wordt de EC daarente-
gen gezien als een internationale instell ing van een type dat zich ook al eerder heeft voorge-
daan in het middeleeuwse Pausdom, zoals uiteengezet in " E U : Papacy Reïncarnated?", dat 
twee jaar geleden werd gepubliceerd door schri jver dezes. Daarin constateerde h i j een aantal 
parallellen tussen de ontwikkel ing van het middeleeuwse Pausdom en die van de E G K S en de 
EEG. In het bijzonder de periode van de Gregoriaanse hervormingen, die rond 1054 beginnen, 
lieten zien dat Rome en Pausdom gegroeid waren van een bescheiden spiritueel centrum naar 
de politieke krachtcentrale van het Christendom. Het genereerde grote hoeveelheden wetge-
ving om de christeli jke gemeenschap te besturen en met name de economische sectoren waar-
over de kerk controle uitoefende. Wereldse heersers werden in meerdere o f mindere mate aan 
de kerkeli jke jur isdict ie onderworpen. De pol i t ieke ambities van het Pausdom z i jn nooit ver-
vuld en het is nog maar de vraag o f die van de EEG en de E U een beter lot beschoren zul len 
zijn. Maar beide beoogden een integratie van de wereldse machthebbers onder de kerk, res-
pectievelijk een Europese regering. Zowel de organisatorische structuren als de historische 
ontwikkelingen en het ethos vertonen een reeks van geli jkenissen die een innerl i jke relatie 
laten zien. 
In dit proefschrift is onderzocht wat de effecten waren van de in 2004 vol t rokken ui tbreid ing 
van de E U op diverse afdelingen van de Europese Commissie en op de nieuwe lidstaten. De 
verwachting was dat deze uitbreiding de werk ing en spanningen van de formele en informele 
structuren zou blootleggen. 
In dit onderzoek worden veel, zo niet alle conventionele theorieën over Europese integratie, 
zoals het intergouvernementalisme en het neo-functional isme, aanvaard als partieel geldige 
benaderingen. Maar hoe kunnen deze alle tegel i jk ju is t zi jn? Door welk processen wordt inte-
gratie bewerkstell igd? De verschillende integratietheorieën dienen zel f te worden geïntegreerd 
in een overkoepelende theorie. 
Bevorderl i jk voor de ontwikkel ing van zo 'n theorie was de observatie dat de Commissie bi jna 
alle door Mintzberg onderscheiden types van organisaties vertoont en dat deze worden ge-
combineerd op een wi jze die praktisch onmogel i jk l i jk t . D i t verklaart al tot op zekere hoogte 
hoe verschillende integratietheorieën tegel i jkert i jd partieel ju is t konden zi jn, namel i jk afhan-
kel i jk van het soort organisatie dat werd bestudeerd. Maar daarmee was echter nog niet duide-
l i jk wat organisatorische veranderingen veroorzaakt en hoe het veranderingsproces verloopt. 
Het theoretische antwoord dat hier op de gestelde vraag wordt voorgesteld is een vorm van 
functionalisme, waarin processen in de wereld van cellen en organismen als model worden 
gehanteerd. Er is een zekere verwantschap met het neo-functionalisme dat aanvankel i jk één 
van de meest succesvolle theorieën was voor de verklar ing van het Europese integratieproces. 
De oudere functionalistische gedachte die teruggaat tot Herbert Spencer en v ia hem tot de ou-
de Grieken, is in theoretisch opzicht echter veel r i jker dan het specifiek op de toenmalige Eu-
ropese integratie toegesneden neo-functionalisme. Spencers functionalisme had zowel betrek-
king op zowel cellen, organismen als ook mensen en hun sociale betrekkingen. H i j zag evolu-
tionaire druk als drijvende, cyclisch werkende kracht achter sociale verandering. Sociale 
446 
structuren reageren veelal net als organismen op bedreigingen en op pogingen ze te beïnvloe-
den en te veranderen. Let we l , het gaat hier om een model dat nutt ig is b i j wi jze van heuris-
t iek, maar ook niet meer dan dat. 
Zoals een l ichaam ziek kan worden, dat w i l zeggen: kan gaan disfunctioneren, kunnen zich 
ook met ziekte vergel i jkbare processen voordoen op sociaal v lak. Oor log kan bi jvoorbeeld 
worden gezien als een belangri jke vorm van ziekte die het hele sociale l ichaam aantast. Oor-
logen ontstaan ook niet uit het niets. Vaak houden ze verband met storingen in het sociale l i -
chaam die het vatbaar o f kwetsbaar maken voor oor log. Pol i t iek extremisme, ideologisch en 
meestal ondemocratisch, is een voorbeeld van zo 'n storing, een ander voorbeeld is economi-
sche instabil i teit . Beide tegel i jk loopt nogal eens op oor log uit. Nat ional isme en polit ieke ide-
ologieën hebben de negentiende-eeuwse Europese staten een zekere eenheid en stabiliteit ver-
leend, maar in de twint igste eeuw namen beide pathologische vormen aan onder invloed van 
economische instabi l i te i t 
A l s sociale l ichamen " z i e k " kunnen worden, zouden ze ook genezen moeten kunnen worden 
door toediening van de ju is te medici jnen. Een belangri jke tak van de medische wetenschap is 
de immunologie. Een arts zou, de Europese geschiedenis van de eerste helft van de twintigste 
eeuw waarnemend, kunnen denken dat Europa een vaccin nod ig had om toekomstige oorlo-
gen in Europa te vermi jden, een vaccin dat zowel de economische als de polit ieke oorzaken 
van oor log zou wegnemen o f althans voldoende zou verzwakken. Vaccins bestaan meestal uit 
dode virussen die mi lde reacties oproepen die echter l i jken op die welke door levende virus-
sen in veel heft iger mate worden opgeroepen. D ie mi lde reacties z i jn echter voldoende om 
afweerstof fen te doen aanmaken die een vol ledige uitbarst ing van ziekte kunnen verhinderen 
doordat deze al in de k iem word t gesmoord. Een ziek element wordt dus gebruikt om een 
ziekte te genezen. 
In deze studie wordt betoogd dat bureaucratie vaak we in ig functioneel is, met name in eco-
nomisch opzicht, en dat het dan als een ziekteverwekker o f ais een parasiet kan worden be-
schouwd. Soms werk t bureaucratie echter als een middel om oor log te bezweren. Zo kunnen 
veel t rekken van de Europese Commissie als pathologisch worden gezien vanuit functionele 
gezichtspunten zoals geformuleerd door M a x Weber. Funct ional i tei t en disfunctionaliteit z i jn 
echter betrekkel i jke begrippen. De disfunctional i tei t van de Europese bureaucratie is als het 
ware de pri js die betaald wordt voor de rol die deze pathogene structuur heeft vervuld met het 
oog op de pathologie die eerder tot twee desastreuze wereldoor logen aanleiding had gegeven. 
Waarmee natuur l i jk niet gezegd is dat deze bureaucratie ook thans nog deze functie vervult. 
Twee krachten hebben de on tw ikke l ing van de E U beïnvloed. De ene is het pathogene ele-
ment in de Europese Commissie, de zogenaamde "Monne t methode". Deze methode maakt 
gebruik van een bureaucratie met een passende ideologie o m zichzelf , o f althans haar invloed 
ui t te breiden en het pol i t ieke systeem te veranderen waarin het is binnengedrongen. De Mon-
net methode was een doelbewuste bevordering van internationalisering van de ene sector naar 
de andere door de funct ionele relaties tussen sectoren. Het methodische ervan bestond in de 
beperkte, technocratisch fragmenterende benadering van de problemen, zowel in inhoudeli jk 
als in bestuurl i jk opzicht, zoals die z ich telkens voordeden wanneer Europese interventie op 
het ene terrein aanpassingen op andere terreinen wensel i jk leek te maken. De Monnet metho-
de was en is het v l iegwie l van de supranationale integratie in Europa. 
De tweede factor in de evolut ie van de E U was echter het democratisch parlementarisme, de 
tradit ionele, in wezen l iberaal-democratische methode van beslu i tvorming die typerend was 
voor de West-Europese natiestaten. Deze had in continentaal Europa veel krediet verloren in 
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de periode tussen de twee wereldoorlogen. Door de overwinn ing van de Anglosaksische de-
mocratieën op de Nazi-dictatuur met z i jn verkrachting van de voor de democratie typerende 
fundamentele rechten, had de democratie echter weer aanzienl i jk aan krediet gewonnen. Zo-
wel democratie als fundamentele rechten werden dan ook geïnternationaliseerd in verdragen 
en in organisaties als de V N en de Raad van Europa. Democrat ie en mensenrechten kregen 
daarmee de status van waarborgen van niet alleen de vr i jhe id, maar ook van waarborgen tegen 
oorlog, althans in de westerse wereld, die zich bedreigd zag door het communisme, zowel van 
buitenaf door de Sovjet Unie, die praktisch heel Centraal Europa onder controle had, als van 
binnenuit, vanwege de populariteit van communistische parti jen in Frankri jk, Italië en Grie-
kenland. 
Vanwege deze externe en interne communistische dreig ing leken democratie en rechten van 
de mens onvoldoende waarborg om West Europa deel te doen bl i jven van de vr i je wereld, 
maar moest het ook een economische en mi l i ta ire eenheid worden. Di t verklaart waarom het 
de Verenigde Staten waren die in eerste instantie aandrongen op Europese integratie en niet 
de Europese staten die zojuist hun onafhankel i jkheid hadden bevochten (zoals Groot-
Brittannië) o f herkregen (zoals Frankri jk). Pas na het mis lukken van het Franse in i t iat ief tot 
een pol i t iek-mi 1 itaire integratie in de vorm van de Europese Defensie Unie, werd de stap gezet 
naar de EEG c.q. de Monnet methode, waarvan de bruikbaarheid intussen gebleken was in de 
EGKS. 
Democratie was echter vreemd aan de Monnet methode, in principe althans. Democratische 
pol i t ic i figureerden er op z i jn best als makelaars tussen belangengroepen. Veelzeggend in di t 
opzicht is dat Monnet zich had afgewend van de EGKS, omdat h i j teleurgesteld was dat er 
een Assemblee aan was toegevoegd. De technocratisch fragmenterende Monnet methode ver-
langt dat het centrum van pol i t iek macht en in i t ia t ie f in de bureaucratie wordt gepositioneerd. 
Typerend voor de parlementaire democratie z i jn pol i t ieke part i jen met omvattende part i jpro-
gramma's met een ideologische achtergrond waartussen de burgers in periodieke verkiezingen 
kunnen kiezen. Democratische pol i t iek is gericht op samenvoeging en verbinding van kwes-
ties, belangen, groepen en zelfs partijen, in het bi jzonder in pol i t ieke systemen waar regerin-
gen coalities van partijen nodig hebben om de steun van een meerderheid van de volksverte-
genwoordigers achter zich te kri jgen. Parlementaire democratie verstaat z ichzelf als een pol i -
tiek bottom-up model dat tegeli jkert i jd bestuurl i jk een top-down model moet z i jn, omdat de 
regering geacht wordt haar w i l op te leggen aan de bureaucratie die zich daarnaar geacht 
wordt te voegen sine ira et studio. 
In tegenstelling tot het inclusieve, verbindende karkater van de parlementaire democratie is de 
Monnet methode fragmenterend en technocratisch. Pol i t ieke kwesties worden zowel substan-
tieel als bestuurlijk uit elkaar getrokken. Dit is echter niet omdat het bestaan van relaties tus-
sen beleidsproblemen niet worden waargenomen. Integendeel! Juist omdat er functionele rela-
ties zi jn, kan de Monnet methode er voor zorgen dat kwesties van nationaal niveau langzaam 
maar zeker naar het internationale niveau worden geti ld. 
Hoewel de parlementaire democratie dus op gespannen voet staat met de Monnet methode, 
z i jn ze toch samengevoegd in het geval van de EEG en in nog veel sterkere mate in de EU. 
Het probleem van de Monnet methode is dat zi j aan haar eigen succes ten onder dreigt te 
gaan. Naarmate zi j zich in meer sectoren heeft ingenesteld, ontstaan er interne afstemmings-
problemen die niet door een centrale regeringsmacht kunnen worden opgelost op basis van 
een democratisch mandaat. Op zo 'n mandaat kunnen nationale regeringen zich echter we l be-
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roepen om de Commissie desnoods min o f meer lam te leggen o f er, in sectoren van groot na-
t ionaal belang, op hun beurt in te infi l treren. 
Toch is de Monnet methode uiterst succesvol geweest in het overleven in een vi jandige om-
gev ing en in het bereiken van de supranationale doeleinden ervan. Volgens onze analyse is 
dat het gevolg van een ongekend organisatorisch aanpassingsvermogen ervan c.q. van een 
combinat ie van organisatiestructuren die theoretisch gezien onverenigbaar l i jken. De rigide 
formele structuur van de Commissie, die teruggaat tot de jaren v i j f t ig , wordt bijvoorbeeld ge-
bru ik t om de Commissie te beschermen tegen pogingen haar streven naar steeds verdere inte-
gratie onder controle te kr i jgen. De Commissie is er in geslaagd om allerlei beleidskwesties te 
fragmenteren en in te voegen in de nieuwe, Europese bestuurslaag, en daardoor ook de oppo-
sit ie tegen haar voorstel len. Z i j is erin geslaagd om de nodige elementen van een nieuwe Eu-
ropese regering in leven te roepen, zi j het met, waar dat onvermi jde l i jk bleek, democratisch 
pol i t ieke tegenwichten op Europees niveau. Achter de façade van bureaucratische hiërarchie 
opereren echter m in o f meer informele netwerken. De beleidsnetwerken die directoraten-
generaal o f onderdelen ervan hebben ontwikke ld en waaraan ze veelal leiding geven, zi jn als 
het ware de natuur l i jke bestuursarmen vanuit Brussel naar de quasi-federale staten. Daarin is 
sectorgewijs de Europese bestuursmacht geconcentreerd. 
Toch was de fragmentatie binnen de Commissie en in de diverse directoraten-generaal in de 
jaren negentig na de grote stappen die gezet waren naar en door het Verdrag van Maastricht, 
zo toegenomen dat de pol i t ieke leiders van de Commissie de greep op hun staf begonnen te 
verl iezen. De laatste Commissie-Delors liet een organisatie achter die sterk op verdere inte-
gratie gericht was, maar die nu meer te doen had dan zi j aankon en die werd geconfronteerd 
met de ui tvoeringsproblemen van na het Verdrag van Maastricht. Een en ander leidde tot een 
crisis van de Commissie aan het einde van de jaren negentig, zoals geanalyseerd in de rappor-
ten van de Commissie van Onafhankel i jke Deskundigen, ingesteld om deze crisis te bezwe-
ren. De crisis maakte de poging tot bureaucratisering mogel i j k , een poging die bescheiden be-
gon in de commissie-Santer en daarna aan belang won. Het aantal horizontale eenheden, die 
eenheden die ondersteunende en controlerende taken hebben en zich weinig bemoeien met het 
beleid als zodanig, namen enorm toe, net als de bureaucratische procedures waaraan de staf 
werd onderworpen. De reactie in de Commissie is er een geweest van het temperen van haar 
ini t iat ieven enerzijds en zich door bureaucratisering te immuniseren tegen aanvallen en beïn-
v loed ing van buiten. 
Op de langere termi jn gezien vo lg t de Commissie het proces van opeenvolgende tempowisse-
l ingen van de Europese integratie, waarbi j spurts worden afgewisseld door langere perioden 
van stagnatie. De bureaucratisering en tempobeheersing van haar apparaat door de Commissie 
is zo gezien een vo rm van immuniser ing tegen de kr i t iek op de ro l van de Commissie en van 
pogingen van lidstaten tot inf i l t rat ie van de Commissie. In eerdere perioden van stagnatie is 
echter gebleken hoe snel de Commissie kan omschakelen van een tameli jk inert apparaat naar 
een organisatie die gebruik maakt van de wensen van de lidstaten tot verdere integratie. De 
hervormingen l i jken niet meer dan een fase in de cyclus waar in de Commissie zi jn rol varieert 
van die van beleidsmanager naar die van beleidsmaker en van een ambteli jke bureaucratie 
naar die van de top van de uitvoerende macht van een proto-federale staat. 
Hoewe l de Commissie Prodi wat t imide begon, was later een duidel i jke opleving te constate-
ren. De Europese Grondwet is wat dat betreft het beste voorbeeld. De bureaucratisering kan 
ook gezien worden als een poging de Commissie meer te laten functioneren als ware het de 
uitvoerende macht van een staat met de Commissarissen als een soort ministers. Signalen in 
die r icht ing waren de u i tbre id ing van de staf in D G Ondernemingen en Industrie waar de ver-
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ticale eenheden geleideli jk in omvang toenamen. D G Regionaal Beleid was druk bezig een 
nieuw beleid vast te stellen met veel steviger regels dan het tot dan toe gevoerde beleid. Het 
Europese Bureau voor Fraudebestrijding, oorspronkel i jk een veil igheidsgordel om de Com-
missie in het gareel te houden werd gebruikt om de integratie te bevorderen middels een Eu-
ropese Openbare Aanklager werd geschapen alsmede een nieuw jur id isch kader om de act iv i -
teiten van het Bureau voor Fraudebestrijding in te perken. Tenslotte was de leidende rol in de 
klimaatbeheersing die de Commissie voor zich opeiste eveneens een duidel i jk teken van een 
krachtig streven de integratie te bevorderen. Di t werd nog recenteli jk gehonoreerd doordat 
klimaatbeheersing bij de herzieningsbijeenkomst van de Europese Raad van Juni 2007 door 
de lidstaten als doelstell ing in het herziene EU-verdrag werd opgenomen. 
Het nieuwe elan na de intensieve eerdere bureaucratisering mag enigszins paradoxaal voor-
komen, maar het kan, nogal ironisch, mede verklaard worden door de groei van de horizontale 
eenheden. Volgens onze zegslieden z i jn deze namel i jk het meest idealistisch ingesteld ten 
aanzien van de Europese integratie als geheel, in tegenstell ing tot de beleidsvormende eenhe-
den die vr i j snel sectoraal idealisme en sectorale loyal i tei ten schijnen te ontwikkelen. De door 
ons bestudeerde periode volgde in feite het al langer bekende patroon van de Europese inte-
gratie als een "stop and go" vooruitgangsproces. Expansie na stagnatie, een dynamische 
Commissie die dan weer wordt afgeremd door bureaucratisering. De uitbreiding van de E U 
verscherpte daarbij de coördinatie- en beheersproblemen van de Commissie. De ui tbreid ing 
onderging daarvan echter ook negatieve gevolgen, zoals b l i j k t uit onze empirische bevindin-
gen, waarop nu nader zal worden ingegaan. 
In het kader van dit onderzoek z i jn zes EU-organisaties onderzocht met het oog op de effecten 
van de EU-uitbreiding. D i t onderzoek geschiedde op basis van primaire en secundaire litera-
tuur alsmede van gesprekken met EU-beleidsambtenaren in die zes organisaties. De opzet was 
om gegevens te verzamelen uit een brede variatie van organisaties, alsmede één van de Com-
missie onafhankeli jke organisatie, die echter we l al len in staat waren commentaar te leveren 
op eikaars activiteiten. Ook zi jn gesprekken gevoerd met ambtenaren van nieuwe lidstaten 
(NLS) over hun ervaringen in de samenwerking met de Commissie. Bovendien vonden ook 
enkele gesprekken plaats met ambtenaren van het Secretariaat-Generaal van de Commissie 
dat verantwoordeli jk is voor de coördinatie op Commissie-niveau. 
Twee Directoraten-Generaal werden gekozen omdat ze veel geld uitbetalen en veel contact 
onderhouden met de N L S , D G Landbouw en Plattelandsontwikkel ing en D G Regionaal Be-
leid. B i j wi jze van contrast werden ook twee beleidsvormende DGs, D G Mi l ieuzaken en D G 
Onderneming en Industrie gekozen. Ook deze onderhielden veel contact met de N L S . De an-
tifraude organisatie van de Commissie, het Europees Bureau voor Fraudebestrijding is nader 
bekeken in het l icht van de hervormingen van de Commissie, Het Europese M i l i eu Agent-
schap, tenslotte, bood de mogel i jkheid om informatie in te winnen over de rol van D G -
Mil ieuzaken in de uitbreidingsproces, waar het E M A ze l f ook bi j betrokken was. Bovendien 
vertegenwoordigt het één van vele sectorale agentschappen die in de toekomst de Commissie 
zouden kunnen vervangen en daarom op wantrouwen kunnen stuiten in de Commissie. 
Het Europese Bureau voor Fraudebestrijding (EBF) is een onderdeel van de verdedigingsl inie 
van de Commissie, zoals de reactie van laatstgenoemde op het EBF laat zien. De hervorming 
van het toezicht op fraude in de vorm van het EBF werd weliswaar geaccepteerd, maar tege-
l i jkert i jd werd deze hervorming slechts een beperkt effect gegund. Het EBF opereerde meer 
voor de buitenwacht en was niet geheel onafhankel i jk van de Commissie. Ook de onder-
zoeksbevoegdheden van het EBF waren niet eenduidig vastgelegd. De Commissie zorgde er 
voor dat de beschikbare middelen voor het EBF beperkt bleven, hoewel het EBF zeer ruime 
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taken had. Tegel i jker t i jd zag de Commissie in het E B F een mogel i jkheid haar personeel meer 
ambtel i jk te laten funct ioneren en op die manier een einde te maken aan de invloed en de on-
gezonde banden tussen de industrie, lidstaten en ambtenaren van de Commissie. Het EBF was 
nut t ig ter ondersteuning van het streven van de Commissie de bureaucratisering er minder 
problematisch en dreigend te laten uitzien. Het EBF droeg bi j aan de algemene tem po verla-
g ing in de Commissie doordat de staf onderworpen werd aan een toenemend aantal controles 
om EBF-onderzoek te voorkomen. 
De Commissie bleek ook zeer goed in staat de dreiging op termi jn in een voordeel te verande-
ren door het EBF te gebruiken in haar eigen cyclus van bureaucratisering om vervolgens de 
integratiemissie weer op gang te brengen. De EBF-staf die eigenl i jk corruptie en fraude dien-
de te bestri jden, was behulpzaam bi j het op gang brengen van nieuwe ontwikkel ingen als 
E U R O J U S T en de Europese Openbare Aanklager. Het E B F vertoonde net als de Commissie 
en de E U in het algemeen, de neiging aan de N L S eisen te stellen die achterwege hadden kun-
nen b l i jven als de Commissie er ze l f beter aan toe was geweest. Het EBF was de schepping 
van nog een actor ( o f beter: de herui tv inding en versterking van een eerdere actor) in het EU-
systeem, om een probleem op te lossen dat wel l ich t beter had kunnen worden opgelost door 
de organisatie ze l f wat rationeler te laten functioneren. 
Het E M A was een interessant geval omdat het ontwikke l ingen in de EU onthulde en nog eens 
de weerstand van de Commissie l iet zien tegen werke l i jke hervorming en tegen iedere organi-
satie die toe w i l zien op haar handel en wandel. De Commissie reageert volgens zegslieden 
nogal al lergisch op Europese agentschappen onafhankel i jk van hun nut, ook al is dit begrijpe-
l i j k in zoverre de lidstaten althans het E M A als een nut t ig institutioneel tegenwicht zien ten 
opzichte van de Commissie. Het E M A dankt z i jn bestaan aan een doelbewuste poging van de 
lidstaten om in samenwerking met belangengroepen weer meer greep te kr i jgen op het terrein 
van het mi l ieubeleid. Eerder was dat ook al het geval geweest in de EGKS, waar de staalkar-
tels en de lidstaten met elkaar verbonden waren. Het E M A is symptomatisch voor de meer 
algemene sectorale spl i ts ing van EU-beleidsvelden, net als de andere agentschappen en daar-
mee verbonden netwerken, waarbi j de r ival i tei t van de lidstaten met de Commissie resulteert 
in telkens nieuwe actoren met door compromissen verzwakte bevoegdheden die niet effect ief 
worden gecoördineerd door enige centrale autoriteit. Het E M A stond erg krit isch tegenover 
het D G en z i jn act ivi tei ten in het kader van de u i tbre id ing van de EU. Met name was er kr i t iek 
op het onvermogen van de Commissie om voor interne coördinatie te zorgen, waardoor de 
N L S gedwongen werden om hun schaarse middelen aan te wenden om elkaar duplicerende 
netwerken in het leven te roepen. Een bi jzonder interessant gegeven was de veranderende re-
latie tussen het E M A en D G Mi l ieuzaken ( D G - M ) . Toen het D G zeer actief was en veel inter-
ne conf l ic ten kende, was het conf l ic t met de E M A op z i jn hev igs t D i t veranderde met de her-
oriëntatie van het D G via personeelsreorganisaties op verschil lende niveaus, waardoor het D G 
meer open kwam te staan voor economische belangen. Het E M A leek daardoor soms bi jna 
een alternatief voor D G - M , moderner en minder formeel en met veel meer partnerachtige re-
laties ten opzichte van de lidstaten dan het DG. 
D G - M bood ook een goede b l i k op het soort ambtel i jk gedrag dat de Commissie bevordert 
ten einde haar macht te doen groeien als de t i jd er r i jp voor is. Het microniveau van de be-
leidsambtenaren vertoont ondernemerskwali teiten die boven in de hiërarchie l i jken te ontbre-
ken. Daarbi j l i j k t de hiërarchie veel minder streng als gelet word t op hoe de Commissie in de 
prakt i jk werkt en wat voor gedrag het st i lzwi jgend aanmoedigt. Een rigide bureaucratie wordt 
gehandhaafd, maar ook losgelaten in een bepaalde fase van de beleidscyclus van de EU. De 
Commissie moedigt ambtel i jke zelfstandigheid en eigen in i t ia t ie f aan, omdat het succes van 
de Commissie veelal wezenl i jk afhankel i jk is van stafleden en hun doorzettingsvermogen. Ze 
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beschikken over een enorme vr i jheid en discretie in verge l i jk ing tot de ambtenaren van de l id-
staten. Ze zi jn bi j uitstek netwerkers met de daartoe vereiste sociale vaardigheden. Onderne-
mingszin is ook vereist om op het juiste moment een regel ing voor te stellen die er door komt. 
Commissie-ambtenaren worden aangemoedigd te concurreren om alles in de Commissie, in-
clusief hun aanstelling, hun dossiers en hun promotie. Mogel i jkheden tot promotie z i jn zeer 
beperkt, in het bi jzonder als het gaat om de benoeming tot afdelingshoofd. DGs die beschik-
ken over zulke ambtenaren met frontervaring, hebben een kostbaar bezit in huis. M i t s op de 
juiste plaats ingezet, z i jn zij bepalend voor het succes van hun DG. De grote hoeveelheid mi -
lieuwetgeving die D G - M heeft weten af te leveren, was het product van buitengewoon capa-
bele ambtenaren, veelal juristen. Het D G schiep werk voor z ichzel f en herbergde dynamische 
ambtenaren die werden aangemoedigd de hiërarchie te omzei len zolang de Commissie als ge-
heel dat wenseli jk achtte. Later gebruikte de Commissie echter diverse methoden om dit soort 
gedrag althans gedeelteli jk onder controle te kr i jgen. 
D i t gold in het bijzonder voor één netwerk dat met hand en tand vasthield aan de oude cultuur 
en ideologie van het DG-M. D i t netwerk bleef t rouw aan een zeer idealistische vo rm van Eu-
ropeanisme en mil ieubescherming. De lidstaten oefenden echter druk uit om het DG onder 
controle te kr i jgen toen een meer economisch georiënteerde Commissie aantrad die bereid 
was om via personeelsreorganisaties de beleidsnetwerken van het D G - M te verzwakken en af 
te breken. Door bureaucratisering werd de productie van regelgeving sterk verminderd en wel 
in zo'n mate dat het imago van het DG onduidel i jk is geworden. Bovendien werd D G M i l i e u 
scherp gecontroleerd vanuit D G Ondernemingen en Industrie. 
Fragmentatie en r ival i tei t tussen DGs bleek ook in het geval van D G Landbouw en Platte-
landsontwikkeling (DG-L&P) . Ook daar bestond veel r ival i te i t met andere DGs alsmede een 
grote mate van fragmentatie. Ook bleek er een groeiende bereidheid van de lidstaten o m te 
interveniëren in het D G , onder andere door er landgenoten in te doen benoemen die ook dui-
deli jk bereid z i jn op te komen voor nationale belangen. Volgens de literatuur is er een proces 
van renationalisering van landbouwbeleid gaande. Het zaï niet verbazen dat daartegen weer-
stand ontstond in het DG, maar de bureaucratisering is sterk toegenomen en de beleidsnet-
werken kunnen daardoor niet meer zo effect ief functioneren. Als gevolg van deze verwikke-
lingen kwamen de N L S niet goed aan de bak in D G - L & P . 
Complexe en excessieve bureaucratische eisen hebben geresulteerd in zeer beperkte financiële 
overdrachten voor de landbouw in de N L S in de relevante periode. Ook confl icten binnen het 
D G - L & P als gevolg van verschillen in nationale managementsti j len werden gesignaleerd. De 
bureaucratisering is gepaard gegaan met een toenemende macht van de horizontale eenheden. 
Personeelsreorganisatie werd gebruikt als een manier om verzet tegen hervorming van beleid 
te breken. Volgens zegslieden in de Commissie werd er vanuit de markteenheden act ief weer-
stand geboden tegen hervormingen en organisaties. Volgens hen was het D G zeer veerkrach-
t ig en succesvol gebleken in z i jn streven pogingen tot hervorming en reorganisatie te weer-
staan. 
D G Regionaal Beleid (DG_RB) heeft tot voor kort ook ingeboet aan beleidsvri jheid en is 
meer en meer een controlerende organisatie geworden. Horizontale afdelingen z i jn toegeno-
men met het oog op de interne coördinatie met name tijdens de hervorming, net zoals in de 
meeste andere DG's . Het D G ontbeerde een kracht ig centraal gezag, waardoor de afdel ingsdi-
recteuren zeer autonoom waren. Ook hier bestond een tendens van de lidstaten om "e igen 
mensen" benoemd te kri jgen. Net als in andere D G ' s z i jn de hervormingen enigszins ave-
rechts gaan werken en uitgemond in bureaucratie als een zelfstandig doel. Volgens zegslieden 
was DG-RB verwikkeld geweest in ongeloof l i jke r ival i tei ten met andere DGs en we l vanwege 
452 
diepgaande, deels ideologische verschi l len van mening over het te volgen beleid. Aan beleids-
en andere netwerken had ook dit D G geen gebrek. Sommige daarvan stonden bepaald niet 
we lw i l l end tegenover de ui tbreiding van de EU, hetgeen soms resulteerde in beleid dat pro-
blematisch was voor de N L S en hun het gevoel gaf niet erg we lkom te zi jn in de EU. Ver-
scheidene afdelingen binnen het D G - R B onthielden zich van bemoeienis met de NLS , terwi j l 
dat we l degeli jk tot hun taak behoorde. In 2004 is daar echter v ia reorganisatie van het D G 
verandering in gekomen. 
B i j D G Ondernemingen en Industrie spraken zegslieden over de communicatie tussen de DGs 
als slecht o f non-existent. Ook hier was sprake van toenemende bemoeienis van de Lidstaten 
met het DG, een enorme ui tbreid ing van de horizontale afdelingen en bureaucratische proce-
dures. Er waren minstens twee grotere reorganisaties nodig om het D G in l i jn met de Lissabon 
doelstel l ingen te brengen en om de nieuwe Commissaris voor Mededingingsbeleid in te pas-
sen. Volgens zegslieden werkten veel hervormingen negatief uit op de N L S simpelweg omdat 
er niet genoeg t i j d overbleef voor met name de afdel ingshoofden om zich van alle taken tege-
l i j ker t i jd te kwi j ten. NLS-ambtenaren klaagden dat hun tegenstri jdige mededelingen werden 
gedaan en dat de procedurele bureaucratie vertwee- o f dr ievoudigd was. De communicatie en 
coördinat ie tussen de DGs werd bekritiseerd. DGs hadden teveel discretionaire macht waaruit 
"v reemde" besluiten resulteerden. Vroeger zou het D G de nodige beleidsnetwerken hebben 
gekend, maar de meer ingri jpende organisaties hadden de invloed ervan verminderd. 
De belangri jkste fenomenen die werden aangetroffen in de Commissie komen neer op: frag-
mentatie van de Commissie, de groei van beleidsnetwerken waarvan de invloed echter minder 
werd als gevolg van personeelsreorganisaties en bureaucratisering en meer beïnvloeding van 
de DGs vanuit de lidstaten. Val t er iets te zeggen over de toekomst van de EU? Het middel-
eeuwse pausdom heeft zich op een w i j ze ontwikke ld die erg l i j k t op de ontwikkel ing van de 
E U . Het functioneerde net als de Commissie als een vaccin tegen oorlogszucht en ver-
scheurdheid. Er on tw ikke lde zich destijds ook een supranationale bestuurslaag die beoogde 
het staatsgezag van de Romeinse keizert i jd te imiteren. In de loop van de t i jd bleek het echter 
niet het ju is te antwoord op de noden en behoeften van het Christendom. Wat begon als een 
idealistische organisatie werd geleidel i jk aan een gecentraliseerde en centraliserende bureau-
cratie. A ls gevolg daarvan zag de middeleeuwse kerk z ichzel f en het Christendom hopeloos 
complex en gefragmenteerd raken, maar ook overgecentraliseerd en op grote afstand van de 
gelovigen. De hoeveelheid canonieke en wereldse wetgeving werd als verstikkend ervaren. 
De Cur ia raakte soms gefragmenteerd in netwerken van cl iënten waarin wereldse heersers een 
grote ro l speelden. Kardinalen waren meer gericht op hun regionale achterband dan op de 
V universele, o f f ic ië le doeleinden van het Pausdom. Het Conci l iar isme van de 15 eeuw was een 
\dappere poging het uiteenvallen van de kerk van onderen ui t een halt toe te roepen. De reactie 
v an de kerkbureaucratie was echter de democratie de kop in te drukken en de noodzaak van 
h e r v o r m i n g te miskennen door de hiërarchie en de bureaucratie ju is t te versterken. Het resul-
taa t daarvan was dat de kerk fundamenteel gespleten raakte door de reformatie. 
i 
So/mmige van deze trends z i jn waarneembaar in de meer recente geschiedenis van de EU zo-
afó boven weergegeven en zouden kunnen dienen als waarschuwing en als aansporing voor 
j 
he rvo rm ing en meer democratie. De recente herstart van de verworpen Europese Grondwet in 
de vo rm van een herziening van de Verdragen die de nationale bestuurders zal toestaan om de 
visies van burgers te omzei len en net te doen alsof ze er niet bestaan, zal wie leest over het 
middeleeuwse Europa heel bekend voorkomen. De betrekkingen tussen de kerkel i jke en we-
reldse bestuurders waren ongezond nauw en dat was met name het geval toen de reformatie in 
aantocht was. Het ju is te antwoord zou z i jn om de waarschuwingen ter harte te nemen en E U 
te hervormen en met het oog op de toekomst meer democratisch toegankeli jk te maken. De 
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gele en rode kaartprocedures zullen mogel i jk we l de betrokkenheid van de nationale parle-
menten bij de E U doen toenemen en hier en daar schendingen van het subsidiariteits- en pro-
portionaliteitsbeginsel weten in te dammen. Het is echter zeer de vraag o f dit ook zal leiden 
tot een grotere betrokkenheid van de EU-burgers, ook al wordt de macht van het EP parallel 
met de supranationale bevoegdheden van de Raad uitgebreid. D i t vereist een directe democra-
tische legitimatie van een Europese regering en niet slechts de stoplappen van een gele o f rode 
kaart procedure. 
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